




3 1761 04791300 9



Univ Coll.
1885.

HUNC LIBRUM

CUM ALIIS

COLLEGIO JUVENTUTIS SUAE ET JUVENTUTI COLLEGII

DONO LEGAVIT

ALFREDUS GULIELMUS STRATTON, M.A., Ph.D.

HUJUS UNIVERSITATIS ET COLLEGII

IN LITTERIS GRAECIS ET LATINIS OLIM ALUMNUS,

UNIVERSITATIS JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOLARIS ET SOCIUS,

UNIVERSITATIS CHICAGO PRAELECTOR,

UNIVERSITATIS LAHORE APUD INDOS

LINGUAE SANSKRITICAE PROFESSOR ET REGISTRARIUS:

ANTE DIEM OBIIT FEBRI MELITENSI IN MONTIBUS KASHMIR

AUGUSTO MENSE A.D. 1902 TRIGINTA SEX ANNOS NATUS.

“Dulces exuviae dum fata deusque sinebant.”

“Respiciebat nos antiquo flumine Gangi transito:
respexit, flumen majus magisque antiquum transiturus.”

“After life's fitful fever he sleeps well.”



ARISTOTELIS
ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

DEPARTMENTA
LIBRARY

RECOGNOVIT

FRANCISCUS SUSEMIHL.



1818 60.
4.7.23.

LIPSIAE
IN AEDIBUS B. G. TEUBNERI.

MDCCCLXXX.

HERMANNO RASSOVIO

ET

CAROLO THUROTO

D. D. D.

EDITOR.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

Plan of Book I.

- (1) The statement of the leading question of political science - what is the Practical Chief Good? (1-4)
- (2) The answer to this question as given by Aristotle himself (7)
- (3) A comparison of Aristotle's definition of the Chief Good with existing opinions on the subject (8-12)
- (4) A commencement of the analysis of the different elements which constitute his definition (13)

These divisions however are not precisely separated from one another. For the first part professes to examine the most important opinions on the subject of happiness or the chief good, and accordingly reviews men's conceptions of it as exhibited in their lives and refutes Plato's theory that the chief good is a transcendental idea on the ground of its being both metaphysically untenable and practically inapplicable. Yet after developing his own conception he returns to compare it with τὰ νοεῖα - 'that goods of the mind are highest,' 'that happiness consists in virtue' &c.

36. Aristotle pursued his usual method. He would have precluded his Ethics with a brief, critical history of the previous progress of the science, in which the leading systems must have been refuted or shown to be inadequate. But it seems as if he did not set out with so clear a conception of Ethics as he does of physics and metaphysics. Before Aristotle ethics cannot be said to have existed as a separate science. Even in the present work there is no name for it as yet.

Hence we may recognize something tentative and uncertain in Aristotle's treatment of the subject. He seems not clear as to how far he is entering on a merely practical and political science, and how far something speculative. He professes to lay the foundations for his science inductively in experience, but really obtains his theory from a priori considerations. The chief good must

the distinction between means and ends characterizes every part of life and action. Given the subordination of means to ends, there must be some end which is never a means. This end-in-itself of all action is obviously identical with the practical chief good. What then is this chief good which must be the determinator of life, and what is the object of politics?

To this question no answer is to be obtained from the common opinions of men, nor from their lives for the most part, nor from the metaphysical system of Plato.

The chief good is identical with the end-in-itself. In this conception the idea of absoluteness and all-sufficiency would seem to be implied. It must be realized in the proper sphere of man, which we see must be a rational and moral existence. To give meaning to the conception of this existence we must assume that it is 'conscious life', and this must be in accordance with its own proper law of excellence and not frustrated by external adversity and we must also have a long enough time to judge of the life.

Hence the chief good for man consists in a rightly harmonized consciousness in adequate external conditions.

We find that this fundamental principle (ἀρχή) includes or supersedes the opinions and theories of others. From it we get an answer to the question "Is happiness to be acquired by human efforts?" and by means of it we are able to see the shallowness of saying "No man can be called happy while he lives". It at once renders nugatory the question "Is happiness praiseworthy or above praise?"

Examining this definition, what is that law of excellence (peculiar to man) which is to regulate his mind. Man is a compound of a rational and an irrational nature. Part of his irrational nature (the passions) rise into communication with reason. This part, then, and the reason itself are the two elements in which human excellence may be exhibited. The

Ad verba Ethicorum Nicomacheorum constituenda praeter codices quattuor, quorum consensum Π signo notavi, a Bekkero per totum opus collatos $K^b L^b M^b O^b$ ubique adhibui editionem principem Aldinam (Ald.) et vetustam translationem (Γ), qualis impressa est ex secunda recognitione anno fere MDIV vel MDV hoc titulo inscripta: Decem librorum moralium Aristotelis tres conversiones: prima Argyropili Byzantii, secunda Leonardi Aretini, tertia vero antiqua etc.*), plerumque etiam Aretini translationem (Ar.) secundum eandem editionem. Qui ubi scripturam vertit, quam ego recepi, ut in editione mea critica Politicorum ita hic quoque saepius ad hoc indicandum variis lectionibus ex alio fontium genere deductis hoc signum † adieci. Praeterea lectiones, quas Heliodorus Prusensis (Hel.) in paraphrasi anno fere MCCCCLXVII facta, a Daniele Heinsio annis MDCVII et MDCXVII Lugduni Batavorum edita et commentatores a Paulo Manutio Venetiis MDXXXVI hoc titulo: Eustratii et aliorum insignium peripateticorum commentaria in libros decem Aristotelis de moribus ad Nicomachum in lucem protracti, de quibus nostra aetate primus egit Schleiermacher Ueber die griechischen Scholien zur

*) Praesto mihi erant etiam variae lectiones, quas e codice manu scripto Pfitzneri syndici Schweidnitiensis olim duos libros priores, nunc praeter secundum has tantum primi partes 1095b, 17 — 1100b, 20. 1102b, 3 — 1103a, 10 continente, et per has quidem partes et per 1105a, 17 — 1106b, 5 sibi enotavit Mauritius Schmidtus comiterque in meum mihi usum permisit. Quas, ubi ab impresso recedunt, Γ^1 nota insignivi.

Nikom. Eth., in Comm. hist.-phil. acad. Berol. 1816—1817, Berol. MDCCCXIX. p. 263 sqq., in exemplis suis aut invenerunt aut videntur certe invenisse, eruere conatus sum omnes. Et sunt quidem tum nomina tum tempora eorum, qui commentarios scripserunt in libros secundum, tertium, quartum, septimum, prorsus ignota (An.), nisi quod is, qui septimum illustrare studuit, neque post medium saeculum XIII^{um} neque, ut videtur, multo antea vixit: octavi commentator est Aspasius (Asp.) haud ignobilis saeculi IIⁱ ineuntis peripateticus, primi et sexti Eustratius (Eu.), qui saeculo XII^o archiepiscopi Nicaeensis munere functus est, quinti, noni, decimi Michael Ephesius (Mi.). Futuro autem editori perlustranda praeterea erunt commentarii in primum, secundum, tertium, quartum, septimum Aspasi, in quintum anonymi scholiaque uberiora in L^b aliisque codicibus adscripta, quae omnia adhuc iacent inedita. Accuratiora qui de his rebus et de origine vetustae translationis doceri volunt, eos ad Krischii recensionem editionis Micheletianae (Jenaische allgem. Literatur-Zeitung 1835. II. p. 385 sqq.) et inprimis ad Rosii commentationem (Ueber die griechischen Commentare zur Ethik des Aristoteles, in Herm. V. 1871. p. 61 sqq. cf. p. 354 sqq.) remitto. Singulis tantum locis alios quoque codices H^a N^b P^b O^{1.2.3.} P^{1.2.} Q Parisinum 1417 Tubingensem respexi. Bekkerianos sex H^a K^b L^b M^b N^b O^b accuratissime descripsi in commentariolo „Die Bekkerschen handschriften der Nikomachischen Ethik“ Annal. philol. CXVII. 1878. p. 625 sqq. inserto: antiquissimum et optimum K^b postquam cum pulvisculo denuo excussit Rud. Schoellius, graviora, quae protulit nova haec collatio, Rassovius in libro egregio „Forschungen über die Nikom. Ethik, Vimar. MDCCCLXXIV“, omnia admixtis nonnullis lectionibus, quas ex L^b codice benigne mecum communicaverunt Grauxius et Omontus, e

have thus intellectual excellence on the one hand
and on the other moral excellence or virtue.

Plan of Book II

- (1) A preliminary discussion on the formation of moral states (1-4)
- (2) The formal definition of virtue according to its genus and differentia (5-6)
- (3) The exhibition of this theory in a list of the separate virtues (7)
- (4) The relation of extremes, or vices, to each other, and to the mean, or virtue (8)
- (5) Rules of action with a view to attaining the mean (9)

The second book of the Ethics goes far to determine the course of the entire succeeding work, by laying down a programme of the separate moral virtues, afterwards followed in Books III and IV: and by suggesting for future consideration the conceptions of $\sigma\phi\delta\varsigma$ $\delta\acute{o}\chi\omicron\varsigma$ and $\pi\rho\omicron\alpha\iota$ etc. But it cannot be said that this book itself exhibits traces of preconceived arrangement. On the contrary, it has the same tentative character as Book I. Its parts are confused with each other and seem to grow up as the book proceeds.

The first four chapters implicitly correlate the whole of the definition of virtue formally drawn out in Chapters V and VI, and though the reservation of $\sigma\phi\delta\varsigma$ $\delta\acute{o}\chi\omicron\varsigma$ for formal analysis really afterwards gives rise to Book VI and the account of intellectual (virtue) $\xi\pi\epsilon\tau\eta$: yet here $\sigma\phi\delta\varsigma$ $\delta\acute{o}\chi\omicron\varsigma$ is by no means identified with intellectual $\xi\pi\epsilon\tau\eta$, and the whole conception of ~~Aristotle's~~ Book VI seems to belong to a later development of Aristotle.

...dication established by Aristotle in the dis-
cussion of his theory of virtue must be
noticed. The nature of this theory can only be
associated by a comparison with the re-
sults which had been previously arrived
at, as they inhibit themselves in the so.

Plan of Book III.

It has already been assumed without proof
that virtue implies purpose (II. 4. 3: 5. 4:
6. 15) and therefore of course will and freedom.
Aristotle now enters upon an examination
of this general conception 'the voluntary' with
a view chiefly to comprehending the special
for purpose.

It has been concluded from the entire separa-
tion of the first five chapters of the book
from both the preceding and following parts
that it was written as a separate treatise: parts
of these chapters do not agree with the psycho-
logy of Books VI and VII and parts of them are
unnecessarily repeated in Book V (still these
only point to Books V - VII having been writ-
ten later), and in Ch. v. there is an apparent ig-
noring of the whole discussion upon moral
states which is in the beginning of Book II,
and no allusion occurs to the mean or happi-
ness. But on the other hand this exclusion
is not unnatural, and the passage is worked
into the general treatise very skilfully.

They are as follows:

- (1) The general definition of the voluntary (1)
- (2) The special account of purpose, that it is dis-
tinct from desire wish opinion: its relation
to the process of deliberation (2-3)
- (3) Consideration of the question whether wish is
for the absolute or the apparent good (4)
- (4) An attack upon the position that while
virtue is free, vice is involuntary (5).

Then follows the discussion upon the virtues
according to the list in Bk II. VII.

- (1) Courage - its proper objects (6). That it is a

ceteris ipse enotavi, ego in calce editionis Ramsauerianae divulgavimus: varias denique lectiones, quas in editione principe et in vetusta translatione inveni, in duabus dissertationibus „de recognoscendis Ethicis Nicomacheis, Berol. (Gryph.) MDCCCLXXVIII et MDCCCLXXIX“ collegi, paucaeque, quae ibi neglexi vel falso rettuli, in hac editione correxi. De Q^MP^{1.2.} codicibus in Prolegomenis editionis meae Politicorum criticae uberrime egi: ceterum quas e P¹ attuli lectiones Micheletianae, quas ex O^{1.2.3.} Wilkinsonianae, quas e Par. 1417 Zellianae editioni, quas e P^b per quintum librum optimae eiusdem recensio ab Iacksone paratae, per decimum Wilamowitzi collegae coniunctissimi collationi, quas e Q praeter paucas a me ipso exscriptas eidem Iacksoni, qui per quintum librum etiam H^aL^bM^bN^bO^b codices denuo excussit, quas e Tubingensi Flachii commentariolo „Ein codex Tubingensis des Aristoteles“ (in Annal. philol. CXIII. 1876. p. 733 sq.) debeo, contra P² librum (qui est apud Bekkerum I^b) per initium operis partim ipse comparavi, partim in usum meum perlustravit Guttmannus. Et est hic codex exaratus saeculo XIV^o exeunte, H^a saeculo fere XIV^o, L^b XII^o, M^b ineunte XV^o, N^b fere XIII^o, O^b XIV^o, Q XV^o, P^b XIV^o*), Par. 1417 XV^o vel XVI^o, P¹ a Demetrio Chalcondyla exeunte XV^o scriptus. K^b autem saeculi Xⁱ fetus praeter ipsum librum (corr.¹) duos invenit eodem saeculo correctores (corr.^{2.3.}) tertiumque eodem exeunte vel ineunte XI^o (rc.).

Optime secundum codices suos Ethica Nicomachea, si quid aliud Aristotelis opus, recensuit Bekker: quae recognitione egent maximam partem congegit Rassovius.

*) Antiquiorem esse hunc codicem putat Iackson, quippe qui O³ librum, qui exaratus est anno MCCLXXIX, ex eo descriptum esse demonstrare conatus sit in commentariolo „On a MS. of the Nicomachean Ethics“, Journ. of Philol. VI. 1867 p. 208 sqq.

Diversam codicum illorum auctoritatem determinare mutamque eorum rationem enucleare primus, sed frustra conatus est Krischius, veriora vidit Bonitzius (Aristot. Stud. II. III. 1863. p. 8 = Comm. Acad. Vindob. XLI. p. 384), perfecit rem Rassovius. Et hic quidem nos docuit duas olim fuisse codicum familias Π^1 et Π^2 , quarum discriminis vestigia nobis quoque ita esse per complures libros servata, ut codicum duorum antiquissimorum et optimorum K^b et L^b alter huius, alter illius familiae agmen ducat, e duobus vero iunioribus per alios libros M^b cum K^b et O^b cum L^b , per alios O^b cum K^b et M^b cum L^b plerumque consentiat. Quae ut possem hic illic amplificare collatis editione Aldina et vetusta translatione mihi contigit. Constat enim altera familia (Π^1) per libros I. II. VI. VII. IX. X. ex K^b et M^b , per libros III. IV. VIII. ex K^b et O^b , altera (Π^2), per I. II. VI. VII. IX. ex L^b et O^b , per III. IV. ex L^b et M^b , per VIII. ex ΓM^b Ald., per X. ex ΓL^b Ald., in libro autem V. modo ab altera parte $K^b L^b$ (Π^1) et ab altera $M^b O^b$ (Π^2) modo ab altera $K^b O^b$ (Π^a) et ab altera $L^b M^b$ (Π^b) stare videntur. Π^1 recensio plerumque nonnihil melior est, quamquam in primo libro praestat Π^2 : quapropter ubi aequae defendi potest utriusque lectio, illam semper fere praetuli. Saepissime autem K^b solus verum offert, multo rarius solus L^b nec saepius quam unus M^b : cum tamen inter peculiare M^b codicis lectiones haud paucae sint sine dubio e mera coniectura modo falsa modo recta haustae, summa in eo adhibendo cautione opus neque Bekker ubique satis ea usus est. Etiam minor eorum locorum est numerus, quibus ex solius vel Aldinae vel vetustae translationis vel O^b codicis auctoritate verba constituenda sint. Ubi vero sex illi fontes nos deserunt omnes, admodum raro ceteri auxilium ferunt, ut, licet in universum haud male nobis traditum sit hoc opus Aristoteleum, saepius tamen confugere cogamur ad

mean (7): that it is from five spurious kinds of courage (8): that it is peculiarly related to pain, and implies great sacrifices for the sake of what is noble (9). (2) Temperance - its objects and nature (10-11). The book ends with some remarks on intemperance, that it is more voluntary than cowardice, and that its character is shown in its etymology.

Plan of Book IV.

With only two exceptions the list of virtues is faithfully followed. These exceptions are - (1) that it inverts the order of the social virtues - Truth, Wit (Geniality) and Friendship: and (2) that, being at its close fragmentary and mutilated, it omits to discuss indignation, and breaks off in the middle of a discussion upon Modesty.

As to the order of treatment, he seems to have taken up first the most prominent and striking qualities according to the common notions in Greece - Courage, Temperance and Liberality. Liberality suggested to him Magnificence - Magnificence, High-mindedness: and from this he proceeded to distinguish the more ordinary quality of Ambition. He then added what has hitherto been omitted, the virtue of regulation of the temper: and pointed out that in social intercourse three excellent qualities are produced by bringing the demeanour under the control of the law of balance. Even in the instinctive and untrained feelings of modesty and Indignation, this same law exhibits itself

whether owing to mutilation or to original incompleteness, the MS. of Bk IV. seems to have broken off in the middle of a subject. Accordingly the editor has introduced three whole books, which

though differing a close resemblance to the style of Aristotle and probably conveying with only slight modifications, his actual system, yet belonging to the Ethics of Eudemus, and thus have only an imperfect coherence with the present work.

Plan of Books VIII-IX.

Aristotle's treatise on friendship contained in these two books is quite continuous, and the division is merely artificial. It has a close connection with the first three books of the Ethics to which it also bears a strong resemblance; but the treatment of similar subjects in Books V-VII is not consistent, while the style is very unlike.

The treatise may be divided into three parts:—

- (1) On the different kinds of friendship and on the nature of the highest and truest type (VIII. 1-8)
- (2) On the connection of friendship with justice,
 - (a) as arising with certain exceptions out of political relationships, or coinciding with them,
 - (b) as implying obligations to be repaid (VIII. 9-IX. 3).
- (3) On other questions connected with the nature of friendship, and especially on its relation to happiness. (IX. 4-12).

Though the treatise is continuous, yet it is easy to see that the writer's views became deeper and more definite as he advanced. By analysis of the objects of liking he clears away all the former vagueness attached to the nature of friendship. And by an application of his own philosophical form *ἐρέτυλ* he obtains a profound theory of the operation of the highest kind of friendship in relation to human happiness. His whole treatment of the question is

virorum doctorum coniecturas. Inter quos primum locum facile tenet Rassovius vir mihi amicissimus, qui nisi oculorum infirmitate et negotiorum multitudine impeditus esset, quominus ipse *Ethica Nicomachea* ederet, vix ego hoc munus suscepissem. Sed iam ante eum multi paucique etiam post eum in textu operis emendando alii non sine magno successu alii minus feliciter laboraverunt. Nolo in eis solis afferendis acquiescere: immo quae nostra aetate prodierunt editiones, translationes, dissertationes selectis priorum temporum praemissis fere omnes in conspectu hoc loco ponam.

Mitto operum Aristoteleorum editiones tres Basi-
leenses (Bas.^{1.2.3.}) Aldinam proxime secutas: breviter no-
mino a Sylburgio et Casaubono paratas. *Ethica Nico-*
machea ediderunt Victorius Flor. MDXLVII et MDLXXXIV,
Turnebus Par. MDLIV et MDLV, Morelius Par. MDLX,
Zwinger Bas. MDLXVI et MDLXXXII, Bergius Francof.
a. M. MDXCI et MDXCVI, Wilkinson Oxon. MDCCXVI,
Zellius Heidelb. MDCCCXX, Coraes Par. MDCCCXXIII,
Cardwellus Oxon. MDCCCXXVIII — MDCCCXXX, qui pri-
mus K^b codice usus est, Micheletus Berol. MDCCCXXIX —
MDCCCXLVIII, Bekker Berol. MDCCCXLV et MDCCCLXI,
Ielfius Oxon. MDCCCLVII, Grantius Lond. MDCCCLVII
sqq., tertium MDCCCLXXIV, Rogersius Lond.
MDCCCLXVIII, Ramsauer Lips. MDCCCLXXVIII, La-
tine reddiderunt post Argyropylum et Aretinum Felicia-
nus, Par. MDXLI (cum commentariis Eustrati et aliorum)
et Ven. MDXLII, Lambinus Par. MDLVIII, quintum tan-
tummodo librum Muretus Ven. MDLXXI, Germanice
Garvius (edd. Manso et I. G. Schneider*) Vratisl.
MDCCXCVIII — MDCCCI, Rieckher Stuttg. MDCCCLVI,
Stahrius Stuttg. MDCCCLXIII, Kirchmannus Lips.
MDCCCLXXVI, Anglice Hatchius Lond. MDCCCLXXIX.

*) Quae „alter editor“ adnotavit, Schneidero tribui.

Praeterea ediderunt libros VIII. et IX. *περὶ φιλίας* A. Th. H. Fritzschiuss Giess. MDCCCXLVII, libros IV. VI. VII. idem in Aristot. Eth. Eud., Eudemi Rhodii Eth., Ratisbonae MDCCCLI, quattuor priores et posteriorem decimi partem Moorius, Lond. MDCCCLXXI, quintum *περὶ δικαιοσύνης*, id quod dixi, Jackson, Cantabr. MDCCCLXXIX. Commentarios scripserunt Muretus (ed. Schottus) Ingolst. MDCI, Camerarius (cum translatione Latina septem posteriorum librorum et partis tertii) Francof. a. M. MDLXXVIII, Gifanius Francof. a. M. MDCVIII. De tota Aristotelis morali doctrina vel quibusdam eius partibus egerunt Prantl Ueber die dianoet. Tugenden in der Nik. Eth. des Ar., Mon. MDCCCLII, Fechner Der Gerechtigkeitsbegriff des Ar., Lips. MDCCCLV, Hampke De eudaemonia Aristotelis moralis disciplinae principio, Brandenb. MDCCCLVIII, Laas *Εὐδαιμονία* Aristotelis in ethicis principium quid velit et valeat, Berol. MDCCCLIX, Teichmueller Die Einheit der aristot. Eudaemonie, Petrop. MDCCCLIX, Munier Ueber einige Lehren der N. E. und ihre Beziehung zur Politik, Mogunt. MDCCCLVIII, Hartenstein Ueber den wissenschaftl. Werth der aristot. Eth., Lips. MDCCCLIX (in Comm. soc. litt. Lips. XI. p. 49 sqq.), Anton Doctrina de natura hominis ab Ar. in scriptis eth. proposita, Berol. MDCCCLII. De hominis habitu naturali quam Ar. in Eth. Nic. proposuerit doctrinam, Erf. MDCCCLX, Nielaender Erlaeuterung des von Ar. in der N. E. gegebenen Begriffes der Tugend, Herf. MDCCCLXI, Haecker Das Eintheilungs- und Anordnungsprincip der moral. Tugendreihe in d. N. E., Berol. MDCCCLXIII, C. W. Schmidt Ueber die Einwuerfe des Ar. in der Nikom. Eth. gegen Platos Lehre von der Lust, Bunzl. MDCCCLXIV, Dielitz Quaestiones Aristoteleae, Berol. MDCCCLXVII, Eucken Ueber die Methode und die Grundlagen der aristot. Eth., Francof. a. M. MDCCCLXX, Luthardt Die Ethik des

is purely Greek. The Romans imitated it. But in modern times it has been much superseded by the idea of sympathetic marriage. Christianity ignores Friendship: and theoretically it now exists only as a temporary advantage for the young.

Plan of Book X.

This book, beginning with a treatise on Pleasure (which subject is introduced (1) because of its connection with Morals: (2) because of the controversies about it) and rising from the critical examination of extreme views to Aristotle's own theory of Pleasure, namely, that it is the sense of the vital functions, or, in other words, of the harmonious action of some one faculty, — proceeds, almost without transition, to declare that happiness in the truest sense of the term must consist in the action of the highest faculty, and that this highest faculty being Reason, Philosophy must, beyond all comparison with anything else, whether idle amusement or even the exercise of the moral virtues, constitute that Practical Chief Good which is the end of Man.

It still remains to ask whether something cannot be added towards its practical realisation, and as habits of life are clearly necessary for the attainment of human excellence, on which the Chief Good depends, it follows that we shall require domestic institutions favorable to this end. These institutions, whether of public or private ordinance, can only be rightly conceived after a study of Legislation, i.e. of Politics in its highest form, to which Aristotle now addresses himself.


Ar. in ihrem Unterschied von der Moral des Christenthums, Lips. MDCCCLXIX. MDCCCLXX. MDCCCLXXVI, Walter Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen Philosophie, Ien. MDCCCLXXIV, Baumann Quae de anima eiusque partibus Ar. in libris Ethicorum Nicomacheorum proposuerit, Hal. MDCCCLXXIV, Klein Das Empirische in der N. E. des Ar., Brandenb. MDCCCLXXV, Kaas Die Lehre des Ar. von der Lust, Graz. MDCCCLXXVIII, Teichmueller Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe. III. Die praktische Vernunft bei Ar., Goth. MDCCCLXXIX, Susemihl Studien zur N. E., in Ann. philol. CXIX. 1879. p. 737 sqq. De mutua Ethicorum Nicomacheorum, Eudemiorum, magnorum ratione postquam minus feliciter disputavit Schleiermacher Ueber die ethischen Werke des Aristoteles, Opp. III, 3. p. 306 sqq., egregie tum hanc quaestionem denuo tractavit tum de operis compositione et integritate disseruit Spengelius Ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethischen Schriften, in Comm. phil. Acad. Mon. III. 1841. p. 439 sqq. Aristotelische Studien I., Mon. MDCCCLXIII (in earundem Comm. X. p. 171 sqq.). Quocum ita facio, ut ne libros quidem V., VI. VII., qui ut simul in Eudemiis leguntur, ita ab aliis velut Schleiermachero, Munrone, Grantio, Iacksone contra Spengeli sententiam Eudemo tribuuntur, universos ab ipso Aristotele abiudicem, attamen non solum priorem quae est de voluptate dissertationem, VII, 12 — 15, cum ipso Spengelio*) aliisque reiciam, verum cetera quoque, quae in his libris inveniuntur, haud omnia integra, sed hic illic fragmenta tantum Aristotelea esse cum frustulis Eudemiis aliisque permixta aliisque locis nullam quidem iacturam

*) Admodum dubitanter olim locutus est Ueber die unter etc. p. 533, postea rationibus allatis gravissimis summa cum fiducia Arist. Stud. I. p. 25 (193) sqq.

fecisse, sed nihilominus alienis additamentis adulterata esse*) cum Rassovio censeam.**) Ceterum in aliis quoque libris haud pauca insunt, quae discipulorum potius quam magistri indolem sapere videantur. Res eiusmodi in examen vocaverunt Ch. Pansch De Eth. Nic., Bonn. MDCCCXXXIII. De Aristot. Eth. Nic. l. VII. c. 12—15 et l. X. c. 1—5, Eut. MDCCCLVIII, A. M. Fischer De Eth. Nicom. et Eudem., Bonn. MDCCCXLVII, qui cum libros VI. et VII. et ultimum quinti caput Eudemo potius adscriberet, Fritzsche assensum tulit, Bendixen De Ethicorum Nicomacheorum integritate, Ploen. MDCCCLIV. Bemerkungen zum siebenten buche der Nik. Eth., in Philol. X. 1855. p. 199 sqq. 263 sqq.,


*) Veluti (de libro VII. ut taceam) VI, 1. 1138 b, 16—34, quod caput Eudemiorum esse satis demonstravit Fischer p. 18—35 (cf. inprimis E. E. 1222 b, 7 sq. cum Fritzsche nota. 1249 b, 3 sqq. 1216 b, 32 sq. 1217 a, 19 sq. 1220 a, 16 sq.) et 1141 b, 21—1142 a, 11. Fortasse non aliter iudicandum est de 1135 a, 16—1136 a, 9, quae vix plane cum Aristotelis (cf. 1111 a, 18 sqq. 25 sqq. 1113 b, 21 sqq.), sed optime cum Eudemi (cf. E. E. 1224 a, 15 sqq. b, 13 sq. 1225 a, 8 sqq. 1226 b, 36—1227 a, 3) doctrina consentire ostendit Iackson (in VI l. ed. p. XXVI. 109 sqq.): aut enim altera recensio 1134 a, 16—23 + 32 sq. ab ipso Aristotele scripta est, ut qui leviter perstringere hoc argumentum satis habuerit, aut si spuria est, fortasse non periit genuina Stagiritae dissertatio, sed is omnino noluit rem peculiariter tractare. Ceterum verba ὅσπερον ἐπισκεπτέον 1135 a, 15 non sunt lacunae indicium, sed recte ea refert Iackson ad eam Politicorum partem, quam de legumlatione scribere voluit Aristoteles.

**) Quod si verum est, falsum esse apparet quod ipse concedit Spengelius Ar. St. I. p. 29 (197): „Wer, wie ich, die Ueberzeugung ausspricht, dass der 2. Theil des 7. Buches (c. 12—15) nicht von Aristoteles ist, kann sich kaum der Folgerung entziehen, dass auch die 1. Haelfte (c. 1—11) damit fuer die Nikomachia verloren gehe“. Quid quod olim addiderat Ueber die unter etc. l. l.: „und dann stehen das 5. und 6. Buch nicht fester“, postea vero adicit haec: „muessen auch nicht sofort(!) alle drei fraglichen Buecher unmittelbar(!) und nothwendig(!) aufgegeben werden etc.“! — Ceterum cf. quae adnotavi ad 1131 a, 10. 1141 a, 20 sq. 1142 a, 30 sq. 1177 a, 17 sq.



Rieckher Die drei der Nik. und Eud. Eth. gemeinsamen Buecher, Zeitschr. f. d. Alterthumsw. 1856. p. 113 sqq., Munro Nicomachean Ethics book V, Eudemian Ethics book IV, Journ. of classical and sacred philology II. 1855. p. 58 sqq., Anton Quae intercedat ratio inter E. N. I. VII, 12—15 et X, 1—5, Gedani MDCCCLVIII, Haecker Das fuenfte Buch der N. E. *περὶ δικαιοσύνης*, Zeitschr. f. Gymnasialw. XVI. 1862. p. 513 sqq. Zur N. E. des Ar., Philol. XIX. 1863. p. 451 sqq. Beitrage zur Kritik und Erklaerung des siebenten Buchs der N. E., Berol. MDCCCLXIX, Monro On E. N. II, 7, Journ. of Philol. VII. 1876. p. 185 sqq., alii, velut Hampke Ueber das fuenfte buch der N. E. des Ar., Philol. XVI. 1861. p. 60 sqq., Noetel Quaestionum Aristotelearum specimen, Berol. MDCCCLXII. Das vierte capitel im ersten buche der N. E., Annal. philol. CXIX. 1879. p. 25 sqq., Iackson On some passages in the N. E., Journ. of Phil. IV. 1872. p. 308 sqq. On dislocations in the text of the fifth book of the N. E., ibid. VI. 1876. p. 100 sqq. singulos simul locos tractaverunt. Varii generis sunt quae scripsit Trendelenburg Historische Beitrage zur Philosophie. II. Berol. MDCCCLV. p. 352 sqq. III. Berol. MDCCCLXVII. p. 399 sqq. Et quinti libri pristinum ordinem turbatum admodum esse plurimi crediderunt: ego has perturbationes, quas in ultimis capitibus revera insunt, id quod primus breviter monuit Spengelius, postea accuratius aperuit Rieckher, magnam certe partem e duplicibus potius recensitionibus ortas esse cum Rieckhero et Rassovio arbitror, transpositionibus contra tollere conati sunt et Spengelius ipse et alii. Et Muretus quidem verba tantum 1134a, 24 sq. *πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον εἴρηται πρότερον* praemissa καὶ particula et *εἴρηται πρότερον* seclasis ante 1133b, 29. *εἴρηται*, Spengelius modo 1137a, 31 — 1138a, 3 (c. 14) ante 1134a, 25. *δεῖ*, modo 1136a, 10 — 1137a, 4 (c. 11).

12) post 1138a, 3 (c. 14), similiter Fechner 1136a, 10 — 1137a, 4 (c. 11. 12) post 1137a, 30 (c. 13), Hildenbrandius (Geschichte und System der Staats- und Rechtsphilosophie. I. Lips. MDCCCLX. p. 325 sqq.) 1134a, 25. *πρότερον* deleta 1134a, 24. *πῶς* — 1135a, 15. *ἐπισκεπτόν* ante 1133b, 29, Zeller (Philosophie der Griechen II³, 2. p. 647), et hic quidem recte, 1137a, 5 — 1138a, 3 (c. 13. 14) post 1138b, 13. *τούτοις* (c. 15) traicere voluerunt. Quibus plus minusve se accommodantes verum ordinem hunc esse: 1132b, 21 — 1133b, 28 (c. 8). 1134a, 24 — 25. *πρότερον*. 1137a, 31 — 1138a 3 (c. 14). 1133b, 29 — 1134a, 16. *καθόλου* (c. 9). 1134a, 25. *δεῖ* — 1135a, 5. 1134a, 16. *ἐπεὶ* — 23. 1135a, 6 — 1137a, 4. 1138a, 4 — b, 13 (c. 15). 1137a, 5 — 30 (c. 13) coniecit Munro, aut hunc: 1132b, 21 — 1133b, 28 (c. 8). 1134a, 24 — 1135a, 5. 1133b, 29 — 1134a, 13 (c. 9). 1138a, 28 — b, 5. 1134a, 14 — 23. 1135a, 6 — 1136a, 9. 1137a, 5 — 30 (c. 13). 1136a, 10 — 1137a, 4 (c. 11. 12). 1138a, 4 — 27. b, 6 — 13. 1137a, 31 — 1138a, 3 (c. 14) aut hunc: 1137a, 31 — 1138a, 3 (c. 14). 1132b, 21 — 1133b, 28 (c. 8). 1134a, 24 — 1135a, 5. 1133b, 29 — 1134a, 13 (c. 9). 1138a, 28 — b, 5. 1134a, 14 — 23. 1135a, 6 — 1136a, 9. 1137a, 5 — 30 (c. 13). 1136a, 10 — 1137a, 4 (c. 11. 12). 1138a, 4 — 27. 1138b, 6 — 13 aut hunc: 1132b, 21 — 1133b, 28 (c. 8). 1134a, 24 — 1135a, 5. 1137a, 31 — 1138a, 3 (c. 14). 1133b, 29 — 1134a, 13 (c. 9). 1138a, 28 — b, 5. 1134a, 14 — 23. 1135a, 6 — 1136a, 9. 1137a, 5 — 30 (c. 13). 1136a, 10 — 1137a, 4 (c. 11. 12). 1138a, 4 — 27. b, 6 — 13 Hampkius, hunc: 1132b, 21 — 1134a, 13 (c. 8. 9). 1137a, 26 — 30. 1134a, 25. *δεῖ* — 1135a, 5. 1134a, 14 — 16. *καθόλου*. 1135a, 6 — 13. 1134a, 16. *ἐπεὶ* — 23. 1135a, 14 — 1136a, 9. 1137a, 5 — 25. 1136a, 10 — 1137a, 4 (c. 11. 12). 1138a,



4—27. b, 6—13. 1138a, 28—b, 5. 1134a, 24—25. *πρότερον*. 1137a, 31—1138a, 3 (c. 14) Haecker, hunc: 1132b, 21—1134a, 23. 1135a, 16—1136a, 9. 1137a, 5—1138a, 3 (c. 13. 14). 1134a, 24—1135a, 15. 1136a, 10—1137a, 4 (c. 11. 12). 1138a, 4—b, 13 (c. 15) Ueberwegius (Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos. des Alterth. ed. II. p. 243. ed. III. p. 149. ed. IV. p. 160. ed. V. p. 177), hunc: 1134a, 1. καὶ ἡ μὲν <κατὰ μέρος> δικαιосύνη — 12. ἔτυχεν. 1133b, 30—1134a, 1. ἄκρων. 1134a, 12. τοῦ — 16. καθόλου. 1132b, 21—1133b, 28 (c. 8). 1134a, 24—1135a, 15 (deleto 1134a, 25. *πρότερον*). 1130b, 30. τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς (κατὰ μέρος fontes) δικαιосύνης — 1132b, 20. 1135a, 16—1137a, 4. 1138a, 4—b, 13 (c. 15). 1137a, 5—1138a, 3 (c. 13. 14) Trendelenburgius, qui 1133b, 29 et tamquam fragmentum, quod hac certe forma nusquam locum idoneum habeat, 1134a, 16. ἐπεὶ — 23 secludit, hunc denique: 1129a, 3—11. ταῦτα. 1137a, 5—25. 1129a, 11. οὐδὲ — b, 6. ἀγαθά. 1137a, 26—30. 1129b, 6. ὁ — 1133b, 33. ἐστίν. 1138a, 30. καὶ — 31. γυμναστικῇ. 1133b, 33. ἡ — 1134a, 13. 1138a, 28—30. μέσον. 31. ἀλλ' — 34. ἀδικίας. 1134a, 32. ἐν οἷς δ' (γὰρ?) — 33. ἀδικία. 1138a, 34. τὸ δ' — b, 5. 1134a, 14—16. καθόλου. 25. δεῖ — 1135b, 24. 1134a, 16. ἐπεὶ — 23. 1135b, 25—1137a, 4. 1138a, 4—27. b, 6—13. 1134a, 24—25. *πρότερον*. 1137a, 31—1138a, 3 (c. 14) Jackson, qui tamen de recta verborum 1134a, 32. ἐν — 33. ἀδικία et 1138a, 30. καὶ — 31. γυμναστικῇ sede ipse dubitat. Praeterea eodem tempore cum Hampkio Muenschero quoque 1134a, 24—1135a, 5 ante 1133b, 29 transponere placuit, Noeteliusque 1133b, 29 et 1134a, 24—25. *πρότερον* locos inter se mutare et 1134a, 16. ἐπεὶ — 23 post 1135b, 8. πρᾶττεν traici vix recte iussit. In libri autem septimi capitibus

undecim prioribus miras sane repetitiones detexerunt Haecker Rassoiviusque, cumque iam sub prelo erant ex hac mea editione libri VI. et VII., ecce mihi affertur novus libellus partim laudabilis acuminis partim, nisi fallor, nimiae subtilitatis et praeposteri iudicii documentum, I. Cook Wilson Aristotelian. Studies. I. Oxon. MDCCCLXXIX, cuius scriptor maximam horum capitum partem e duabus commentationibus veterum peripateticorum, quibus hic illic etiam tertiam quartamque adiungit, compilatam esse demonstrare conatus est. Quas recensiones diversas ut secundum discrimen, quod inter eas statuit, aetatis hac serie ABCD litteris insigniamus, certe BCD neque ab Aristotele neque ab Eudemo profecta esse contendit, quamquam non quidem negat nonnulla videri in hac operis parte superesse, quae forsitan ab ipso Aristotele scripta sint, aliaeque ex Eudemo hausta esse vero proximum habet. Et Eudemo quidem antiquius non solum ei videtur initium 1145a, 15 — b, 20 paucis versibus b, 16 — 19. *ἐλvai* exceptis postea (nescio an a compilatore demum) additis*), verum ex Eth. Eud. 1235b, 13 — 18 cum probabiliter concludat iam ab Eudemo lecta esse praeter 1145b, 2 — 7 etiam 1146b, 6 — 8 vix intellego, quo iure possint intercedentia 1145b,

46b, 5 vel certe maior eorum pars ab ipso Stagira abiudicari. Contra Eudemo quae relinqui queant e Wilsonis sententia nisi forte pauca illa ex A fonte libata aliaeque vix plura profecto nequaquam video. Si enim ea, quae aut huic aut illi auctori impertit, ita scribimus, ut e priore columna in posteriorem transcurrant, eaque, de quibus nihil certi prodit aut inter plures sententias optionem dat aut quae pro compilatoris demum additamentis habere videtur, in ultima columna x littera superscripta componamus, tabula fragmentorum Wilsoniana haec est:

*) Idem indicat de 1145b, 28. *καί* — 29. *ἀγνοίας*.

Ceterum confiteor mihi ex hac dispositione vix multo plura*) placere, quam de quibus auctor cum Rassovio plus minusve consentit. Inprimis ego quidem, utpote cui minime reputasse videatur quae de 1146b, 31 — 1147b, 17 optime disseruit Rassovius (p. 127—129) aliisque locis aut sententiam male intellexisse aut minoribus discrepantiis et repugnantibus nimium ponderis tribuisse, nullas invenio causas reapse cogentes, cur non etiam 1146b, 8—14. 24—1148a, 17. 1148b, 15—1149a, 24. 1150a, 9—16. 32 sqq. b, 29 — 1152a, 36 (paucis exceptis) ab ipso Aristotele, 1148a, 22—b, 14 aliaque ab Eudemo originem traxisse**) verisimillimum habeam, praesertim cum in altera recensione 1147b, 23—1148a, 17 nihil inesse, quod a solita Aristotelis ratione recedat, in sola altera 1148a, 22—b, 14 deprehendi vestigia illa Eudemia a Fritzschio aliisque indagata, quamvis utramque ab utroque abiudicare velit, scite demonstraverit ipse Wilson. Sed haec haec: tempus enim est tandem ad eos transire, qui singulis locis aut recensendis vel emendandis aut interpretandis operam dederunt. Sunt autem praeter Rassovium aliosque, de quibus iam dixi, inprimis hi: H. L. M. On the interpretation of a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Book V. Ch. 8, Journ. of class. and sacred philol. I. 1854. p. 344—348 (cui obloquitur Munro l. l.), Breier De amicitia principum. Explicatur locus Eth. Nic. VII. p. 1158 (a, 27 sqq.), Lubec. MDCCCLVII, Oncken Emendationum in Ar. Eth. Nicom. et Politica specimen, Heidelberg. MDCCCLXI, Muenscher Quaestionum criticarum et exegeticarum in Ar. Eth. Nicom. specimen, Marb.

*) 1149a, 24 — 1150a, 8 revera sunt fortasse consuta e diversis fragmentis, sed accuratiora non definio.

**) Quae verbis *διεῖλονεν πρότερον* 1148a, 25 citantur, nusquam in Ethicis inveniri neque in Nicomacheis neque in servatis partibus Eudemiorum monuit Spengelius.

MDCCCLXI, Vermehren Aristotel. Schriftstellen, Lips. MDCCCLXIV, Imelmann Observationes criticae in Ar. Eth. Nicom., Hal. MDCCCLXIV, Bernays Aristoteles und Clemens, in Symb. philol. Bonn., Lips. MDCCCLXIV, p. 303 sqq., Richards Notes on Ar. Ethics, Journ. of Philol. IV. 1872. p. 150 sqq. Bywater A passage in Ar. Eth., ibid. p. 218. Aristotelia, ibid. V. 1874. p. 115 sq. Boesser Commentarius ad Aristotelis Eth. Nic. librum VIII et IX, Eut. MDCCCLXXIII. Compluria eiusmodi praeterea tractaverunt Spengelius et Euckenius non solum locis iam supra allatis, verum etiam in censuris aliorum librorum, ille editionis Ethicorum Eudemiorum Fritzscheanae (Muenchner gel. Anz. XXXIV. 1852. I. p. 433 sqq.), hic commentationis Rassovianae (Neue Jenaer L. Z. 1874. p. 339—341): nec non Thurotus in censura editionis Ramsaue- rianae (Rev. crit. 1879. II. p. 168—171) suas coniecturas cum lectoribus communicavit, eas autem, in quas incidit Ios. Scaliger, divulgavit Onckenius in Eois I. 1864. p. 103 sqq. 215 sqq. Ceterum conferenda sunt quae composuerunt Bendixen Die aristotelische ethik und politik, Philol. XI. 1856. p. 351 sqq. 544 sqq. XVI. 1861. p. 465 sqq. et Susemihl Jahresberichte ueber die Fortschritte der class. Alterthumsw. I. p. 590 sqq. III. p. 361 sqq. V. p. 271 sqq. VII. p. 353 sqq.

Coniecturas in ipsa verba haud ita multas recepi: saepius quae mihi placent subter versus diductis litteris imprimendas curavi. Interpunctionem tacite mutavi saepissime. In hiatibus aut plene scribendis aut elisione vel crasi tollendis, in οὔτως et ν ἐφελκυστικῶ ante consonantes ponendo, in οὐθίς vel οὐδείς, γίνεσθαι vel γίγνεσθαι, γινώσκειν vel γιγνώσκειν scribendo ubique secutus sum K^b codicem praestantissimum et antiquissimum, nisi quod pro οὐδ' εἰς et οὐθ' εἰς semper οὐδείς et οὐθίς recepi. Verba me quidem iudice ab ipso Aristotele non profecta cancellis

his*) [], lacunis devorata his < >, alieno loco posita uno asterisco * ibi inserto, ubi pristinam eorum sedem fuisse reor, his [], duorum locorum, qui inter se commutandi mihi videntur, alterum eisdem [] alterum his [], in duplicibus denique, quas vocant, recensitionibus posteriorem, nisi potius alteram utram utpote non genuinam alio illo uncinorum genere [] seclusi, his ||| circumscripsi: duo autem asterisci ** lacunae sunt signum. Ubi in verbis constituendis ab editionibus Bekkerianis (Bk.) vel maiore (Bk.¹) vel minore (Bk.²), Fritschiana (Fr.), Ramsaueriana (Rr.), Jacksoniana (Ja.) recessi, semper hoc indicare lectori utile mihi videbatur. Sigla $\Pi^{1.2}$ $\Pi^{a.b}$ ita adhibui, ut primas semper codicum manus respicerem, ubicunque tamen recentior aliam lectionem inseruit, in parenthesi hoc adicerem. Compendiis usus sum fere his: pr. significat primam manum, rc. recentiorem, corr. in codicibus omnibus praeter K^b correctionem ab ipso librario profectam vel dubiae originis, mg. quae in margine scripta sunt, $\gamma\varrho$. mg. lectionem, quae in margine $\gamma\varrho$. nota praemissa legitur, cet. ceteros fontes, c. c. = cum ceteris fontibus ex sex eorum numero, e quibus ubique hausi, $\Gamma K^b L^b M^b O^b$ Ald. vel certe, ubi e vetusta translatione Latina lectio Graeca perspicitur nequit, e ceterorum quinque, crx. = correxit (correxerunt), em. = emendavit (emendaverunt), om. = omissum, suppl. = supplevit (suppleverunt), add. = addidit (addiderunt) vel additum, ead. m. = eadem manus, mg. rc. = in margine recentior manus, secl. = secluserunt, ci. = coniecit (coniecerunt), tri. = traiecit (traiecerunt), transp. = transposuit (transposuerunt), prb. = probat (probant), del. = deleuit, fors. = forsitan, fort. = fortasse, v. d. = vir doctus, v. l. = varia lectio, h. v. = hoc verbum, n. =

*) Quae duplicavi ([[]]), ubi postea in eiusmodi locos de-nuo aliena irrepsisse videntur.

nota, denique v. aut vide aut versum aut verbum significat.
Unum superest, ut sigla fontium et editionum in tabula ponam:

Q = Marcian. Ven. 200.

H^a = Marcian. Ven. 214.

K^b = Laurent. LXXXI, 11.

corr.¹ K^b = correctiones ipsius
librari.

corr.^{2.3.} K^b = duo eiusdem
saeculi correctores.

re. K^b = corrector tertius.

L^b = Parisiensis 1854.

M^b = Marcian. Ven. 213.

N^b = Marcian., append. IV,
53.

O^b = Riccardianus 46.

P^b = Vaticanus 1342.

O¹ = Oxoniensis collegi cor-
poris Christi.

O² = Oxoniensis collegi novi.

O³ = Oxoniensis olim Ioan-
nis Mori episcopi Eliensis.

P¹ = Paris. 2023.

P² = Paris. Coisl. 161.

Par. 1417 = Parisiensis 1417.

Γ = vetusta translatio.

Π = K^bL^bM^bO^b.

Π¹ = K^bM^b in libris I. II.
VI. VII. IX. X.

Π¹ = K^bO^b in libris III. IV.
VIII.

Π¹ = K^bL^b in libro V.

Π² = L^bO^b in libris I. II.
VI. VII. IX.

Π² = L^bM^b in libris III. IV.

Π² = M^bO^b in libro V.

Π² = ΓM^b Ald. in libro VIII.

Π² = ΓL^b Ald. in libro X.

Π^a = K^bO^b in libro V.

Π^b = L^bM^b in libro V.

E. E. = Ethica Eudemia.

M. M. = Magna Moralia.

An. = Anonymi commenta-
tores librorum II. III. IV.
VII.

Eu. = Eustrati commenta-
rius in libros I. VI.

Mi. = Michaelis Ephesii com-
mentarius in libros V. IX. X.

Asp. = Aspasi commentarius
in librum VIII.

Hel. = Heliodori paraphrasis.

Ar. = Leonardi Aretini trans-
latio.

† = eiusdem cum textu con-
sensus.

Ald. = operum Aristoteleo-
rum editio princeps Aldina.

Bas.³ = eorundem editio Ba-
sileensis tertia.

Bk. = Bekker.


Bk.¹ = operum Aristoteleo-
rum editio Bekkeriana.

Bk.² = Ethicorum Nicoma-
cheorum editio Bekkeriana
minor.

Fr. = Fritzscheii editiones
librorum V. VI. VII. VIII.
IX.

Rr. = Ramsauer.

Ia. = Iackson.



1. $\delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\iota$ every part and every science, and so too all moral action, that is to say purpose are thought to aim at some good result - 10.
2. $\delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\iota$ does not imply any doubt in the assertion. Sometimes it denotes the opinion of others, not of Aristotle himself, but here it is a part of style, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism. Similar forms of language are common in Aristotle and are characteristic of him: e.g. the use of 'nows, or the statement of an assertion as a question. $\delta\iota\alpha\phi\omicron\rho\alpha$: 'now ends clearly differ: sometimes the end is merely an action (the exercise of a faculty), at other times certain external results beyond the exercise of the faculty'.
3. Strictly acc. to the Aristotelian system to speak of an $\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\pi\upsilon\kappa\tau\alpha$ not containing its end in itself is a contradiction of terms. But just as some $\tau\epsilon\lambda\eta$ are means to ulterior ends, so some functions may be called $\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\pi\upsilon\kappa\tau\alpha$ which are also mere $\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\tau\alpha$ of external results.
4. The end of function is the good we hope to see rise by that action.
5. Though ends differ he shows afterwards that they may all be reduced to one final end.
6. $\tau\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\nu$, such actions would be called $\pi\alpha\upsilon\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, while the others would be called $\pi\omicron\kappa\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ - see more Glossary p. 43.
12. $\alpha\iota\tau\eta\ \delta\epsilon$ - 'while this itself and every warlike operation falls under (is subordinated to) strategy: and in the same way of course (reading $\delta\eta$ for $\delta\epsilon$) other operations under some different faculty - in all, I say ($\delta\epsilon$), the ends of the master faculties (arts) are more excellent than those of the subordinate'.
- This sentence exhibits many of the peculiarities of Aristotle -
1. the indefiniteness of $\delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\iota$, first of $\pi\alpha\upsilon\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, then of $\tau\epsilon\chi\upsilon\epsilon\iota\varsigma$.
 2. $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ is used in a sense from which the application of "faculty" to law & medicine has been derived. Aristotle opposing $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ to $\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\pi\upsilon\kappa\tau\alpha$ treats the arts as a class of $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$, i.e. certain capabilities of action: though they differ from other $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ in being themselves not fully developed into $\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\pi\upsilon\kappa\tau\alpha$, but formed out of them.
 3. $\delta\epsilon$ used as often in Aristotle to mark the apodosis.
 4. The sentence moreover is an anacoluthon ($\delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\iota$ - $\alpha\iota\tau\eta\ \delta\epsilon$).
 5. The adj. $\alpha\rho\chi\iota\tau\epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\nu\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ as applied to the supreme sciences is not found before Aristotle. The metaphor is, the architect who conceives the design is concerned with the end, the laborers who carry out the details, with the means.

12. Art supplying the power to produce practical results is here called $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ Α.

ell.
I

Bekk.
p. 1094a

Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ προᾶξίς τε καὶ
 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφρή-
 ναντο τὰ γὰρ τὸν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται
 2 τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς
 ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τού- 5
 3 τοις βελτίῳ ἐφύκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ
 πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται
 καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ
 4 πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι *arts or*
 δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ *sciences.*
 τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλινοποιητικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν *10 perh. operation*
 ὁργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ προᾶξις ὑπὸ
 τὴν στρατηγικὴν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἐτέ-
 ρας· ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάν-
 5 των ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά. τούτων γὰρ χάριν 15
 κάκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς
 εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθά-

Lib. I. K^bM^b = Π¹, L^bO^b = Π².

1094a, 1. δὲ] δὲ καὶ ΓM^bO^bAr. || 4. παρὰ ταύτας Γ et
 corr.² K^b || 8. καὶ om. Π¹, c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || 10. ἀρετὴν
 Ald. Ar. et pr. O¹, δύναμιν c. c. Eu. Hel. || 11. ἡ ante χαλινο-
 ποιητικὴ add. L^bBk. || χαλινοποιικὴ Bk. Rr. et pr. K^b, χαλινο-
 ποιητικὴ c. c. Eu. Hel. et rc. K^b || 13. τὸν] κατὰ τὸν Π¹ ||
 δὲ Ald., δὴ Π Bk. Rr., om. Γ || 14. δὴ ΓM^b† || 15. ὑφ' αὐτά
 Π²M^bAld.

περ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεῖσων ἐπιστημῶν. εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν Π
 πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ
 20 πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον,
 ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ^{subjectless} μάταιαν τὴν ὁρεξιν), δηλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν
 εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. — ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ 2
 γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει βοήθην, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται
 σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' 3
 25 οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ
 τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριω- 4
 τάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ 5
 φαίνεται· τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πό- 6
 1094b λεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μακθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη
 διατάσσει. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων
 ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ζητορικὴν.
 χρωμένῃς δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστη- 7
 5 μῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχε-
 σθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε
 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ 8
 καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνε-
 ται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σφῆξιν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ
 10 μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.
 ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα· λέ- 9
^{subject matter} γοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθῇ.
 τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον,
 ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, 2
 15 ^{indefinite objects, not definite quantities, and} περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ
^{fluctuation, as to come to be held only conventional distinctions, not natural} πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νομῶ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μὴ. τοιαύ- 3

20. οὕτω γ' K^b, οὕτως Π² M^b Ald. et fort. Γ || 22. ἄρ' Ald.,
 ἄρ' Γ K^b Ar., ἄρ P² || 24. σκοποῦ, ἔχοντες μᾶλλον Onckenius ||
 27. δ' ἡ] δὲ ἡ Hel., δὲ καὶ ἡ L^b, δὴ καὶ ἡ Γ N^b Ald. † ||
 1094b, 8. τε Π¹ || τελειότερον O^b Bk. Rr., θειότερον L^b Eu. et
 corr.³ P² (τελειότερον etiam Hel.) || 9. γὰρ om. Γ K^b Ar., c. c.
 add. Eu. Hel. || 11. αὕτη post μέθοδος add. M^b P² † || 13. ἐν
 — λόγοις] ἐφ' ἐκάστου γένους Eu. et cod. Victori.

between ἐπίστυμν and τὸ πρῶτον μέτρον for the latter.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς. The meaning is - we have desires, these cannot be in vain, hence we cannot always be desiring means: it must be some ... which is never a means and which constitutes the true object of desire.

τὸ δὲ τὸν πρακτικὸν. Aristotle is not enquiring after a transcendental good, like the Platonic Idea, but after a good of this world in its own right.

δὲ δὲ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἑνεκα. See τὸ αὐτὸ, as a means to this.

1. The argument from design - the fact that human nature is created with a desire for some final good proves that such a good must exist.

2. καὶ βέβαιον - emphatical - the knowledge is practical as well as theoretical.

4. τοῦ δέοντος. not 'our duty' in the modern sense, this conception having not as yet been developed. It was commonly used to define justice, like ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἄλλοις τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἑμφ' ἑαυτοῦ. But the exact import of the term was not fixed.

ἐπὶ δὲ. and if this be so we must endeavour to comprehend in outline at least, what it is and of which of the sciences or faculties, etc., it is the end. Encumbered with Platonic associations - that virtue is a science, that it is an art of life, etc. - he starts with the impression that the present treatise is an art rather than a science. In Bk I, he imperfectly distinguishes the scientific theory and the practical attainment of virtue.

6. now it would seem to be the end of the most absolute (authoritative) and that which is most a master science. κύριος means (1) what is authoritative, what has control, (2) what has validity especially the validity of custom, what is established, etc., absolute.

7. Plato had represented politics as a division of metaphysics, Aristotle calls it the supreme art.

6. γὰρ. for even supposing the chief good to be identical for an individual and a state, that of the state appears at all events something greater and more absolute both to attain and preserve: even for an individual himself it is desirable, but for a nation, and for states it is something more noble and divine. In the Politics he describes the chief good for a state as consisting in development and play of speculative thought, all fit conditions and means thereto being implied and presupposed.

1. πολιτικὴ τις. Aristotle has not yet arrived at the concept of Ethics as a separate science. He still, following Plato, identifies it with Politics. But by his treatment of the question of Ethics he prepared the way for its separation from Politics, which was partly made by Eudemus, and afterwards entirely by the Stoics.

ἀπολύτως. Aristotle never fails to pay attention to the logic of a science - the method of procedure. In Bk I we have three digressions on the logic of it: (1) he decides that it cannot be an exact science [c. 3] (2) it must be inductive rather than deductive (a priori) [c. 4] (3) not quite consistently with (2) he says the principle (ἀρχή) which he has evolved is to be applied to the elucidation of all future difficulties [c. 7].

2. δὲ δὲ. The matter of a science (the facts or conceptions with which deals must determine its method, according to the exactness with which they admit of being stated.

15. We can see traces of the immaturity of Aristotle's ethical system in 1. he speaks of politics as the science treating of right action. 2. he seems to accept for the moment as at all events, worth considering, the view that the chief good is the life of contemplation.

right (τὸ κατὰ κατὰ τὸ δὲ κατὰ) in sort of 'elucidation'.

that the truth should be set forth roughly and in outline and as we are reasoning about generalities and from generalities. The conclusions should be of the same nature also. And it is in the same spirit (manner) that all statements should be received.

In his preliminary inquiries as to the right method of different sciences, Aristotle generally adds that it will be the office of τὰ δὲ κατὰ or of the τὰ κατὰ δὲ κατὰ to arbitrate on the question. τὰ δὲ κατὰ here implies not the cultivation of the whole man, but a certain special cultivation in relation to science, as a connoisseur. This 'education' is a critical criticism - it will have certain standards by reference to which it will form a judgment on the shape and manner of the propositions presented, quite independently of their truth and falsehood. The term κατὰ ἐκαστον τὰ κατὰ δὲ κατὰ shows that not only is a general knowledge of logic necessary to constitute τὰ δὲ κατὰ, but also that some acquaintance with the special subject. τὰ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν - it is as absurd to accept (be content with) plausible statements from a mathematician as to suspect demonstrations from a rhetorician.

may, moreover, since he is given to follow his passions, he will hear uselessly and without profit, since the end of the science is not knowledge but action.

for the deficiency comes not by reason of time

κατὰ δὲ κατὰ, returning from the parenthetical discussion on method γυνώσκω. προαίρεσις. The original four terms τέχνη, μέθοδος, πράξις, προαίρεσις are reduced to these two. πράξις is implied in or identical with προαίρεσις, and τέχνη is omitted as falling under the practical powers in man. Thus human nature before classified as productive, scientific, and moral, is here summed up as moral and intellectual.

Π)

την δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ
 4 πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν ^{we must be content.} περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τὰληθές ἐν- 20
δείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεῶν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευ- 25
μένον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ^{magistratus} τακριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν ^{in each case} καθ' ἕκαστον
γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παρα- 25
πλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

5 ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν 1095a
 πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶν οἰκείος ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ
 6 τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν
ματαίως ἀκούσεται ^{αὐτῶν} καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ 5
 7 γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρα τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἑλλειψις, ἀλλὰ
 διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσι·
 τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι 10
 πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.

8 καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί 2
 IV ^{the first in view} προτιθέμεθα, ^{consequenter de rebus} πεφροσιμιάσθω τοσαῦτα· λέγωμεν δ' ἀνα-
λαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος
ὁρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγωμεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ 15

19. ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ φιλίαν Rassovius (nescio an recte), secl. Euckenius || 22. δὲ O^b Ald. Hel., δὴ cet., δὲ δὴ? Susem. || 23. ἕκαστα Π¹ || 1095a, 1. ἀκροατῆς ci. Thurotus || μὲν post ἕκαστον add. M^b et rc. H^a et pr. K^b (del. rc.) || 3. πραγμάτων L^b M^b, πράξεων c. c. Eu. Hel. || 12. καὶ — 13. τοσαῦτα post b, 13. ἀνὴρ tri. Euckenius: immo v. quae ad y. 31 sqq. adnotabo || 13. λέγωμεν ΓK^b Hel. Ar., λέγωμεν cet.

τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι 2
 μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται (τὴν γὰρ
 εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ
living well *appearing well* *δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν* ταυτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ
 20 εὐδαιμονεῖν). περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβη-
 τοῦσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν.
something false *οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν* 3
 ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ
 αὐτὸς ἕτερον (νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ
 25 πλοῦτον), *conscientious* *δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοίαν* τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ
 ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. *ἐνιοὶ δ' ὥντο παρὰ τὰ*
 πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι *καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε*
παῖσιν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν 4
 τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα
 30 *epitaphizing* *ἐπιπολαζούσας* ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.

|| μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν 5
 λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπύρει τοῦτο, καὶ
 ἐξήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός,
 1095b ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνά-
 παλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς·
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. [διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθουσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς τὸν 6
 5 περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμε-

16. ἀγαθῶν K^b L^b Eu. Hel., ἀγαθόν cet. Ar. || 18. τὸ δ']
 τό τ' Argyropylos (nescio an recte) || 25. δ'] θ' ? Susem. ||
 27. τοῖσδε] τούτοις Π¹ || 28. αἰτιον ἐστὶν post ἀγαθὰ Π¹ || 31. μὴ
 — b, 13. ἀνῆρ, quam suspicionem movit Rr., altera quodam-
 modo recensio esse videntur verborum 1094b, 11. λέγοιτο —
 1095a, 11. εἰδέναι, quam ut hoc loco insereret, b, 14. ἡμεῖς
 — παρεξέβημεν adiecta sunt ab editore antiquissimo peri-
 patetico || ὑμᾶς L^b M^b + || 32. ὁ ante Πλάτων add. Π¹ || 1095b, 2.
 γὰρ] οὖν Γ^L L^b Hel. Bk. Rr. || 3. <δ'> οὖν? Susem. || 4. διὸ —
 6. ἱκανῶς parenthesin esse iudicavit Gifanius, post 7. διότι tri.
 Onckenius || 4. ἔθουσιν Γ^K O^b Eu. Hel. et corr. N^b, ἡθουσιν L^b M^b
 Ald. Ar. et rc. H^a, ἔθνεσιν pr. H^a N^b.

both classes, however, are in a different way possessed of the truth, Aristotle would always acknowledge. Cp ch 8. 7.

and when conscious of their ignorance, people look up with admiration to those who say something fine and beyond their powers. On the other hand certain (philosophers) have thought that beyond all these manifold goods there is some one absolute good, which is the cause to them of their being good. Consciousness of ignorance makes people fancy wisdom to be the chief good.

7. The chief good, acc. Plato, is the quality or condition invariably present in everything good, the possession of which causes the same thing good to be applicable in each case. Whatever that is which is the one cause of goodness wherever it is found, is itself the chief good of all.

31. If it is implied just below that the method of Ethics must be inductive, starting from relative and individual facts this involves a fallacy, because, though the individual must begin with what he knows, there is nothing to prevent an absolute truth ($\tau\acute{o} \acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\alpha}\nu\sigma\tau\omicron\nu \psi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\sigma\iota\mu\omicron\nu$) forming part of the intuitions and experiences of the individual. Again in $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta \gamma\alpha\rho \tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota$, $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ may mean that a moral fact really amounts to a law, but then in this case Ethics begins $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$: if the meaning is 'starting point' $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ should not have been used.

relative and absolute knowledge) - a particulars and universals (see more)

How $\acute{\sigma}\upsilon\nu \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu \gamma\epsilon$ - a not unusual style in Aristotle there may be a method more ideally perfect method, but this suits best the imperfections of human nature. - $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ below is hardly a 'principle' but a 'starting point'; though the first is possible.

4. $\delta\epsilon\omicron \delta\omicron\epsilon$ - therefore he should have been well trained in his habits who is to study right things, beautiful and just, that is to say, in a word, politics. The facts of morals are the notions in their most simple and rudimentary form of right, wrong, just, unjust, duty, &c. The study presupposes that these notions are, in some degree at least, intelligible to us: that the terms convey some sort of meaning to us ($\tau\acute{o} \acute{\sigma}\tau\epsilon$) though we may not be able to define them accurately, or to say what constitutes rightness, wrongness, &c. But even this dim appreciation implies some training in good habits.

of the nature of a universal.
571 - the fact of moral distinctions, and a capacity for their recognition in the banner: - this is all we presuppose.
51071 - the reason why one thing is right and another wrong - what is the essential difference

6. $\tau\omega\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\alpha\ \delta\acute{\iota}\omega$ - for people seem with regards to form their conceptions of the chief good and of life of business from men's lives. i.e. men's lives exhibit practical ideas of what it is desirable.
 $\beta\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$ is the external form (career) as opposed to $\epsilon\upsilon\eta$, the inner principle of life.

7. $\alpha\tau\omicron\lambda\upsilon\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu$ - love a life of sensuality, pleasure; fr. $\epsilon\tau\omicron\lambda\upsilon\sigma\iota\omega$ - the simple $\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\omega$ is not found, but it was probably $\lambda\acute{\alpha}\omega$ and $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ - hence $\lambda\omicron\iota\alpha$, $\lambda\eta\iota\varsigma$, $\lambda\alpha\tau\omicron$, $\lambda\alpha\tau\iota\varsigma$. $\lambda\alpha\tau\omicron\kappa\tau\epsilon\mu\iota\varsigma$ akin to $\lambda\alpha\tau\omicron\kappa\alpha\upsilon\omega$ - The word does not occur before Aristotle.
7015 - Plato divides them into $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\sigma\sigma\phi\omicron\nu$, $\phi\iota\lambda\upsilon\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu$, $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\kappa\epsilon\tau\omicron\delta\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$. Under the life of gain he includes the life of pleasure, for these, he says, are only two forms of concupiscence. But Aristotle, better, separates them. He omits however the $\beta\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma\ \chi\omicron\upsilon\eta\mu\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$, because, as not being purely voluntary it does not exhibit a conception of happiness. Though it has many adherents these do not seek it spontaneously as containing happiness in itself.

8. $\tau\upsilon\chi\ \chi\alpha\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ - they obtain considerations (especially in this treatise) - cf. what is said in 1186. 3-4.

2. $\omicron\iota\ \delta\epsilon\ \chi\alpha\tau$ - but the refined and active seek ($\phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\mu\eta\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\iota$) honour for this, may be said to be ($\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\omicron\nu$) the end of their political life. - The desire for honour is higher than the desire for pleasure. it is "the last infirmity of noble minds"

4. $\delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\iota\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}$ - for it seems to rest more with the honouree than with the honourer, where we divine that the chief good must be one's own and not in the power of others to take away. (secure)

6. Honour is not only insecure, but it seems not even desired for its own sake. It is desired by men as an evidence of their merits; then the consciousness of virtue is the end to which honour is a means. If then virtue be regarded as the end of the political life will this answer to the chief good? No it falls short of being a supreme end. For it might subsist in a life of inaction or of the heaviest misfortunes. And to call this happiness would be paradoxical.

9. $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\tau\eta$ - on grounds of merit? - we do not care to be held in honour by worthless persons or upon trivial or discreditable grounds.

(IV)

7 νον ἰκανῶς.] ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνεται ἀρ-
κούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. * ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ
λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ὃ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει ^{ενεργεσάτω} τούτων,
ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἑσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείντος ὃς εὖ εἰπὸντι πίθηται,
ὃς δὲ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλον ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλλεται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρηῖος ἀνὴρ.

10

V [ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν.] || τὸ γὰρ ἀγα- 3
θὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων 15
2 ὑπολαμβάνειν. οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι ^{the vulgar and coarse} τὴν ἡδονὴν·
διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι
μάλιστα οἱ προέχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός
3 καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ^{superficial} ἀν-
δραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, 20
τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις
4 ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ· οἱ δὲ χαριέντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ
τιμὴν. τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαί-
νεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· ^{too superficial} δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν
τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τάχαθὸν δ' 25
5 οἰκειὸν τι καὶ δυσσφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι δ' εἰ-
κασί τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς
εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ'
οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ γε
6 τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις 30

6. ἀρχὴ post γὰρ pr. K^b (em. corr.²), ἀρκεῖ M^b et mg.³ K^b
et corr. L^b et rc. H^a (γρ. ἀρχὴ mg. H^a) + || εἰ τοῦτο] ἐν τού-
τοις pr. K^b, τοῦτο mg.³ K^b || 7. γὰρ Susem., δὲ ΓΠ Ald. Hel.
Bk. Rr. || 10. νοέει L^b, νοήσῃ (νοήσει M^b) φρασσάμενος τὰ κ'
ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ἣσιν ἀμείνω M^b Ald. Hel. || 11. πείθεται Π¹
H^a N^b O^b, θείπεται Ald. || 13. βάλλεται L^b M^b Ald. || 22. Σαρδανα-
πάλλῳ K^b, Σαρδαναπάλλω c. c. Hel. Ar. Bk.¹ || 23. τὸ post τοῦτο
add. Π² Ald. || 27. πιστεύσωσιν Π¹ O^b Eu. Hel., πιστεύωσιν L^b
Ald. Bk. Rr. || εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς Π¹.

τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις
 1096a κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτως ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλης (ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν)· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ
 5 τὴν ἐπισκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρημα- 8 τιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δηλὸν ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι
 10 πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται.
 4 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφελῆσθαι· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπι- VI σκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γιγνομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδράς εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε
 15 τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλον ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ιδέας 2 ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον (διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον)· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν
 20 τῷ τί καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ιδέα. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς 3

31. δὴ L^b, γὰρ pr. K^b (crx. rc.) † || 1096a, 4. ὑπὲρ] περὶ Bk. Rr. || 5. ἐχομένοις K^b || 6. βίαιός] βίος ἄβιός duo codices Lambini, ἄβιός Muretus, οὐ βίος ci. Coraes, βάνανσός ci. Rr. (haud recte) || 9. τοι om. Π¹ † || 14. ἴσως — καὶ secl. Spengelius || 18. τὸ post καὶ add. M^b O^b Ald. Eu. Hel. Bk. Rr. || ἐλέγομεν K^b † || 20. ἐστὶ post τί add. Γ L^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. (om. etiam Eu.) || καὶ — ποιῶ secl. Spengelius || 23. τούτοις Π¹ || δ' om. Γ L^b Ald. Hel. Bk. Rr.

33. $\epsilon\chi\upsilon\tau\alpha\tau\eta\nu\ \alpha\gamma\epsilon\tau\eta\nu$. It is the $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\alpha\varsigma$, virtue regarded as a moral quality which Aristotle rejects. Pass merits, the passive possession of a mere quality, whose existence depends on the abstinence of some, cannot be thought to constitute the chief good. Very different from this is $\epsilon\upsilon\phi\upsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\tau'\ \alpha\gamma\epsilon\tau\eta\nu$, the consciousness of a virtuous life.
2. $\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ in demonstration are those improved principles necessary to the existence of each separate science, just as $\alpha\gamma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ lead me to the existence of reasoning in general. But in dialectic as here meant, $\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ are paradoxical positions resting on the authority of some great name. The above paradox ($\theta\eta\alpha\tau\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\tau\epsilon\pi\iota\kappa\eta\varsigma\ \eta\ \alpha\gamma\epsilon\tau\eta\ \tau\epsilon\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\eta\nu\ \epsilon\iota\delta\alpha\mu\omicron\nu\alpha\iota$) was maintained afterwards by the Stoics. Cicero maintains it also, arguing the greatness of Regulus (wh. however is not happiness) in his misfortunes.
3. $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\upsilon\kappa\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$, belonging to the world of every day, life - i.e. common place, popular, unscientific - here, 'popular works'. It does not refer to any work of Aristotle (Exoteric philosophy) but to the unscientific discourses of men upon scientific subjects - that is, the insufficiency of virtue for happiness had been the subject of common place discussion. Eustratius thinks that a poem of Aristotle is meant, ending with the same line with which it began, hence $\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$: pulsed soul - $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota$ understood two books $\tau\epsilon\pi\epsilon\epsilon\ \epsilon\gamma\kappa\upsilon\kappa\lambda\iota\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\alpha\iota\ \delta\epsilon\lambda\alpha\varsigma$.
6. $\beta\epsilon\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\iota\varsigma$ - under a sort of constraint, because no one would toil for wealth if he could secure his pleasures without this toil - or is immaterial, because it makes an end of what is essentially a means. It is the opposite of $\epsilon\kappa\upsilon\upsilon\epsilon\gamma\epsilon$ (forced), no one would devote himself to the outset to making money if necessity.
7. $\tau\omicron\ \delta\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\upsilon$. 'the universal' - The Idea was the universal element in existence and in knowledge: without it, acc. Plato, the particular could neither be nor be known. Still the use of the word $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\upsilon$ is remarkable for it does not at all distinctively belong to Plato's system. Aristotle also held the necessary existence of universals, only more as a nominalist, saying that they were $\kappa\alpha\tau'\ \pi\omicron\delta\delta\alpha\tau\alpha$ (predicable of particulars) not $\tau\alpha\pi\alpha\ \tau\alpha\ \pi\omicron\delta\delta\alpha$ (independent of particulars).
- $\tau\omicron\ \delta\epsilon$ - but perhaps it were better to consider the universal and ask what it means, although the inquiry is made difficult.
14. $\delta\omicron\phi\epsilon\iota\omicron$. But it would seem perhaps better, nay necessary, when the safety of truth is in question, to sacrifice even our own theory, especially as we are philosophers: so where both are dear it is a sacred duty to preserve the truth.
16. Hence the saying 'innocent Plato, and brave and true veritas'.
17. $\omicron\upsilon\kappa'\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\upsilon$ - used not to make ideas of things of which they predicated for it, and posteriority. The words $\delta\alpha\gamma\alpha\tau\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\nu\ \omega\delta\epsilon\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\ \tau\delta\epsilon\alpha\varsigma$ seem used to express an arbitrary and fictitious system.
19. $\eta\alpha\iota\delta\alpha\mu\alpha\iota$ - Plato distinguishes two kinds of number, mathematical (one, two, &c) and transcendental (unity, duality, &c). It is the ideal numbers of which Aristotle says that they stand in essential and immutable succession to and dependence upon each other and therefore cannot be brought under no common idea. But unity and duality are ideas the failure of which can be shown by no idea of them.
- $\tau\omicron\ \delta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota$ - now good can be conceived as substance and equality, and as relation and essence, that is substance, is of necessity prior to relation. If this seems as it were an offshoot and hence an accident of substance, the relatively good must be a sort of deduction from the relatively good, and the relatively good, not thought, and thus incapable of being brought under a common idea.

be distributable: they are $\delta\iota\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, substance; $\pi\omicron\sigma\delta\upsilon$, quantity; $\pi\omicron\delta\iota\omicron\varsigma$, quality; $\pi\pi\omicron\varsigma\tau\iota$, relation; $\pi\omicron\tau\iota\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, action; $\pi\delta\omicron\gamma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, suffering; $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, place; $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon$, time.
 $\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, position; $\epsilon\chi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, habit or condition.
 Everything which can be a $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ must come under the head of one or the other of these figures & predicates.

29. There are many sciences which may treat of the good, therefore it cannot be reduced to unity. Plato would say, dialectic is the science of the idea of good, and in this all the sciences find their meeting point. Even acc. Aristotle the $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ falls (in all its manifestations whether as means or ends) under the one supreme science - Politics

30. Now one might be puzzled as to what they mean by an absolute thing, if for instance, in man and absolute man there is one and the same conception of man: for in so far as each is man, there is no difference between them: and if this be true, so also of good. And the absolute good will be no more good by being eternal, since what is worse old is no whiter than that which least, but a $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$. Aristotle says that the idea only multiplies phenomena, as it exhibits the same law or conception as them. But Plato says that particular have no body in them, that the universal is the only condition of their existence. The idea does not multiply phenomena but reduces them to unity.
 Again he conceives duration ($\pi\omicron\tau\omicron\upsilon\chi\pi\omicron\tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon$) and eternity ($\alpha\iota\delta\iota\omicron\varsigma$) which is out of all relation to time, the necessary, absolute, unconditional, uncreated and indestructible.

5. The Pythagoreans seem to give a more probable account of it, placing unity in the row of goods: whom Speusippus too, it must be observed ($\delta\delta\eta$) appears to follow. - see note.

8. But let us consider these questions again.
 $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\upsilon$ - the subject of the good and its relation to unity - to existence - to the world: - the scope of Aristotle's entire metaphysics. $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\upsilon$ does not refer merely to Speusippus and the Pythagoreans.
 $\tau\omicron\delta\iota\delta\epsilon\lambda\omicron\chi$ - but against what I have said an objection may be raised that their arguments are not meant to apply to every good (not in the regarding...) but that under one head are classed those goods that are sought and loved in and for themselves, while those productive of these or in any way preservative of them or of a continuation of their opposites are spoken of as secondary goods (means to these) and in another fashion.

(VI)

λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ
ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέ- 25
τριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ και-
ρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτια καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ
ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετο ἐν πά-
4 σαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν
κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάν- 30
των ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰςὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν
ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατη-
γικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν
5 ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστικὴ. [ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί
ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἕν τε αὐτο- 35
ανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ 1096b
ἀνθρώπου. ἥ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως,
6 οὐδ' ἥ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν τῷ αἰδίου εἶναι μᾶλλον
ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ
7 ἐφημέρου.] πιθανώτερον δὲ εἰκόασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν 5
περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς
δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

8 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν
ἀμφισβήτησιν τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ
τοὺς λόγους ποιῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ 10
διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλα-
κτικὰ πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ
9 τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγεται ἂν τὰγαθὰ,

24. τί <ἔστι> Spengelius et fort. Γ, rec. Rr. || 32. γὰρ om.
L^b Ald. Ar. Bk. || 34. ἀπορήσειε — b, 5. ἐφημέρου alieno loco
inserta sunt e scholis, nisi fallor, Aristoteleis ab editore anti-
quissimo: melius se haberent ante 17. οἷ: ne tamen cum Noe-
telio illuc transponamus, impedit forma orationis || 1096b, 1.
ἐν ante ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς add. Π¹ P² Ar.(?) || 4. πολυχρονιώτερον
Γ L^b || 8. ἔσται Π¹ Hel. Ar.(?) || 10. ποιῆσθαι Π¹ et corr.¹ P²,
εἰρῆσθαι Π² Ald. Ar. Hel. Bk. Rr. et pr. P², εἰρῆσθαι καὶ ποι-
εῖσθαι Γ || 13. τὰγαθόν L^b, τὸ ἀγαθόν H^a O^b Hel., τὰγαθὸν aut
τὸ ἀγαθόν Γ †.

καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίζαντες
 15 οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέ-
 γεται κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θελή τις ἄν; ἢ 10
 ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὄραν καὶ
 ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώ-
 κομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θελή τις ἄν. ἢ οὐδ'
 20 ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ιδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.
 εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν 11
 ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφανεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν
 χιόνι καὶ ψιμνυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρο-
 νήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγα-
 25 θά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι <καὶ> κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν.
 ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ 12
 τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς
 ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ ἀναλογίαν; ὥς γὰρ
 ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.
 30 ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν, ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ 13
 αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴῃ φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 περὶ τῆς ιδέας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι καὶ κοινῇ κατηγορού-
 μενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον ὥς οὐκ
 ἂν εἴῃ πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι
 35 ζητεῖται. τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν 14
 1097a αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ
 παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν
 ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν 15
 οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικεν δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμας διαφωνεῖν·
 5 πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦ-
 σαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλι-
 κοῦτον ἅπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν

19. ἂν τις ΓΠ²H^a Ald. || 25. καὶ add. Noetelius || 26. γε
 om. Π¹ || 32. καὶ ΓΠ² Hel., om. Π¹ Ald. Ar. et Γ¹ || καὶ Π¹
 Eu., τὸ ΓΠ² Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 33. αὐτό τι Π¹ || 1097a, 4. τινα
 ἔχει ΓΠ¹ || 7. ἅπαντας post τὰς τεχνίτας Π¹.

20. or nothing but the ideas? then the idea (the class good) will be devoid of content - The Platonic idea was not only an absolute truth transcending the world of space and time, but also a universal nature manifesting itself in a form of individuals. This latter property, Aristotle argues, will be lost if we keep saying of things & attainable goods, that they are goods in themselves.

2d. Of honour, thought and pleasure different accounts must
be given, when viewed as goods (they exhibit different laws).
The question, whether these goods, sought for themselves, exhibit
the same or different laws of good, he does not stay to inquire.
His statement is mere dogmatism and a trifling with the ques-
tion: of course he would refer us to etaphysics. But, acc. to eto
honour is not an absolute good, and pleasure and thought,
being both *εὐπρόσδε*, exhibit the same law of good.

25. Good therefore is not something generic under one idea. . . .
how then is the term used? for certainly it does not seem to
be a chance equivocation or coincidence in language. Surely
it must be either that all goods proceed from one
or tend to one end, or rather that they are analogous to one
another.

αὐτοῦ τῆς - αὐτοῦ αὐτῶν words, νόμ, kalins, page,
 αὐτῶν μα { ἐκ δ' αὐτοῦ τῶν - ἐκ τοῦ ἐκ τῶν coming from our source
 τῶν ἐκ τῶν - ἐκ τῶν ἐκ τῶν coming from our result
 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐκ τῶν - ἐκ τῶν ἐκ τῶν impertinence of resemblance or analog.

30. but perhaps we should dismiss these questions for the present for to refine upon them belongs more properly to another kind of philosophy. So too with regard to the idea. For even if there is any one good, universal and generic (predicable of all), or Transcendental and absolute, it is plain that it can neither be realized nor possessed by man, whereas it is something of this kind, after which we are enquiring. Not being ^{τι παρ' ὧν τι} it does not belong to ethics, and cannot serve even as a model.

5. They all aim at some good end and seek to supply what is lacking, yet they ignore the knowledge of this. And then it is not likely (reasonable) that all artists should know nothing of, in fact should not even enquire after so great an assistance, if it really exists).

It has been objected that, in the passage *foldo vinn*, Aristotle has selected to mean arts, that he might have spoken differently if he had adduced the fine arts. But the question is whether for practical life the idea, that is a knowledge of the absolute, could be made available. While Aristotle regards it as purely metaphysical and quite apart from practice, Plato regards it as an object for the imagination as well as the reason, an ideal as well as an idea. It would affect life as well as knowledge, for by contemplation of it the mind would become conformed to it.

be benefited with e.g. d is d is x by a knowledge of the absolute good: or how it is to become a better doctor or general by having contemplated the absolute idea.

11. not only does the physician disregard the abstract idea of health: but he does not aim at producing even health in any general sense, but the health of the one particular individual whom he has in hand.

16. every course of conduct and every act has its own peculiar good.

24 and so by a different course the argument has come round to the same point - or, we may say, the good and the end are identical in all individual cases, and therefore the chief good ^{is} the final end will be identical also. In other words, every action aims at some good, and therefore the chief good is what all things aim at: it is the ultimate good or final end of all things.

25. whereas the chief good is absolutely final

VI)

16 οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ ο. κτηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τε- 10
 θεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπι-
 σκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν
 τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει.

VII

καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· πάλιν 5
 δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' 15
 ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ·
 ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς
 ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τ' ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ
 πράττεται; τοῦτο δὲ ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ
 δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν 20
 ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα
 τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστε εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάν-
 των ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω,
 2 ταῦτα. μεταβαλὼν δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτον ἀφίκται. τοῦτο
 3 δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὴ πλείω φαί- 25
 νεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δὲ αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον
 πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν
 πάντα τέλει· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ
 μὲν ἐστὶν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,
 4 εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγο- 30
 μεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε

9. τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν M^b, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν K^b || 18. ἐκάστη
 Γ O^b Ald. Hel. || 21. τέλειον M^b, ἐν ἄλλῳ τέλειον corr.¹ P² † ||
 22. εἰ <ἐν> Zwinger || 24. ταῦτόν] τοῦτο M^b et Eu., qui alteram
 quoque lectionem novit, τὸ αὐτὸ Ald. Hel., τοῦτο αὐτὸ Γ † ||
 25. δὴ Hel. Ar., δὲ Γ Π Ald. Bk. Rr. in textu || 26. ἕτερον
 Γ Π¹ || 27. αὐλοὺς] ἀγροὺς ci. Coraes, φίλους Bonitzius
 (Specimen emendationum, Vindob. MDCCCLVIII), cui frustra
 obloquitur Bendixenius (Philol. XVI, p. 488), cf. 1099a, 33 sq.,
 secludendum esse ci. Zellius || 28. πάντα] ταῦτα ci. Coraes ||
 30. τελειότερον γὰρ λέγομεν Eu.

δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν <καὶ> καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν,
 καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέ-
 ποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ. 5
 1097b ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο,
 τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα
 μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν,
 5 διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμο-
 νίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. φαίνε- 6
 ται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ
 τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δὲ αὐταρκές λέγο-
 μεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γο-
 10 νεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πο-
 λίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος 7
 ὄρος τις· ἐπεκτείνουντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους
 καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο
 μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκές τίθεμεν ὃ μονού-
 15 μενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηθενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ
 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην 8
 μὴ συναριθμουμένην. συναριθμουμένην γὰρ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέ-
 ραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν
 γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἰρετωτέρον
 20 αἰεὶ. τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκές ἡ εὐδαιμονία,
 τῶν πρακτῶν οὐσα τέλος.

32. καὶ post τῶν add. Eu. Felicianus et, ut videtur, Hel.
 (de Γ¹ tacet Schmidtus) || 34. δ'] δὴ ΓΚ^b || 1097b, 5. δ' post
 εὐδαιμονίαν H^aK^bP² || 10. γυναιξὶ Π¹, γυναικὶ c. c. Eu. Hel.
 Ar. || 11. πολιτικὸς L^bM^b Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr., πολιτικὸν c. c. Eu.,
 πολιτικὸν ζῶον Γ¹ || ὁ Π¹ Eu. Hel., om. Π²H^aP². Ald. Bk. Rr. ||
 15. αἰρετὸν] ἄρκιον καὶ αἰρετὸν ΓH^aL^bP² Eu. Hel. Ar., αἰρε-
 τὸν καὶ ἄρκιον M^b || 17. συναριθμουμένην γὰρ — 20. αἰεὶ vel certe
 18. ὑπεροχὴ — 20. αἰεὶ secl. Zeller (Philos. d. Gr. II³, 2.
 p. 610 sq. n. 2), nescio an recte || γὰρ Ar., δὲ ΓΠ Ald. Bk. Rr. ||
 21. τῶν] πάντων τῶν M^b Ald. et pr. P² †.

33. and therefore we call that absolutely (of its nature of) an end, which is desirable in and for itself always and never as a means to something else. Plato says those are the highest goods which have desired both for their own sakes and for their results. Aristotle's conception of the practical chief good is that while it is solely an end, it yet sums up the results of all means.

for we should choose each one of them even if they bore no fruit.

9. If we desire everything else only for the sake of happiness, the possession of it would render all such minor desires superfluous.

10. τὸ δὲ αὐτάρκῃς - the conception of all sufficiency we do not mean to limit to the individual alone leading a solitary life, but we extend it also to parents and children and wife and in general friends and citizens: since man is by nature social. - that is, through the chief good. needs nothing besides itself to make life all we could desire. we must not understand this to mean that it would enable a man to be independent of his fellow-men and live happily in isolation.

who should constrain himself to live out of all relation to his fellow-men would not have any more than a man who would go down on one leg. This error, thus protected against by Aristotle was common in the history of philosophy.

but to these we must set some limit, for if we extend the limit to ~~many parents~~ fathers and forefathers and the friends of a man's friends it will go on forever. But this point we must consider hereafter. - He does not return to this question.

11. τὸ δ' αὐτάρκῃς. the self-sufficient we define as that which alone and by itself can make our life all that is desirable and supply all our needs, and as such we regard happiness, and moreover we think it the most desirable of all goods provided it be not counted one of their number. For it is plain that if it were so reckoned it would become more desirable with the addition of the slightest good, for the addition constitutes a preponderance of goods, and the greater good is always the more desirable.

12. He has pointed already that the chief good, whatever it is, must be τὸ αὐτάρκῃς, (2) αὐτάρκῃς ὅτι αὐτὸν, now (3) he lays down that it must be self-sufficient.

24. proper function - the purpose of wishing -

25. Plato defines the *εἶδος* or end of anything as that which cannot be accomplished or not so well accomplished by any other thing.
shall we say, that a carpenter or cobbler has a certain specific end and course of action, and that man (as man) has none, and has no end in his action?

26. now mere life is shared even by the plants whereas we are seeking something peculiar. We may set aside therefore the life of nutrition and growth

27. succeeding this is what may be called the life of perception - (the perceptive principle)

28. there remains the moral life (the life of free moral action) of the creature possessing reason (or belonging to that part of us which possesses reason)

ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ - the meaning of *ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΟΣ* are

1. with a genitive - able to do, disposed to do.
2. active, practical, opposed to quiescent or speculative.
3. moral, opposed to the life of animal instinct or to the artistic and the scientific.

29. *ἵππους*. But further, since this life may be spoken of in two ways (either as an existing state, *ἐν ᾧ ἐστί*, or developed into actuality, *ἐν ᾧ ἐκτελέσθαι*) we must assume it to be in actuality: for this seems the more properly called life.

30. Now if the function of man be conscious life according to a law, or implying a law, and if (an appeal to language or common consent) we say that the function of such one and of such a good one is in kind the same, as, for instance, of a harper, and of a good harper.

31. *νοῦς* substitutes for the previous *ἵππους* denotes the entire principle of life, thought, and action in man. (see note)

VII)

- 9 ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμο- 6
 λογουμενον τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι
 10 λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθῇ τὸ ἔργον
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ 25
 παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξεις, ἐν
 τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ το ^{ἐν} ~~ἐν~~ οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ
 11 ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν
 καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδὲν
 ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χει- 30
 ρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι
 ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θεῖται τις ἂν
 12 ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν
 εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φντοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφο-
 ριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ ἀνέξητικὴν ζωὴν. ἐπομένη δὲ 1098a
 αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ
 13 καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λό-
 γον ἔχοντος. [τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς
 ἔχον καὶ διανοοῦμενον.] διττῶς δὲ [καὶ] ταύτης λεγομένης 5
 τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγε-
 14 σθαι. εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον
 ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει
 τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου
 κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς 10
 κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
 κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ)· εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τί-

24. δὲ M^b Hel. Ar. Par. 1417 et corr.¹ P² (haud male) ||
 28. ἔργον τι ΓΠ², τι ἔργον c. c. Γ¹ || 32. ταῦτα ante πάντα
 ΓM^bO^b, om. L^b || 33. γὰρ] οὖν Hel. || 1098a, 3. δὲ Π¹, δὴ c.
 c. Hel. Ar. || 4. τούτου — 5. διανοοῦμενον secludenda esse ci.
 Grantius, secl. Rassovius || 5. καὶ secl. Rassovius || 6. <τῆς μὲν
 κατ' ἐνέργειαν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔξιν> τὴν Rassovius || 7. δὴ
 Susem. secundum Heliodori paraphrasin (τοίνυν) et Argyropyli
 translationem (igitur), δ' ΓΠ Ald. Bk. Rr. || 12. δ'] δὴ secun-
 dum Rieckheri translationem ci. Susem.

12 θεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις
 μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίον δὲ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἔκα-
 15 στον δὲ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ δὲ οὕτω, 15
 τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεταί κατ' ἀρετὴν,
 εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην.
 ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἕαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ 16
 μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα
 20 οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος. * * *
 7 περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ (δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑπο- 17
 τυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἰδ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι). [δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς
 εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ,
 καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι.
 25 ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γηγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσ-
 θεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. μεμνησθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, 18
 καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ἡμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκά-
 στοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔφ' ὅσον οἰ-
 κεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρως διαφερόντως 19
 30 ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔρ-
 γον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεωτῆς γὰρ τάληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν
 δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα
 τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν 20
 1098b ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι κα-
 λῶς [[, οἶον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς]]. τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή·
 τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δὲ αἰσθησί, 21
 αἱ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρα- 22
 5 τέον ἐκάστας ἥ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι

13. πράξιν Γ^Mb O^bP² Eu., πράξεις c. c. Hel. Ar. || 15. δὴ Bonitzius, δ' ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 18. οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα secludenda esse ci. Susem. || 19. δὴ ΓO^b, δὲ καὶ H^aP² || 20. * * Susem.: desunt quae citantur 1199a, 32 || 22. ἀναγράφειν M^b O^b Ald. || δόξειε — b, 8. ζητουμένων secl. Susem.: v. quae adnotabo ad v. 26 sqq. || 25. αἱ add. K^b || 26. μεμνησθαι — b, 8. ζητουμένων ab Aristotele abiudicat Rassovius || 1098b, 2. οἶον — ἀρχάς secl. Zeller (ap. Muenscherum) || δ' secludendum esse ci. Rr. || ὅτι del. Gifanius.

14. and everything is well completed in accordance with its own proper excellence. This connexion between itself and its own peculiar law of excellence, is that of the *form*. It is used here to justify the term *Kat' aspectiv* in the definition of happiness.
15. if so, I say (8n), it results that the good for man is conscious life according to the law of excellence, and if this excellence be more than one, according to that which is best and in itself most absolutely desirable.
- γινεσθαι* used just as the future tense is often employed.
16. *ἐν βίῳ τῷ τελείῳ* - 'in a complete period and sphere of circumstances', *βίος*, the external form and condition of life implies both fortunes and duration. The addition of this gives a practical aspect to the definition: ideally, a moment of consciousness might be called the highest good, independent of space and time. As to *τῷ τελείῳ*, no doubt the conception is partly a complete or perfect duration of life, partly an external history and career that could be designated as desirable for its own sake. *ἐν βίῳ* is not merely a complete life.
17. as much then for a sketch of the chief good, for we ought surely to draw the outline first and afterwards to fill it up. And it would seem that any one could bring forward and complete what fits in with the sketch, and that time is a good discoverer of such things and a good cooperator. Hence it is too that the development of the *telos* has taken place for it is in every man's power to add something hitherto wanting.
18. *ἀκριβέστερον* - mathematical exactness is not suited to ethics, too much subtlety is not to be expected, and too much detail is to be avoided. (see note)
19. *ὅτι* - in the same way as a model in cork could never be finished like one in ivory.
20. *μορὰς ἀνθρώπων* are practical: mathematics are exact. *οὐδὲν* - nothing would be gained by making the comparison of a real thing with a model. So the subject matter of moral science is not a model of exactness and the practical character in view does not require it.
21. *ὅτι* - fact itself is the object of his speculation.
22. in morals it is sufficient that the fact be well established - as is the case with first principles: now the fact constitutes a starting-point and first principle. - In morals a fact appealing to the individual consciousness has a paramount validity.
23. of principles some are apprehended by induction, others by intuition, others by a sort of habituation of the mind: in fact different principles in different ways. But we must endeavour to apprehend them in the natural way, and we must take all pains to have them delineated as fully as they have great influence on what follows - Aristotle having laid down his ground principle of ethics makes a pause, introducing some remarks on principles, their importance and the methods of attaining them.
- ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ* - shows that the list of methods is not meant to be exhaustive: it only generalizes the whole proposition. *ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν* is the evolution of a general law out of particular facts. *διότι* is the recognition of the law in the fact. It is not to be restricted to the perception of the sense or confined to the physical sciences. Rather it is opposed to *ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν* as intuition to inference.

...from the fact that it is not a mere vacuum as necessary -
...less at the same time without which we could not live at all or be mistaken perhaps for instinct though they are the sort of long exercise and frequent repetition.

8. we must consider it (the first principle, 20X7, referred to in the preceding line) therefore not only from the point of view of our own conclusion and premises, but also from that of sayings on the subject, for with what is true all experiments coincide, with what is false the truth quickly shows a discrepancy.

12. to apply our principle (5X) goods have been divided into three classes, some being called external goods, the others goods of mind and of body, and those of mind we call most distinctly, and most especially goods - it is only in opposition to virtue that we can call 40X4 mind. Aristotle thus is much more free and undefined than we are.

18. and our definition is right in that certain actions and modes of consciousness are specified as the end in itself: for thus it comes to be one of the goods of the mind and not one of those that are external.

19. 20X5 is aimed for the development of the moral nature of man: - εὐδαιμονία more generally, for the development of any part of his nature into consciousness. In either case the man depends not out of himself: the good is one existing in one for his mind.

22. moreover the various theories of what is requisite with regard to the purposes seem all included in the definition - more so in the case of the meanings of 6X7 (5X) - vare - vague popular theories given above -

1. to require 2. to search after 3. to examine investigate 4. to question. Here 6X7 (5X) to move means partly 'the things demanded or thought requisite: partly the discussions or investigations on the subject of happiness.

δὲ καὶ - a transition from popular opinions to philosophical views

24. not an accurate classification of the schools of philosophy. The Cynics identified happiness with virtue: Socrates with practical wisdom (90X4015): Anaxagoras with philosophy (100X4) and so too Heracitus & Anaxagoras: Plato says that it consists in these things or one of them with pleasure added or implied: that favorable external conditions must be included was the opinion of Democritus.

27. now some of these are opinions held by many and from ancient times: others by a few illustrious men: but it is not likely that either class should be utterly wrong, rather that in some point at least if not in most of their conclusions they should be right.

He says nothing here in reference to those who made happiness to consist in 100X4 115 which or 90X4015. The relation of these in his system to happiness is discussed in Bk. 6 + 10 - a mark of systematic method in the book.

(VII)

- 23 καλῶς. μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι βροπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ
 γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἡμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμ-
 VIII φανῇ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.] σκεπτεόν δὲ περὶ 8
 αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος,
 2 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ 10
 ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ
 ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ [τάληθές]. — νενεμνημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυ-
χὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ
 μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ. τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχι- 15
κὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ
 γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὔσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ
 3 τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὁρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγον-
 ται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγα-
 4 θῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός. ^{with our definition of πρὸς as referring to} συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ 20
 εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα. ^{abstract as grammar words} σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία
 5 τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. — φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα 9
 6 περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν
 γὰρ ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δο-
 κεῖ· τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἀνευ ἡδονῆς· 25
 7 ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπααραλαμβάνουσι. τού-
των δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι
 καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν
 8 τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἔν γε τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. τοῖς

7. γὰρ ΓΚ^b Eu. Ar., οὖν c. c. Hel. || ἦ] ἦ τὸ H^aP² Ald. Eu. Hel., τὸ ἦ τὸ M^b || τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι H^aΠ¹ Ald. Eu., εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς O^b, τοῦ παντὸς L^b, παντὸς εἶναι Bk. Rr. || ἐμφανῇ M^b Ald. Hel. || 8. δὲ K^b Hel., δὴ ΓM^bO^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr., δὴ καὶ H^aL^bP² || 9. αὐτοῦ (i. e. τῶν ἀγαθῶν a, 20) deletis a, 22. δόξειε — b, 8. ζητουμένων Sussem. || 10. αὐτοῦ Eu. || 12. τάληθές secl. Rassovius || 26. εὐπορίαν Ald., εὐμερίαν ci. Coraes || συμπααραλαμβάνουσι ΓΚ^bL^b Eu. Hel., συμπεριλαμβάνονσι M^bO^b Ald. || 29. ἔν γε pr. K^b (crx. rc.), ἐπί H^aM^bO^b Ald. et pr. P² || τι om. pr. K^b (suppl. rc.) || ἦ καὶ L^b, ἦ Γ Eu., καὶ M^bO^b Ald. Hel. Ar., τὴν pr. K^b (del. rc.), om. Cardwellus || κατορθοῦντας Cardwellus.

30. τὴν] τὴν πᾶσαν $\Pi^2 H^a$ et pr. P^2 , τὴν πᾶσαν τὴν (superscr. εὐδαιμονίαν) corr.¹ P^2 , πᾶσαν τὴν M^b Ar., πᾶσαν Hel. || σύ-
νορός K^b , συμφωνός L^b , συναρδός c. c. Eu. Hel. || 1099 a, 10.
φιλοθεωρῶν K^b , φιλοθεάμονι Π^2 , φιλοθεώρων c. c. Eu. Hel. ||
13. τοιαῦτα Sylburgius Bk. Rr. || 14. δ' $\Gamma \Pi^2$ Eu. Ar., δὲ P^2
Ald., δ' αἰε Π^1 || 15. δὲ ΓL^b , δὲ δὴ M^b , δὴ c. c. Hel. || 22. καὶ
ἀγαθαὶ γε καὶ καλαὶ $O^b P^2$ Ald. Eu. Hel. Ar., γε ἀγαθαὶ καὶ
καλαὶ M^b , καὶ ἀγαθαὶ τε καὶ καλαὶ K^b , καλαὶ γε καὶ ἀγαθαὶ
 L^b , καὶ καλαὶ τε (vel γε) καὶ ἀγαθαὶ Γ .

3. for a mode of consciousness (conscious life) according to law, of excellence is not less this.

5. for too it is they who act who attain the noble and excellent share in life.

10. the superiority of the pleasures derive from virtue to other pleasures is indisputable -
1. because the former are intrinsic or inherent in the act themselves.
2. because they are natural and not artificial.

11. for the feeling of pleasure is something internal.

12. now most men's pleasures are discordant: there is a sense of discord in them because they are not naturally pleasant: the beautiful things are pleasant which are naturally pleasant. Τα φύσιν ἡδύα - pleasant things are, ought to be, and must be pleasant according to the eternal fitness of things, in accordance with the whole frame of the world - partly pleasures which are in accordance with the nature of the individual - his natural state, his highest condition.

16. that is, happiness must be the actual tendency of virtue: but it cannot be its conscious aim

17. in 2. 3. 1. he says that pleasure is the condition of a thing being formed. There is no pleasure in doing a thing, such is not his habit. He had said above that the virtuous man loves virtue and that he takes pleasure in it. now he goes further and says that unless a man feels pleasure in it he is ipso facto not virtuous at all. The conduct of the Cyrenaeans fails of being strictly virtuous because it is accompanied with pain and difficulty.

31. as we have said, it seems to require favorable external conditions (external goods) as well.

2. the absence of some (conditions of prosperity) is enough to ruin happiness

6. as we have said then it seems to require favorable external conditions (prosperity) of this sort: hence some have identified good fortune with happiness, and others virtue. - The Cypriatics and Cypriotes seem to be alluded to here.

7. Whence, also, the question has been raised whether it (happiness) is to be attained by teaching, or habit, or any other kind of practice; or whether it comes by some divine providence or we may even say by chance. - Since happiness seems to be a balance of two principles, virtue (internal) and circumstances (external), the question arises whether it is, it is made by the individual (though many described it as such), or whether it is beyond his control. The question of the day, moreover, 2000 or 2500 years ago, comes before him in mentioning that some identify happiness with virtue, and he says: it is questioned whether happiness can be learned?

III)

ἔκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπονδαῖος· κρίνει
 14 δ' ὥς εἵπομεν. ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ
 εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ *Δηλιακὸν* ἐπί- 25
 γραμμα·

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
 ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίστοις ἐνεργείαις· ταύ-
 τας δέ, ἡ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαι- 50
 15 μονίαν. φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεο-
 μένη, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ καλὰ
 πράττειν ^{καὶ ἀποφύγετα} ἀχορηγῆτον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται,
 καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς 1099
 16 δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι δυπαλίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον
 εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους. οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ
 τὴν ιδέαν παναίσχυς ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος,
 ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἦτιον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἴεν [ἢ φίλοι], 5
 17 ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἵπομεν, ἔοικεν προσ-
 δεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας. ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν
 ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν].

IX ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ καὶ 10
 ἄλλως πῶς ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινὰ θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην 10
 2 παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν θεῶν δῶρημα ἀν-
 θρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ

28. ἡδιστον δὲ] πάντων δ' ἡδιστον (πάντων ἡδιστον δ'
 crx. Spengelius) E. E. 1214a, 6 || δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυ-
 χεῖν K^b Hel., δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἔραται (vel ἐρᾷται) τυχεῖν H^a
 M^b N^b P² et codices E. E., δ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τυχεῖν Γ Π², δὲ τυ-
 χεῖν οὐ τις ἔκαστος ἐρᾷ Ald., οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν E. E. secun-
 dum Ald. || 30. τὴν om. Π² || εἰναί φαμεν H^a M^b P² Ald. ||
 1099b, 1. διὰ] καὶ διὰ Π¹, ἢ διὰ Ald. Hel., τῶν L^b † || 5. ἢ
 φίλοι om. H^a O² P² Par. 1417 Eu. Hel. †, μὴ φίλοι ci. Coraes ||
 ἢ om. K^b Ald., καί, si ἢ φίλοι recte se habeant, ci. Coraes ||
 8. ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν secl. Gifanius Rr. || ἔνιοι] ἔτεροι K^b Bk.
 Rr. (ἔνιοι etiam Hel. Ar.) || 9. ἢ καὶ Π¹ H^a P² Eu., ἢ Γ Π² Ald.
 Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 11. θεῶν ἐστι Γ H^a M^b O^b P² Ald.

especially as it is the best of human things.

μαλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσω βέλτιστον· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν 3
 ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν
 15 μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ
 ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρε-
 τῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ
 μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύνκοινον· δυνατόν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι 4
 πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τινος μαθήσεως
 20 καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαι- 5
 μονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὥς οἶόν
 τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτως πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ 6
every kind of causation
 τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην.
depend upon
 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημ-
in an unbecom- ingly
inconclusive 25
 μελές ἂν εἴη. συμφανές δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητού- 7
 μενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις.
 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ
 συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὁργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα 8
 δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς
 30 τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται
 τοῦ ποιούς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτι-
in part, however, in the direction
 κούς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππων οὔτε ἄλλο 9
 τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἶόν τε
 1100a κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν 10
 οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων
 διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρί-
 ζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ
 5 βίου τελείου. πολλὰ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι 11
 τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστα εὐθνηοῦντα
 μεγάλας συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς

14. καὶ ἐν] εἰ καὶ L^b Eu.(?) Hel.(?), καὶ O^b || 17. εἶναι φαίνεται K^bP² Hel., εἶναι post φαίνεται M^b, om. cet. Ar. (fors. recte) || 20. ἢ] ἢ τὸ Π¹ || 25. δέ τι K^b, δ' ἂν εἴη L^b + || 33. τῶν] τι τῶν H^aM^bO^bP² Hel. Ar.

- virtue, the only & the sole of learning and for learning, in a special sense, one of the divinest of things - & thus, ...
1. is acknowledgment and admission of the religious point of view, i.e., the divine basis, grounds for the intervention of Providence in this case as in any others.
 2. his strict maintenance of the separate spheres of the sciences: a question of theology cannot bring in ethics.
 3. his half-ironical manner of dismissing the subject; altering the view and giving it a Pantheistic instead of a Theistic tendency.
 4. his immediate return to the natural and practical mode of thought.
 5. the intervention of natural laws does not include divine agency, which established the laws and works through them.
 6. it must be widely common property; for it can be possessed through a certain course of learning and care - by all who are not incapable of excellence. - This last clause (not to be) is justified by arguments from both reason and experience. Aristotle insisted much less than Plato on the innate difference between us and the gods.

10. οὐτὼ ἐδὲ τινος μεθ' ὧν καὶ ἐπεμετρίετο.

21. are regulated in the best possible way.

23. ἐπιόντι δὲ τῷ seems to be nature (Φύσις, 1.21) - every act and every intelligent cause (for αὐτὸς here refers to any sort of intelligent cause as opposed to ἡ φύσις) does its best: and therefore nature, which is the first of causes, above all others does what is absolutely best. Nature translates the theory in virtue.

7. τὰ νοτὰ ἡγιασμένα are τὰ σωματικά - comprising (1) τὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, such as health, which are necessary to the existence of happiness: and (2) τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, as wealth, friends, &c. which are helps and instruments to happiness. - If happiness lies essentially in the consciousness: then there are other and secondary conditions partly necessary and partly favorable.

23. in agreement with what we said in starting

29. ἡ πολιτικὴ aims at securing happiness through the means of virtuous conduct and character, and this implies that the acquisition of happiness depends mainly on ourselves.

8. δὲ τὸν ὁπότε - the boy's good qualities have not an independent existence in and for his own consciousness: they only give the promise of such.

4. Happiness, he says, requires absolute virtue and a completed round of life, this owing to the uncertainty of human affairs, though which brings him to consider the paradox of Solon.

10. he is no one else of mankind (rather to be considered happy, as he is, and must we as Solon says, look to the end? Well then if we are to adopt this view is a man really happy then, when he is dead?
11. *οὐδ' ἄλλοι οὐδ' ἄλλοι - περὶ. not even an ordinary man.*
οὐδ' ἄλλοι. 901-2. οὐδ' ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς πόλιν ἢ τοὺς οἴκους ἐνέουσι.
13. now, surely this is altogether absurd, especially to us who call happiness a vivid state of consciousness.

18. now this also is open to some difficulty: for it is thought that both good and evil can happen to the dead, just as to the living, who are unconscious of them -
 Grant omits *μη*, giving greater strength to the idea.

19. Oedipus would not have been concerned if he had known who translated ~~him~~ if they came to the living without his being conscious of it. - he had never discovered his incestuous marriage. His ignorance would not have been bliss. It is somewhat natural then to suppose that the happiness of a dead man, and though he be unconscious, is marred by the misfortunes of his family on earth. He is however only stating a popular belief.

22. for however happy may have been a man's life, and however fitting his death, it is still possible

26. and it is plain that in their several degrees of removal the deceased may stand in every variety of relationships to their ancestors - some giving pleasure, some pain.

27. it would be absurd therefore if the dead should change in sympathy with them and become at one time happy and then again wretched: but it would be absurd also that in nothing and not even for a moment should the fortunes of the deceased interests the ancestors. - This latter is merely a popular argument, not Aristotle's own views. See however Chap. 11. sec. 1.6.

31. but let us return to our original problem, for perhaps the present question may be solved by a reference to it.
προτ. ἀπορ. - translation of Solon's
ὅτι τὸν νεκρὸν οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἡμεῖς
 question arising out of attempts to explain the dictum in the next chapter he applies the solution of the dictum to the wider question.

X)

ἡρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησά-
μενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδείς εὐδαιμονίζει.

X

πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον 11

2

ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὀραῖν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ 11
θετέον οὕτως, ἅρα γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀπο-
θάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέ-
γουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέρογείαν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγο-

3

μεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, (μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται,) 15

ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον
ὥς ἐπὶ τὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει
μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα· ^{εἰς ἀπορία}δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ
τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ
αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ 20

4

ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι· ^{difficult}ἀπόριαν δὴ
καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει. τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέγροι
γῆρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μετα-
βολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν
ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναν- 25

5

τίας, δηλὸν δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς
παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται· ἄτοπον δὴ γίνονται ἂν,
εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαί-
μων 30

6

πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος, ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ
τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. 30
ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν
θεωρηθεῖη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος
ὀραῖν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὥς ὄντα μακά-
ριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαί-

1100a, 8. τρωϊκοῖς Π¹ et corr.¹ P², γρ. ὁμηρικοῖς mg. P²
(sed oblitt.), ἡρωϊκοῖς c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. || 9. εὐδαιμονίσει Γ
(nescio an recte) || 17. τῶν post καὶ fort. recte om. Π² Ald.
Hel. (legisse videtur Eu.) || 19. μὴ] καὶ Hel.(?) || 21. δὴ Susem.,
γὰρ M^b, δὲ c. c. Bk. Rr. || 26. δ'] γὰρ vel θ' ci. Susem.
28. συμμεταβάλλοι L^bM^b Eu.(?) Hel., συμμεταβάλλοι K^bO^b Ald. ||
32. τὸ post δὴ add. K^b, fort. c. c. omittendum est (cf. v. 11).

35 μων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ
 1100b βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς
 καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπέληφέναι καὶ
 μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖ-
 σθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς· ὁ δὲ γὰρ ὥς εἰ συνακολουθοίμεν 8
 5 ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν
 πολλάκις, ^{καὶ οὐκ ἐκαστὸν} χαμαιλέοντα τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες
 καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον. ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν 9
 οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ
 προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, κύν-
 10 ραι δὲ εἰσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ
 δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν 10
 διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
 ἔργων βεβαιότης ὥς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν
 μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
 15 τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώταται διὰ τὸ μάλι-
 στα καὶ συνεχεύοντα καταξῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους·
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην.
ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου 11
 τοιοῦτος· αἰ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει
 20 τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντα
 πάντως ἐμμελῶς ^{καὶ οὐκ ἐκαστὸν} ὅ γ' ὥς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος
 ἄνευ ψόγου. πολλῶν δὲ γινόμενων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφε- 12
 ρόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχη-
 μάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ὁ δὲ γὰρ ὥς οὐ ποιεῖ
 25 ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν
 εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ ^{αὐτὸς} αὐτὰ συνεπι-
 κοσμεῖν πέφυκε, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία
 γίνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται

1100b, 9. εἶπαμεν K^b Bk.¹ Rr. || 15. τιμιώτεραι M^b Hel.,
 τιμιώτεραι καὶ Eu. † || μονιμώτεραι ΓΠ¹ L^b Eu. Hel. et corr.¹
 P² (de Γ¹ tacet Schmidtus) † || 17. αἴτιον Γ L^b || 23. μικρό-
 τητι Π² M^b.

8. because we do not wish to ~~change~~ ^{change} the course of our lives and because our supposing happiness to be abiding and in no way open to change. With Fortune wheel makes man return to the same individuals

7. rather to follow chance is altogether a mistake, for good and evil resides not in these, but human life requires them, so we have said, as an external condition; while what determines happiness is the rightly regulated mental consciousness, and vice versa (harmoniousness of mind)

11. and even the present difficulty bears witness to our theory - the difficulty felt in predicating happiness except retrospectively shows that happiness must be regarded as something more stable than the fluctuations of fortune. This stability is intelligible if happiness depends on virtue.

12. for about no human object is there so much stability, as about harmonious moods of the consciousness (virtuous actions) for these are thought to be more abiding even than the sciences. And the highest among them are most abiding of all, for because the happy dwell in them most entirely and continuously which account for their never being forgotten - every virtue in active exercise. Aristotle insists upon the stability and permanence of mental states. Thus he says "We are masters of our actions, but our habits are masters of us", "The just man cannot be unjust at will." (note)

19. the required stability will belong to the happy man, and happiness will be through life: for always or above all men he will act and contemplate in accordance with the law of his being. -

21. now the results of fortune are manifold, both great and small, good, and likewise evil fortunes if small, obviously do not alter the balance of the life and feelings (Fion) [turn the scale of life], but good fortunes, if considerable and coming in numbers, will make one's condition (1305) more blessed.

26. for they naturally add a lustre (to our happiness) This is said from the practical point of view which analyses happiness into the internal mood and the external circumstances. From the ideal point of view which takes happiness as a whole, nothing can be added to it or make it better.

29. while contrary circumstances depress and spoil (crush man's blessedness introducing (bringing with them) pains and often hindering the play of the mind (hindering many noble acts)

2. ἀναγνώριαν - the view of the slaves. But Aristotle maintains that natural feelings, though under control are not to be crushed or eradicated.
32. not from insensibility, but from true high-breeding and greatness of spirit.
33. now if life is determined by its moments of consciousness (our life by our acts), as we have said, no one of the blessed will ever become miserable for he will never do that which is hateful and mean. μακρίος is a more enthusiastic term than εὐδαιμόνιος, and would seem generally more applicable to the internal feelings.

6. the happy man can never become miserable - not however that he will retain his joyful state (be blessed) if he falls into the lot of Pinax

11. And after such he cannot again become happy in a short time, but, if at all, in a long and complete period, having in it attained great and noble things.

14. who is enjoying absolute harmony of mind (perfect virtue in) and is sufficiently furnished with external goods, not for a casual period but for an adequate length of time? or must we add - 'and who shall live on so and die accordingly' - since the future is uncertain to us, and we assume happiness to be ~~something~~ an end in itself and absolute in every possible way?

(X)

τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολ-
 λαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ κα- 30
 λόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυ-
 χίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὧν καὶ μεγάλω-
 13 ψυχος. εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ
 εἵπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε
 γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς 35
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφορον πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημό- 1101a
 νως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰετὰ κάλλιστα πράτ-
 τειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῇ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ
 χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων
 σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον 5
 14 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν
 οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακαριός γε, ἂν
 Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ
 εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθίσεται ῥα-
 δίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγά- 10
 λων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν
 εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινι καὶ
 τελείῳ, μεγάλῳ καὶ καλῷ ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.
 15 τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν
 ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, 15
 μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; [ἢ προσθετέον

34. γίνοιτο? Susem. || 35. τὰ post καὶ add. Π¹ (om. etiam Hel.) || 1101a, 1. ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐφρονα L^b et corr.³ K^b, καὶ ἔμφορον ἀγαθὸν H^aN^b, εὐδαίμονα καὶ ἔμφορον ἀγαθὸν M^bP², ἔμφορον καὶ ἀγαθὸν Hel. † || 8. γε M^bP² Ald. Hel., τὲ K^b, om. Π² || 10. οὐδ' M^bP², οὐδ' H^aL^bO^b Ald., οὐτε K^b Eu. Hel. || 11. τε post τοιούτων O^b, om. L^b Ald. et, ut videtur, Ar. || οὐκ] δ' οὐκ L^b Ald. Ar. || 16. μὴ — βίον post 17. οὕτως tri. Euckenius || ἢ — 19. πάντως ad antecedentia non quadrare ideoque ab ipsius Aristotelis doctrina abhorre demonstravit Rasso-
 vius, qui signo interrogandi in puncti locum post ea posito hoc quodammodo excusari vix recte censet: secl. Susem.: utrum signum praestet, dubius sum.

καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτως καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ
τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τί-
θεμεν πάντη πάντως;] εἰ δ' οὕτως, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων 16

20 οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω, τὰς δὲ XI
τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν
μυηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς
δοξαῖς ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων δια- 2

25 φοράς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμέ-
νων τῶν δ' ἥττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ
ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν
ικανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχη- 3
μάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βροῦθος καὶ ῥοπήν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ

30 δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως
ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ 4
τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα
καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι,
συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως 5

35 τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοι-
1101b νωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖ-
ται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τούναντίον, ἀφανρόν
τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν
γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
5 μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι 6
μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἰ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φί-

19. καὶ post πάντη add. O^b Ald. † || 20. δ' δ' ὡς ΓΟ¹ Eu. Hel. et corr. P¹ † || 21. μὲν om. Π² (leg. etiam Hel. Ar.) || 26. ἕκαστα L^b M^b || 33. πλάττεσθαι Hel. || 34. ταύτην Π¹ P³ Eu., ταύτη ΓΠ² H^a Ald. Ar. || δ' secludendum vel γ' restituendum esse ci. Euckenius || 35. τόδε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι Lambinus, τόδε δεῖ ἀπορεῖσθαι Rassovius, τῷ διαπορεῖσθαι codices Lambini, rec. Coraes, ἢ δεῖ ἀπορεῖσθαι vel ἢ <δεῖ> διαπορεῖσθαι Euckenius || 1101b, 1. γὰρ] οὖν L^b Hel. (γὰρ etiam Eu. Ar.) || 5. συμβάλλεσθαι — 9. μηδὲν secludenda esse ci. Victorius (nescio an recte).

19. if so, we shall call those men happy during their lifetime who have or shall have the qualities mentioned, but of course happy ^{for men} (is only in so far as men can be happy: happy but still subject to the conditions of humanity).

21. chap 11. as to the question whether the happiness of the dead can be affected by the vicissitudes of this world, he will not altogether deny that some consciousness of events may reach the dead, but he argues that the impressions produced by them must be slight and unimportant.

25. of the misfortunes which affect (attach to) one's self, some have a certain weight and influence upon life, while others seem lighter. If then this be true as well in regard to those which befall all our friends, and if there is a far greater difference (it matters far more) whether any misfortune happen during our lifetime or after our death than it matters whether heinous and dreadful deeds in the tragedy occur before the action of the play or are acted on the stage if so we must take account of this difference, or rather perhaps we must take into account the fact that a question is raised (that it is doubtful) about the dead as to whether they share at all in good or evil.

(1) if misfortunes were in this life differ when they concern ourselves and when they concern our friends.

(2) if absence from the actual scene of their occurrence and a fortiori if removal to another world altogether dull their effects upon us

It is -

Then these points and especially this difference must be taken in consideration in determining the question before us. Unless indeed we go further still and make the question one not of degree but of fact: how far are they affected? but are they affected at all?

3. either in itself or upon them - referring respectively to §§ 3 and 4.

10. Chap. 12. The trifling and unimportant question whether happiness is to be considered as admirable or praiseworthy, is answered by being stated; for the chief good and the absolute must necessarily be above praise, which is only given to the relatively not-absolutely good. But Aristotle, aimed at verbal precision and wished to reconcile his theory with all questions, doctrines and forms of language of the day.
11. for of course it is plain that it is not merely a potential good—
 goods are divided into
 1. potential, which may be good
 2. actual, which must be good: comprising the praiseworthy & the admirable, which are above praise.
 8 υναρτων things not necessarily good, their character depending on the use made of them—as power, riches, beauty, strength.
12. from its possessing a certain character and bearing a certain relation to something else. (cf. sec 3 - 8 c' & 9 c' 25)
20. because praise is made by reference to a (higher) standard.
 Moreover το ττατος involves the idea of commendation
22. Praise is always applied with a view to results; results are necessarily higher than the means which lead to them: these results and at any rate the final result cannot be subjects for praise.
28. To have pleaded well the claims of pleasure to the first prize, for the thought, its not being praised, while it is a good shows that it is above those things which are praiseworthy
31. praise is for excellence (for thus it is that we become disposed to noble deeds: eunoia are for achievements whether bodily or mental. But perhaps to go into the minutiae of this subject belongs more properly to those who write out (to write on) eunoia ... (to treat it accurately) — the Sophists are especially referred to.

(XI)

λων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

XII

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαι- 12
μονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· 11
2 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἐστίν. φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν
τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν ἐπαι-
νεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν
ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ 15
ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόντινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγα-
3 θόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς
θεοὺς ἐπαινῶν· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερό-
μενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαινους δι' 20
4 ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιού-
των, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν
τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς
μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειο-
τάτους μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς 25
γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὥς
5 θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδόξος
καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ
ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὕσαν μηνύειν ὥτε οὐ κρεῖττόν ἐστι
τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰγαθόν· 30
6 πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀναφῆρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος
τῆς ἀρετῆς (πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης), τὰ δ'
ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν
7 ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν

11. πότερα K^b, πότερον L^b Eu., πότερον οὖν M^b || 12. δῆ] δὲ ΓΠ² Ar. || 15. τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα K^b Ald. Eu., τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰς πράξεις Π² H^a M^b P² Ar. || 16. δὲ add. K^b, c. c. om. Bk. Rr. || 21. εἵπαμεν K^b Bk.¹ Rr. || 25. μακαρίζομεν post ἀγαθῶν transponendum esse ci. Thurotus, secludendum forsitan esse ci. Sussem. || 29. κρεῖττων ἐστὶ Π¹, κρεῖττόν ἐστι c. c. Hel. Ar.

- 35 τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
 1102a εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων.
ἔοικεν δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ 8
 χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ
 καὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.
- 13 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' XIIII
 6 ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον. τάχα γὰρ οὕτως
 ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ 2
 καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεπο-
 νῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν
 10 νόμων ὑπηκόους (παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν 3
 καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινας ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι
 γεγέννηται)· εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον 4
 ὅτι γίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ 5
 ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τάγα-
 15 θὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐξηγοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην.
 ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν 6
 τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέ-
 γομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν 7
 εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θε-
 20 ραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα
 καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἱατρικῆς· τῶν δὲ ἱατρῶν οἱ χα-
 ρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶ-
 σιν. θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον 8

1102a, 2. ἀρχὴν M^b O^b Ald. || 3. πάντα post πάντες H^a O^b P² Ald., post πράττομεν M^b Eu. || 4. τίθεμεν] hoc loco clausulam imponere debebant libro primo || 5. ἐπεὶ Π¹ Ald. Eu. Hel. Ar., εἰ ΓΠ² || 6. σκεπτέον L^b Hel.(?), ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη K^b, ἐπισκεπτέον c. c. Eu. || 8. γε πονεῖσθαι ci. Coraes || 12. αὕτη ἡ σκέψις Π² || 13. γίνοιτ' K^b, γένοιτ' c. c. Eu. Bk. Rr. || 19. ψυχῆς K^b O^b Eu., ψυχὴν c. c. Hel. || θεωραπεύοντα ΓΚ^b, θεωραπεύοντα L^b, θεωραπεύοντα c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. || 20. πᾶν <τὸ> ci. Rr. || 21. τῶν — 22. γνῶσιν fort. secludenda esse ci. Susem. || τῶν δὲ ἱατρῶν K^b, καὶ τῶν ἱατρῶν M^b P² Eu.(?), καὶ τῶν ἱατρῶν δ' ΓΠ² H^a Ald. Hel. (fors. recte) || 23. δ' Π² M^b (δὴ etiam Hel.).

2. And this seems the case also from its being a principle: for we do all things else for the sake of this. Now the principle and the cause of things we assume to be something admirable and divine — $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ - primary motive
Happiness or the chief good is the $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ of life as being the final cause or $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$. But the idea of happiness when apprehended becomes an $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ in another way, namely, a major premise or principle for action (see 6. 12. 10)

His language resembles Plato's with regard to the idea of good.

5. Chap. 13. If happiness be conscious life in conformity with the law of absolute excellence, the question arises, what this law of excellence is. A threefold development of the internal principle is assumed as sufficient for present purposes:-

1. the purely physical or vegetative, excluded from all share in human excellence properly so-called, i.e. virtue.
2. the semi-rational or appetitive, the sphere of moral virtue
3. the purely rational, the sphere of intellectual virtue.

6. this also seems to have been the chief concern of the true politician (statesman), for he wishes to make the citizens good and obe dient to the laws.

$\kappa\alpha\tau' \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\alpha$ - absolutely, deeply, essentially, what it is, to the exclusion of all mere seeming. These are opposed to the $\epsilon\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\iota$ $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\iota$ whose aims are not always to make the citizens better.

11. as an instance of this we have the law givers of the Cre-
tans and the Lacedaemonians -
Aristotle like Socrates & Plato felt a preference for the Spartan constitution which presented the scheme of an entire education for the citizens.

These systems above all others attempted to regulate by legislation all the details of private morality, the domestic life, the personal interests of the citizens, regarding their character not only as citizens but as men.

19. But if this be so, it is plain that the politician must know in a way the nature of the internal principle, just as he who is to cure the eyes must know also the whole body. And this holds good the more in proportion as Politics is higher and better than medicine - just as the oculist must understand the whole nervous system, so the politician who has not by any means to deal with the whole of the $\psi\chi\eta$ must understand its entire nature, although his knowledge may be limited by a practical scope. This is better than to make $\omicron\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho$ the object of $\theta\epsilon\rho\alpha\pi\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, that as the doctor must understand the body, so the politician must understand the $\psi\chi\eta$.

25. for to be more accurate would involve more than our present purpose requires.
27. as for instance that part of it is irrational and part rational.
28. or whether they are distinguishable only in conception, while in nature they are inseparable, like the concave and convex in the circumference of a circle makes no difference for our present purpose.
29. now of the irrational, part appears common and vegetative. I mean that which is the cause of nourishment and growth: for this sort of power of the internal principle must assume as existing in all things that are nourished, and even in brutes, and the same also in perfect creatures, for this is more reasonable than any other supposition.
3. now excellence in this respect seems common and not peculiarly human for this part or faculty seems to operate especially in sleep and the good and bad are least distinguishable in sleep.
7. now this result is natural: for sleep is an inaction of the internal principle, viewed as morally good or bad, except so far as certain impulses may to a trifling extent reach it, and as the degrees of the good will be better than those of the common sort.
18. but there seems also to be another nature in the internal principle which is irrational and yet in a way partakes of reason. For in the continent and incontinent man we praise the reason and that within them which possesses reason.

(XIII)

- δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητού-
 μενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶν ²⁵
⁹ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ^{popular account} ἐξω-
 τερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκοῦντως ἕνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. οἶον τὸ
¹⁰ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πό-
^{divisible matter} τερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη καὶ πᾶν τὸ
 μεριστον, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότες καθάπερ ³⁰
 ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει
¹¹ πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυ-
 τικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἵτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν
 τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τροφομέ-
 νοις θεῖη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην ^{1102b}
¹² καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύ-
 της μὲν οὖν κοινὴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπικὴ φαίνεται· ^{not particular human} δο-
^{peculiar} καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μέρος τοῦτο καὶ
 ἢ δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δὲ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι ⁵
 καθ' ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς
¹³ εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτ' εἰκότως· ἀργία
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἣ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φανύλη,
 πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν δικνοῦνται τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ
 ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν ¹⁰
¹⁴ τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλης, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν
 ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν·
¹⁵ ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις ^{element} φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, με-
 τέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν

25. πλείστον L^b Ald., πλείον c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. || 33. αὐξάν-
 νεσθαι H^a Hel.(?), τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι Ald., αὔξεσθαι c. c. Eu. ||
 1102b, 3. ἀνθρωπικὴ Π² H^a M^b P² Eu., ἀνθρωπίνῃ K^b Hel. Bk.
 Rr. || 5. διάδηλος P² Ald. Hel., δηλός Eu., διαδηλοῖ ci. Zellius † ||
 13. δὲ K^b L^b O¹⁻³. Eu. Hel., δὴ Γ H^a M^b O^b P² Ald. || τῆς Π¹ Ald.
 Eu. Hel., om. Π² || 14. μέντοι πῃ K^b P² Ald. Eu. Hel. Ar., μὲν
 πῃ Γ Π² M^b, πῇ μὲν H^a || ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς Π² Ald. Eu.
 Hel. Ar., ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς Γ Π¹ H^a P², ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ
 εὐκρατοῦς v. d. in exemplo Gottingensi editionis Wilkinsonianae,
 ἀκρατοῦς [καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς] Onckenius (speciosius quam verius).

15 λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν. ὁρθῶς γὰρ
 καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα ^{ἐν τῇ τῇ} παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς
 καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μέχεται τε καὶ
 ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ^{ἐν τῇ τῇ} ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυ-
 μένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινήσαι
 20 τοῦναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
 οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν 16
 τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ^{ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ} ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυ-
 χῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομι-
 στέον εἶναι τι ^{besides} παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντι-
 25 βαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 17
 φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ
τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρο-
 νος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ 18
 καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινω-
 30 νεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὁρεκτικὸν μετέχει
 πῶς, ἥ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. [οὕτω δὴ καὶ
 τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φάμεν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ
 ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.] ὅτι δὲ πελθεταί πῶς ὑπὸ λόγου
 τὸ ἄλογον, μὴνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε
 1103a καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, 19
 διττόν ἐσται [καὶ] τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ,
 τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ 20
 ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς
 5 μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἡθικὰς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν
 καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἔλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην

17. τε om. Π² || 20. εἰς] καὶ εἰς P² Par. 1714 Hel. † ||
 περιφέρεται M^b, προσφέρεται K^b, παραφέρεται c. c. Eu. Hel. ||
 29. φυσικὸν L^b, θυμικὸν pr. K^b, φυτικὸν c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. et
 rc. K^b || 31. οὕτω — 33. μαθηματικῶν secl. Stahrius Rr. || 33.
 ὥσπερ <ἐπὶ> ci. Coraes || 1103a, 2. ἔσται ΓK^b P² Ald. Eu. Ar.,
 ἄρα Π², ἔσται ἄρα M^b || καὶ secl. Coraes, non vertit Ar. || γὰρ
 post μὲν haud male add. M^b P² † || 3. δὲ] δὴ ci. Rr. (fors.
 recte).

16. δ & thus appears to be something else also within them, who fights and strives against the reason. For just as paralyzed limbs in the body, when we mean to move them to the right, go in the opposite direction to the left, so it is with the mind: for the tendencies of the incontinent are in the opposite direction to reason.

It has been said that this passage exhibits the doctrine of human corruption. But to say this introduces a set of associations foreign to Aristotle. The passage does not go so deep as to the distinction and contrast between sin and holiness, purity and corruption: it does not point out a radical and incurable defect in the whole race of man: on the contrary he says presumptuously that in the $\theta\omega\phi\omega\rho$ all things are in harmony with reason.

25. $\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\omega\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\kappa\epsilon\iota\upsilon$. Otherwise it could not oppose reason as in $\tau\omega\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\varsigma$, $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$ with reason as in the $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\varsigma$, or become merged in reason as in the $\theta\omega\phi\omega\rho$. But it is not wholly rational else it would not be $\theta\epsilon\tau\iota\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$ to reason.

26. for in the continent man it certainly obeys his reason. And perhaps it is still more obedient in the temperate and the brave: for in them all things are in harmony with reason. The $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\varsigma$ is one who maintains virtue by a conflict. In the $\theta\omega\phi\omega\rho$ there is an absolute harmony between the passions and the reason. The $\delta\upsilon\delta\omicron\pi\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$ is one whose instincts coincide with his reason.

30. But the appetitive part and the concupiscent generally, in a way, partakes of reason, inasmuch as it is subject and obedient to it. In like way we speak of paying attention to one's father and one's friends not in the same sense as we speak of paying attention to mathematics.

There is an analogy between the obedience of the passions to the reason and the submission one pays to the law of the state, and on the other hand between the purely intellectual and the exercise of mathematical study and the independent action of the reason itself.

3. According to this division also is human excellence divided. For we speak of intellectual and of moral excellences, philosophy, intelligence and wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral.

...praise or blame the philosopher man for his state of mind, and
praise or blame the states of mind we call excellences.

14. We are not immediately told that the consideration of $\epsilon\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$ intel-
lectual $\epsilon\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$ is to be deferred: that only comes out incidentally
(ch. 2.2) when he defers the discussion of $\sigma\phi\delta\omicron\varsigma \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, attainments
identified with $\phi\delta\omicron\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, the perfection of the practical reason.
Hence the mention of the two forms of $\epsilon\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$ only goes to show
that neither of them is innate - that they are both acquired.
15. $\tau\omicron \pi \alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ - now intellectual excellence ~~is~~ for the most
part takes both its origin and its growth from teaching,
(is acquired and developed mainly by instruction, hence it
requires experience and time: but moral virtue results
from habit whence also it has, with a slight deflection,
derived its name. ($\eta\theta\iota\kappa\eta$ from $\epsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$
Aristotle is inclined to this mechanical theory both of the
intellect and the moral character: it is qualified however
by admissions with regard to $\epsilon\lambda\theta\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\eta \epsilon\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$
 $\tau\omicron \pi \alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ - with the exceptional case of great natural genius.
16. whence also it is plain that none of these ~~is~~ in this sense in
us by nature.
If moral virtue be implanted by nature, and not acquired by practice, the
science of ethics has no reason ~~to be~~ as a practical science: and the affec-
tive part of the $\psi\chi\eta$ would be as much out of our control as the in-
tuitive and vital functions.
23. therefore neither by nature nor against nature, do the vir-
tues come in us, but we are on the one hand naturally
disposed to receive them and on the other hand per-
fected by habit.
26. Again all the things that come to us by nature we ~~use~~ $\epsilon\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$ it
is difficult, of these do we exhibit them in actual operations.
This is clear with regard to the senses, for we did not get our
senses by hearing often or seeing often, but on the contrary,
we had them and then used them, we did not learn them
by using them.
31. But the virtues we gain by having acted first: as in the
case with the $\epsilon\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$, for those things which we must
learn before we can do, we learn by doing.

III)

ἡθικῆς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετός ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετάς ἀρετάς λέγομεν.

10

B.

B I

διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς, ἣ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει 15 καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἣ δὲ ἡθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα
 2 ἔσχηκεν μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. — ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει 20 κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω βλέπων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδὲ
 3 ἄλλο οὐθὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίγνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόςι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειομένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ 25
 4 ἔθους. — ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολ-
 λάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχο- 30
 μεν)· τὰς δὲ ἀρετάς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκο-

Lib. II. K^b M^b = Π¹, L^b O^b = Π².

1103a, 14. δὴ Susem. secundum Rieckheri translationem, δὲ ΓΠ Ald. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 15. πλεῖον K^b L^b P² Hel., πλεῖστον ΓM^b O^b Ald. Ar. || ἐκ τῆς διδασκαλίας L^b Hel. (?), ἐν διδασκαλίας M^b et corr.¹ P² † || 18. παρεκκλῖνον Ald., παρεγκλῖνον K^b N^b P² Hel. † || 22. αὐτὸν post μυριάκις add. ΓΠ² H^a N^b Ald. Ar. Bk., om. Π¹ P² Hel., secl. Rr. || τὸ om. L^b Ald. (legit etiam Hel.) || 23. ἄλλως post τῶν secl. Spengelius || 32. τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν ἄλλων Π² (τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν etiam Hel.).

δόμοι γίνονται καὶ καθαρίζοντες καθαρισταί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ
 1103b μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονες
 σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρεῖοι. — μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγνό- 5
 μενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθί-
 ζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομο-
 5 θέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν,
 καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης. — ἔτι 6
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ
 καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ καθαρίζειν·
 καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ γίνονται καθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον
 10 δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ
 εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς
 κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, 7
ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι
 15 τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδι-
 κοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖ-
 σθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὁράδας. οἱ μὲν
γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὁρ-
 20 γίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ
 ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ
 ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιᾶς ἀποδιδόναι· 8
 κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ
 μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθύς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζε-
 25 σθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.
 2 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά Π

34. δὴ L^b Hel., om. M^b || 1103b, 10. οἱ ante οἰκοδόμοι
 add. H^a N^b P² Ald. Hel., secl. Rr. || 15. γινόμεθα post ἄδικοι Π²,
 γινόμενα K^b (γινόμεθα ante οἱ μὲν etiam Hel.) || 18. τὰ prius om.
 L^b Ald., utrumque M^b Hel. || 26. ἐπεὶ — 1104a, 26. σφίξεσθαι turbare
 sententiarum continuationem nescio an recte videantur Euckenio
 (p. 15), fort. igitur una cum 1105a, 14. καὶ ὅτι — 16. γινόμενον et
 1106a, 24. πῶς — 26. αὐτῆς secludenda sunt || ἕνεκέν? Susem.

7. Again, from the same given circumstances, and by the same means used, all excellence is both produced and destroyed. for by harp-playing both the good and the bad harpers are formed - while in nature the same causes invariably produce the same effects.
8. $\epsilon\kappa\tau\acute{\omega}\nu\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ - But all men do not start equals in morals or as artists. What determines the well or ill of the first essays in art or in action, is in the one case genius, talent, aptitude or the reverse: in the other case, $\epsilon\iota\phi\upsilon\delta\iota\alpha$, or the rational bent of the character, as modified by circumstances.
9. $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ (also written $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$) = $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\gamma\omega\varsigma$, in like manner - peculiar to Aristotle's Ethics.

13. but all would be formed (be born) good or bad - and so all apprenticeship or practice would have been useless.

21. and, in one word, states of mind are formed out of corresponding acts - Aristotle's famous doctrine of habits. This was a new discovery and in contrast with the state of moral action in his time.

By means of $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$ and $\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\pi\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$, he finds it possible to explain the formation of virtue just as he does the existence of the world. In each act and movement at the outset of $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$ which was potential in us and quite indeterminate to good or evil ($\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$) is brought to actuality, and is then determinately either good or evil. This determination in the case of habits reproduces itself, and thus there is no longer left an ambiguous $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$, but a $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$ or $\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\pi\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ which is good or evil is explained. Why we are good or bad, or that we do not know, is the content of the habit. The habit is a $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$.

we may be conversive, else there would be no profit in the enquiry (that it is necessary to consider with regard to actions, how they should be done: for these are what determine the quality of the states of mind which are products in us, as before stated.

27. ὁσπερ δ' ἔτι καὶ - classifying sciences into speculative and practical - Elsewhere he adds a third class, the productive. Moore says - other treatises on this subject.

30. αὐτὰ - the παρὰ τοῖς; the ἐν ἐργασίᾳ of chap. 1.

31. That we must act according to the right law is a general principle and may be assumed (as the basis of our conception); but we shall discuss hereafter, both what the right law is, and how it is related to the other virtues.

κοινόν - a generic difference - a quality which without being strikingly obvious is distinct from the other virtues; the conception of a class.

ἐκ τούτου ὁρθόν νόμον - 'according to the right law' rather than 'according to right reason': -

(1) because of the article, which seems to show that νόμος is used here to denote no particular faculty of the mind, but bears a general sense

(2) because by the use of a word so definite as 'reason' we exclude the notion of associations which must have been in Aristotle's mind of standard, proportion, law, &c

3. now the decisions and interests of men exhibit no fixed rule - no more than the conditions of health do

5. and if this is the case with the universal theory, still more is the theory of particular acts incapable of being exactly fixed, for it falls under the domain of no art or regimen (body of rules), but the actor themselves must always consider (watch) what suits the occasion, as is the case with medicine and navigation - that is, (1) the theory of action cannot be reduced to universal axioms, like those of mathematics (2) it is impossible to do what the theorist would attempt, viz. to settle scientifically the minutiae of particular actions.

11. first then we may observe that in such matters excess and defect are alike prejudicial (for about immaterial things we must use material analogies, παρὰ τὰ σώματα)

τὰ σώματα τὰ - virtuous actions.

ὡς περ - there are three points to which this chapter and the next contribute tentatively to the theory of virtuous actions: -

(1) from the analogy of life, health and strength, they must exhibit the law of the balance between extremes.

(2) virtue reproduces the actions out of which it was formed.

(3) it is essentially, pleasurable, and is indeed essentially based on a regulation of pleasures and pains.

ταπεινός - the line of thought pursued in this chapter is the analogy existing between the body and soul in respect of their habits or acquired capacities. In the formal definition (chap. vi) the argument proceeds from the analogy between virtue and art.

(II)

ἐστὶν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ
 σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γινώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν
 ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς
 πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γὰρ εἰσιν κύριαι καὶ 30
 2 τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν
 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω, ῥηθῆ-
 σεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὀρθὸς λόγος,
 3 καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδι-
 ομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπων 1104a
 καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς
 εἵπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ' ἐν
 ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐσθηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσ-
 4 περ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, 5
 ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές·
 οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει,
 δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς αἰετὸς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.
 5 ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου 10
 6 πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ
 τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρε-
 σθαι (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις
 χρῆσθαι), ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὀρώμεν·
 τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα 15
 φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία
 πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γιγνόμενά φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ

27. τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ M^b Hel., ἡ ἀρετὴ τί K^b || 28. γινώμεθα
 M^b, γινώμεθα c. c. P² Hel. Bk. Rr. || 29. ἐπισκέψασθαι] ἐστι
 σκέψασθαι Γ O^b P² Bk. Rr., ἦν σκέψασθαι K^b, εἴη ἂν σκέψα-
 σθαι M^b || 32. ὑποκείσθω Γ Π An., ὑπερκείσθω N^b P² Ald. Hel. ||
 33. ὁ ante ὀρθὸς add. M^b N^b Ald. Bk. Rr., om. Π² K^b P² Hel. ||
 34. προδιόμολογείσθω Γ M^b Hel., προδιωμολογείσθω Ald., προ-
 διωμολογήσθω P², προσδιόμολογείσθω K^b, προομολογείσθω Π² ||
 1104a, 1. πρακτῶν O^b Ald. Hel., πρακτέων Π¹ L^b || 13. δεῖ —
 14. χρῆσθαι post 14. ὀρώμεν transp. Muretus.

σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ 7
ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.
20 ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπο-
μένων δειλὸς γίγνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ
πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης
ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος,
ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναίσθητός τις.
25 φθείρεται δὴ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερ-
βολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται.

ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ ἀνξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ 8
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ
αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
30 ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος·
γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολ-
λοὺς πόρους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν
ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ 9
τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενό-
35 μενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ
1104b καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φο-
βεῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενό-
μενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδο- III
5 νὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματι-
κῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος
ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ
μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ
ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετή. — διὰ μὲν γὰρ
10 τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν
καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὥς 2

24. τις om. ΓΠ² Hel. + || 25. δὴ Susem., δὲ K^b, γὰρ c. c. Ar.
Bk. Rr., ἄρα? Susem. || 27. αἱ ante ἀνξήσεις add. M^b P² Ald.
Hel. Bk. Rr., om. Π¹ H^a L^b N^b || αἱ ante φθοραὶ om. Π² H^a N^b
P² (habet etiam Hel.) || 1104b, 2. γινόμενοι Rr. (errore typogr.).

2. ἡγροῦκος - ascetics, hoarse; prob. referring to the *Deipnists*

27. But not only does the formation, the increase, the destruction of these qualities arise out of the same given circumstances, and by the same means - the exercise also of the qualities when formed) will be in the same sphere. This is the case likewise with things more palpable, as for instance strength. For it arises out of taking much food and enduring much toil, and these things the strong man is especially able to do.

+ now we must consider the test of a formed state of mind to be the pleasure or pain that results on doing the particular acts. For he who also ~~is~~ from bodily indulgence, and feels pleasure at doing so, is temperate, but he who does it reluctantly, is temperate and he who endures danger gladly, or at all events without pain is brave, while he that does it with pain is a coward.

ἀκόλαστος and δειδώς seem loosely used, merely as the contradictories of σώφρων and ἡδονικός. So a brave man with danger or to meet danger with reluctance, shows not intemperance or cowardice, but only imperfect self control.

9. for it is with pleasures and pains that moral virtue is concerned - the proofs (to which we refer to some extent run into each other and the whole of it after may be accused of want of neatness both in itself and in relation to the entire Ethics. But we must remember that there is still something tentative in Aristotle's theory of virtues that psychology was still in its infancy, and that Aristotle was only gradually winning his way to establish moral virtues as certain virtues who had

6. punishments, also which are inflicted by means of these bear witness to this. for they are remedies as it were, and remedies naturally go by contraries.

8. Again as we have already said, every mental state is essentially related to and concerned with those things by which it is naturally made better or worse. Now men, on reading, when our mental states are corrupted by pleasures and pains, from pursuing and avoiding them — either those which one ought not (to pursue or avoid), or at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner, or what ever other points of the kind are specified in the definition (500 to 5400)

25. Hence it is that people define the virtues to be certain aptitudes and allies and quietudes — not rightly, however because they state this absolutely without adding 'as is right' and 'as is wrong' and 'when it is wrong' and all the other qualifications. Of Zoroaster esp. the Cyrics, but others also, as Democritus who seems to have placed the highest good in ἀταξία. ἀνδρῶν — absolutely, as opp. κατὰ πρὸς θεοῖν or πρὸς ἀνθρώπων 'with a qualification'.

27. we assume then that this kind of excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains, and tends with regard to them to the performance of what is best, while vice is the opposite.

ΠΙ)

ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ·
 3 ἢ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. — ἔτι δὲ εἰ αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσι περὶ
 πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἔπε-
 4 ται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ 15
 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. — μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμε-
 5 ναι διὰ τούτων· ἱατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι
διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. — ἔτι, ὥς καὶ πρότερον
 εἵπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὅφ' οἷον πέφνυκε γίνεσθαι
 χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύ- 20
 σιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ
 διώκειν τὰς καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἄς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ
 ὥς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅσα καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ
 τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς
 καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ 25
 ὥς δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται.
 6 ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῆς, ἡ δὲ κακία τοῦναντίον. —
 7 γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ἔτι περὶ τῶν
 αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν 30
 τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγὰς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ [τριῶν]
 τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα
 μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστίν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρ-
 τητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη
 τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἴρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· 35
 8 καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. — ἔτι 1105a

13. εἰ αἱ Coraes, ἐπεὶ αἱ Hel., εἰ om. K^b, αἱ c. c. om.
 An. Bk. Rr. || 14. πράξεις καὶ πάθη ΓK^b Ald. An. Hel. Ar. et
 corr. P², πάθη καὶ πράξεις cet. || 21. φαῦλοι ΓL^b M^b P² Ar. et
 pr. K^b et E. E. II, 4, φαῦλοι O^b Ald. Hel. Bk. Rr. et rc. K^b ||
 γίνονται secludendum esse ci. Spengelius || 26. καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ
 om. Γ Hel. (legerunt etiam An. Ar.) || 31. τῶν] ὄντων τῶν M^b
 N^b P², ὄντων Π² Ald. || τριῶν secl. Coraes || 32. βλαβεροῦ] ἀσυμ-
 φόρου Π² M^b N^b P² Ald. Hel. Ar. (fors. recte) || πάντα μὲν ταῦτα
 ΓH^a N^b P² Ald. Bk. || 34. τε om. Π².

δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀπο-
 τρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. — κα-
 νονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἷ μὲν μᾶλλον οἷ δ' ἦττον,
 5 ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. — διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα 9
 τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις
 εὔῃ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. — ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον 10
 ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος,
 περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή·
 10 καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὔῃ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ
 ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ
 τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὔῃ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται,
 ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.
 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι 11
 15 ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύ-
 τως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ,
 εἰρησθῶ· ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ IV
 μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα
 σώφρονας. εἰ γὰρ πράττουσιν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα,
 20 ἥδη εἰδὲν δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ
 καὶ μουσικὰ, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ 2
 τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι
 ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε
 οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ
 25 καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμ-

1105a, 5. ταῦτ' Rr., τοῦτ' II Ald. Bk. (τοῦτο K^b) || 7. καὶ] ἢ L^b Ald. Hel. Ar., ἢ καὶ M^bN^b || 11. καὶ τῇ — 12. πολιτικῇ secl. Gifanius || ἡθικῇ M^bO² Par. 1417 Ald. et pr. P² et re. L^b, ἀρετῇ c. c. Hel. Ar., ἀρετῇ τῇ ἡθικῇ ci. Zelliis (haud recte) || 14. καὶ ὅτι — 16. γινομένων si genuina sunt (v. quae adnotavi ad 1103b, 26 sqq.), 15. ὑπὸ τούτων post καὶ αὖξεται traicienda esse censet Sussem. || 19. τὰ post καὶ add. II² Ald. Bk. Rr. || 20. εἰ] οἱ M^bN^bP² Hel. † || 21. τὰ ante μουσικὰ add. K^b Bk. Rr. || 24. καὶ om. ΓM^bN^bP² Hel. || τι ante καὶ II² (sed non Hel.).

Again it has been fostered in us
it is hard to rub off this feeling which is ingrained into
our life. And we all move or less measure actions by
pleasure and pain.

17. This statement & the theory involves a difficulty - how do we become just by doing - just things? Give us just things
we are not yet just already, as Plato persons music is a virtuous
musician:-
1. Not even in the arts is this the case. The first essays of the learner
in music by chance or by the guidance of his master attain a
sort of successful and an artistic appearance, but the learner is
no artist as yet.
 2. a fortiori it is not the case in morals. For the outward result
in art is something sufficient in itself. But the outward act
in morals is not enough. Hence those just acts by which we
acquire justice are not in inspection rather just
Aristotle also notes that knowledge is less important than
purity of purpose and stability of character: that philosophy
without action is in vain for the acquirement of virtue. &

32. He says not that 'good acts must be done with the feeling of duty,' but merely that they must be chosen for their own sake. (as $\sigma\tau. \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\sigma$). He does not analyse further.

33. Now for the attainment of $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\eta$ (the $\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota$) none of these is taken into account except the mere knowledge, but with regard to the attainment of virtue knowledge is of a light or no weight while the other elements are of no small weight. They are all in all. But in $\epsilon\theta\eta$ VI. 13. 6 and VII. 2. 5 (which are probably by Eudemos), it is said he who has $\sigma\phi\omega\eta$ & 15 has all the virtues.

12. But most people do not do these things but fly to the theory, as opposed to practice) of them, and think to philosophize, supposing that so they shall be good men, just like sick men, who listen carefully to their physicians but do not practice a single thing they are told. As then, by this mode of treatment, they will never get well in body, so neither will these men get well in mind by philosophizing.

V)

³ ματικὴν. ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτα πῶς ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἔαν αὐτὰ πῶς ἔχη, δι-
 καίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔαν ὁ πράττων ³⁰
 πῶς ἔχων πράττη, πρῶτον μὲν ἔαν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' ἔαν προαι-
 ρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἔαν
 βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττη. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς
 μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλην ^{1105 b}
 αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μι-
 κρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν
 δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ
⁴ σῶφρονά περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σῶ-
 φρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σῶ-
 φρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σῶφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα
 πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτως πράττων ὥς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ
⁵ σῶφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια
 πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σῶφρονα ὁ σῶφρων· ¹⁰
 ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε
 γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττου-
 σιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν
 καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὁμοίον τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς
 κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι ¹⁵
 δ' οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ
 ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυ-
 χὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

26. τε add. K^b P² Tubingensis, c. c. om. Bk. Rr. || 27. γιγνό-
 μενα Ald., γινόμενα Π² || 28. αὐτά Π² || 29. ἂν Π² || 30. ἂν
 Π² M^b || 32. καὶ προαιρούμενος om. Π² N^b P² † || διὰ ταῦτα Γ
 K^b † || 1105 b, 2. τὸ δὲ πρὸς Ald., πρὸς δὲ K^b, prb. Rr. (nescio
 an recte) || 4. καὶ post ἅπερ add. Π² Ald. † || 6. ἢ ὁ K^b Ald.
 Hel., ἢ Π², καὶ Γ M^b P² Ar. || 8. οἱ post δίκαιοι καὶ add. L^b
 Ald. Hel. Bk. Rr. || 9. τὰ om. Bk. Rr. || 11. μελλήσειε K^b P² Hel.,
 μελήσειε cet. Ar. || 16. οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι L^b, ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ M^b, ἐκεῖνοι
 οὐδ' Γ.

4 τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξῆς σκεπτεόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν ν
 20 τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστίν, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τού-
 των ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν 2
 ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πό-
 θον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυ-
 νάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ'
 25 ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι. ἕξεις δὲ
 καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ
 ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνεμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν,
 εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα. πάθη μὲν 3
 οὖν οὐκ εἶδὲν οὐθ' αἰ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἰ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγό-
 30 μεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς
 ἀρετάς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ
 πάθη οὔτε ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται
 ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς
 1106 a ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς καὶ τὰς
 κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ 4
 φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἰ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ
 οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
 5 κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς καὶ τὰς κακίας
 οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακινεῖσθαι πῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ 5
 δυνάμεις εἶδὲν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι
 πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγό-
 μεθα. καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ
 10 κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότε-

19. τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξῆς K^b O^{2.3.}, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξῆς O¹, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ΓΠ²
 Ald. Hel. Bk. Rr., μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ M^b || 21. ἂν
 τι ΓΚ^b, τι (τί P² Ald.) ἂν Π² M^b N^b P² Ald. (nescio an recte) ||
 22. θάρσος post φθόνον K^b, θράσος c. c. Hel. Bk. Rr. || μῖσος
 φιλίαν Π², φιλίαν μῖσος c. c. Hel. Ar. || 25. λυπιθῆναι Ald.,
 φοβηθῆναι secundum Stob. Ecl. eth. p. 296, Rasso-
 vius || 31. ἢ] καὶ K^b Ar. Rr. || 1106a, 8. πάσχειν] πράττειν O²
 Ald. Ar., secl. Gifanius (male) || 9. καὶ om. K^b, secl. Rr.

23. in short all that is accompanied by pleasure and pain.
 24. those faculties by which we are said to be capable of feeling these things as for instance capable of being angry or pained or of pitying (of feeling anger or pain or pity). Those states by which we stand in a certain condition, good or bad, to the feelings, as, for instance to feeling anger in excess or defect, it is an evil condition: the moderation a good condition.

These three terms are not scientifically defined. Thus of the feelings, desire is a wider term than most of the others; envy and emulation are different modes of the same feeling and so on.

Notice - ἐξ ὧν ... καὶ ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔστι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ

2. neither anger nor fear springs from purpose whereas the virtues are deliberate choices or at least imply deliberate choice - there has been no proof of this position as yet.
 3. ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος - spontaneously
 προαίρεσις - are extreme statements, in opposition to the social doctrine that virtues were ἐφ' ὧν ἔστιν, which he immediately modifies.

15. We must premise, then, that every excellence both exhibits the perfection of the thing of which it is an excellence, and causes the perfect performance of its functions.
See Plato Rep. p. 353 p. 335

21. Cicero treats of human virtue as part of a general law by which all natural objects fulfill their several relations, and in accordance with their own proper excellence.

(V)

6 ρον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἶσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λεί-
πεται ἕξις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

VI ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται· δεῖ 5
δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποῖα

2 τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτό 15

τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδω-
σιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπου-
δαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ
ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε
σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἐπι- 20

3 βάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ'
ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔρ-

4 γον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτο ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι
δὲ καὶ ᾧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποῖα τίς ἐστὶν 25
ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστὶν

λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα
ἡ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἴσον μέσον

5 τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν ^{κατὰ φύσιν} πραγμα-
τος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ 30
ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, ^{ἀπὸ τοῦ} πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονά-

6 ζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἓν, οὐδὲ ταῦτόν πᾶσιν.
οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἕξ μέσα
λαμβάνουσιν κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ
ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν 35

7 ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ
εἴ τῳ δέκα μναὶ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλεί- 1106b
πτῆς ἕξ μναῖς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ
τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ

24. πῶς — 26. αὐτῆς secludenda et 26. δὲ restituendum
esse ci. Susem., v. quae adnotavi ad 1103 b, 26 sqq. || 28. πρὸς
καθ' Π² (πρὸς etiam Hel.) || 30. ἑκατέρων L^b M^b || 34. ἴσως Γ
Π² N^b P² Ald. Ar. || 1106b, 1. εἴ τῳ] ᾧ K^b, τῷ Γ¹ † || μναὶ
K^b, μναῖς Γ¹ N^b O^b P² Ald. Hel. Ar.

ἀρχομένων τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμον καὶ
 5 πάλῃς. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ 8
 τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦδ' αἰρεῖ-
 ται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
 εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτως τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ 9
 μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώ-
 10 θασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτε ἀφελεῖν
 ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλ-
 λείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης),
 εἰ δὴ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες
 ἐργάζονται, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ
 15 ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στο-
 χαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν περὶ πάθη 10
 καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις
 καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἶον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπι-
 θυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι
 20 καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστιν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα
 οὐκ εὖ, τὸ δὲ ὅτε καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ 11
 ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ 12
 καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. || ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ
 25 πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ
 ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθού-
 ται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. || μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν 13
 ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρ- 14
 τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ
 30 Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ

13. εἰ δ' οἱ K^b, οἱ δ' ΓL^b P² Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. in textu |
 19. καὶ ἀποστραφῆναι post ἐπιθυμῆσαι add. M^b P², καὶ μισῆσαι
 Hel. † || 22. ἐστὶ] ἐπὶ N^b P² Ald., ἐστὶν ἐπὶ K^b O³ Ar. || 24. ἡ
 — 27. ἀρετῆς = 16. αὕτη — 24. μέσον, si αὕτη γὰρ reponis
 pro ἡ δ' ἀρετῆ || δὴ Bergius || 25. ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις
 ἀμαρτάνεται <καὶ> ψέγεται Rassoivius (nescio an recte) || 27.
 ἐστὶν ἄρα Π², ἄρα P².

8. if then every art so completes its work, looking to the mean, and conducting its results to this.

16. The intellectual $\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ are not $\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\theta\eta\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, for they are the laws or standards by which the passions are regulated.

21. but to feel these at the right time, and at the right things, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right manner, is a habit, and something most excellent, which is the characteristic of virtue.

36 Virtue, therefore, is a (developed) state of the moral purpose (or - a state embodying purpose), in relative balance, determined by a standard according as the wise man would determine. The Sophists had made the individual reason the valid judge of all action and had thus destroyed all necessary distinction between right and wrong. The *Protagoras* stands as the representative of the absolute reason of man manifested in the individual consciousness. This ideal (derived from Socrates) was prominent in the Cynic and Cyrenaic systems and explained with the Stoics.

6. So it is, we therefore, and by its real definition virtue is a mean: but as regards perfection and goodness it is an extreme. Virtue, therefore, framed formally, and defined according to the deeper conception of things, is a mean state: but, from a moral point of view (viewed under the category of the good), it is an extreme. *οὐσίαν* - ambiguous word - Aristotle, *Metaph.* VI. 3. 1) conveys four meanings: - 1) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι - 2) τὸ καὶ ὅτι εἶναι - 3) τὸ γένος. 4) τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Here however it is made definite by the phrase following, καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δεῖν οὔτε.

Though the phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is not found in Plato, Aristotle presupposes familiarity with its use, and accordingly gives no account of its genesis. From his *Metaph.* VII. 4-11 however we gather

- 1) that it implies the essential nature of a thing to the exclusion of all that is accidental.
- 2) that though it is in a way the definition of a thing, it is not the definition of all things, for it excludes all material associations.
- 3) that it is no mere abstract notion, but is closely connected with individual existence. It implies the notion of a universal element in a thing, but also something more. It has much in common with the Platonic idea, being the immaterial, primal and archetypal law of the being of things.
- 4) "The knowledge of a thing consists not in knowing its τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι": so that we may compare the "forms" of B. con.

(VI)

δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· [διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἢ ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἢ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς ἢ μεσότης.]

ἑσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. *

35

- 15 ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι 6
οὔσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνι- 1107a
μος ὀρίσειε. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβο-
16 λὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς
δὲ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πρά-
17 ξεσιν, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι. διὸ 5
κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα
μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.
18 οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος
τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα
μετὰ τῆς φανλότητος, οἷον ἐπίχαιρεκακία ἀναίσχυντία φθό- 10
νος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία·
πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα
εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις.
οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ
ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστιν τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοι- 15
αῦτα ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ'
19 ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. ὅμοιον
οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ

31. διὸ — 34. μεσότης post 35. κακοί tri. Scaliger || 33. καὶ — 34. μεσότης post 35. κακοί tri. Spengelius || 34. ἡ post καὶ om. M^b N^b O^b P² || 35. κακοὶ δὲ παντοδαπῶς Π² || 1107a, 1. ὠρισμένη Ald. Alex. Aphrod. Qu. nat. et mor. p. 295 Speng., ὠρισμένη Bk. Rr. in textu || 6. τὸ add. K^b, c. c. om. Bk. || 8. οὐ — 27. ἔλλειψις citat Alex. Aphrod. l. l. p. 300 sq. || 12. ψέγεται M^b, λέγεται Γ Π² K^b N^b P² Ald. Alex. Hel. Ar. || αὐτὰ om. Alex. (ut videtur) || 13. οὐχ αἱ] οὐ καὶ Alex. || ἀλλ' post αὐτῶν add. Alex. || 15. περὶ] περὶ τε Alex. || 16. ἦν K^b, ἢ Γ, ἢ Ald. || 17. τὸ om. Alex. || 18. τῷ Γ(?), καὶ τὸ Alex. || καὶ post ἀξιοῦν om. Alex.

ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλει-
 20 ψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἑλλείψεως με-
 σότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις ἑλλείψεως.
 ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
 ἑλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ
 ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν
 25 πρᾶττηται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἑλ-
 λείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλ-
 λειψις.

7 [δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ VII
 τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς
 30 πρᾶξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ
 μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πρᾶξεις,
 δεόν δὴ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς
 διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ ^{confidenc}θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσό-
 1107b τής· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος
 (πολλὰ δ' ἔστιν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλ-
 λων θαρσύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ
 θαρρεῖν ἑλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ 3
 5 πάσας, ἥττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σω-
 φροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἑλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς
 ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχί-

19. εἶναι post μεσότητα Alex. || 22. δὴ Γ || ἀνδρείας P²
 Alex. || 23. διὰ — 24. ἑλλειψις om. M^b † || τὸ τὸ Π² N^b P²
 Alex. || ἄκρον M^b N^b P² Ald. || 24. καὶ] οὐδὲ Alex. || 25. ἑλλεί-
 ψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς Alex. || 26. οὔτε K^b Alex. Hel., οὐδὲ Π² M^b
 N^b P² Ald. Rr. errore typographico || 28. δεῖ — 1108 b, 10. ἀρε-
 τῶν secl. Euckenius (p. 14) et Monro (Journal of Philology
 VI. 1876. p. 185 sqq.), cf. quae adnotabo ad 1115 b, 25. 1125 b,
 1. 13 || τοῦτο μὴ] μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ K^b, μὴ Γ L^b || ἐν post καὶ
 add. Γ L^b Ald. || 30. κενώτεροί Γ O^b Ar. et pr. O¹ et fort. v. l.
 ap. An., κοινότεροί Π¹ L^b N^b O^{2.3}. P² Ald. An. Hel. et γρ. mg.
 O¹ || 32. δὴ Susem., θ' Π Bk. Rr., δὲ P² Ald., δ' aut δὲ Γ ||
 1107 b, 3. ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ Π¹ || 5. <μὴν> πάσας vel πάσας <δὲ> ci.
 Casaubonus || 7. ὀνόματος — 8. τοιοῦτοι] οὔτοι ὀνόματος τε-
 τυχήκασι Γ Π² M^b N^b P² Ald. (nescio an recte).

29. *Ch. VII.* Aristotle now exemplifies his general law of virtue in the various separate virtues. Books III and IV treat of the virtues mentioned and in this order. In this list he has abandoned the old enumeration of four cardinal virtues (Plato, *Repub.* p. 428) courage, temperance, justice, wisdom. These all reappear, but not on the same level with each other, for wisdom is divided into $\phi\phi\sigma\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ and $\rho\sigma\phi\iota\alpha$, of which the first is made the standard of moral virtue, and the other stands apart as a perfection of the pure intellect. Justice also is separated from the practical virtues, so being something internally $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\eta$. The other virtue given in the *Protag.* p. 349, holiness ($\delta\sigma\phi\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma$) or $\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\phi\epsilon\beta\epsilon\alpha$ (*Heu*) he omits altogether, probably on account of the separation he made between ethics and religion. With this exception Aristotle's list of virtues contains the same view of life as Plato's, only it goes more into detail and aims at more completeness.
29. $\delta\epsilon\iota\ \delta\epsilon$ - This principle however must not only be stated universally, but we must apply it to particular cases: for in theories about moral actions universal statements are unsatisfactory (more vague) and particulars are more real. For actions are concerned with particulars, and it is necessary that our theories should be borne out when applied to these. Let us take our instances then from the scheme (table). Or reading $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omega\tau\epsilon\pi\omicron\iota$ - "are it is true of wider application, but-
31. $\acute{\alpha}\delta\eta\ \delta\iota\upsilon\psi\tau\epsilon\sigma\iota$ - The particular is more real than the universal as being more concrete and more definite - not in the sense in which Plato would have said that the particular is more universal is more real. This is a polemic against the views of Plato where Socrates urges that it is absolutely necessary to know the law of virtue as a unity instead of regarding it in its multifarious exhibitions.
33. $\delta\iota\alpha\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\eta$ - The intermediate Ethics has $\iota\sigma\omicron\gamma\sigma\alpha\phi\eta\varsigma$. $\mu\epsilon\sigma\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma$. Aristotle appears here only to be working his way to his theory of the mean. At first he speaks as if there were excess and defect of both the two opposite principles by the balance of which virtue is constituted. Cf. *Et.* III. 7.

16. δ and θ are here identical with ϵ and η . Sometimes ϵ and η is distinguished from δ and θ as more lasting and firm. So also χ and ψ and ϕ and ω are sometimes identified, sometimes distinguished.

(VII)

4 κασιν οὐδὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ^{insensitive} ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δό-
 σιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν μεσότης μὲν ἑλευθεριότης, ὑπερ-
 βολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἄσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως 10
 δ' ἑαυταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσιν καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσω-
 τος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ
 δὲ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει
 5 ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν,
 ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν 15
 6 διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι δια^{dispositio}θέσεις
 εἰσὶν, μεσότης μὲν ^{magnificence} μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
 διαφέρει ἑλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ
 7 μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ^{had taste} ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ^{indiscreet} βανανυσία, ἔλλειψις
 δὲ ^{careless} μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δὴ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἑλευ- 20
 7 θεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ζηθήσεται. περὶ
 δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερ-
 βολὴ δὲ ^{vanity} χανυότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·
 8 ὥς δὲ λέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἑλευ-
 θεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ 25
 πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὕτη
 περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστιν γὰρ ὥς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων
 ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ
 μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ 30
 τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ^{say alone to} ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῆς
 μέσης χώρας, καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλό-

11. δ' ἑαυταῖς L^b, δ' ἑαυτὰς N^b P², δὲ αὐταῖς M^b, δὲ αὐτὰς
 O^b O²⁻³. Ald., δὲ κατ' αὐτὰς O¹, δὲ καὶ αὐταὶ Γ, δὲ K^b || 20.
 διαφέρουσι — ἑλευθεριότητα om. K^b, διαφέρουσι — 21. ῥη-
 θήσεται secl. Rr. † || δὴ Susem., δὲ P² Ald., δ' L^b M^b O^b Bk.
 Rr., δὲ αὐτ' δ' Γ Ar. || 21. πῇ] ὧ Π² M^b N^b P² (nescio an recte),
 ὁ Ald. || 24. δὲ λέγομεν Γ N^b P² Ald., δ' ἐλέγομεν Π Hel. Ar.
 Bk. Rr. (fors. recte) || 25. <τῷ> περὶ Rr. || 26. αὕτη M^b Ar. et
 corr.² K^b, αὐτη pr. K^b, αὐτὴν N^b P², αὕτη δὲ Γ || 27. μικρὰ K^b
 L^b N^b Ald. † || 32. δὴ? Susem. || ἔστι — 33. καὶ om. K^b, secl.
 Rr. †.

- τιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν
 1108a ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον.
 διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· 9
 νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν *κατὰ* τὸν ὑψηγῆμενον
tempus τρόπον. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ 10
 5 μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον
 πρῶτον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα ^{μεσότησα} ~~πραότητα~~ καλέσομεν· τῶν
 δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ-
 γιλότης, ὁ δ' ἔλλειπτον ^{ἀσχητόν} ἀοργητος τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀορ-
 γησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν 11
 10 τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων·
 πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσιν περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν,
 διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔστιν περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς,
 αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν
 πᾶσιν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα
 15 μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ
 δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ὀρθὰ οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. ἔστι μὲν
 οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνεῖας ἕνεκα
 καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ 12
 20 μὲν μέσος ἀληθὴς τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω,
 ἡ δὲ ^{ἀντικειμένη} προσπολήσις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ
 ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλάζων, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ
dissimuler *genua* εἴρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος 13
 25 ^{ἡδονή} ~~εὐδαιμονία~~ ^{ἡδονή} ~~εὐδαιμονία~~ καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολοχος, ὁ δ' ἔλλειπτον
 ἀγοῖκος τις καὶ ἡ ἥξις ἀγοικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ
 τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδύς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσό-

33. καὶ ante ἀφιλότιμον add. N^b P² || καὶ — 1108a, 1. ἀφιλό-
 τιμον om. Π² M^b † || μὲν om. K^b || 1108a, 1. ἔστι — ἀφιλότιμον
 om. K^b † || 2. ἐν ΓΠ¹ P² Hel. Ar., om. Π² Ald. || 3. λέγομεν L^b
 N^b P² Ald., λέγωμεν c. c. Hel. Ar. || 8. δ' ἔλλειψις] δὲ κακία K^b † ||
 12. ἡ μὲν ὅτι ἔστι K^b, ὅτι αἱ μὲν εἰσι O^b || 18. ἔνεκεν Π² M^b
 Ald. Bk. Rr. || 23. <ὁ ἔχων> εἴρων ci. Rr. (nescio an recte).

3. κατὰ τὸν - according to the method which has guided us. ἵσχυρόν τε seems a metaphor from a sketch or outline drawn by a master to be filled in or followed up by the pupil.

14. These also must accordingly be discussed in order that we may see still more clearly that the mean in everything is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor praiseworthy but blamable. Now most of these qualities are without names: but we must endeavour, as in other cases, ourselves to create names for the sake of clearness and of being easily ~~understood~~ followed.

17. περιπατήσας ὁμοματότρον - Aristotle's method consists partly in accepting experience as shown in common language, or partly in rectifying it, or re-stating it from his own point of view: partly in finding new expressions for it, so as to disclose men's thoughts to themselves. He usually rather fixes the meaning of words than creates new ones.

34. $\alpha\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$ and $\nu\epsilon\mu\epsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma$ he does not consider virtues because they are not developed states of mind - but the law of the balance exists in these natural instincts. $\alpha\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$ is from his *cesses* in Book IV, but $\nu\epsilon\mu\epsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma$ is not again alluded to.

1. But indignation is a balance between envy and malice now these are both caused with pain and pleasure resulting from what happens to others. For the indignant man is pained at those who prosper unworthily, but the envious man, exceeding him is pained at all who prosper, while the malicious man is so far defective in feeling pain as even to rejoice. But envy and malice are different forms only of the same state of mind: they cannot be opposed as two extremes. Again the $\epsilon\mu\chi\alpha\rho\epsilon\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ cannot be said $\epsilon\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$ for he does not rejoice at the success of the good which the envious grieves at. The opposite to $\phi\theta\omicron\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$ must be $\alpha\nu\alpha\lambda\omicron\omicron\eta\omicron\iota\alpha$ $\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$.

7. But about these points in the first place we shall have another opportunity of speaking; in the second place about justice since the term is used in more senses than one, we shall separately define it and show how the two species of it are severally mean states.

10. $\delta\mu\omicron\iota\omega\varsigma$ - $\epsilon\rho\epsilon\tau\omega\nu$ - probably an interpolation. The term $\delta\omicron\chi\epsilon\iota$ never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus as applied to $\delta\epsilon\alpha\omicron\upsilon\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}\iota$ $\epsilon\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota$. Again Aristotle could not possibly say he meant to show how the intellectual excellences were $\mu\epsilon\omicron\omicron\tau\eta\tau\epsilon\varsigma$.

11. In Σ VIII with logical inconsistency, though with thorough truth, Aristotle proceeds, that one extreme is generally more contrary to the mean than the other, either because of a greater objective dissimilarity to virtue, in the tendency itself, or from our following a natural bent and persisting in it the tendency to *astravagance*.

(VII)

- της φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ^{ἀρετικῶς} ἀρε-
 σκος, εἰ δὲ ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, ^{ἀγαθῶν} κολαξ, ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων καὶ
 14 ἐν πᾶσιν ^{ἀγαθῶν} ἀθῆς ^{ἐν τοῖς} δύσερις ^{ἐν τοῖς} τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰδὶν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 30
 πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ
 μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τού-
 τοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, <ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων·
 καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον> ὥς ὁ ^{καταπληρῶς} καταπληρῶς ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος,
 ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων ἢ ὁ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. 35
 15 νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰδὶ δὲ περὶ 1108b
 λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν τοῖς πέλας γινο-
 μένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ
 πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλον τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν λυ-
 πεῖται, <καὶ ὁ μὲν νεμεσητικὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακῶς πρᾶτ- 5
 τουσι λυπεῖται,> ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρεκακος τοσοῦτον ἑλλείπει τοῦ λυ-
 16 πεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι
 καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται,
 μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἑροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητες
 εἰσὶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.] 10
 VIII τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν 8
 καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς
 μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταιί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ
 ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντῖαι εἰσὶν, ἡ δὲ
 2 μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἑλατ- 15
 τον μείζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἑλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι

28. et 29. εἰ] ὁ Π² Ald. (εἰ etiam Hel. Ar.) || 28. ἔνεκεν? Susem. || 33. μέσος, ὁ δ' secl. Zwinger || ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων· καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον add. Rassovius, ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων· καὶ ὑπερβάλλον μὲν Coraes || 35. ὁ post ἢ om. K^b || μηδὲν K^b, μηδὲ c. c. Hel. Bk.¹ Rr., μηδ' Bk.² || 1108b, 5. καὶ ὁ μὲν νεμεσητικὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακῶς πράττουσι λυπεῖται add. Sauppius (Dionysius und Aristoteles, Gott. 1863, p. 22) || 7. χαίρει L^b N^b || 9. πῶς μεσότητες εἰσὶν secludenda esse ci. Rr. || 10. ὁμοίως — ἀρετῶν secl. Grantius et Rr. || 11. δὲ ΓΠ¹ Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 16. μείζον πρὸς] μέγα πρὸς M^b O^b et corr. P² (sed non Hel. Ar.) || οὕτως] οὕτω καὶ P².

ἔξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσιν πρὸς δὲ τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πρά-
 ξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαί-
 20 νεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων
 πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναισθητὸν ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον
 ἀναισθητός, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσω-
 τος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται 3
 τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροις ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι
 25 τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. οὕτως δὲ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις 4
 τούτων, πλείων ἐναντιότης ἐστὶν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ
 πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφῆστηκεν ἀλλήλων
 ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν
 30 τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον 5
 ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὥς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς
 τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς
 δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. τὰ δὲ πλεῖ-
 στον ἀπέχοντα ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλ-
 35 λον ἐναντία τὰ πλείον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀν- 6
 1109 a τίκεται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ
 ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή
 οὐσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὐσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνη
 οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἐνδεια οὐσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερ-
 5 βολή οὐσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν 7
 μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι
 καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ
 τοῦναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον
 10 δ' ἢ δειλίᾳ, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέ-

27. πλείων Γ(?) Hel. Ar., πλείστη Π N^b P^a Ald. || 30. μὲν
 τὸ] τὸν Π¹ || 35. ἀντίκεινται L^b M^b † || 1109a, 1. ἐφ' ὧν μᾶλ-
 λον μὲν M^b N^b et corr. P², ἐπὶ τινων ἐφ' ὧν μᾶλλον μὲν pr.
 P², ἐφ' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον Γ Π³ Ald.

19. For the brave man appears rash in comparison with the coward, but a coward in comparison with the rash man. Aristotle's system depends on faith in a certain standard inherent in the general reason of mankind. The $\alpha + \beta$ is $\alpha + \beta$ $\alpha + \beta$ $\alpha + \beta$. And this law or standard of the absolute reason finds its exponent in the wise man, $\phi\psi\omega$ $\mu\omega\sigma$.

30. Again while some extremes appear to have a sort of similarity to the mean, as for instance rashness to bravery and prodigality to liberality, the extremes have the greatest dissimilarity to each other. But things most removed from each other, people define to be contraries, therefore things more removed are more contrary to each other. Contraries being $\tau\alpha$ $\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{o}\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ $\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}$ $\chi\omega\tau\alpha$, he should not speak of $\tau\alpha$ $\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{o}\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ $\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}$ $\chi\omega\tau\alpha$ - here he means 'repugnant'.

5. Now this takes place from two causes, one depending on the nature of the thing itself. for that extreme is more like the mean, we do not oppose so much ($\alpha\beta$ $\mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{o}\tau\alpha$) to the mean as its contrary - that is some fault to be errors on virtue's side. Rashness is the same tendency as courage, only carried too far, but cowardice differs from it in kind.

itself. A second cause depends on ourselves. For those things to which we are in a way more disposed by nature, appear on our part to be nearer to the mean. So, for instance, we are in ourselves more disposed towards pleasures, since we are more carried away in the direction of intemperance, than in that of (excessive) orderliness. Therefore we call those things more contrary to the mean in which we run to greater lengths, and thus intemperance which is the excess is more contrary to the mean, temperance (than the other extreme). Aristotle is certainly not putting forth a doctrine of human corruption, that we are by nature prone to what is worse - but there are two main explanations given: 1. that there is the greatest struggle in avoiding that extreme to which we are prone, and therefore it appears more opposed to the mean - this view is favoured by the second rule of the next chapter (sec. 4). 2. that whenever we have an inclination towards one side we run into extravagance on that side, and so we rate that form of error, and make it seem worse than its opposite - this view is put forward in the magna moralia.

20. ch. 12. We have now practical rules for attaining the mean.

- (1) avoid the worst extreme.
- (2) find out your bent and go rather into the extremely opposite direction.
- (3) beware of the delusions of pleasure.
- (4) after all, the appeal must be in the last resort to the intuitive judgment.

24. Success to be a good man is an achievement, for it is so, to catch the mean point in each case; just as not every body but only the scientific man can find the centre of a circle.

35. κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν - Secure what is secure - at all events. Various explanations - (1) If you sail do it on your voyage out do it on your return voyage - (2) If the wind fails take to the oars - (3) Make a loss by taking.

IX

8 χοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν
 οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα
 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον
 πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν πρὸς 15
 ἀκολασίαν [ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα]. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναν-
 τία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶν τῇ
 σωφροσύνῃ.

IX

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἡθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, 9
 καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς 21
 δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶν διὰ τὸ στοχα^{animal}στικὴ
 τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκα-
 2 νῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστῳ
 γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παν- 25
 τὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παν-
 τὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι·
 τὸ δ' ἂ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παν-
 τὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ
 3 καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχω- 30
 ρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ
 τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτός ἔεργε
 νῆα.

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ' ἥττον·
 4 ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπὸν, κατὰ τὸν δεύ- 35

15. μᾶλλον post ἐσμεν add. M. M. 1186 b, 27 Turnebus
 Bk. Rr. || 16. ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα secl. Spengelius, legisse vide-
 tur iam scriptor M. Moraliū l. l. || 23. τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς πράξεσιν K^b, ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν Π² || 26. δὴ
 Π² || 28. ὧ <δεῖ> Rr. || 29. διόπερ K^b Ald. Ar. M. M. 1187 a, 4,
 ὅπερ ΓΠ² M^b N^b P² Hel. || ἐστὶν post διόπερ add. ΓΠ² M^b N^b
 P² Ald. Hel. (nescio an recte) || 31. ἡ Καλυψὼ] ἡ κίρκη O¹,
 γρ. ὀδυσεὺς mg. O^b || παραινεῖ K^b, παρῆνει ΓΠ² M^b N^b Ald.
 Hel. Ar. || 32. τούτου Γ, τουτου pr. K^b, τοῦ τοῦ corr.² K^b, τὸ
 τοῦ M^b N^b P² Hel., ὡς τοῦ Π², τὸ ὡς τοῦ Ald. || μὲν om. K^b.

τερόν φασι πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο
 1109b δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν δὲ
 δεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἃ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροι ἐσμέν· ἄλλοι γὰρ
 πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς
 ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τούναν- 5
 5 τλον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ
 ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα
 τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλα- 6
 κτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν
 αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην,
 10 τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν
 τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτήν ἀποπεμπό-
 μενοι ἦττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὥς ἐν κε- 7
 φαλαῖῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν.
 χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ
 15 γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι πῶς καὶ τίσιν καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πό-
 σον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἔλλείπον-
 τας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαί-
 νοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ 8
 παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ
 20 ἦττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος
 καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο 9
 δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση ξῆσις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινιτὴ, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ
 25 δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν·
 οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

1109b, 2. καὶ πρὸς ἃ Γ^{Mb}Q, πρὸς ἃ καὶ Π²K^b Ald. Bk.
 Rr., καὶ πρὸς ἃ καὶ H^aN^bP² || 5. ἀπάγοντες Π¹N^b, ἀπαγαγόν-
 τες Π²P² Ald. Bk. || 15. πῶς] καὶ πῶς K^bL^b || 18. ἀποκαλοῦν-
 τες K^b et, ut videtur, Hel. Ar., ἐπικαλοῦντες M^b, ἀποκαλοῦμεν
 c. c. Bk. Rr. || 23. τοσοῦτον Π²M^bN^b Ald. et corr.² K^b || 24.
 δῆλον codices Turnebi Bk. Rr. || 25. ὅτε — ὅτε K^b (ut v. 16 sq.),
 τοτὲ — τοτὲ Π²M^bN^bP² Ald., ποτὲ — ποτὲ Hel.

6. But we must drag ourselves into the opposite direction for by pulling a long way from the erroneous intention we shall arrive at the mean; just as they do who are shaking out of wood.

7. But in everything we must especially be on our guard against the pleasant and pleasurable. For we judge her not incorruptibly. Therefore, just as the old counsellors felt towards Helen, so ought we to feel towards pleasure, and in everything apply their saying: for by sending her out of sight we shall err the less.

8. δέκα οτοί. δέκα, is L. decuriare - to bribe at elections

18. To what point and how far a man may go before he is blameworthy.

23. αἰὸς ἡσ - the decision must be intuitive - αἰὸς ἡσ is not a moral sense, for he did not assert the separate existence of any such faculty

disposition in the agent. It is a disposition on free will, which it would certainly have assigned to itself, 91, 100, and on a plan, and would have thought out, place in a system of ideas.

31. **EXHAUSTIVE** etc. a deeper ground than that taken might surely have been found for the position that moral right is freedom. But though a philosophy even before Aristotle has dealt to some extent with the ideas of necessity and freedom, it remained for the Stoics to open the question more decisively. The discussions on it will in this place are never topical, final, an appeal to language and common opinions seems especially the whole.

1. **inquiring** what is the voluntary Aristotle does not pursue a speculative code of ethics, concerning the deep things of immortality and consciousness, of the individuality of these things, etc. But he is content with defining the voluntary by a contrast to the involuntary. What constitutes an involuntary act. The notion of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this - that the actor is in even case the appropriate cause of his own actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there is really a superior $\delta\omega\kappa\iota$ or force, where he does not know what his action is, or may be held to do. The cause of what he meant to do. What we use to show the individual is an $\delta\omega\kappa\iota$, is the point where Aristotle stops short in the enquiry.

2. **βίαιον** - that is compulsion, whose cause is external to the agent, and is of such a nature that the agent is patient of it, he is nothing to it. - $\delta\omega\kappa\iota$ $\sigma\upsilon\mu\upsilon\sigma$ = $\delta\omega\kappa\iota$ $\nu\epsilon\mu\epsilon\sigma$, the efficient cause. - Aristotle attributes spontaneity so decisively to the individual act, that he confines the external compulsion as only applicable to the cases of absolute physical force. No compulsion of the will, fear, etc. he will not call compulsion without qualification, because still the individual acts under it.

4. **When men are forced not to an act but to an alternative**, (they may do what is grievous for the fear of what is worse) such acts may be of a mixed character. Relatively to the moment they come from the choice and will of the individual. Although straddled, and in themselves they are contrary to the will. But as every act aims at something in reference to the particular nature, and is thus entirely dependent on it, so these must be judged as acts done and chosen voluntarily, and according to circumstances must oblige blame or praise (see note)

13. **τεδός** - the moral character of an action [merely] depends on the circumstances of the motive. - $\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ of $\tau\epsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma$ is set out of a combination of associations, final cause and 'motive' being combined with 'end-in-itself', perfection, completeness.

4. **Force** also the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' must be predicated in reference to the moment when a person is acting. now in the case of the individual acts voluntarily: for the efficient cause of the movement of the accessory limbs is in himself.

Γ.

¹ τῆς ἀρετῆς δὲ περὶ πάθῃ τε καὶ πράξεις οὕσης, καὶ ³⁰
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ
δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκού-
σιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
² ἐπισκοποῦσιν, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τὰς
τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. 35
³ δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γιγνόμενα. ^{1110 a}
βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὕσα ἐν ἡ μὴδὲν συμβάλ-
λεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι
⁴ ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν
πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχυρόν ⁵
τι πράξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σφύ-
ζονται μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότε-
⁵ ρον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἡ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δὲ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ
τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπο-
βάλλεται ἐκῶν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ¹⁰
⁶ ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται
πράξεις, εἰδικασί δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίοις. αἵρεται γὰρ εἰσὶν
τότε ὅτε πράττονται· τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν
καιρὸν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράτ-
τει, λεκτέον· πράττει δὴ ἐκῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν ¹⁵
τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ
ἐστίν· ὢν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν

Lib. III. K^b O^b = II¹, L^b M^b = II².

1109b, 30. δὲ O² Ald. Hel., δὴ ΓΠ Ar. Bk. Rr. || 31. ἐπὶ
— ἐπὶ K^b, ἐν — ἐν II² N^b O^b P² Ald. || 32. δὲ ante καὶ om.
Π² O^b || 33. τὸ add. K^b, c. c. om. Bk. Rr. || 1110a, 1. δὴ co-
dices Lambini || βίαια N^b P² Tubingensis Par. 1417 Hel., βία
c. c. An. || 3. κινήσει M^b Hel. † || 6. πράξαντες Γ M^b N^b P² Ald.
et corr.³ K^b, πράξαντι O^b (πράξαντος etiam Hel. Ar.) || 7. πρά-
ξαντες corr.³ K^b † || 8. τι add. Γ O^b Ald. Ar., om. Π² K^b Hel.
(nescio an recte) || 14. ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ ἀκούσιον O^b, ἀκούσιον
δὴ καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον Π² † || 15. δὴ Susem., δὲ ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk.
Rr., τοίνυν Hel.

καὶ μή. ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δὲ ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ ταῖς 7
 20 πράξεσιν δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχροῦν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσι ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται. τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἐπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ
 25 τις ἢ μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, 8 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι 9
 30 ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δὲ ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἐπαινοὶ καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς
 1110b ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς 1 μὲν, ὅπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ἢ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; ἢ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστιν, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι,
 5 καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστιν, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δὲ ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίῃ βίαια 1

24. ταῦτα L^b et corr.¹ P², τὰ τοιαῦτα M^b || πράξει K^b, πράξει L^b, πράξει M^b N^b O^b P² Ald. || 25. καὶ ante τὴν add. Ald. et corr.³ K^b || ὑπερτείνει post 26. ὑπομεῖναι Π² || 26. ὑπομεῖναι pr. K^b, ὑπομεῖναι N^b et corr.² K^b, ὑπομείνη Π² O^b || 27. ἀποθανετέον παθόντα Π² N^b O^b P² Ald. || 29. τὸ κρῖναι L^b N^b O^b, τὸ κρῖναι Ald., τὸ διακρῖναι O¹ Hel. || 32. τὰ δ' ἀναγκάζοντα M^b N^b Ald. et pr. P² (rubro liquore corr.) || 1110b, 9. τὰ ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ N^b P², τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἡδέα L^b An. Hel., τὰ ἡδέα M^b O^b †.

as the death perhaps...
one would choose any of such things as these.

28. That is, the curses threatened by Amphiaraios, who
when departing for Thebes enjoined his son to put
Eriphyle to death

9. Aristotle now guards his definition against a
possible misconception. Having defined the compul-
sion to be that whose cause is external, he disallows
the supposition that the two great inducements
to all action the pleasant and the noble, because
external to us, make the actions they induce com-
pulsory. His arguments against this supposition
are: (1) It would make all action compulsory and
thus imply more than anyone would wish to
support. (2) Compulsory actions are painful:
those done for the pleasant or the noble are plea-
surable. (3) It leaves out to account the internal
susceptibility of the agent.
His own definition then is sufficiently qualified
by the addition of the words 'the person under com-
pulsion in no wise consenting' (ὑπὸν οὐ κατὰ λόγον μέν-
οντος).

not rests in our wishing to do a thing... it is right.

Sixth - stands here first for what compels, secondly for what is compelled.

The principle is brought out that the objective in an action cannot be separate from the subjective apprehension of this in the will.

22. With regard therefore to actions done through ignorance we may say that he who repents has been an involuntary agent, while him who does not repent we may distinguish as having been a non-voluntary one. for where there is a real difference it is proper to have a distinctive name.
24. There seems to be a further difference between acting through ignorance and doing a thing in ignorance
§1271... in consequence of drunkenness or anger
20. But the term involuntary is not meant to cover ignorance of man's true interest. Ignorance which affects moral choice and ignorance of the universal, as the causes, not of involuntary action, but of wickedness, and it is precisely for this ignorance that men are blamed. The ignorance which causes involuntary action is ignorance of particulars, which are the circumstances and objects of actions.

(I)

εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω ¹⁰
 βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ
 μὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ κα-
 λὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιασθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ
 μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθιήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν
¹² καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικεν δὲ τὸ ¹⁵
βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀρχῇ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ
βιασθέντος.
¹³ τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἄκουσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκού- ²
 σιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν
 πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδὲν δὲ δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν ²⁰
 μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ἡδαι, οὐ δ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπού-
 μενός γε. τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων
 δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν·
¹⁴ ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ'
ἔοικεν καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ ²⁵
 γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδώς δὲ ἄλλ' ἀγνοῶν.
 ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν
 ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως
¹⁵ κακοὶ γίνονται· τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ³⁰
 ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον. οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια
 αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδὲ ἢ καθόλου
 (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην), ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν
 οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πράξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ^{1111a}

10. ἀναγκάζει Γ^{Kb}, ἀνάγκη Ald. || πάντα καλὰ εἴη ἂν L^b,
 καὶ τὰ καλὰ πάντα εἴη ἂν M^b † || οὕτω Γ^{Nb} O^b P², αὐτῶι Π² K^b
 Ar.(?) (nescio an recte), οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ Ald., οὕτως αὐτῷ? Susem.,
 τούτῳ ci. Coraes || 11. πάντα πάντες L^b N^b O^b || 12. ἡδὺ καὶ] ἡδὺ
 ἢ Π², ἡδὺ O^b Ar., ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ P², ἡδὺ τὸ Ald. || κακόν Ald., om.
 N^b O^b Ar. || 13. δὲ Γ^{Kb} N^b O^b P² † || 20. δὲ] τι K^b, om. Γ^{Mb} ||
 21. οὐ δ' Susem., οὐδ' cum fontibus Bk. Rr. || 23. ἔσται Π² † ||
 25. τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας pr. K^b, τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντως re. K^b, τοῦ ἀγνο-
 οῦντος M^b, τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα c. c. Hel. || ποιεῖν post ἀγνοοῦντα
 add. Γ Bk. Rr. || 1111a, 1. καὶ post γὰρ om. Π² Ald.

- συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστίν, τίς 16 τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ 5 τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν 17 ἀγνοήσειεν μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἂν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα 10 ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθεῖη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρωῖσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείνειν ἂν· καὶ θῖξαι βουλόμενος, 15 ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἂν. περὶ πάντα δὴ 18 ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης ἐν οἷς ἡ προᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριωτάτα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ προᾶξις καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα. τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου 19 20 λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν προᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μετα-μελείᾳ.
- 3 ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκού- 20 σιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ προᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκού- 21

6. ἂν om. Π² Ald. || 8. ἑαυτὸν γε ὃ τε O^b, ὃ δὲ (δι' corr.²) ἑαυτὸν γε K^b, δ — 10. ἦν om. M^b † || 9. λέγοντάς ci. Rr. || αὐ- τοὺς Ald., αὐτούς II Bk., αὐτοῖς vel αὐτοῖς fortasse An., αὐτοῖς Lambinus || 10. θίξαι M^b || 13. λελογχευμένον Ald. et rc. M^b || κίσσηριν L^b Hel., κίσσηριν K^b O^b P² || 14. πίσας An. (fol. 40^a) et Mi. (fol. 72^b) et Clem. Al. Strom. II, 14. p. 461 P. et, ut vide- tur, E. E. 1225 b, 4 sq. et M. M. 1188 b, 31 sqq., id quod demon- stravit Bernaysius, πάλσας ΓΠ¹ L^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr., σπεύ- σας M^b, πέμψας Hel. || θίξαι codices Turnebi, δεῖξαι ΓΠ Ald. An. Ar. Bk. Rr., πείσαι vel simile quid Bernaysius (p. 306. n. 6) || 16. ἐν οἷς ἡ προᾶξις secl. Rr. || 19. δὲ Thurotus, δὴ ΓΠ Ald. Bk. Rr. || 22. βιαίου N^b O^b Ald.

- The fact is, we are connected with the world, and it is impossible to be ignorant of it, about which ignorance is impossible.
1. The man doing it, about which ignorance is impossible.
 2. The thing done which is not to be known: e.g. a man who did not know he was striking the man who was his son.
 3. The thing or person made the object of the action: e.g. a man who did not know it was his son.
 4. The instrument: e.g. one might find that one's spear had a hole in it.
 5. The force, speed or tendency of the act: e.g. one wishing to strike a man right kill.
 6. The manner: e.g. one might strike harder than he wished.

14. And we must show the way, as those do who box with the open hand and man might give another a blow.

15. Ignorance then being concerned with all these circumstances of the action he that was ignorant of some one of these is held to have acted voluntarily, and especially if ignorant with regard to the most important: and the most important seems to be the objects of the action and the tendency of it.

22. Having separated off the involuntary in to two parts of compulsion and mistake, there remains the voluntary. The notion of the voluntary is that a man acts with knowledge of the circumstances of the action. There is a notion (ὁ κατὰ δέοντα) that acts done from anger or desire (which are in the agent) are involuntary. This is refuted by the following arguments:-

1. It would prove too much, and would make all the actions of brutes and children involuntary.
2. Some acts prompted by desire or anger are good and good. We must either class these as involuntary or say that while these are voluntary, bad acts spontaneously prompted are involuntary. Either is absurd.
3. There is a feeling of obligation attaching some things to these emotions: we ought to desire some things, and be angry at some: implying freedom.
4. Acts prompted by desire are pleasant; involuntary acts to pain.
5. We hold the errors of passion as much as errors of

ch. II. 1134a 10-11 does not mean the will is a whole for that intellect has no one name but a particular, ~~the~~ ~~con~~ ~~trib~~ ~~ution~~ of it, namely a ~~conscious~~ ~~deter~~ ~~mination~~ ~~of the will~~. 'Purpose' or 'determination' is the nearest English word. Aristotle also was taking up a problem from common language, and giving it a philosophical twist.

Aristotle's account of προαιρεσις is, that it is a species of the rational faculty, τὸ νουνόμοιον (ἐκλογιστικόν), and that it differs from desire, wish, and any form of opinion.

1. It differs from desire or anger as not being shared by irrational creatures, as being often opposed to desire, &c.
 2. It is still less like anger than like desire or anger, excluding the notion of purpose or deliberate choice.
 3. It is not wish, for we often wish for what is impossible or beyond our control, and because, speaking generally, wish is of the end, whereas purpose is of the means and restricts itself to what is in our power.
 4. Nor is it opinion, which may be about anything, the eternal or the impossible, or what is characterized as true or false, not, like purpose, as good or bad. Nor is it opinion on matters of action. For opinion on good and evil does not constitute the moral character in the way that purpose does: again the use of these terms in common language points out a difference between purpose and opinion.
- Purpose, then, being a species of the voluntary, implies also intellect and deliberation. It is a deliberate desire of what is within our power.
5. For it seems most closely bound up with virtue, and to be a better criterion of moral character than were actions.

(I)

22 *σια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμόν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ* 25
οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες·
 23 *εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν*
ἢ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροῦ ἀκου-
 24 *σίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ*
ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι 30
ἐπὶ τισὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως.
 25 *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπι-*
 26 *θυμίαν ἡδέα. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ*
λογισμὸν ἢ θυμόν ἀμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω,
 27 *δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα [πάθη], ὥστε* 1111b
καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου [ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας].
ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

II *διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ* 4
προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ 5
 2 *τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. — ἡ*
προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ, ἀλλ'
ἐπὶ πλεον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ
τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα κοινωνοῦν, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης
 3 *ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. — οἱ δὲ λέγοντες* 10
αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμόν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοί-
κασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν
 4 *ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπι-*
θυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνά-
 5 *παλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσει* 15

25. δι' om. Π¹ (nescio an recte) || 27. ἐπιθυμίαν] θυμόν
 Ar. || 28. ἢ θυμόν Γ Π² N^b O^b P² Ald. Hel., καὶ θυμόν K^b Bk.
 Rr., καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν Ar. || 32. καὶ add. K^b, c. c. om. Ar. Bk.
 Rr. || 1111b, 1. πάθη om. pr. K^b, c. c. et corr.³ K^b add. Hel.
 Ar. Bk. Rr. || ὥστε καὶ αἱ Γ K^b O³, ἔτι καὶ αἱ mg. O¹, αἱ δὲ
 c. c. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 2. ἀπὸ — ἐπιθυμίας om. K^b, c. c. add.
 Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr.: malim ego quoque αἱ praemisso servare ||
 6. κρίναι τῶν πράξεων M^b, κρίνειν προαιρέσει τῶν πράξεων Γ,
 τῶν πράξεων κρίνειν K^b || 7. δὴ Γ K^b Hel., δὲ Π² N^b O^b P² Ald. ||
 9. τὰ ἄλλα] ἄλλα O^b, τὰ L^b.

μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἡ
 μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυ-
 πηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. — θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἦττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ 6
 θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. — ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις 7
 20 γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον. προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
 ἔστιν τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη
 ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστιν τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθα-
 νασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστιν καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' 8
 αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν.
 25 προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι
 ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, 9
 ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα.
 προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλό-
 μεθα μὲν καὶ φασίμεν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει· ὅπως
 30 γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. — οὐδὲ δὴ 10
 δόξα ἂν εἴη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι,
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ
 καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. — ὅπως μὲν οὖν
 1112a δόξῃ ταῦτόν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί. τῷ γὰρ 11
 προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῖ τινὲς ἔσμεν, τῷ δὲ
 12 δοξάζειν οὐ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι
 τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστίν ἢ τί τι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς·
 5 λαβεῖν δὲ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάννυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προ- 13
 αἶρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ
 δὲ δόξα τῷ ὥς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἅ μάλιστα
 ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἅ οὐ πάννυ ἴσμεν. δοκοῦσί 14

18. διὰ ΓΟ^b Ald. Hel. et corr.¹ K^b, κατὰ Π² et pr. K^b ||
 25. οἴεται ἂν γενέσθαι L^b Ald., ἂν δοκεῖ γενέσθαι M^b || 30.
 τὰ] τῶν N^b et pr. P² || 1112a, 1. δόξῃ O^b Ald. Hel. Ar., δόξει
 K^b, καὶ δόξῃ Π², δόξει οὐ Γ(?) || 4. πῶς <ἔσται> vel πῶς
 <ἔχει> ci. Rr. || 5. καὶ — 7. ἀληθῶς verbis repeti 1111^b 33.
 καὶ τῷ — 34. μᾶλλον dicta monet Rr. || 7. ὥς add. ΓΠ¹ N^b.

purpose contradict any desire: e. g. the desire for
moving is thwarted by the desire for pleasure. . . .
the psychology is not very explicit here.

37. Now that purpose is identical with opinion as a whole
perhaps no one maintains at all. But neither is it
identical with any special kind of opinion ~~at all~~.
For our moral character consists in purposing, not in
opining, what is good or bad. And we purpose to
take or avoid or something of this kind, but we ~~know~~
what a thing is or for whom it is good or bad,
but we do not exactly opine to take or avoid. And
while purpose is praised by the epithets "of the right
object" or "rightly," opinion is praised by the epithet
"true." And we purpose things that as far as ma-
be (62.107a) we know to be good, but we opine
what we do not exactly know.

th. 111. The object of deliberation is applied in purpose—
 All things, as the ancients say, are not in a table: we do not de-
 liberate about things eternal: nor of things mutable,
 about those which are regulated by necessity, by nature
 or by chance. Hence we deliberate about mutable
 things within the power of man, or rather about those
 within our own power; and not about ends, but
 about means; and where there is room for question.—
 The mode of operation is a kind of analysis. Assuming
 as desirable some end, we first ask what
 means will immediately produce this end, and so
 on till we have brought the last link of the chain
 of causation to ourselves, when we commence
 acting at once, the last step in the analysis being
 the first in the productive process. If any step
 occurs which is necessary for the given end, but
 unattainable by us, the chain cannot be com-
 pleted: the deliberation is relinquished. But if
 all the steps are feasible that which was indefinite
 before becomes definite and purpose succeeds
 deliberation.

We might have expected Aristotle to say, that in the
 deliberation which precedes an action some account
 should always be taken of the right or wrong of the
 action. But here the only question is, how is a given
 end to be obtained? What action will serve as a
 means to it?

21. No man deliberates about eternal things, such as
 the universe, or the incorruptibility of the diagonal
 and the side in a square; nor about things in motion
 if their motion takes place invariably in the same way,
 whether of necessity, or by nature, or from some other
 cause, as in the influence of the solstices and the ris-
 ings of the sun: nor about things strictly variable, as
 droughts and rains; nor about matters of chance, as
 the finding of a treasure.

31. For the causes of things seem to be nature or necessity
 and chance, and again reason and all that depends
 on man.— See Essay 5.

(II)

τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἐνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἂν
 15 δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολου-
 θεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταυτόν
 16 ἐστὶν δόξη τινί. — τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρη-
 μένων οὐδέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν
 17 προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἢ γὰρ προ- 15
 αἰρέσεις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικεν
 καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

III

βουλευόνται δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευ- 5
 2 τόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δὲ ἴσως βου-
 λευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος, 20
 3 ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. — περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βου-
 λεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
 4 πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. — ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει,
 αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτά γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ
 φύσει ἢ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατο- 25
 5 λῶν. — οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμ-
 βρων. — οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησανροῦ εὐρέσεως. —
 6 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύ-
 θαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται.
 7 οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐδὲν δι' ἡμῶν. — βουλευόμεθα δὲ 30
 περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτικῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστιν λοιπά. αἴτια
 γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ
 νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βου-
 8 λεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτικῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς

9. τε] δὲ K^b || τε K^b, τὰ cet. || 20. ἂν τις βουλευσάιτο Π²
 Ald. || 23. ἀσύμμετρος M^b, σύμμετροι pr. K^b, γρ. ἀσύμμετρα mg.³
 K^b † || 24. εἴτ' — 25. ἄλλην post 26. ἄλλως tri. Thuro-
 tus || καὶ add. K^b || 25. ἢ] εἴτε O^b, om. K^b || 28. ἀνθρωπίνων
 ἀπάντων K^b, ἀνθρωπίνων πάντων Rr. || 30. δι' ἡμῶν οὐθέν
 N^b O^b, δ' ἡμῶν οὐθέν Ald., ἡμῶν οὐθέν L^b, οὐθέν ἡμῶν M^b ||
 31. ἐν K^b, ἐφ' c. c. Hel. || καὶ post ἡμῖν add. Γ K^b, c. c. om.
 Hel. || αἰτία K^b M^b, αἴτια c. c. Hel.

1112b ἀκριβεῖς καὶ ἀντάρχεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον
περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον). ἀλλ'
ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' αἰεὶ, περὶ τούτων βου-
λευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἱατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν,
5 καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσα ἦττον
διηκριβῶνται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως. μᾶλλον δὲ 9
καὶ περὶ τὰς δόξας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ
αὐτὰς διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 10
πολύ, ἀδήλοισι δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ** ἀδιόριστον.
10 συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦν-
τες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγινῶναι. — βουλευόμεθα 11
δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε
γὰρ ἱατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε φῆτωρ εἰ πείσει,
οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς
15 περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων
ἔσται σκοποῦσιν, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι
διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσιν, δι' ἐνὸς δ' ἐπι-
τελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κακείνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν
ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατον
20 ἐστίν· ὃ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικεν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν
εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν 12
ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαί, ἡ
δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀνα-
λύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. καὶ μὲν ἀδυνάτω ἐν- 13
25 τύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ
οἷον τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι
πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἢ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ
τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζη- 14
τεῖται δὲ ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὅτε δὲ ἡ χρεῖα αὐτῶν·

1112b, 7. δόξας N^b et corr. L^b et v. l. ap. An., τέχνας
ΓΠ¹ M^b Ald. An. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. et pr. L^b || 9. οἷς <τὸ ὡς
δεῖ> secundum M. M. 1189b, 18 sqq. Rassovius, οἷς <τὸ>
ci. Rr. || 15. τίνος Π², τίνων c. c. Hel. || 21. εἰρημένον] αὐτὸν K^b.

avoid writing for we do not know how we begin is a

17. If it can be accomplished by one means alone, we inquire how this produces the end, ~~until~~ and by what it is itself produced, until we come to that which as a cause is first but is the last thing to be discovered: for such deliberation as we describe is like seeing the solution of a geometrical problem by analysis of the diagram.

29. The question is sometimes what instruments are necessary to construct such figures as are to be used in the

33. In one sense, and so far as deliberation is concerned, actions must be regarded as means. But in another sense and from a moral point of view, each action is an end-in-itself.

5. For every one stops enquiring how he shall act, when he has brought home the first link in the chain to himself and to the guiding principle in himself: that is to say, to that which purposes.

9. The people were required to acquiesce in and carry out the decisions of the kings, which else would have remained unratified. So the reason announces its decision to the will or purpose.

10. If the object of purpose is that, which, being in our power, we desire after deliberation, purpose will be a deliberate desire of things in our power. After deliberating we decide, and form a desire in accordance with our deliberations.

Ch. IV. Hitherto every act has been regarded as a means, and has been acknowledged voluntary because originating in the individual. Deliberation and purpose have been restricted to the mere choice and taking of means. But when we get the conception of ends? What is the nature of soul, not is the faculty of ends? Are we as free in the choice as here as in that of the means? There are two extreme opinions the one (that of Plato) that wish is always for the good: the other (that of some of the sophists) that it is for the lesser or good. These he rejects, the first as contradicting facts, the second as ignoring any true object of wish. Abstractedly and ideally, as appealing to the ^{universal} reason, the good is the object of wish: while to the individual mind only that which appears good can seem desirable: hence, although the good man who is in accord with the universal reason wishes for the good alone others are deceived by false appearances and by pleasure and desire what is not truly good.

15. Τὸ γὰρ ὁ δόξας doctrine is slated at length in Plato book II 466 to Plato distinguishes $\delta\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ from $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ while Aristotle does not. The $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ of Plato is the higher will or desire of the universal. In this higher sense of the word 'wish', no one wishes except for what is good, that is, in his best or noble, in that aspect of his nature, is the true bearings of his wish be pointed out to him. In this sense the wish of the individual is, in accordance with universal reason, and is an expression of it. In a lower sense we wish with different parts of our nature, and thus wish for all sorts of things, bad as well as good. But to this latter kind of wish

(II)

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτι μὲν δι' οὗ ὅτι δὲ πῶς 30
 15 δὴ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικεν δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι
 ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶ πρακτικῶν,
 16 αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ
 τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. — οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα,
 οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθῆσεως γὰρ 1113 a
 17 ταῦτα. — εἰ δὲ αἰὲ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἦξει. — βουλευ-
 τὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλην ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ
 προαιρετόν. τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετὸν
 ἐστίν. πάνεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς 5
 αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον·
 18 τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν
 ἀρχαίων πολιτικῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασι-
 19 λεῖς ἀ προέλουντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ
προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις 10
 20 ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι
 γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ 6
 IV ποῖά ἐστιν καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη· ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι
 μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὰγαθοῦ 15
 2 εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς
 μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ
 βούλεται ὃ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλευτόν,
 3 καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ

31. δὴ διὰ τίνος Muenscher, ἢ διὰ τίνος ΓΠ Ald. Hel. Ar.
 Bk. Rr. || 33. οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν Sussem., οὐ γὰρ ἂν K^b, οὐκ ἄρα οὖν
 M^b, οὐκ ἂν οὖν Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. || 1113a, 1. πε ὡς δεῖ pr.
 K^b, πέψεως δεῖ corr.² K^b, πέπεσται ὡς δεῖ L^b, πέπεπται ἢ
 πεποιήται ὡς δεῖ N^b Hel., πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ ἢ πεποιήται ὡς δεῖ
 Γ† || 6. ἀνάγῃ M^b, ἀγάγῃ L^b || αὐτοῦ Ald. Ar., αὐτό ΓK^b ||
 9. προείλουντο ΓK^bM^b Ar., προέλουντο c. c. An. || δὴ an δὲ
 <δὴ>? Sussem. || 10. τῶν] ἐκ τῶν K^bM^b (sed non Hel. Ar.) ||
 12. βούλησιν M^b An. (βούλευσιν etiam Hel. Ar.) || 14. καὶ <τί
 καὶ> Zwinger || 15. τὰγαθοῦ Γ Ald. Hel., ἀγαθοῦ Π Bk. Rr. ||
 17. τὸ om. N^bO^b Ald. Hel.

20 τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλευτὸν λέγουσιν μὴ εἶναι φύ-
σει βουλευτόν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλῳ φαί-
νεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, τάναντία· εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα 4
μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν
βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον· τῷ
25 μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φανύῳ
τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ δια-
κειμένοις ὑγιεινὰ ἐστὶν τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς
δὲ ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ
θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα; ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ
30 ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὰληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνε-
ται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἰδιά ἐστὶν καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ 5
διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἔσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν ἐκάστοις
ὄραν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄν. τοῖς πολλοῖς
δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικεν γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὕσα
1113b ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἰροῦνται γοῦν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν 6
δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

7 ὄντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ v
προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ
5 προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέρ-
γειαί περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, 2
καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστε εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ'
ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχροὺς ὃν, καὶ εἰ
10 τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχροὺς ὃν
ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχροῦς, ὁμοίως 3

20. τὸ ante βουλευτὸν add. H^a N^b Ald. Hel. || 21. ἀλλ' ὡδ' ἄλλως N^b, ἄλλω δ' ἄλλο Γ O^b Hel., ἄλλω δ' ἄλλως Π² Ald., ἄλλο δ' ἄλλοις(?) Ar. || 31. καὶ post ἐστι add. Γ N^b Ald. || 32. τὸ σπουδαῖον K^b || 33. ὦν Γ O^b Ald. An. Hel. Ar., ὃν K^b, om. Π² N^b || 1113b, 1. γοῦν M^b An., οὖν Γ K^b L^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr., δὲ N^b O^b || 5. εἶεν ἂν Γ K^b N^b Ald. (nescio an recte) || 6. δὴ Hel. (ἄρα) Muretus, δὲ Γ Π N^b Ald. An. Ar. Bk. || 11. τὰ — τὰ] τὸ — τὸ Sylburgius.

1. The argument drawn from the constitution of society, from the fact of rewards and punishments proves that the mind is of a nature to be acted upon by inducements. It does not touch the metaphysical difficulty of the whole world being bound by a law of necessity. But it proves an instinctive belief existing in society, that the individual is the cause of particular acts. There is no natural tendency in criminals to disclaim responsibility for their crimes. If they do so it is not from an instinctive feeling but rather from a sophisticated mind. This fact is not sufficient to discover a metaphysical system which would represent judge, criminal, and the whole world as forced to do what they do by an irresistible succession of cause and effect. But ethically and politically it is sufficient to justify a practical assumption of freedom.

(V)

δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι,
 4 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φανύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς
 οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ

ἔοικεν τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δὲ ἀληθεῖ. μακάριος μὲν γὰρ 15
 5 οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον· ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν
 εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον
 ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέ-
 6 κνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρ-
 χὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν· ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν 20
 7 ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. τούτοις δ' ἔοικε
 μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν
 νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας
 μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι,
 τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προ- 25
 τρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μῆτε ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 ἔστι μῆτε ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν
 πρὸ ἔργου ὄν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ
 πεινῆν ἢ ὅτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἦττον πεισό-
 8 μεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἔαν αἰ- 30
 τιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσιν διπλᾶ τὰ
 ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυ-
 σθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι
 τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστιν,
 9 κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέ- 1114 a
 λειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὄν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν·
 10 τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε
 μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι

13. ἄρα] ἔσται ΓΠ²N^b Ald. Ar. || 14. μάκαρ Victorius,
 μακάριος ΠΝ^b Hel., μακάριον Ald. || 20. ἐν] ἐφ' Π² Ald. Bk. ||
 καὶ om. Π²O^b || 24. οἷς M^b, ἢ K^b, ἧς c. c. Hel. Ar. || αἴτιοι
 αὐτοὶ Π² || 26. ὅσα Π¹ Hel., πρὸς αὐτὸ ΓΝ^b, πρὸς ὅσα Π² Ald. ||
 28. ὄν τὸ] ὄντος Ν^bO^b Ald. An. || 29. ἀλλ' ὅτιοῦν Π² Ald. Bk.
 Rr. || 1114a, 1. δὴ Π², δὲ c. c. Hel. || 2. ὄν post μὴ ἀγνοεῖν
 Π² || 4. τοιούτον K^bN^b, τοιούτοι ci. Rr.

5 ζῶντες ἀναιμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἳ μὲν
 κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες·
 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆ- 11
 λον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ προᾶξιν·
 διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ 12
 10 ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου·
 [ἔτι δὲ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ 13
 τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον·] εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράτ-
 τει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴῃ. * οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε 14
 βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. οὐδὲ γὰρ
 15 ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής, καί<-τοι> εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς
 βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς· τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ
 μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ'
 αὐτὸν δυνατόν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ λαβεῖν
 καὶ ῥῆναι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ
 20 καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γίνεσθαι,
 διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν μὴ εἶναι. οὐ μό- 15
 νον δὲ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ
 αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ
 φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
 25 ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν· οὐθεὶς
 γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσκειεν τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς,
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι· τῷ δὲ ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκο-
 λασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσῃ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν 16
 αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐ. εἰ δ'
 30 οὕτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμῶμεναι τῶν κακιῶν

5. ἄδικοι ἢ ἀκόλαστοι ci. Rr. || 8. γρ. μελετών mg. Ob ||
 11. ἔτι — 12. ἀκόλαστον post 13. εἴῃ tri. Rassoivius || 12. ἀκό-
 λαστον τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα Π² || 15. καί<-τοι> Rassoivius, <εἰ>
 καὶ ci. Rr. || 18. λαβεῖν O^{1,2}. Ar., βαλεῖν Γ Π Ald. Bk. Rr. ||
 19. ἐν Rassoivius, ἐπ' Π Ald. Bk. Rr. || 20. γίνεσθαι L^b, γενέ-
 σθαι Π¹ M^b Ald. Bk. Rr. || 21. ἔτι om. Π² Ald. Hel.(?)
 Ar. || ἔστι Π¹ M^b (ἔστιν pr. K^b) † || 25. αἰσχος post ἀσθένειαν
 add. M^b, καὶ αἰσχος L^b N^b Ald. Ar. || 27. ἐλεῆσαι Ald., ἐλεή-
 σεις Π².

on the particular developments of the mind in each case give people their character. This may be illustrated in the case of those who are practising from some conflict or action, - for the keep on exercising their powers now: or to know that the several states of mind arise from particular developments of the powers is absolute idiocy.

11. Aristotle would not say himself that ~~the~~ anyone wished to be intemperate, that is, wished it in the general, in the abstract; for its own sake. But he goes to show that those who do not wish to be intemperate yet take the steps that lead inevitably to this. He argues that the means make the end free; the end sets the conclusion; the parts, the whole. Afterward he allows that the general state is not essentially in our power as the particular act. With regard to the former it is rather true to say that we are responsible for it than that we choose it. The paradox then remains, that men produce by voluntary acts that which they do not wish.

suppose it to be said that all aim, as what appears to them to be good, but that their ideas and impressions are beyond their control, being dependent in each case on the character of the individual. (2) On this an alternative follows: either (ἐἰ μὲν αἰτίος the individual is the cause of his own character, and so, accordingly, of his ideas, or (3) let us see what the consequences will be if we allow that the individual is not the cause of his own character (ἐἰ δὲ ἀνίη). In this case no one will be responsible for doing wrong: wrong will reduce itself to mere ignorance, the knowledge of the good to a happy gift of nature. (4) But these exhausted deductions are overthrown by its being shown, that they will equally disprove the voluntariness of virtue as well as that of vice (ἐἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ὁμωδὴν ὀφεί). (5) To sum up (ἐπεὶ δὴ ὁμοίως γάρ), in whatever sense virtue is said to be free, whether as implying that the idea of the end is in our power, or only that there is something free and individual in the taking of means — in exactly the same sense vice will be free.

33. 'But are not masters of their impressions'. Παῖσις denotes the sensuous impression of an object. Aristotle in the De Anima separates it from sensation on the one hand, and reason on the other. It does not correspond with any of our psychological terms. In relation to the fancy and the imagination it represents the material for them, the brain images out of which the creations of fancy are constructed. Aristotle not entering in to the philosophy of the imaginative faculties merely speaks of παῖσις as furnishing a necessary element to thought.

16. Whether then the conception of the end, of whatever kind, comes not to each individual by nature, but something also is contributed by himself, or whether the end indeed is fixed by nature, but it is through the good man's voluntarily taking the means that virtue is voluntary: in either case, I say, vice will be not a whit less voluntary, for the bad man, exactly as the good, has individuality (τὸ εἰ αὐτὸν) in the particular actions, if not in the conception of the end.

22. 'For we are ourselves joint causes, in a way, of our own states of mind.'

(V)

17 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφρίενται τοῦ
 φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὅποῖός
 ποθ' ἕκαστος ἐστίν, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ 1114b
 μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος αὐτῷ τῆς ἑξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς
 φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος, εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς αὐτῷ
 αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
 πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ 5
 δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ ἀνυπαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ
 ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἣ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν
 αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυνῆς ὃ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν (τὸ
 γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἐτέρου μὴ οἶον
 τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἔξει, [καὶ] 10
 τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ
 ἂν εἴη εὐφυῖα), εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ
 18 ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ
 ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαί-
 νεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες 15
 19 πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστω
 φαίνεται ὁσὸνδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε
 τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκουσίας
 τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιον ἐστίν, οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἡ κα-
 κία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη. ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει 20
 20 τὸ δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ
 οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν
 ἑξῆων συναίτιοι πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι
 τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακαὶ ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν·

31. εἰ — b, 12. εὐφυῖα leguntur etiam ap. Alex. Aphrod.
 l. l. p. 303 sq. Speng. || λέγει L^b O^b || 32. οἶός Alex. || 1114b, 2.
 αὐτῷ post ἑξεώς Alex., αὐτῷ O^b et pr. K^b (em. corr.²), εἰνατῷ
 c. c. Bk. Rr. || 3. μηδεὶς ΓΠ² N^b Ald. Alex. An. Hel. Ar., μὴ,
 οὐθεις Π¹ Bk. Rr. || 4. κακὰ ποιεῖν N^b O^b Ald. Alex. Bk. Rr. (fors.
 recte) || ἀλλά] ἀλλ' ἢ Alex. || 9. ἐτέρων Alex. || 10. καὶ secl. Vermeh-
 renus || καὶ τὸ] τὸ δ' Π², καὶ Alex. † || 12. ἂν post εἴη Alex. ||
 15. τοῦτο Ald., ταῦτα ΠH^a Ar., ταῦτ' N^b || 17. αὐτόν K^b, αὐτῷ
 Π² N^b O^b, αὐτὸ Ald. || 21. εἰ μὴ om. ΓK^b Ald. † || τελείῳ K^b †.

- 30 ὁμοίως γάρ. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν καὶ αἱ 22
 ἔξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους
 κύριοι ἐσμέν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῆς
 1115a ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστικῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως
 χρῆσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.
- 1114b, 8 κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε 21
 26 γένος τύπων, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἔξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε
 γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥς ἂν ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ.
- 1115a, 9 ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης εἰπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ περὶ 23
 4 ποῖα καὶ πῶς, ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσὶν. καὶ
 5 πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας· ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεστότης ἐστὶ περὶ VI
 φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἥδη φανερόν γεγένηται, φοβούμεθα 2
 δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν
 κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.
- 10 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν 3
 νόσον ἀφίλιαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀν-
 δρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ
 δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπι-

30. οὐχ — 1115a, 3. ἐκούσιοι ante 26. κοινῇ tri. Scaliger et ibi legisse videtur An. || 31. τοῦ om. Π² Ald. || 1115a, 1. καθ' τῶν καθ' Ald., τῶν δὲ καθ' ΓM^b O^b Ar. || πρόσθεσις K^b M^b Ald., πρόσθεσις c. c. An. Ar. || 3. χρῆσθαι Π¹ (nescio an recte), χρῆσεσθαι (immo χρῆσασθαι!) An. || 1114b, 26. ἡμῖν] ἢ μὲν K^b || ὅτι μεσότητες καὶ ἔξεις O^b, ὅτι μεστότης καὶ ἔξεις K^b (nescio an recte) || 28. καὶ add. Π² Ald. Hel., om. ΓΠ¹ Ar., secl. Muenscher Rr. (fors. recte) || πρακτικοὶ Π² N^b Hel. || καὶ add. ΓO^b Ald., c. c. om. An. Bk. Rr. (fors. recte), ante πρακτικαὶ transponendum esse haud male ci. Rr. || 29. καὶ οὕτως — προστάξῃ secl. Rr. (nescio an recte) || προστάξει L^b, προστάξειεν M^b || 1115a, 4. δὲ ΓM^b Hel., δὴ c. c. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 7. φανερόν γεγένηται] καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται Π² Ar. Bk. Rr., καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται· φανερόν γὰρ γεγένηται O³ Ald. || 8. ὥς om. Π¹ M^b || 10. μὲν K^b, καὶ N^b, om. cet. et Hel. (fors. recte) || 13. γὰρ om. Π².

because we know all the particulars, but we can only control the beginning of our habit, till the gradual addition made by each particular step is unperceived, as is also the case with illnesses.

4. Let us therefore resume our discussion of the separate virtues, stating what they are, with what actions they are concerned, and in what manner. It will at the same time appear how many there are.
6. *ἡερίαιδότης*. In the *P. Lagoras* courage is identified with the science of the truly safe and the truly dangerous. In the *Laches*, however, it is argued, that if danger be future evil courage cannot be the science of this for a science includes all consideration of time, so if courage be a science, it must be the science of good and evil universally. Thus Plato merges courage in that universal wide consciousness, which he considers the true ground of morality. In the *Republic* courage is said to be the maintenance of right principles in spite of the distractions of danger. — By Aristotle courage is more definitely fixed as a condition of the moral side of man's nature and as implying not only a consciousness but a conscious choice of the highest moral good. Its sphere is limited to war, and thus a rather special and restricted character is given to the virtue. At the same time a reverence is shown for the nobleness of courage, beyond what we find in Plato.

11. In the *Laches* courage is extended to all those objects which are here expressly excluded from it — dangers by sea, illness, political conflicts, even the encountering of temptations. This "extension" treats all such applications of the word *ἡερίαιδότης* as merely metaphorical (*κατὰ μὲταφορὰν*), to these he opposes the proper use of the word (*κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν*) as belonging peculiarly to war.

32. He then can be properly called brave who is fearless about the noble kind of death, and about things which suddenly bring on death, - and such especially are the affairs of war. No doubt the brave man when he is upon the sea or upon a sick bed, will be brave; but his bravery will not be that of a sailor. Landmen in danger of drowning give up all hope of safety, and keep ignorance of the thought of such a death: while sailors make confident of their experience. And men put forth their courage on occasions where a prowess may be shown or where to die is glorious: but in despatch sea [by shipwreck] or from sickness neither of these qualities is to be found.

1) *εικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέ-
 γεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ 15
 τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρεῖ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.
 4 πενίαν δὲ ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα
 μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα
 ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος, λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα.
 ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἔλεν- 20
 θέριοι εἰσιν καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχου-
 5 σιν. οὐδὲ δ' εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παιδᾶς καὶ γυναιῖκα φοβεῖ-
 ται ἢ φθόρον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλὸς ἐστίν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ
 6 μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν
 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθίς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος 25
 τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ
 οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.
 7 δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος
 8 εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν
 τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ 30
 9 καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶν καὶ αἱ τι-
 10 μαὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως δὲ
 λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεῆς, καὶ
 ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ^{καὶ ἀδεῆς} ὑπόγνια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα
 11 τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν
 νόσοις ἀδεῆς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτως δὲ ὥς οἱ θαλάτ- 1115b
 12 τιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνα-
 τον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδες εἰσι παρὰ
 τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκή
 ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέ- 5
 τερον ὑπάρχει.*

16. ὅμοιόν τι Π² Ald. || 20. ἐν om. Π² (sed non Hel. Ar.) ||
 ἐλεύθεροί K^b M^b Ald., ἔλενθέριοι c. c. Hel. Ar. || 24. γ' οὖν
 Π¹, οὖν c. c. Hel. Ar. || 29. εἰ post οἷον add. N^b Ald. Bk. Rr.,
 ἢ Π² || ἐν ante νόσοις add. Γ Π² N^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 32. αἱ
 ante ἐν add. N^b O^b Ald. Bk. Rr. || μονάρχαις Γ, μονομάχοις M^b.

- 10 τὸ δὲ φοβερόν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι VII
καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερόν τῷ γε
νοῦν ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ
10 μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀν- 2
δρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ <τε> τοῦ
καλοῦ ἔνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστιν δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ 3
ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς τοιαῦτα
15 φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὴ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι ὁ οὐ δεῖ, 4
ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα 5
ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος (κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος,
20 πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος· τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας 6
ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, καὶ τῷ ἀνδρεῖῳ δέ· ἡ <δ'> ἀνδρεία κα-
λόν· τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τέλος· [ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει]
καλοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ
τὴν ἀνδρείαν· *)· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ 7
25 ἀνώνυμος [(εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλὰ ἐστὶν
ἀνώνυμα)], εἴη δ' ἂν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάληγτος, εἰ μη-
δὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμόν μήτε τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ
τοὺς Κελτούς, ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φο-
βερά θρασὺς (δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ 8

1115b, 8. γε om. Π¹N^b Ald. || 9. τὰ H^aL^bN^b Ald. Ar.,
τὸ ΓΠ¹ et corr. M^b, τῷ pr. M^b || 12. τε add. Susem. || 15. δὴ
Muenscher, δὲ ΓΠ Ar. Ald. Bk. Rr. || δ οὐ Γ, οὐ Π Ald. Bk.
Rr., οὐ οὐ Gruchius, οὐχ δ Bergius, οὐχ ἂν olim Rassovius, ἂν
οὐ Coraes, prb. Rassovius (nescio an recte), ὡς οὐ Ar. || 18.
καὶ ante ὡς om. Π² † || 20. τέλος — 24. ἀνδρείαν secl. Rr. ||
δὲ] τε? Susem. || 21. δὴ Imelmannus, δὴ ci. Rr. (fors. recte) ||
δέ — 22. τέλος] δὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία τέλος· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ καλόν Imel-
mannus || δ' add. Rassovius, prb. Rr. || 22. τέλος <καὶ ἡ ἐνέρ-
γεια> ci. Rr. || ὀρίζεται — τέλει secundum An. et Hel. post 24.
ἀνδρείαν tri. Imelmannus || 23. δὴ ΓΟ^b, δὲ cet. Ar. || 25. εἴρη-
ται — 26. ἀνώνυμα secl. Monro: v. quae adnotavi ad 1107a,
28 sqq. || 27. τὰ om. K^b Ald.

...to bear, the brave man needs not (overcome) fear. He has
fears or fears all things in their due measure according
to the true standard, his aim being to attain the noble.
Thus he is distinguished from the extremes of cowardice &
rashness. The extremes are fourfold:-

1. deficiency of fear - nameless
2. excess of fear - - - - }
3. deficiency of daring } = cowardice
4. excess of daring } = rashness

Now the fearful is different to different persons, independ-
ently of our calling some things fearful beyond human en-
durance. These latter are fearful to every man in his senses.
Dangers that are not beyond human endurance differ both
in magnitude and in degree: a difference found also in
the things that give courage.

20. The end, in itself, or perfection, of every moral act, will be
identical with that which belongs to the formed moral
act.

The meaning of the passage is that what makes an act truly
brave is that like the perfect state of bravery it aims at the
beautiful.

21. Now to the brave man courage is something morally beau-
tiful. Of this nature then must be the end of courage, for
it is the end of a thing which in each case determines its
character. Therefore the beautiful is the end for the sake
of which the brave man endures and does whatever is
brave.

Ch. VIII. This chapter discusses the spurious kinds of courage. The five shades (ἑπὶ πέντε) mentioned by Aristotle are: (1) apparent courage produced (1) from a regard to the opinions of society, (2) from a perception of the particular danger, (3) from a regard to the danger of a sanguine mind, (4) from ignorance.

17. ἡ ποδίσκη. The term as used in Plato's Repub. 420 C. is meant to distinguish the true courage of a civilized man from all merely brutal instincts. Aristotle meant by "civil courage" the daring which is prompted, not by an independent desire for the beautiful, but by a regard to reputation, and to the shame or disgrace and even perishing, not rewarded by society to brave or cowardly actions respectively.

20. Aristotle does not actually assert that real courage is capable of cultivation by the influence of society. But, more truly, courage flourishes most in war-like ages and communities. And, will most men courage and native generosity in the individual, springs out of the feelings of society.

II)

προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὥς οὖν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερά³⁰
 ἔχει, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται,
 9 μιμεῖται· διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ^{δειλοὶ} θρασυδειλοὶ· ἐν
 τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερά οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν), ὁ
 δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλον δειλός. καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ
 καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ.
 ἔλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερ- 1116a
 11 βάλλον μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δει-
 λός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ
 12 θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. περὶ ταῦτά μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὁ τε δειλός
 καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς 5
 αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσιν καὶ ἔλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέ-
 σως ἔχει καὶ ὥς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς καὶ
 βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων, ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ
 δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχοι.

13 καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶν περὶ 11
 θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖ- 11
 ται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν
 φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρεῖον, ἀλλὰ
 μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ
 οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. 15

III

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἔτε-
 ραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους. — πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ
 ἔοικεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ
 τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδῆ καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς.
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρεϊότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ 20

33. τούτῳ Π², τούτοις c. c. Hel., αὐτοῖς et θρασυνά-
 μενοι ci. Onckenius || 1116a, 3. ἐναντίος ΓΜ^b N^b O^b Ald.,
 ἐναντίως c. c. Hel. Ar. || 4. ταυτὰ L^b Hel. Ar. et corr. M^b,
 ταῦτα ΓΠ¹ Ald. et pr. M^b || 7. οἱ θρασεῖς προπετεῖς μὲν καὶ
 βουλόμενοι vel οἱ θρασεῖς προπετεῖς μὲν [καὶ] βούλονται
 vel οἱ θρασεῖς προπετεῖς καὶ βούλονται μὲν ci. Onckenius ||
 8. κινδυνεύειν post κινδύνων add. Ald., prb. Onckenius || δ',
 si βουλόμενοι retineatur, delendum esse putat Onckenius.

ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιοῦτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος 2
ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·

καὶ Διομήδης,

- 25 Ἐκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων
Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο.

ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι δι' 3
ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς
γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις 4
30 καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταῦτό·
χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσιν,
καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκά-
ζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἐκτωρ

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,

- 35 οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.

καὶ οἱ προτάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσιν τύπτοντες ταῦτα 5
1116b δρῶσιν, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατά-
τοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην
ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. — δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ 6
περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾤθη
5 ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις,
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δὲ οἱ στρατιῶται. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι
πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι·
φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷα ἐστίν.
εἴτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμ- 7
10 πειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχον-

21. καὶ οἱ] οἱ δὲ ΓΠ² N^b Ald. An. Hel. Ar. || 28. διὰ om. N^b O^b Ald. || καλοῦ — τιμῆς] τιμῆς — καλοῦ Imelmannus (perperam) || 31. ὅσοι Π¹ || 33. ὁ add. Π¹ Hel., om. Π² Ald. || 36. προτάττοντες codex Amioti et Victorius, προστάσσοντες M^b, προστάττοντες c. c. Bk. || 1116b, 4. τις Π² Ald. Ar., om. ΓΠ¹ N^b Hel. || 5. εἶναι post ἐπιστήμην add. ΓL^b Ald. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 7. κενὰ ΓL^b O^b An. Hel. Ar., καινὰ K^b M^b Ald. || 9. μὴ] μηδὲν Π² || 10. καὶ φυλάξασθαι καὶ πατάξαι ante δυνάμενοι add. ΓΠ¹ N^b Ald. Hel., om. Π² Ar.

He said to the king, "Polydamas, I believe it is cowardly
to approach at this time, and so I am advised," Hector will some day, having
among the Trojans a class - Polydamas, but he is terrified, fled
to the ships.

17. But this courage is most like the kind which we de-
scribed above, for it originates in virtue, namely, in a
sense of honour, in a desire for the beautiful, since it
aims at reputation, and in a fear of dishonour as of some-
thing base. — This spirit of honour is the nearest approach
to, and at all events in many of the relations of life,
the best substitute for a genuine morality. Just as
Plato places the philosopher above the man of honour
Book IV, cf. Repub. 574-9, so Aristotle conceives of a higher
and purer courage than that which emanates from
the spirit of honour. Cf. Eth. IV. 9.

18. Civil courage is of two kinds: 1. that which depends on
honour, 2. that which depends on fear.

19. Experience of particular dangers is also accounted a
kind of courage: which gave Socrates occasion to think
that ~~courage~~ courage was a science. Different men have
experience in different dangers, and regular soldiers
in the dangers of war. Now there are many unreal shows
of danger in warfare, and professional soldiers, being
perfectly accustomed to these, appear brave, because other
men are deceived by appearances.

The effects of experience may be analysed into (1) a familiarity
with and contempt for much that seemingly
but not really, terrible: (2) a skill of weapons giving
both an offensive and a defensive superiority.

15. But regular troops lose heart when the danger is overpowering, and when they are inferior in numbers and equipment. In such cases they are the first to run away, while citizen troops remain and die, as actually happened at the Hermæum.

23. The spirit of anger too, men reckon as courage, and they who act through anger (like brutes turning on those who have no noble claim) at the character of being brave, because the converse is true and brave men are spirited. The spirit of anger is most keen for encountering dangers, and hence Homer wrote: 'he put strength into his wrath', 'he roused up his strength and his wrath', 'fierce strength in his nostrils', 'his blood boiled'. For all such things appear to signify the awakening and outbreak of anger. Aristotle fails to remember the great indefiniteness of "Draos" - Homer - life, spirit, wrath, heart, mind.

I)

8 τες ὅποια ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ
 παθεῖν κράτιστα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὀπλισμένοι μάχον-
 ται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶ-
 9 σιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρεϊότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μά-
 λιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρα- 15
 τιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ
 λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ
 φεύγουσιν, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ καὶ πῖ
 τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχροὺς τὸ φεύγειν
 καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος, οἱ δὲ 20
 καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ
 φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ
 10 δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος. — καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν
 ἐπιφέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν
 ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ 25
 ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἱτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς
 κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὀμηρος “σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ” καὶ
 “μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρεν” καὶ “δοιμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥίνας μένος”
 καὶ “ἔξεσεν αἷμα”. πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικεν σημαί-
 11 νειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι 30
 διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ
 θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην, διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φο-
 βεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ἦ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ
 δὴ ἔστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνης καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμαῖν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προσορῶντα, ἐπεὶ 35
 οὕτως γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ
 οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. [καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν 1117a

19. φεύγειν <ῆν> ci. Coraes || 24. φέρουσιν K^b, ἀναφέρουσιν
 Π² || 25. φερόμενοι Γ^N^b O^b Ald. Bk. Rr., φερόμενα^c. c. Hel.
 E. E. 1230a, 23 || 26. ἰθυητικώτατον Canter (ap. Zwingerum), κινη-
 τικώτατον M^b, τὸ ὀρητικώτατον Ald. || 32. διὰ τὸ om. Π² Ald.
 Bk. Rr. || 33. ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ vel ἢ ἐν ἔλει secludenda esse ci. Victorius¹ ||
 ἐν post ἢ om. Π² † || 36. καὶ ΓΠ² K^b || εἶεν] ἂν εἶεν Π² Ald. ||
 1117a, 1. καὶ — 2. δρῶσιν secl. Rassovius, om. Hel. (sed legit An.).

ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν.] [φυσικωτάτη γὰρ ἔοι-
 4 κεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν
 5 καὶ τὸ οὐ ^{motu} ἐνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι.] καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὲ
 ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσιν, τιμωρούμενοι δὲ ἡδοναί· οἱ δὲ
 διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ
 γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος·
 παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσιν τι. * — οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες 13
 10 ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι
 θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω
 θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα
 θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἷσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μη-
 15 θὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσιν καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· 14
 15 εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τοιαῦτα,
 φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπων ὄντα καὶ
 φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. διὸ 15
 καὶ ἀνδρειότερον δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις
 ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ
 20 ἔξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, [ἢ καὶ] ὅτι ἤττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ
 προφανῇ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο,
 τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. — ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ 16
 οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ'
 ὅσα ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσιν τινα
 25 χρόνον· οἱ δὲ ἡπατημένοι, εἰὰν γινῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑπο-

2. οὐ δὴ (οὐ δὴ οὖν L^b N^b Ald.) ἔστιν ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀλη-
 δόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον post δρῶσιν
 add. ΓΠ² N^b Ald. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 2. φυσικωτάτη — 5. εἶναι
 post 9. τι tri. Rassovius || γὰρ Susem., δέ K^b Ald., δ' c. c. Hel.
 Ar. Bk. Rr. || 4. εἶναι aut v. 5. εἶναι delendum esse ci. Co-
 raes || καὶ secundum Argyropylum del. Coraes et Spengelius ||
 5. ἀνδρεία εἶναι del. Spengelius, εἶναι om. ΓN^b Ar. et, ut
 videtur, Hel., del. in textu Coraes || δὴ ΓK^b L^b Bk. Rr. ||
 7. μαχόμενοι add. K^b L^b || 13. κράτιστοι Π¹ (nescio an recte),
 κρατίστους Ald. || 16. τὸ M^b, τὸ τὰ L^b || καὶ] καὶ μὴ Γ K^b † ||
 20. ἢ καὶ secl. Susem., καὶ om. ΓΠ¹ || 25. ὑποπιτεύσωσι O^b Ald.
 An., ὑποπιτεύσουσι L^b, ὑποπιτεύουσιν ΓK^b, ὑποπιτεύωσι M^b.

16. The instinct of anger is part of our nature and rightly directed and brought under the control of the will and reason can be elevated into a moral state. It is remarkable how high a level it reaches in places of danger. It must be entirely prompt, he says, by a desire for what is morally better. mere physical courage is only an assistance in realizing this, and the prompting of anger will make men peripatetic but not brave. The great separation found in Aristotle between true courage and the spiritless element which must be its physical basis is to be attributed (1) to his high moral tone, (2) to his analytical mode of treatment.

17. For this reason it seems braver to be fearless and untroubled in sudden troubles than in such as may be anticipated. In the former case a man is braver more by habit, or in other words less by premeditation: for in unforeseen dangers a man may calculate and reason out the course to be chosen, in sudden ones he must depend upon his habitual character.

24. This confidence enables the sanguine to stand their ground for a time, while those who have blundered into bravery as soon as it appears that they are in danger - other than they had supposed to be to their heels, as was the case with the Argives when they fell in with some Sacedaemonians whom they took for men of Sicyon.

Ch. IX. the connection of courage with pain and loss. The nobleness of courage depends chiefly on the sacrifice which it entails. The man who has become a martyr makes a sacrifice of the greatest magnitude. To do so he runs the risk of diminishing a life which is eminently valuable and, by reason of his virtue, full of happiness. Courage, then, is not to be considered pleasurable except as attending to a satisfaction above all pleasure, attainable in short to the end of one's being. The conscious heroism of the brave man distinguishes him from the recklessness of the mercenary; it disqualifies him indeed from becoming a mere pant and file a mere machine of discipline.

1. Without doubt the end that belongs to courage is pleasant in itself, but this pleasantness is neutralized by the attendant circumstances.
4. But the blows and indeed the whole action are painful and grievous to flesh and blood; so that by the multitude of intervening pains the incentive which is small in itself, loses all appearance of being pleasant.
11. Cf. Wordsworth's "Happy Warrior" whose master bias leans to homely pleasures and to gentle scenes; ... more have for this, that he hath much to love.
15. Therefore it is not the case that in all the virtues, virtuous action is accompanied by pleasure except in so far as one attains to the end in itself.

I)

πτεύσωσιν, φεύγουσιν, ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις.

- οἷ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες 12
 X ἀνδρεῖοι· περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὕσα οὐχ
 ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά. ὁ 30
 γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀν-
 2 δρεῖος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπο-
 μένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ λυπὸν ἡ
 ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυ-
 3 πηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ 35
 δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν 1117b
 κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἂν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν γί-
 νεται. τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ
 στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ
 σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ 5
 ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὅν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδύ φαίνεται ἔχειν.
 4 εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος
 καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται,
 ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μή. καὶ
 ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχη πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστε- 10
 ρος ἢ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ
 γὰρ μάλιστα ^{conspicuius} ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μελίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀπο-
 στερεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἥττον ἀνδρεῖος,
 ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ'
 5 ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως 15
 ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.
 6 στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἥττον μὲν ἀνδρεῖους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μη-

1117b, 7. εἰ — 15. αἰρεῖται post 16. ἐφάπτεται tri. Eucke-
 nius || δὴ ΓΟ^b Ald. Hel. Ar., δὲ Π², δὲ δὴ Κ^b || 9. ὑπομενεῖ
 Muretus, ὑπομένει ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 10. ἔχει Κ^b, ἔχοι
 Μ^b || 11. λυπήσεται Κ^b Ald. et, ut videtur, Γ, λυπεῖται Π²,
 λύπη ἔσται Ν^b Ο^b, λυπηθήσεται Casaubonus Bk. Rr. et, ut vi-
 detur, An.

δὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν
20 βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.

- 13 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω (τί γάρ
ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων)
μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ
τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
25 μεσότης ἐστὶν περὶ ἡδονᾶς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν
(ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ τὰς λύπας ἐστίν)· ἐν τοῖς
αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν
ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηγήσθωσαν δὴ καὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ
καὶ αἱ ψυχικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ
30 τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώ-
ματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύ-
τας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· ὁμοίως
δὲ οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσιν. τοὺς
γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
35 κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ
1118a λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. περὶ
δὴ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ
— ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρώ-
μασι καὶ στήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκό-
5 λαστοὶ λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὥς δεῖ χαί-
ρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένους

21. γὰρ ἐστίν Susem., δ' ἐστίν ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 23. δοκοῦσι — 24. ἀρεταί secl. Rr. (nisi fallor, recte) || 26. τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ post ὁμοίως add. Π², c. c. om. Hel. Ar. || ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς (τὰς om. M^b) λύπας ΓΠ²N^b Ald. Bk. Rr. || τοῖς αὐτοῖς] τούτοις ΓΠ²N^b Ald. Hel. Ar. || 28. νῦν om. Π², c. c. add. An. Hel. Ar. || δὴ Susem., οὖν M^b, δὲ c. c. An. Hel. Bk. Rr. || καὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ αἱ ψυχικαὶ Π¹ Hel., αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ (αἱ om. M^b) σωματικαὶ ΓΠ² Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 30. τούτῳ Scaliger || 34. διηγηματικούς M^b Ald., διηγητικούς c. c. Hel. || 35. ἀδολέσχους O^b Ald. Hel. || 1118a, 2. δὴ Susem., om. Γ, δὲ c. c. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. in textu.

sell their life for a trifling sum.

In the Ethics where psychology and moral science both in process of formation, we cannot expect to find systematic arrangement. Courage and temperance are probably treated first because they were two of the Greek cardinal virtues, and when he came to temperance he said 'this comes next because it also is an excellence of the irrational part of our nature'.

24. τὸν ἀνθρώπου μένος. The instincts, as of self-preservation, fear, desire etc., can only be capable of excellence by being brought under a law (νόμος, νόμος) of the intellect, having no law in themselves. This law of the intellect becomes the most important part of the conception of virtues, as form is more striking than matter: in Plato the law is put for virtue altogether, and thus he speaks of ~~virtue~~ courage as a science.

25. σωφροσύνη - see note.

29. For each of these (the ambitious man and the scholar) respectively takes pleasure in his favorite pursuit without the body being at all affected, but only the mind.

15. It is strange that Aristotle should have spoken of the pleasure felt in colours, forms, painting, music and acting, at all as bodily pleasures.

16. Brutes, says Aristotle, have no pleasures of hearing or ~~pleasures~~ smell or sight, except accidental ones, viz when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food: it may however be questioned whether brutes are e.g. not capable of pleasures from musical sounds and from certain smells.

C)

χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθείς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ
 τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σῶφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμια- 10
 μάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς
 μύρων ἢ ὀψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι
 6 διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. ἴδοι
 δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσιν, χαίροντας ταῖς
 τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστον. 15
 7 τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
 ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμ-
 βεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαί-
 ρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἰσθήσιν ἢ ὁσμὴ ἐποίη-
 σεν· οὐδὲ ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ, ὅτι 20
 δ' ἐγγύς ἐστιν, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἥσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ
 φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν [ἢ εὐρὼν] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον
 8 αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡδονὰς
 ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα
 κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· 25
 9 αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφῆ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει
 ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ
 κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες
 καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ
 οἷ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα 30

9. οὐδὲ — 23. ἔξει] totum locum vix sanum esse censet
 Rr. || 12. ἢ Π¹ Ar., καὶ ΓΠ² Ald. Hel. Bk. Rr. || 13. ἴδοι —
 15. ὁσμαῖς secl. Rr., — 16. ταῦτα fortasse secludenda esse putat
 Susem. || 13. ἐπιθυμητῶν ΓΟ^b Hel. Ar., ἐπιθυμημάτων K^b, ἐπι-
 θυμιῶν Π² Ald. || 14. δ'] γὰρ? Susem. || 15. <ἀεὶ> χαίρειν?
 Susem. || 16. τούτων Π² K^b N^b Ald. Ar. || ἐπιθυμητὰ H^a N^b O^b,
 ἐπιθυμήματα Π² K^b Ald. Ar., ἐπιθυμητόν(?) Γ || οὐδ' ἐν] οὐδὲ
 Π² N^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. (fors. recte) || 19. δ' post αἰσθήσιν Π² ||
 22. ἢ εὐρὼν, in quibus recte haesit Rr., secl. Susem. || 23. δὴ
 ΓΠ¹ Ald. Hel. Ar., δ' Π² || 26. δὲ Hel. Ar. Muenscher, δ' οἱ
 σῶφρονες M^b, δὴ c. c. An. Bk. || 28. χυμῶν M^b O^b Hel., χυλῶν
 K^b L^b N^b Ald. An.

δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις
 λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ἡῤξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὦν τὸν φά- 10
 ρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὥς ἡδόμενος τῇ
 1118b ἀφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία·
 καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἄνθρω-
 ποὶ ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν 11
 καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται
 5 τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφήρηται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνα-
 σίοις διὰ τριψέως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμενοι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ
 πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινὰ μέρος.
 τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ <καὶ φυσικαὶ> δοκοῦσιν XI
 εἶναι, αἱ δὲ ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθεται· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικὴ·
 10 πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ'
 ἄμφοιν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων·
 τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ 2
 φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν·
 ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδία
 15 τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι 3
 ἁμαρτάνουσιν καὶ ἐφ' ἓν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον (τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ
 τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ
 τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας
 ἢ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία· διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὥς
 20 παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν· τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν
 ἀνδραποδώδεις)· περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ 4
 πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιοῦτων λεγομένων

32. εῤξατό L^b N^b, εῤξαιτό M^b, ηῤξατο c. c. Hel. || τις II²
 Q Ar. et, ut videtur, An., τις Φιλόξενος ὁ (ὁ om. N^b Ald. Hel.)
 ἐρύξιος Γ N^b O^b Ald. Hel. et corr.¹ K^b, τις Φιλόξενος ὁ εῤξιος
 O¹ et pr. K^b, om. H^a || 33. ἡδόμενος ἢ δ' ἀφῇ Par. 1417, μενέ-
 ξενος ἢ δ' ἀφῇ M^b, ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ. ἢ δὲ ἀφῇ Γ Ald. † ||
 1118b, 7. τὸ add. K^b Ald. Hel. || 8. καὶ φυσικαὶ add. Scaliger ||
 10. ὁ ἐνδεὴς] ὅταν ἐνδεὴς ἢ Γ II² N^b Ald. Ar. || 12. πᾶς] παν-
 τός ci. Rr. || 13. καὶ om. Γ II¹ Ar., c. c. add. Hel. || 17. ἕως
 πλησθῆι II¹ || 21. ἡδονῶν] ἐπιθυμιῶν ci. Rassovius.

8. Hence this (choice of particular food &c) appears merely factitious. In reality however it has something natural in it, for different things are pleasant to different people, and all men have their preferences. - Aristotle attributes the very diversity of tastes to a wise law of nature and to a wise purpose.

31. And thus his pleasure that produces him his pain.

6. οὐ πᾶσι γίγνεται. Such would be the experience of a Greek, but it is not so true in all periods of the world. A monkish turn of mind seems occasionally to diminish to an unhappy extent the natural and human feelings, so as to impair the kindness, the geniality and the good sense of mankind.

11. Aristotle's standard of temperance (ὡς δεῖ, τὸ καλόν) is indefinite, yet he appeals to a sense in each man's own mind. There is a relative element to be considered, (the health or fortune of the individual (ἐγίαιεν, οὐδ' αἶεν)), and there is also something that appears absolute amidst all that is relative (τὸ καλόν)

XI)

ἢ τὸ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὥς δεῖ. κατὰ πάντα δὴ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ 25 γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισιν δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν.

ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ 5 ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος τῷ μῇ, ἀλλ' ὁ 30 μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τοῦ ἡδέος. 6 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν 14 ¹¹¹⁹ μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν (μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' 7 ἔοικεν τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι)· ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς 5 ἡδονὰς καὶ ἥττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνν γίνονται. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δὲ τῷ μηθέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι. οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὀνόματος ὁ τοιοῦ- 10 8 τος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνν γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταῦτα

23. τῷ ΓΚ^b L^b N^b Ald. An. Ar. Bk. Rr. || τὸ N^b O^b, τῷ c. c. An. Ar. Bk. Rr. || μᾶλλον, ἢ Bk. Rr. || ὥς secl. Grati-
tius || 24. ὥς δεῖ ΓΟ^b An. Ar., ἢ ὡδὲ K^b, ὥς δεῖ ἢ ὡς δεῖ L^b,
ὥς δεῖ ἢ ὡς μὴ δεῖ M^b, ὥς δεῖ ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ Ald. || δὴ M^b, δ' c. c.
Ar. Bk. Rr. || 26. καὶ εἴ ΓΠ¹ Hel. Ar., καὶ ἐπὶ Π², καὶ ἐπὶ
Ald. || <ἢ οὐχ ὥς δεῖ ἢ> μᾶλλον Susem. || 27. καὶ ἢ ὥς K^b, ἢ
καὶ ὥς Ald., καὶ ὥς οὐχ N^b, καὶ οὐχ ὥς P¹ Hel., καὶ ὥς c. c.
Ar. Bk. Rr. || χαίρουσιν<, καὶ οὐχ ὥς δεῖ> ci. Thurotus || 30.
οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος ΓΠ¹ O^b An., ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος Ald., ἀκόλαστος
δὲ Π² Bk. Rr. || 33. καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι post ἀπουσία add. ΓΠ²
N^b Ald. Bk. Rr., om. Π¹ et, ut videtur, An. Hel. Ar. || 1119a,
3. ἄλλων] καλῶν Muretus || 5. τὰ ante περὶ add. Π¹ (fors.
recte) || 9. δὴ? Susem. || 10. δ'] δὴ an τ'? Susem. || ὀνόματος
post τοιοῦτος ΓΠ² N^b Ald. Bk. Rr.

ἔχει. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ
 15 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ἃ δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὥς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς
 20 ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὥς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.
 15 ἐκονσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. XII ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἢ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν 2 τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἢ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον
 25 δὴ ἐκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον. καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶρον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε 3 δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε
 30 καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥίπτειν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα 4 ἐκούσια (ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ), τὸ δ' ὅλον ἥττον. οὐθείς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι.

τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας 5
 1119b φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον

13. οὐδ' — οὐδὲ Rassoivius, οὐθ' — οὔτε II Bk. Rr., οὔτε — οὔτε Ald. || 14. οὐδ'] οὐτ' K^b, οὔτε δ' O^b || 15. ἢ δεῖ Γ Hel., ἢ δεῖ οὐθ' ἔν K^b, ἢ δεῖ οὐθενί vel οὐδενί c. c. Ald. || οὐθέν Bk., οὐθενός vel οὐδενός ΓΠ Ald. || 16. ἃ] ὅσα ΓΠ² Ald. Hel. Bk. Rr. et γρ. mg. O^b || 25. δὴ Argyropylus, δ' ΓΠ Ar. Ald. Bk. Rr. || ἐκούσιον corruptum esse perperam censet Rr. || ἐπονειδιστότερον ΓΠ² N^b O^b Ald. An. Hel. Ar., ἐπονειδιστον K^b Rr. || 26. ῥάιον L^b N^b Ald. An. Hel., ῥάιδιον ΓΠ¹ M^b Ar. Rr. || 28. ἐκούσιον Γ^b N^b Ald. An. Hel. et γρ. mg. O^b, ἀκούσιον Ar., φευκτόν Π || 29. αὐτὴ Bk., αὐτῇ ΓΠ H^a N^b Ald. Ar. || 34. καὶ om. Π² Ald. Ar.

Chap. XII. Opening with a theory of the voluntary & proceeding to discuss courage and temperance, Aristotle concludes the book by considering them in relation to the voluntary. The subject is also closely connected with the theory of the formation of habits (II. 1. 2), and also with the question of the voluntariness of vicious habits (III. 5).

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice inasmuch as it consists in choosing pleasure while cowardice is under a sort of compulsion, flying from pain. 2. Again it is easier by practice to learn to resist temptation than to learn to withstand danger, the opportunities are frequent and free from risk. 3. Cowardice as a whole is more voluntary than its parts: intemperance as a whole is less voluntary than its parts.

23. And while pain distracts and overturns the mental balance of him who experiences it, pleasure does nothing of the kind. $\phi 1015$ is the perfect or normal state.

29. But cowardice is more voluntary than its particular acts, for in itself it is painless, while its particulars distract the mind with pain — Each cowardly act while it leaves the mind irresolute and so prone to fresh cowardice on the other hand brings experience and renders the mind more familiar with danger. Thus cowardice, at first involuntary, tends to become more and more voluntary and deliberate, while intemperance at first voluntary becomes more and more involuntary.

.. which is called from which, matters not for our present purpose: obviously, that which is latter in conception is called from that which is earlier.

is wrong, and which has a mighty capacity for development, requires to be chastened, and this is just the character of desire and of the child. Children live entirely by desire, and have the longing for what is pleasant most strongly.

8. The longing for what is foolish is insatiable in him that is foolish and seeks satisfaction from all quarters: and the exercise of desire increases its native powers, and if the desires grow great and vehement they expell all reasoning in the end.

24. now again in decisions. (ὡς περ' ὁ δίκαιος)

26. χρῆμ. now we call properly all things whose value is measured by money.

30. τὴν δὲ ἀουτίαν - But the term prodigality we sometimes apply in a complicated sense, for we call it who are incontinent and who lavish money on intemperance prodigals.

(XII)

6 ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικεν μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολλάσθαι
 γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον,
 τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν 5
 γὰρ ζῶσιν καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος
 7 ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται ^{ἐπὶ τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τῷ ὄρει} ~~εὐπειθὲς~~ καὶ ^{ἐπὶ τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τῷ ὄρει} ~~ὑπὸ τὸ ἀρχον~~, ἐπὶ πολὺ
 ἥξει· ἀπληστος γὰρ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ
 ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἢ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές,
 καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρά ὦσιν, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. 10
 διὸ δεῖ μετρίως εἶναι αὐτάς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μη-
 8 θὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκο-
 λασμένον, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα
 τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν
 9 λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν 15
 τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ
 σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ
 λόγος.

Δ.

Δ 1 ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης· λέγω- 19
 μεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι περὶ ^{ἀνελευθερίας} ~~χρη-~~ 22
 ματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς
 πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρι-
 σεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δὲ 25
 2 ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἢ ἀξία νο-
 3 μίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία
 περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνε-
 λευθερίαν προσάπτομεν αἰετὸς τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ ^{βασίλειον} ~~χρή-~~
 ματα σπουδαζουσιν, τὴν δὲ ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμ- 30

1119b, 4. τὸ] τὸν ΓΚ^b Μ^b || ἔχοντα ΓΜ^b || 6. καὶ ante μάλ-
 ιστα om. K^b Μ^b † || ἐν] δὲ ἐν Μ^b || ἢ] γὰρ καὶ ἢ K^b || 8. πάν-
 τοθεν K^b Rr. (fors. recte) || 11. αὐτὰς ante εἶναι L^b Ald., om.
 ΓΜ^b || 12. καὶ om. K^b, secl. Rr. (fors. recte) || 13. δὲ] γὰρ ΓΠ²
 Hel. Ar. Ald. Bk. || 17. καὶ ὡς δεῖ om. Π², c. c. add. Hel. Ar.
 Lib. IV. K^b O^b = Π¹, L^b Μ^b = Π².

1119b, 19. λέγομεν Π² || 22. ἢ post εἶναι add. K^b Bk.

πλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς
 ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ ^{most exp. amad} φανυλότετοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· 4
 πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγο-
 ρεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἐν τι κακὸν ἔχων, 5
 1120a τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμε-
 νος, δοκεῖ δὲ ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
 ὥς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος.

οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα· ὦν δ' ἔστι χρεία, ἔστιν 6
 5 τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἔστιν τῶν χρη-
 σίμων· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν·
 καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ χρῆσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρε-
 τήν. οὗτος δ' ἔστιν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρησὶς δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημά- 7
 1 των δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτησὶς μᾶλλον.
 10 διὸ μᾶλλον ἔστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν
 ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον
 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλ-
 λον ἢ τὰ αἰσχροὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν 8
 δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λή-
 15 ψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ
 διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον.
 καὶ ὅῃον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἦττον 9
 προῖενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευ- 10
 θέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ
 20 εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἦττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην·
 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνν. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχε- 11
 δὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γάρ,
 2 τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ 12

33. δὲ Γ, δὴ Π Ald. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 34. τι om. Π¹,
 c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || 1120a, 1. φθεῖρον L^b Hel. || 4. τις (τις
 Ald.) post χρεία add. ΓΠ² Ald. Hel., om. Π¹ An. || 6. τοῦτο]
 ἕκαστον ΓΠ² Ald. (fors. recte) † || 11. γὰρ post ἀρετῆς Π²
 Ald. || 16. μὴ om. ΓM^b et pr. K^b (suppl. re.) † || 17. λαμβά-
 νειν Π² Ald. Hel. || διδόναι Ald. Hel. || 21. σχεδὸν om. K^b
 M^b †.

33. But (on reading $\delta\eta$ - therefore, they are not appropriately styled, for the prodigal means one who exhibits one particular evil, namely, the ruin of his substance, for he that is destroyed by himself is prodigal & irreclaimable, and the ruin of one's substance appears a sort of self-destruction inasmuch as life depends on substance. This then is the sense in which we understand $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\acute{o}\nu\eta\varsigma$.
34. ὁ ὅτι οὗτος - the man who destroys his property destroys himself and he who destroys himself is beyond salvation.

8. $\chi\eta\acute{\rho}\iota\omicron\varsigma$ -- $\kappa\tau\eta\acute{\rho}\iota\omicron\varsigma$ - Liberality consists more in right giving and spending than in right receiving. Giving is the use of money, receiving and keeping is mere possession. And more (Rhet. 1.5.7) constitutes $\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu\acute{o}\nu\eta\varsigma$ itself, as being a sort of life and reality ($\epsilon\upsilon\pi\gamma\omicron\iota\alpha$), which mere possession is not.

13. But it is plain that doing good and acting nobly are the results of giving while receiving good and avoiding the base are the results of receiving.

17. And it is easier to abstain from taking than it is to give: for men are less willing to give away what is their own, than they are to abstain from taking what belongs to others.

21. οὐ δὲ - But they who receive can hardly be said to be praised at all.

7
10. nor would he be read, to ask favours, for it does not belong to the benefactor to be easily a receiver of benefits. This spirit of manliness and nobility runs through the virtuous characters of Aristotle. it appears most strongly in the magnanimous man. The principle of individuality, a sense of life and free action (ὁρᾷ ἑαυτὸν) are with Aristotle the basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect. In Aristotle's whole account we do not find a word about benevolence or love to others as prompting acts of liberality; we find no motive but the splendor (καλὸν) of the acts themselves. What is said in the present section verges towards the selfish theory, which would ascribe such acts to the love of power inherent in man.

11. Now those seem to be more liberal, who have not acquired their property, but inherited it, for they have never known what want is; and besides, all men love more what they have produced themselves, as parents do and poets.
Cp. Plato. Repub. 330. 102.

(I)

τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα
 καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα ²⁵
¹³ ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δώσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ
¹⁴ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥμιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδούς
 οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην
 αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τις ζηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ
 λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς ³⁰
¹⁵ πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίον. οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ
 δεῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη
¹⁶ λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποι-
¹⁷ οῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετῆσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ
 τῶν ιδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὥς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὥς ἀναγκαῖον, ^{1120b}
 ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ιδίων, βουλόμενός γε
 διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ
¹⁸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶν
 σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δώσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ⁵
 ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου.
¹⁹ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
 πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος
 ἔξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει
 ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, εἰς ἀπ' ἐλατ- ¹⁰
²⁰ τόνων διδῶ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησά-
 μενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἅπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς
 ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα,
 ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὸν
 ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν ¹⁵
 δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς

24. οὖν ΓΠ¹ Ald. Hel. Ar., δὲ Π² || 27. ἥμιστα λυπηρόν
 L^b Ald., ἢ ἥμιστα λυπηρόν H^a M^b, om. Γ || 30. αἰροῦτ' Π² ||
 31. δὲ om. Γ H^a M^b O^b || 1120b, 2. ιδίων Π¹ Ald. Hel., οἰκείων
 Π² || 4. ὅτε καὶ οὐ ΓΠ² Ald. Hel. Ar., ὅτε οὐ H^a, ὅπου Π¹ ||
 5. καταλείπειν O^b Ald. Hel., καταλιπεῖν Π² K^b || 6. βλέπειν K^b
 M^b || αὐτὸν Π², ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ καλόν O^b || 8. δόντος H^a M^b ||
 9. οὐθὲν δὲ Γ H^a, ὅθεν οὐθὲν Π² Ald., ὥστε οὐδὲν Hel.

δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι 21
 ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ
 γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματα ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ
 20 οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ 22
 δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ
 τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς
 ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριος ἐστὶν ὁ 23
 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
 25 ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἄσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλη-
 θος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾷδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς
 δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσότητος 24
 οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ
 δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μι-
 30 κροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν
 δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότη-
 τος, ποιήσει ἀμφοτέρω ὥς δεῖ. ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δό-
 σει ἢ τοιαύτῃ λήψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτῃ ἐναντία ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν
 οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντία δῆ-
 1121a λον ὥς οὔ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμ- 25
 βαίνειν αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπῆσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ·
 τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ
 ὥς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα· 26
 5 δύνатаι γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ 27
 μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ
 μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.
 3 ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδέται 28
 ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προιοῦσι φανε-
 10 ρώτερον. εἴρηται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν 29

22. αὐτὰ Π² || 26. δόσεσι καὶ δαπάναις H^a, δαπάναις καὶ
 ταῖς δόσεσιν Π² || 30. δ' add. Π¹ || 1121a, 4. καὶ om. Π¹ † ||
 9. οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ ci. Coraes, καὶ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ M^b, οὔτε ὥς
 δεῖ ΓL^b Ald. et post λυπεῖται Π¹ || 10. γὰρ Susem., δ' ΓΠ
 Ald. Bk. Rr.

4. The liberal man is easy to deal with in monetary transactions for he may be cheated inasmuch as he does not regard money, and is more annoyed at having omitted to spend anything he ought, than pained at having spent anything he ought not. ~~and~~ he does not approve of the sentiments of Simonides. This is not the highest liberality: the gratification of a personal feeling is too prominent. All the sentiments attributed to Simonides, however, to the solid advantage of riches.

14. Illiberality is deficient in giving, but exceeds in taking, only it must be in petty matters.
Grasping on a large scale is wickedness.
15. τὰ πρὸς ὅν. In prodigality the two ^{extreme} tendencies can hardly be said to exist together, that is (γὰρ), it is not easy to give to everybody and receive from nobody: private individuals, who are held to be prodigals, soon find their substance fail them in giving: [the two bad tendencies, then, do not co-exist, and no wonder] since (ἐπεὶ) the prodigal must surely be thought much better than the illiberal man.

27. It is much to be doubted whether prodigality in any sense does more good than illiberality.

20. But most prodigals, as has been said, take whence they ought not and in this way are illiberal.
Often in Aristotle's virtues and vices extremes meet. cf. IV. 7. 15:
11. 7. 15: IV. 3. 20.

(1)

ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λή-
 ψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
 ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ
 λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλ-
 30 λείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. τὰ 15
 μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πᾶν συνδυάζεται (οὐ γὰρ ῥᾷδιον
 μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσιν διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλεί-
 πει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι
 31 εἶναι)· ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι
 τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐλατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας 20
 καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν.
 ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσιν καὶ οὐ λαμβά-
 νει, οὐδέτερον δὲ ὥς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἢ πως
 ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ,
 καὶ λήψεται ὅθεν δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ 25
 ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν δι-
 32 δόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρό-
 πον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διὰ τε
 τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθέννα,
 33 ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν· ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ 30
 εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶν κατὰ τοῦτο
 34 ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀνα-
 λίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι. ταχὺ γὰρ

11. ἐν δυσίν om. Π¹ † || λήψει καὶ ἐν δόσει Π² Ald. † ||
 13. καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν om. L^b † || 15. ἐπὶ ἐν Π² || 16. συνδυά-
 ζεται Π¹ An., συναύξεται ΓH^aM^b Ald. Hel. Ar., συναύξουσιν
 L^b || 18. ἰδιώτας διδόντας L^b, διδόντας ἰδιώτας cet. || εἴπερ Ver-
 mehrenus || 19. ἐπειθ' Zwinger, secl. et δὲ pro γε ci. Muretus
 (perperam) || 20. καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει post ἀνελευ-
 θέρου add. Π², c. c. om. Hel. Ar. || τε om. Π¹ (suppl. re. K^b) ||
 24. μεταβάλοι L^b, μεταβάλλοι cet. H^a || 25. οὐ ante λήψεται
 add. ΓΠ² Ald. An. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || οὐ ante δεῖ add. ΓΠ²
 O^b Ald. An. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 27. δὴ Hel. Vermehrenus, δὲ
 ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. || 28. τε om. Π¹ || 33. τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνα-
 σθαι Π² O² Ald. Ar., μὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν K^b, τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖν Hel.,
 τοῦτο ποιεῖν ΓH^a O^b O^{1,3}.

ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν
 1121 b πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλι-
 γώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν,
 τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἔλεν- 35
 θέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλά, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα,
 5 οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους
 ποιοῦσιν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς
 δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ
 ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες
 καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσιν, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς
 10 τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν.

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα 36
 μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφί-
 κοιτ' ἂν· ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτός ἐστιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας 37
 καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. καὶ συμφνέστερον τοῖς
 15 ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον
 ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν· 38
 πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσιν τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ
 γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς
 λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χω-
 20 ρίζεται. καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δό-
 σει ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις 39
 οἶον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλεί-
 πουσιν, τῶν δ' ἄλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβά-
 νειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχροῶν
 25 (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασὶ γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ
 ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πράξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ
 κυμνοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς
 ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι), οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέ-

1121 b, 4. αὐτοῦ post τούτου add. ΓΠ²Η^a Ar. Ald. Bk.,
 om. Π¹ et, ut videtur, Hel., secl. Rr. || ἕνεκεν? Susem. || 28.
 μηθὲν M^b, μηθέν L^b, μηθενὶ ΓΗ^aN^b Ald. Ar. [Bk. Rr. in
 textu || ἂν om. Π².

14. Illiberality is more innate in men than prodigality. For most men are more avaricious than generous. - This assertion is not universally true.

15. Aristotle from his dislike to all that is sordid, and his admiration for the brilliant and noble qualities, takes perhaps too favorable a view of the vice of prodigality. Its connection with vanity, selfishness, and often with heartlessness, he does not sufficiently notice, nor does he observe that lavish giving often proceeds from an incapacity for estimating the worth of objects.

16. It is widespread and has many forms, for there are thought to be many kinds of illiberality. It contains two elements - excess of taking and defect of giving, but it does not always manifest itself in its entirety, but sometimes one element exists separately.

21. For one class who go by such names as 'stingy', 'niggard', 'miser', all are defective in giving, but they do not meddle with the property of others, nor do they wish to take it; some of them, through a sort of equity and caution about what is wrong, for a set of them have it's appearance of being on their guard, or, at all events, say they are, against ever being compelled to do a wrong action, and to this set belong the 'skinflint'; and all such like, who get their names from an excessive unwillingness to give to anyone. But others again abstain from their neighbours' goods through fear, since it is not easy to take what belongs to others and not have others take what belongs to oneself - they are content therefore neither to take nor give.

31. A second class are excessive in taking everything and from all quarters, as for instance those who ply illiberal trades, brothel keepers and all such like, and lenders of small sums upon large interest. For all these take whence they can, not and more than they ought.

14. - The statement that prodigality does more ~~the~~ good than illiberality is doubtful. This, that illiberality does more harm than prodigality is false. - It regards prodigality as a short-lived evil which will be cured by time, and illiberality as inveterate. But in their consequences it is rather prodigality that is incurable, and illiberality transitory.

19. ch. IX. Magnificence is a higher kind of liberality. It consists in spending money on a great scale with propriety. Thus there are two elements, greatness and propriety. The greatness is relative, being limited by the propriety, and the propriety is relative to the person, the circumstances and the object. Magnificence will of course be prompted by a desire for what is noble. There will be something imaginative and striking about the effect it produces. Great and solemn occasions will be its proper sphere, the services of religion, the entertaining of foreigners, public works, gifts, and retinues. The well born and illustrious will be the proper persons to exercise it. The householder, magnificent will be of suitable splendour, everything he does will show to a taste and propriety: even in a gift to a child he will exhibit the idea of magnificence. The vulgar man missing this happily, will jar upon our taste with his excessive splendour, his object being evidently mere ostentation. The petty man on the other hand from timidity, and constant fear of expense will be always below the mark, and even after considerable expense will never show the whole effect by carelessness in some point of detail.

χονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὥς οὐ ῥάδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων
 λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους μὴ, ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ 30
 μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι· οἷ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν
 ὑπερβάλλουσιν τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ
 τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ
 πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῶ.
 πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ὅπόσον 1122a
 οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται. πάντες
 γὰρ ἔνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδὴ ὑπομένουσιν.
 τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἂν δεῖ,
 οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦν- 5
 τας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ
 ἀδίκους· ὁ μέντοι κυβευτῆς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστής
 τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν. αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἔνε-
 κεν ἀμφοτέροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδὴ ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ
 οἷ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἔνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἷ δ' ἀπὸ 10
 τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφοτέροι δὲ ὅθεν
 οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς. καὶ πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ
 τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροί. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι
 ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μείζον τε γὰρ κακόν ἐστὶ τῆς
 ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν 15
 λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων 4
 κακιῶν τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω· δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι
 καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη
 περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι. οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευ- 20

29. τὸ] τὸν Π², om. K^b || 30. ἀρέσκειν Π² H^a K^b † || 33. καὶ
 post ἐργαζόμενοι add. ΓΠ² Ald. || 34. κατὰ μικρὸν M^b, κατὰ
 μικρὰ O^b, καὶ τὰ μικρὸν καὶ pr. K^b, καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ΓL^b H^a Ald.
 Ar. et rc. K^b || 1122a, 4. δὲ om. ΓH^a Ald. || 8. ἔνεκα Π¹ H^a M^b
 Ald., ἔνεκα <μικροῦ> ci. Rr. || 13. δὲ Γ Hel. Ar., δὲ c. c. Bk.
 Rr. || 14. κακόν post ἐστὶ ΓΠ² Ald. Bk. Rr. || 15. ταύτης M^b,
 ταῦτα L^b et pr. K^b (crx. rc.) || 19. δόξαι H^a K^b || αὕτη Coraes
 (fors. recte), αὕτη αὕτῃ Γ.

θειοῦτης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις,
 ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερ-
 ἔχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα
 αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρότερον δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ 2
 25 δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχω
 καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρότερον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ
 περὶ ὅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν 3
 οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ "πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη".
 ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευ-
 30 θέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς 4
 τοιαύτης δ' ἔξεως ἢ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται,
 ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βανανσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται,
 οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ
 καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν.
 35 ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν. τὸ πρότερον γὰρ 5
 δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥστερ 6
 1122b γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἢ ἔξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ
 ὧν ἐστίν· αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ
 πρότερουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα
 δαπάνημα καὶ πρότερον <εἰ πρότερον> τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον
 5 τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ
 ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανῆσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ κα- 7
 λοῦ ἔνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ 8
 προετικῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλ- 9
 λιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσον καὶ
 10 πῶς ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλο- 10

22. τὰ δαπανηρὰ Muretus || 23. γὰρ om. ΓΠ² † || 26. ᾧ
 <καὶ ὡς>? Susem. || καὶ] ἢ? Muenscher || 27. περὶ del. Turne-
 bus (male) || ᾧ ΓΟ^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr., ᾧ <καὶ ὡς> Thurotus ||
 29. οὕτως M^b, οὕτος c. c. H^a Ar. || 34. δ' ὑπὲρ] δὲ περὶ Π²H^a
 Ald. Bk. Rr. || 36. καὶ] χρὴ δ' ἀεὶ Imelmannus, ὡς vel ὥστε
 ci. Susem. || ὥστερ — b, 2. ἐστίν secl. Rr. || 1122b, 1. καὶ om.
 Par. 1417 et fort. An. (male, cf. Teichmueller p. 81) || 2. δὲ Ald. ||
 4. καὶ] εἰ Lambinus || εἰ πρότερον add. Rassovius || 5. δεῖ M^b Bk.
 Rr. || 10. δὲ ΓH^a Ald. Hel. Ar.

25. Now the greatness is relative: for there is not the same expense for a patriarch as there is for a leader of the sacred procession.
26. The propriety accordingly must be relative to the person, the circumstances and the object: He touches on the suitability of the person sec. 12-14: the circumstances 11, 15: the object 16-18.
31. And the defect of this character is called pettiness; and the excess is vulgarity and want of taste and all such qualities.

35. But the magnificence seems to go scientifically to work, for he has a faculty of perceiving the appropriate, and of spending great sums harmoniously.
36. For as we said at the outset a moral state is determined by its acts and its objects therefore the outlays of the magnificent man will be great and suitable. And the work, which he employs them will be of a suitable character, the same character, for thus it will be possible to have a great outlay suitable to the work.
- Ev. 2 p. 19 - perhaps generally the beginning of Bk. II. But in the present place he is not speaking of the formation of habits or states but rather of moral habits or states as such, a definite existence and reality only in acts and in the objective circumstances to which they refer. A moral state is thus a mere potentiality, which only attains definite and concrete actuality by emerging into an act: accordingly he gives a concrete treatment of the virtues of magnificence.

liberal, for it is almost too full-dependent on the right, and in the right way, but it is not a little liberal. It is concerned with the objects, that element of newness which there is in the magnificent man - for instance, it may be noticed of proportions, will make the work even from the same appears more magnificent. For a work is not to be prized for the same quality as a possession, that possession is most prized which is worth most, as for instance gold, but that work which is great and noble. For the sight of such a work strikes on the imagination, nor the magnificent is something which strikes the imagination and the highest quality, of a work if it be on a grand scale, is magnificence. - Magnificence differs from ~~degs~~ liberality, not in degree but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination in the same objects, and this with the same expense producing a more striking result.

2. favourite objects of rivalry.

29. But to undertake them is suitable to those by whom such things have been done before (H. 500 p. 2 X. 60), or showing themselves out their ancestors or their relations (For. par.), and to the well born and illustrious and so on, for all that has a greatness and dignity, about it.

(Π)

πρεπῇ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσῃ ἂν δεῖ καὶ ὡς
 δεῖ. ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος
 περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος <λαβ->ούσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
 δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσῃ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ
 ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον 15
 τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν. τοῦ
 γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυ-
 μαστόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἔργον μεγαλοπρέπεια ἀρετὴ ἐν μεγέθει.
 11 ἔστιν δὲ τῶν δαπάνημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ 5
 περὶ θεούς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως 20
 δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν
 εὐφιλοτίμητα ἐστίν, οἷον εἴ ποιν χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμ-
 12 πρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ἅπασιν δ',
 ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς
 ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ 25
 13 μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι πρόπειν. διὸ πέ-
 νης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπῆς (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν
 πολλὰ δαπανήσῃ προπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ
 14 τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς)· πρό-
 πει δὲ καὶ οἷς τοιαῦτα προὔπαρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν 30
 προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστι, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς
 ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει

12. τὸ μέγα om. H^a, μέγα secl. Muenscher || οἷον μέγεθος] ἀνευ μεγέθους Vermehrenus || 13. ταυτὰ H^a et re. K^b, ταῦτά Bk. Rr. (Muensch. Verm.) † || <λαβ->ούσης Rassovius, <ἐχ->ούσης Coraes || 15. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ] κτήματος μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ΓΟ^s Par. 1417 An. Hel. et re. K^b, κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ H^a † || καὶ post ἄξιον add. ΓΗ^a Ald. Hel. Ar. et re. K^b || 16. ἔργον Γ Hel. † || 18. καὶ — μέγεθει om. Garvius || μεγαλοπρέπεια post ἀρετὴ ΓΠ¹ Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. (at cf. Zeller l. l. p. 638. n. 4), secl. Muretus, μεγαλοπρεποῦς ci. Gifanuis || ἀρετὴ om. Ald. || 19. ἔστιν δὲ κ. τ. λ.] mutilatum esse hunc locum censet Rr., lacunam ante eum statuit Thurotus (nescio an recte) || τὰ prius om. M^b || 20. τοὺς post περὶ add. Π²H^a || 21. ὅσα ante περὶ om. Π¹ (suppl. mg. re. K^b) || 30. τὰ ante τοιαῦτα add. Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. || διὰ post ἢ add. Π² Ald. Bk. Rr.

καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ 15
ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται (μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότερα). τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα
1123a εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περὶ
τι ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ
ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντι-
δωρεάς. οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής ἀλλ'
5 εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον.
μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι προπόντως 16
τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος) καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
μᾶλλον δαπανᾷν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα
γὰρ ταῦτα) καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ πρόπον. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά ἀρ- 17
10 μόξει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ
τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλο-
πρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν
τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ 18
δαπανήματι (σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ λήκυθος ἢ καλλίστη μεγα-
15 λοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἢ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ
ἀνελεύθερον). διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ 19
γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐνυτέρβλη-
τον), καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος.
6 τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων 20
καὶ βάνανσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσ-
περ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀνα-
λίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς
ἐστιῶν, καὶ κωμωδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσ-
φέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ
25 τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ
τὰ τοιαῦτα ολόμενος θαναμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀνα-

34. τοῖς om. H^aL^bO^b || 1123a, 2. ἡ post πᾶσα Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. || 3. καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς om. Π¹ (suppl. mg. re. K^b) † || 4. ἀν-
τὸν Π² || 10. ἐπεὶ Felicianus, ἐπὶ ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 14. ἡ καλ-
λίστη post γὰρ add. Π¹, c. c. om. Hel. Ar. || μεγαλοπρέπειαν post
15. ἔχει Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. || 26. τὰ τοιαῦτα] ταῦτα Π² Ald. Hel. Bk. Rr.

13. And the 'greatness' which is exhibited in the work, hides us from the greatness of the expense: for a ball or the most brilliant & brilliant in the world possesses magnificence as a gift for a child, though the price of it is small and faint. Hence the magnificent man whatever kind of thing he produces will produce it magnificently: for such he is motivated to be admired: and at the same time keep in ^{due} proportion with regard to the outlay.

14. Such now is the magnificent man, but he who exceeds and is vulgar exceeds by reason of wrong spending. For in small matters of expense he spends much and makes a show which is out of taste, as for instance leading his club to a marriage feast and when he is a beguiler for the comedy making the chorus march in burlesque, as the magicians and notice for their stupidity, &c. And all such things he will do, not aiming at what is noble, but merely making a show of his wealth, and thinking to be admired for these things, and where he ought to spend much spending little, and where little much.

now there are vices: (vulgarity, & felliness), but they
are not unlauded disgrace, because they are neither hurtful
to one's neighbour, nor are they very conspicuous.

35.

35. Now it does not make the least difference whether we
consider the state of mind or the character that is
produced by the state of mind.
The procedure adopted by Aristotle throughout is
that of describing virtues in the concrete. This proced-
ure while it gives graphic likeness to the discus-
sions, tends to make us forget that these virtues
are not different kinds of character so much as dif-
ferent elements in the same character.

6. For highmindedness implies greatness, just as beauty
implies a large body: little people may be pretty
and elegant but not beautiful.

20. Here he fixes external honor as the object with which
highmindedness deals: afterwards he sets it above
all external honor. Honor is not good enough: but
the world has nothing better to give.

(Π)

21 λῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικρο-
 προεπῆς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν
 μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ
 σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτα ὀδυρόμενος, 30
 22 καὶ πάντα οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἔξεις
 αὐταὶ κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνειδίη γ' ἐπιφέρουσιν διὰ τὸ μήτε βλα-
 βεραι τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

Π

ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνό- 7
 2 ματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἔστιν πρῶτον λάβωμεν. δια- 35
 3 φέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἔξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν-σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ 1123b
 δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἄξιος ὢν· ὁ
 γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδὲ ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος
 4 (ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξίων ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγα- 5
 5 λόψυχος δὲ οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἢ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ
 τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δὲ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμ-
 6 μετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ). ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξίων ἀνάξιος ὢν
 7 χαῦνος (ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος). ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων
 ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, εἴαν τε μεγάλων εἴαν τε μετρίων, εἴαν 10
 τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ
 μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ
 8 μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστιν δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν με-
 γέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος (τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν
 9 ἀξιοῖ). οὐ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγά- 15
 λων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ
 10 ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. ἡ γὰρ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ·
 μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμεμεν, καὶ οὗ
 μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
 ἀθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ (μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς 20

33. τῶν H^aK^b Ald. Hel. || 1123b, 1. τὸ L^b, τὰ re. K^b ||
 5. γὰρ ΓΠ¹ L^b Hel., δὲ M^b Ald. Ar. || 8. αὐτὸν Π², αὐτὸν
 Ald. || 11. καὶ post τε om. ΓM^b, ante 10. μετρίων habet Ald. ||
 ἑαυτὸν Π² Ald. || 17. γὰρ Susem. secundum Rieckheri trans-
 lationem, δ' ΓΠ Ald. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr.

ἀγαθῶν)· περὶ τιμᾶς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχος ἐστὶν
ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ 11
τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,
κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν 12
25 καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς 13
ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ 14
δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἀξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
μείζονος γὰρ αἰεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἀξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.
τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ
30 δόξειεν δ' ἄν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα.
οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείδαντι, 15
οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνας γὰρ ἔνεκα πράξει αἰσχροῦ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα;
καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάνπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν
ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἀξιος
35 φραῦλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται
1124a τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις 16
εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζονος γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνε-
ται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλό-
ψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. μάλιστα 17
5 μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχος ἐστίν, καὶ
ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως
ἡσθησεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων (ἀρε-
τῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμὴ), οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
ἀποδέχεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν·
10 τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάνπαν ὀλι-
γωρήσει (οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἀξιος), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας (οὐ
γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν). μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ 13
εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ
πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν

25. μεγάλου Π², μεγαλοψύχου c. c. Hel. Ar. || 26. γε om.
Π¹ || 28. μείζονος — βελτίων] εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων L^b † || 30.
δ' om. Π¹ || ἂν add. Turnebus || 32. ὥς pr. K^b (crx. rc.) || γ'
om. Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. || 1124a, 1. μὲν ante οὖν add. Γ Π¹ Bk. Rr.

2. And in short, without question honor appears to be the object with which the highminded are concerned. For the great most deem themselves worthy of honour but yet according to their merits.

31. It would never suit the highminded man to fly in ungraceful haste.

Now highmindedness appears to be, as it were, a sort of crown of the virtues: it enhances them and it cannot come into existence without them. Hence it is hard to be highminded in the true sense of the term, for this is impossible without beauty and goodness of the character.

4. καλοκῆρυξ & αἰδώς. Plato uses καλός & καλότης in the common Athenian sense of 'a gentleman'. In Aristotle the word has no peculiar moral import (cf. Eth. I. 8. 9). Eudaimonia appears to have developed the idea of καλοκῆρυξ & αἰδώς, and to have underlaid by it the perfection of moral virtue combined with the service and contemplation of God.

5. But the high minded man despises justly (for his estimate is true), but most people do so indiscriminately. Throughout the great man is justified in the high position he assumes by the positive correctness of his estimate.

III)

μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτε εὐτυχῶν περιχαρῆς 15
 ἔσται οὔτε ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει
 ὥς μέγιστον ὂν (αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν
 τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν
 βούλονται)· ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστιν, τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.
 19 διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα 8
 συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιούν- 21
 ται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ
 γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχότερους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν.
 20 κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητέος· ᾧ δ' ἄμφο 25
 ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ
 τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιού-
 σιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς
 21 παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρίζονται καὶ
 οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ 30
 ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐκ δυνάμενοι δὲ
 φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν κατα- 1124b
 φρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται
 γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν
 οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσιν, καταφρο-
 22 νοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως κατα- 5
 23 φρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ
 ἔστιν δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν,

17. ὡς secl. Rr. || 19. δὲ ΓL^b || 20. καὶ post διὸ add. re.
 K^b || 22. οἱ post ἢ add. H^aL^bN^bO^b Ald. Bk. Rr. || 25. τιμητός
 M^b et pr. K^b (crx. re.), τιμητέος c. c. An. || 29. καὶ post ὑβρίζονται
 fort. recte om. codices Lambini, καὶ <κακοὶ> haud bene ci. v. d.
 ap. eundem || 30. οἱ add. K^b || ἀγαθοὶ O^b, κακὰ Par. 1417 Ald. et
 γρ. L^b, κακοὶ Γ, non vertit Ar., secl. idem v. d. ap. Lam-
 binum (perperam) || 1124b, 5. μὲν γὰρ K^b, δὲ c. c. Ar. Bk.
 Rr. || 6. ** οὐκ Rr. || 7. μικροκίνδυνος] πυκνοκίνδυνος Π²
 H^aO² Ald. et pr. O^b (γρ. μικροκίνδυνος mg. O^b) † || φιλο-
 κίνδυνος] πυκνοκίνδυνος Hel. (id quod perspexit Michele-
 tus) Ar.

μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὡς
οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος 24
10 δὲ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχο-
μένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικός πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει
ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημο- 25
νεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, <ὕφ'> ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ·
ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δὲ ὑπερέχειν.
15 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ
λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἂ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ 26
μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγισ, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς
μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ
20 τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ
σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ
ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθε-
νεῖς ἰσχυρῶζεσθαι. καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὐ πρω- 27
τεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλήτην ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου
25 τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων
δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστικόν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ 28
φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβούμενον. καὶ μέλειν
τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράτ-
τειν φανερώς· παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. διὸ

8. ἀφειδήσει Π² H^a An. et γρ. mg. O^b, ἀφειδεῖ O² et corr.
O¹ || 13. ὕφ' add. Muenscher || 14. εὖ post τοῦ Π² || 17. ἐπεπόν-
θεσαν H^a N^b, ἐπεπόνθεισαν L^b An., πεπόνθασιν Γ K^b || 21. ἐπ'
Π¹ O^{1,3}, ἐν Π² H^a N^b O² Ald. Bk. Rr. || 24. μελλήτην Γ Hel. Ar. (?),
μελλήτην K^b, μελητήν Π² H^a O^b An., μελητήν Ald. || 27. καὶ μέλλειν
N^b O^b, ἀμελεῖν pr. K^b (erx. rc.), ἀμέλει Ald. † || 29. παρρησια-
στής — 30. ἀληθευτικός γρ. Par. 1856, παρρησιαστικός γὰρ διὸ
καταφρονητικός δέ, διὸ παρρησιαστικός καὶ ἀληθευτικός pr.
1856, καταφρονητικοῦ γάρ. παρρησιαστοῦ γάρ. διὸ παρρησια-
στικός δὲ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικός εἶναι καὶ ἀληθευτικός pr. K^b,
παρρησιαστής γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικός εἶναι, καταφρονητι-
κός δὲ διὸ (διὰ τὸ Γ) παρρησιαστικός, παρρησιαστικός δὲ διὸ
(διὰ τὸ Γ) καταφρονητικός καὶ ἀληθευτικός Γ et rc. K^b (par-
tim in mg., partim in textu), καταφρονητικός γὰρ διὸ κατα-

9. - He is glad to do a benefit and ashamed to receive one: he will wipe out a favour by doing a greater one in return: he will remember those whom he has benefitted, but not those by whom he has been benefitted: he will be in want of no one: he will serve any readily: he will be proud to the great, and easy with the lowly. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition: he will attempt only great and important matters, he will seem otherwise inactive: he will be free from envy, jealousy and hatred: really straightforward and deeply truthful, but reserved and ironical in manner to common people: will live for his friend alone, will wonder at nothing, will bear no malice, will be no gossip, will not be anxious about trifles, and will care more to possess that which is fine than that which is productive: his movements are slow, his voice is deep, and his diction stately.

18. Now it is true that these again are not bad but only in error.

II)

καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἰρωνία δὲ 30
 29 πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν
 ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλα- 1125a
 30 κες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ
 μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ
 31 μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐ- 5
 τοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει
 αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγονται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός
 ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι'
 32 ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἤκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός
 καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. 10
 33 καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν
 43 καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κί-
 νησις δὲ βραδεία τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ
 βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπενυστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα
 σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἢ δ' ὅξυ- 15
 φωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτής διὰ τούτων.
 35 τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μι- 9
 κρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν
 εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ
 μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιός ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὢν 20

φρονητικός καὶ ἀληθευτικός pr. H^a, καταφρονητικός γὰρ παρ-
 ρησιαστικός διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικός εἶναι καὶ ἀληθευτικός re.
 H^a, παρρησιαστικός γάρ. διὸ (καὶ add. M^b) καταφρονητικός.
 καταφρονητικός δέ, διὸ παρρησιαστικός καὶ ἀληθευτικός Π^a,
 καταφρονητικός γάρ· διὸ παρρησιαστικός. παρρησιαστικός δέ·
 διὸ καταφρονητικός καὶ ἀληθευτικός Ar., καταφρονητικοῦ γάρ·
 διὸ παρρησιαστικός. (καὶ add. N^b) παρρησιαστικοῦ δέ. διὸ κατα-
 φρονητικός καὶ (καὶ om. N^b) ἀληθευτικός N^b O^b Ald., qua in
 lectione παρρησιαστικοῦ δέ. διὸ καταφρονητικός καὶ secl. Co-
 raes, similiterque καταφρονητικός γάρ. διὸ καὶ παρρησιαστικός
 καὶ ἀληθευτικός, ut videtur, Hel. || 30. εἰρωνία N^b, εἰρωνεία cet.
 Ar., εἰρων? Susem. || 1125a, 1. πρὸς post ἢ add. Π² Ald. Ar.
 Bk. Rr. || 3. οὐ] οὐδὲ Π² † || 16. τούτων] τουτέστι ταῦτα An.,
 ταῦτα codices Lambini.

ἄξιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἔοικεν κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δὲ ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιός
 ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὲν ἡλίθιοι γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χεῖρους
 25 ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφλένται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ
 τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνά-
 ξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι 36
 ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς (ὡς γὰρ
 ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελέγχονται),
 30 καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, καὶ
 βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι
 περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ 37
 μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἢ μικροψυχίᾳ μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ
 34 γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρον ἐστίν.
 10 ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶν μεγάλην, 38
 1125b ὥσπερ εἴρηται· ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, [καθά- IV
 περ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη,] ἢ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν
 πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν
 μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὐταὶ τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεςτᾶσιν,
 5 περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ.
 ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἔστιν καὶ 2
 ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλ-
 λον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τὸν τε 3
 γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ
 10 δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς
 καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον 4

21. ἄξιός post ἐστὶν Π² || 23. οἱ τοιοῦτοι ΓΠ¹ An. Hel.,
 οὔτοι M^b Ald. et post δοκοῦσιν L^b || 24. ὀκνηροί ΓΠ¹ O² Ald.,
 νοεροί Π² An. et pr. O³, νωθροί O¹ Hel. et mg. O³, morosi
 Ar. || 28. τοῦτ' Rr. || 32. αὐτῶν K^b Ald. Hel. Ar., αὐτῶν ΓL^b
 Bk. Rr. || 35. ἡ — b, 1. εἴρηται secl. Rr. || 1125b, 1. ταύτην]
 τιμὴν Rr. (nescio an recte) || καθάπερ — 2. ἐλέχθη secl. Monro:
 v. quae adnotavi ad 1107a, 28 || 5. τὰ post καὶ add. Π² Ald.
 Bk. Rr. || ἡμᾶς om. H^a, secl. Rr. † || 7. τε om. Π² || 9. καὶ post
 ὡς om. Π¹ H^a N^b || 11. ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ τὸν M^b Ar., ἔτι δὲ τὸν K^b.

deprives himself of his own good, and is not appreciating his claims, and by ignorance of himself else he would have missed at the good thing - he has a lack to. Such as these however are not to be called foolish but rather deficient (deficient in energy). But this way of thinking really seems to make men worse, for all aim at what they are fit for, but (these) stand aloof from noble deeds and practices, as not aspiring to them, and so too for external goods.

Aristotle decides that want of spirit is worse than want of assets, that it is more common. Want of elevation, want of effort, of will, of individuality, are fatal deficiencies so regards the attainment of what is fine and noble in character.

1. Ch. IV. Aristotle now considers the virtue of a laudable ambition. This is compared with the desire for honor as it exists in ordinary men. There is no name for this virtue, but language testifies to the existence of extremes: hence we may infer a mean.

periled, and again, the ambitious man, as order-
 the and temperate, as mentioned in my first remarks. Now
 it is plain that the term 'lover of anything' is used in more
 senses than one, we do not apply the term 'lover of honor'
 to express the same thing, but when we praise him we
 apply it to express more than the vulgar, but when we blame
 him more than is right. The mean state being without
 a name, the extremes seem to contend for it as for an
 occupied ground, but where there is an excessive defect
 there must be mean.

- 26 Ch. v. The regulation of the temper. Provisionally (as there
 is no name for this) he calls it mildness, though this term
 is also used to express a deficiency in the feeling of an-
 ger. Excess in this feeling has various forms: the passion-
 ate (ὀργιστός), the hasty (ἄκροχόδοι), the sulky (πικροί) the morose
 (χαλεκοί), all show excessive or ill-directed anger.

Aristotle does not here enter upon the philosophy of
 anger, enquire its final cause, and in accordance
 with this determine its right manifestation. He says
 it is human to avenge oneself: and not to resent certain
 things is slavish and a moral defect: hence we must
 have a certain amount of anger. This amount must
 be duly regulated, but, where the true mean is, cannot
 be laid down in the abstract (τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδέναι): it de-
 pends on the particular circumstances and must be
 left to the intuitive judgment of the mind.

33. For the term 'mild man' means one that should be
 (or - the mild man has a tendency to be) calm and
 not carried away by his feeling, but should be angry
 in the way, at the things, and for so long a time, as
 the mental standard may have appointed. Yet this
 character seems rather to incline to error on the side of
 deficiency, for he is more apt to pardon than to resent.

IV)

ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον
ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα[, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἵπομεν].
δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιοῦτου λεγομένου οὐκ
ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν αἰεὶ τὸν φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες ¹⁵
μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλ-
λον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμου δὲ οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοι-
κεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
⁵ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὁρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
δεῖ καὶ ἦττον· ἔστιν δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν καὶ ἡ ἕξις ²⁰
αὕτη, μεσότης οὕσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς
μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν
⁶ φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀμφοτέρωθεν πῶς. ἔοικεν δὲ τοῦτ'
εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεισθῆναι δὲ ἐνταῦθα
οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον. ²⁵
^V πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς, ἀνωνύμου δ' ¹¹
ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον
τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσιν,
² ἀνώνυμον οὕσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἂν.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ ³⁰
³ διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος,
ἔτι δὲ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται, πρῶτος
δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἵπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται (βούλεται
γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πᾶ-
θους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ ³⁵
⁴ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν· ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ^{1126a}
ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρῶτος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλ-

13. ὥσπερ — εἵπομεν secl. Monro: v. quae adnotavimus
ad 1107a, 28 || 15. φέρομεν αἰεὶ ΓΠ¹Η^aN^b, αἰεὶ φέρομεν Π²
Ald. Bk. || 19. τῆς om. Π²Η^aN^b Ald. Bk. Rr. || 20. ἡδὴ N^b, δ'
ἡδὴ Η^a, δ' ὅτε M^b Par. 1417 Bk., δὲ Γ(?), δὴ c. c. An. Ar. et, ut
videtur, Hel. || δ' οὖν Π¹, γ' οὖν N^b, γοῦν Η^a Ald. Bk. Rr. (fors.
recte), οὖν ΓL^b Ar., μὲν M^bQ || καὶ om. ΓΠ¹Η^aN^b Ald. Ar.
Bk. Rr., add. Π²Q || 25. τὸν] τὸ Π² || 26. μὲν om. Π² Ald. ||
27. τὸ] τῶν pr. Η^a, τὸν Victorius Bk. Rr. || 32. καὶ ante ὡς
add. Π² Bk. Rr.

λον συγγνωμονικός)· ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτε ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν 5
 εἴθ' ὃ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται (οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς
 5 δεῖ ἡλλῆθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὥς δεῖ μῆδ' ὅτε μῆδ'
 οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργι- 6
 ζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προσηλακίζόμενον
 ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδιῶδες)· ἡ δ' 7
 ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται (καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ,
 10 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάττον, καὶ πλείω
 χρόνον), οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 δύναίτο εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσιν, κἂν ὀλό-
 κληρον ἴ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν 8
 ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
 15 δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμ-
 βαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ'
 ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί εἰσιν διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἰτα ἀπο-
 παύονται. ὑπερβολὴ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς 9
 πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ 10
 20 δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ
 τὸν θυμὸν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἡ γὰρ
 τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.
 τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπι-
 φανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι
 25 τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνον δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι
 καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς 11
 τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρό-
 νον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.
 τῇ πρᾶοτητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ 12

1126a, 3. ἀοργησία H^aK^bN^b, ἀοργισία M^b || 5. οἱ μὴ] μὴ
 K^b, μῆδ' ci. Rr. || 10. ἢ post θάττον add. Π¹ † || 12. καὶ <καθ'>
 ἑαυτὸ Ald., καθ' αὐτὸ Zwinger || 17. ἀποδιδόασιν Π¹ † || 20. ὀρ-
 γίλοι K^b, ὀργίλοι O^b, ὀργιζόμενοι An., ὀργίζονται c. c. Hel. Ar. ||
 21. ἀποδιδῶ M^bO^b, ἀνταποδιδῶσιν Γ Ald. || 28. ἢ καὶ K^bN^b
 Ald., καὶ O³ An. et corr. Par. 1417, ἢ c. c. Ar. et v. l.
 ap. An.

who do not feel anger at things at which they ought to feel it, or in the manner they ought, or at the time they ought, or at the seasons they ought. Such a man seems not to perceive things or feel annoyed, and since he does not feel anger, he seems not to be able to defend himself. But to submit to continually oneself, or to see one's family subjected to it is slavish.

7. 10 86 7105. Had the Ethics been composed on a psychological plan what is said here might have been arranged under the head of 8, 205, and would have been connected with the relation of 86 205 to courage. (see III. 8. 10-12).

8. Now therefore is possible under all heads, the wrong people, the wrong things, more, quicker, longer, than is right. However all these (forms of excess) are not possessed by the same man. This would be impossible. For evil decisions even itself, and if it exist in its entirety, it becomes unbearable.

16. and the reason of this is that they do not restrain their anger, but show their resentment in the way you see them do, through the quickness of disposition, and then cease.

19. But the sulky are hard to bring round, and are angry for a long time, for they keep in their wrath. Now respite comes when one has weakened one's resentment, since revenge stops anger by substituting a feeling of pleasure ~~and~~ for that of pain. But if this does not take place, these people continue to feel their burden; because since the cause of them is not clear, no one consoles them, and to digest one's anger in oneself requires time. Such characters are most troublesome to themselves and to their nearest friends.

11. Ch. VI. The regulation of one's deportment in society, with regard especially to complacency or the reverse. This also is a balance between extremes, avoiding on the one side sourliness (τὸ δὺς κολοῦν), and on the other side, the conduct both of the weak assentor (ἄποκος) and of the interested flatterer (κολαίς). The balance has no name: it is most like friendship, but differs from it in being devoid of affection, and being extended to all in proper degree.

This is an improvement on II. 7. 11-13. There it was said there are three virtues connected with speech and action in society: the first is about what is true, the others about what is pleasant. But here the quality which concerns the deportment and whole spirit of a man in society is treated as most generic and placed first. Here he does not, as in Bk II, call this quality φιλία, but only points out a resemblance of it to friendship.

(V)

- γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται (ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι), 30
 13 καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥά-
 διον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσιν καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον
 χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιῇ τις ἢ ἁμαρ-
 τάνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ 35
 τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας
 ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀν- 1126b
 δρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκ-
 βαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
 14 καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον
 δῆλον, ὅτι ἢ μὲν μέση ἔξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργι- 5
 ζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,
 αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν
 γινόμεναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφό-
 δρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἔξεως ἀνθεκτέον. ἥ
 15 αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἔξεις εἰρήσθωσαν· ἐν 12
 VI δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων 11
 κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς
 ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι
 2 δεῖν ἅλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τού-
 τοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φρον- 15
 3 τίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ
 εἰρημέναι ἔξεις ψεκταὶ εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἢ μέση
 τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέχεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ,
 4 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δὲ οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ

30. τὸ] μᾶλλον τὸ H^aN^b, τὸ μᾶλλον Ald., τὸ μᾶλλον aut
 μᾶλλον τὸ Γ Ar. || 31. ὁ — b, 9. ἀνθεκτέον paene eisdem ver-
 bis, id quod recte monuit Rassovius, repetunt quae iam dicta
 sunt illo loco, qui verbis ἐν τοῖς πρότερον citatur, 1109b,
 14—26: num eam ob causam ab ipso Aristotele abiudicanda
 sint, in medio relinquo || 36. δὲ καὶ M^b, γὰρ c. c. Ar. Bk. Rr. ||
 1126b, 4. ἕκαστα, καὶ <ἐν> Rr. || τοσοῦτον K^b, τοιοῦτον c. c.
 H^aN^b || 15. ἀντιτυποῦντες H^aN^b || 19. αὐτῇ τι οὐκ ἀποδέδοται
 L^b, οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι Γ H^aN^b Ald.

20 τι, ἔοικεν δὲ μάλιστα φίλῳ. τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν
 μέσῃν ἔξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ
 στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ 5
 πάθους ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ
 ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὥς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος
 25 εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώστας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις
 καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὥς ἀρμό-
 ζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὁθνεῶν φροντίζειν,
 οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὥς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, 6
 ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται
 30 τοῦ ἢ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ 7
 λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας, τούτων δ' ὅσας
 μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερα-
 νεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. κὰν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημο-
 σύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ' ἐναν-
 35 τίωσις μικράν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέχεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ.
 διαφερόντως δὲ ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, 8
 1127a καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς
 ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ'
 αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δὲ εὐλαβούμενος,
 τοῖς δὲ ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ἢ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ
 5 τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς
 εἰσαυθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει.

ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· τοῦ δὲ 9
 συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι
 ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα
 10 καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσιν δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται

20. ἐστὶν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν κατὰ τὴν μέσῃν ἔξιν
 ὁ ἐπιεικῆς φίλος Thurotus || 22. προσλαβών Thurotus || 24.
 ἐχθαίρειν K^b Hel., ἐχθαίνειν M^b, ἐχθραίνειν cet. || 26. καὶ
 ἀσυνήθεις om. K^b, secl. Rr. † || 30. ἢ λυπεῖν Imelmannus, μὴ
 λυπεῖν ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. || συνηδεῖν K^b L^b || 33. δ'] δὴ Sca-
 liger || 1127a, 3. δε] τε? Susem. || 8. διὰ τι ἄλλο ΓΠ¹ H^a N^b
 Ald. (fors. recte) || 9. ὠφέλεια post τις Π¹ (fors. recte).

27. For it is not fitting to care in the same way for old acquaintances and for strangers, nor again in the same way to put them to pain - a man must bring himself to give pain on occasion, with a view to important moral consequences in the future. He would of course feel himself more bound to exercise this duty with regard to friends.

28. We have said generally, that the good man will associate with people as he ought, but we may add (5c) that with a constant reference to what is noble and good, he will aim at (not - reading "at") giving pain or at contributing pleasure. For he seems to be concerned with pleasures and pains arising in society and in those where it would be not noble, or wherever it would be harmful for him to contribute pleasure, he will refuse to do so, and will choose rather to give pain. And if there be something which will bring to any considerable degree disgrace or harm on the other, while opposition will give him slight pain, he will not approve it, but will show his repugnance.

13. Ch VII. The regulation of boastfulness. The boastful man (braggart) lays claim to honorable qualities which he does not possess to a greater degree than he possesses them, while the ironical man (dissembler) denies or understates his own merits. The balance between these two is found in the straightforward character, who in word and deed neither diminishes nor overrates his own good qualities. In Eth. II. 7. 12 the name *ἐπίφρων* was given to this quality; but he reports out that it is to be distinguished from truth, in the more serious sense of the term, that truth which makes the difference between justice and injustice. What he is here concerned with is merely a truthfulness of manner, though this has a moral worth.

25. *Επίφρων* is simply an affair of the manner - hardly our ironical dissembling, nor over-modesty. There appear to be two forms of it - one, that refined species exhibited by Socrates, - the other an affectation of humility, which is really contemptible.

26. Now it is possible to practise both irony and boastfulness, either with or without a particular motive. But in general a man speaks, acts, and lives, in accordance with his character, unless he have a particular motive. A lie is in itself base and reprehensible, and the truth noble and praiseworthy, and thus the truthful man, who occupies the mean, is praiseworthy, while those who do falsely on both sides are reprehensible, and especially the boaster.

- §5. Both irony and boastfulness are prompted generally by a particular motive - for, if it were not so, men would be simple and natural - afterwards we are told that boastfulness is a condition of the will, that it aims at either gain or reputation, - that irony may spring from a motive of refinement, or again from vanity itself. These things, however, may aim at reputation and yet be instinctive, the desire for reputation forming part of men's natural impulses.

VI)

ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικείμεθα δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα
ἐαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

VII

περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας 13
<καὶ τῆς εἰρωνείας> μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὕτη. οὐ χει-
ρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείη- 15
μεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἡθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητος
εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύομεν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνι-
δόντες. || ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμι-
λοῦντες εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθεύοντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων
εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. || 20
δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζών προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ
ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἰρων ἀνάπαλιν
ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐτῆς ^{στὴν εἰρωνείαν}
καστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ
ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε 25
ἐλάττω. ἔστιν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ
μηδενός. ἕκαστος δὲ οἷος ἔστιν, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει
καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἔαν μὴ τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ
μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθές καλὸν καὶ
ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν ἐπαινε- 30
τός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφοτέροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ
ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀλη-
θευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος
λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης
γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου δια- 1127b
φέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἔξιν
8 τοιούτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιούτος ἐπιεικής εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ

14. καὶ τῆς εἰρωνείας add. Imelmannus (lacunae signum
etiam Rr.) || αὐτὴ ΓΠ¹ Bk. || 16. ἕκαστα Π² || 18. ἐν — 20.
προσποιήματι = 13. περὶ — 17. συνιδόντες, id quod intellexit
Imelmannus || 20. καὶ post πράξεσι secl. Imelmannus ||
21. δὲ Π² Ald., γὰρ(?) Ar. || 25. αὐτὸν ΓΚ^b Ald. || 27. πράττει
καὶ λέγει Π² Ald. Ar., λέγει καὶ πράττει c. c. An. Hel. || 32.
τοῦ om. L^b O^b.

φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει
 5 καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὥς γὰρ αἰσχροὺς τὸ ψευ-
 δος εὐλαβήσεται, ὃ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἡύλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦ-
 10 τος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπο-
 κλινεῖ· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μεῖζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιού- 10
 10 μενος μηδενὸς ἔνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρεν
 τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ δ' 11
 ἔνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, [ὥς ὁ
 ἀλαζών,] ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος.
 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· 12
 15 κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν[, ὥσπερ
 καὶ ψεύστης ὃ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὃ δὲ δόξης
 ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους]. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαξονεύοντες 13
 τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός,
 οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶν τοῖς πέλας καὶ ἂ δια-
 20 λαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν, σοφόν, ἱατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο
 οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαξονεύονται·
 ἔστιν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δὲ εἰρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλατ- 14
 τον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἥθη φαίνονται (οὐ γὰρ κέρ-

1127b, 5. ὥς] οὐ Π² † || 6. αὐτὸν K^b, ἐαυτὸν H^aN^b, ἐαυτὸ
 Hel. || εὐλαβεῖτο L^b et pr. K^b, εὐλαβεῖται corr.² K^b || 7. ἀποκλινεῖ
 Coraes, ἀποκλίνει ΓΠ Ar. Bk. Rr., ἀποκλίνει Ald. || 12. ὥς ὁ
 ἀλαζών secl. Rr. || ὥς om. Hel. || ὃ] γε Imelmannus, om. M^b
 (habet etiam Hel.) || 14. οὐκ — 15. ἐστὶν post 22. εἰρημένα tri.
 Imelmannus || 15. ποίος H^aM^bO^b† || ὥσπερ — 17. κέρδους secl.
 Imelmannus, asteriscis circumscripsit Rr. || 19. ὧν καὶ] ἢ δι' ὧν
 καὶ M^b, ὧν ἡ δεῖ pr. K^b, ὧν ἡ δεῖ corr.² K^b, ὧν ἡ δεῖ ci. Rr.
 (nescio an recte) || ἂ] δι' ἂ H^aM^b, om. K^b, id quod prob.
 Rr. † || 20. ὄντων? Rr. || οἷον — 22. εἰρημένα secl. Rr. || 20. μάν-
 τιν σοφὸν ἱατρόν K^b, prb. Rr. in adn., μάντιν ἱατρόν σοφόν
 vel μάντιν ἢ ἱατρόν ἢ σοφόν An., μάντιν σοφόν ἢ ἱατρόν Π²
 Bk. Rr. in textu, μάντιν ἢ ἱατρόν σοφόν O^b, ἱατρόν ἢ μάντιν
 σοφόν ΓH^aN^b Ald. Hel. Ar., ἱατρόν ἢ μάντιν ἢ σοφόν O³ ||
 διὰ τοῦτο om. K^b, delenda esse censet Rr. || 21. ταῦτα καὶ Π¹,
 καὶ ταῦτα ci. Rr., τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ c. c. An.

lover of truth and honesty, does not matter, will be still more truthful in affairs of importance, for he will surely avoid a lie when it appears as something base, where he avoided it before merely for its own sake. - Aristotle ends his tale of virtues though proper, while he is in it. Truthfulness of manner.

9. But he who pretends to greater things than he possesses, if it be with no purpose in view, is certainly of small moral worth (as a man in some sense), else he would not have delighted in falsehood, though he seems rather foolish than bad. But supposing it be with purpose, if his aim be reputation or honor the boaster is not to be too much blamed, but if it be money or things leading to money, his conduct is more disgraceful. --- (something is)

10. The boaster is not corrected by any given faculty, but by a particular condition of the will, for a man is a boaster in accordance with his moral state and by reason of his character, just as a man is a liar, - though the latter takes pleasure in falsehood itself, while the former aims at reputation or gain (cf. Boastfulness as a reprehensible habit does not consist so much in the mere capacity or propensity to boast (δύεμῖς). That may arise from natural constitution (τῷ τοιοῦτος ἔχει), or from force of habit (κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν). The moral depravity or boastfulness depends ~~not~~ rather upon the motives for which it is adopted (τῷ αἵτι-οῖς), the distinction between some of which has just been pointed out.

17. - Desire for reputation makes men pretend to reputation, power and the like: but desire for gain makes them pretend to useful arts, the possessors of which cannot be tested, as these given.

20. as weather - prophets, fortune-tellers, ~~not~~ quack-doctors.

22. But the ironical in understating the truth, exhibit it is true a certain refinement of character, for they do not appear to speak in that way for the sake of gain, but to avoid pomposity, the appearance of giving themselves airs.

less. We often make great mistakes in our estimates of the power of the mind. Now they who make a pretence about it, pretend they do not possess the same supply of $\mu\eta\delta\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ things better and obvious are called affected, scorned, and are despised by every man. Sometimes such conduct appears to be boastfulness, for both excess of show and extreme deficiency are of the nature of boasting.

35. Ch VIII. On Wit (Fact. levity). This is concerned with the amusing and sportive element in society: it is a balance between foolishness that sacrifices all propriety to the ludicrous, and dulness that is incapable of either making or appreciating a joke.

Aristotle does not here enter into the philosophy of the ludicrous, or enquire what is a joke and why it pleases. Nor does he lay down any cautions for the regulation of it except such general ones as that nothing should be said which is unworthy of a gentleman: that the hearer must not be shocked; &c. On the whole he leaves it indefinite, saying that $\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\iota\delta\iota\phi\epsilon\tau\iota$, and that the educated man will be a law to himself.

36. Next also being a part of human life, and an element in this being playful diversion, we find here likewise the sphere for a certain harmonious manner of intercourse, and the possibility of both speaking and hearing the right sort of things: though there will be a difference as to what one is the speaker in such matters or listens to what is said.

9. But they who are sportive and at the same time graceful are called witty (quick), as moving quickly.

VII

δους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν)* μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης 25
 15 ἔποiei· οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητοι εἰσίν (καὶ ἐνίστε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακωνῶν ἐσθής· καὶ
 16 γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν). οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδῶν 30
 17 καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικειῖσθαι δὲ ὁ ἀλαζῶν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.

VIII

οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ 14
 διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία
 τις ἐμμελῆς, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 1128a
 ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκού-
 2 ειν. δῆλον δ' ὥς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ ἔλλειψις
 3 τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι
 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, 5
 καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτος ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν
 εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτομενον· οἱ δὲ μήτε
 αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραί-
 νοντες ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροὶ ^{harsh}δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ ἐμμελῶς
 παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποι. τοῦ 10

24. ὀκληρόν K^b Ald., ὀκληρόν καὶ ὀγκηρόν Γ, ὀγκηρόν c. c. An. Hel. Ar. || 25. καὶ post δὲ fort. secludendum esse ci. Susem. || 26. οἱ — 27. εἰσίν post 22. εἰρημένα transponenda esse ci. Rr. || καὶ post δὲ om. ΓK^b Ald. || τὰ ante φανερὰ add. Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. || μὴ ante προσποιούμενοι add. H^a N^b † || προσποιούμενοι secl. Vahlenus (Philol. XXI. p. 153 sq.) || 27. κανκοπανοῦργοι O^b, βλακοπανοῦργοι corr. N^b, βανανσοπανοῦργοι M^b, βαυκοπανοῦργοι c. c. An. Hel. || εὐκαταφρονητότεροί Π¹, εὐκαταφρονητοὶ c. c. Hel. Ar. || 31. καὶ ante ἀντικειῖσθαι add. Π¹ † || 34. εἶναι post 1128a, 1. τις Π² || 1128a, 2. τῷ ΓH^a N^b Ald., τὸ c. c. Hel. Ar. || τοῖς τοιούτοις Ald., τοσούτοις L^b, τούτοις M^b, τοιούτοις c. c. Hel. Ar. || 3. δ' om. K^b M^b, add. c. c. Ar., δῆ Hel. || 8. ἂν post εἰπόντες Π² || 9. ἄγριοι K^b (nescio an recte), cf. 1108a, 26. E. E. 1234a, 5 sqq. M. M. 1193a, 11 sqq., ἄγριοι c. c. Hel.

γὰρ ἡθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσιν κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ
 σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτως καὶ τὰ ἥθη. ἐπι- 4
 πλάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαϊρόντων τῇ
 παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι
 15 εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρου-
 σιν, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. τῇ μέσῃ δ' 5
 ἔξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδ^{λαγ}εξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξι^{liberal}λου ἐστίν
 τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπικεικῇ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ
 ἀρμόττει· ἔστι γὰρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παι-
 20 διᾷς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει
 τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὖ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαι-
 δεύτου. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν 6
 καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία,
 τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρόν ταῦτα
 25 πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστείον 7
 τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῇ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα
 ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἄοριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλω
Οὐ καὶ αὐτὸ διακρίνεται
 μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ 8
 ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· 9
 30 τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδορήμιά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθῆται ἔνια
 λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὲ χαρίεις 10
 καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἐαυτῷ.

τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτρά-
 πελος λέγεται· ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστίν τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε
 35 ἐαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοι-

16. καὶ om. M^b Hel. || ἐκ] καὶ ἐκ Π¹ Hel. || 18. ἐλευθέρω
 Π² H^a Ald. Hel. Ar. || 20. ἐλευθέρον H^a K^b N^b Hel. Ar. || 21.
 αὖ τοῦ M^b Ald., αἱ τοῦ L^b, τοῦ N^b O^b, ἡ τοῦ Hel., om. Γ H^a
 K^b || 26. μὴ ἀπρεπῇ K^b, μὴ ἃ πρέπει Γ H^a, ἃ πρέπει c. c. Ar.
 Bk. Rr. || ἐλευθέρω Π² Hel. Ar. || 28. δὲ] δὲ <ἃ> Imelmannus,
 δὴ <ἃ> vel δὴ <ἃ αὐτὸς> ci. Susem. || ἀκούεται K^b, ἀκούσεται
 <καὶ πράττεσθαι δόξει> vel simile quid ci. Bergius || 29. ποιή-
 σει] ἀκούσεται Zwinger, λέξει ci. Coraes, ποιῆσαι H^a N^b || 32.
 ἐλευθέρος Π² H^a Ald. Ar., ἐλευθέριος c. c. An. Hel.

But as the ludicrous is such ~~now~~ in vogue, and most people take pleasure in sport and jesting more than they ought, such buffoons get the name of witty just as though they were fine wits.

Now one may see this by a comparison of the old and new comedies, for in the former coarse language was the instrument of humour, but in the latter it is not; and this makes no slight difference in respect of propriety.

Therefore he will not give utterance to every jest, for the jest is a sort of reviling, and the lawgivers forbid certain kinds of reviling—they ought perhaps to have forbidden certain jests (understand *ἔνδια καὶ ὀνειδισμὸν*). This then will be the attitude of the refined and liberal man, he being as it were a law to himself.

Aristotle usually escapes from pure indefiniteness and relativity by asserting that the standard is in each case the good, the wise, the refined man. The standard is the expression of the universal reason of man—we must not suppose from him that wit, beauty, or goodness are mere matters of taste: when he adds that the educated man must be the standard of appeal, he means that the laws of reason must decide.

2. for he contributed nothing to the interest (of the company) and takes offence at those who do.

10. ch. ix. According to the programme (Eth. II. 7. 14-15) we now come to the place for discussing two instances of the law of the balance existing in the ~~instinctive~~ instinctive feelings of the mind, namely modesty and indignation. But from some cause, his work is interrupted here, indignation is not treated of at all, and the discussion on modesty is left unfinished. There is no mention of the extremes, shamelessness ($\alpha\upsilon\alpha\iota\omicron\chi\upsilon\tau\iota\acute{\alpha}$) and shamefacedness ($\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\upsilon\delta\iota\alpha$) which are specified in Bk. II. After stating that only to certain ages is modesty suitable, and that only in a certain provisional sense ($\epsilon\grave{\epsilon}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$) can it be called a virtue, the chapter abruptly ends, a sentence having been added by some later hand which gives an appearance of finish to the book and awkwardly connects it with the opening of Bk. X.
10. If modesty it is not fitting to speak as if it were a state: for it is more like a feeling than a state of the mind. At all events it is defined to be a sort of fear of disgrace; and in its effects it is similar to fear about danger: for men who are ashamed blush, and men fearing death grow pale. Therefore we may conclude that both these are in a way bodily affectionous, which is the character of a feeling rather than of a state.

III)

αὐτα λέγων ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκού- 1128b
σαι· ὁ δ' ἄγχιος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖτος. οὐθὲν γὰρ
11 συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαισις καὶ
ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον.
12 τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες· εἰσὶ δὲ 5
πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι
δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αὐτὴ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ, τῶν δὲ
περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ
τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίας.

IX περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· 15
πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις 11
2 ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται τε τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλή-
σιον· ἐρυνθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον
φοβούμενοι ὠχρῶσι. σωματικὰ δὲ φαίνεται πως εἶναι
3 ἀμφοτέρω, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι. οὐ 15
πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα
γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶν-
τας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι, καὶ
ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ'
οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν 20
4 αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν
ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φανύλοις (οὐ γὰρ πρα-
5 κτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχροὶ
τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα,
6 ὥστε οὐδ' αἰσχυντέον), φανύλου δὲ διὰ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἶον 25
πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξειέ

1128b, 1. ἂν post εἴποι ΓH^aK^bN^b Hel., om. M^b || εἴποι
post χαρίεις Ald. || 2. ἄγχιος ci. Coraes || 3. καὶ post δὲ add.
H^aN^b Ald. Hel. || 4. ἀναγκαῖα H^aK^b, ἀναγκαῖον c. c. Hel. ||
11. οὖν ΓΠ¹ Ar., γὰρ (i. e. γοῦν) Hel. || 12. ἀποτελεῖται τε O^b,
καὶ ἀποτελεῖται K^b, ἀποτελεῖται γὰρ Hel., ἀποτελεῖται δὲ c. c.
Ar. Bk. Rr. || 25. οὐδ' Γ Ar., οὐκ c. c. Bk. Rr. || διὰ Rasso-
vius, καὶ ΓΠ Ald. An. Bk. Rr. || 26. <ἂν> τι Rr., non vertit
Ar. || ὥστε πρᾶξαι K^bN^b, ὥστ' εἰ πρᾶξαι H^a, ὥστε πράξαντα
ci. Rr., ὥστ' εἰ πράξειέ c. c. Hel. Ar.

τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἶεσθαι ἐπιεικῇ
εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ
ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς ἐξ 7
30 ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικής· εἰ γὰρ πράξει, αἰσχύνειτ' ἂν· οὐκ ἔστιν
δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναίσχυντία φαῦλον καὶ
τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχροῦ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοι-
αῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ οὐδ' ἡ 8
ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ
35 αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. [νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἵπωμεν.]

E.

1129a περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας E I
τε τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἔστιν ἡ δι-
5 καιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν 2
ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ 3
πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην,
ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶν καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπρα-
γοῦσιν καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
10 περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. [διὸ
καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ 4
τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ
τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων

30. γὰρ om. K^b, quod haud displicet Ramsauero † || πρά-
ξαι K^b, πράξοι M^b, πράξει H^a O^b † || 32. γε post οὐδὲν add.
H^a N^b || μᾶλλον τὸν K^b L^b Ald. || τοιαῦτα O^b, ταῦτα Π² Ald. Ar.,
τὰ τοιαῦτα K^b, τοιαῦτα aut τὰ τοιαῦτα Γ || 33. *. οὐκ Monro,
qui excidisse putat de nemesi disputationem, at 1108b, 6 sq.
καὶ ἄλλοθι ad Rhetorica potius spectare videntur || οὐκ — 35.
εἵπωμεν secl. Grantius || 35. νῦν — εἵπωμεν secl. Rr.

Lib. V. K^b L^b = Π¹, M^b O^b = Π², K^b O^b = Π^a, L^b M^b = Π^b.

1129a, 10. διὸ — 26. ἀδικία secl. Susem.: fort. ex Eudemo
deprompta sunt || 11. οὔτε K^b, οὐ M^b || 14. ἡ ἐναντία secludenda
aut τοῦ ἐναντίου pro τῶν ἐναντίων scribendum esse ci. Hamp-
kius, ἡ αὐτὴ H^a Muretus et fort. Mi. Hel. (nisi fallor, recte),
ἡ ἐναντία Spengelius.

29. It must be in a provisional sense then that modesty is good - if a person did the act he would be ashamed. But this is not the way with the virtues. Though shamelessness and having no sensibility about base acts is bad, it does not follow that to do such things and feel shame is good. Just so confidence is not a virtue but a sort of mixed quality.



(1)

οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ 15
τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν
5 βαδίξῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ
ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ
τῶν ὑποκειμένων· εἴαν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ἢ φανερά, καὶ ἡ
καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία 20
καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης
σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ
6 τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ δ'
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐὰν θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ θάτερα
πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ 25
7 ἀδικία.] ἔοικεν δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ 2
ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν
λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δῆλη μᾶλλον· ἡ
γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλή ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται
κλείς ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ὑπὸ τὸν ἀνχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἢ τὰς 30
8 θύρας κλείουσιν. εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται.
δοκεῖ δὲ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ
ἄνιστος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος
καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ
9 δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνιστον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πλεο- 1129b
νέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ

15. οὐ secl. Coraes || ἀπὸ — πράττεται] ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι M^b
Q † || 23. ποιητικὸν] δεκτικὸν? Noetelius || 25. τὸ δίκαιον καὶ
om. K^b Rr. † || καὶ <ἡ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ> ἡ ἀδικία ci. Susem.,
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον Rr., καὶ τὸ δίκαιον <καὶ εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ
δικαιοσύνη> vel certe καὶ τὸ δίκαιον <καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄδικον, καὶ
ἡ ἀδικία> ci. Rr., om. ΓΠ² H^a N^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. || 26. ἡ
διδαισιόνη καὶ secl. Rr. || 27. ἡ ὁμωνυμία Thurotus || 28. μᾶλ-
λον ante δῆλη tri. Spengelius (nescio an recte), secludendum
esse ci. Noetelius || 29. γὰρ] δὲ? Gifanius || ὅτε Hel. || 30. κλείς
Π¹ Hel.(?) || 32. καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης secl. Hampkius || καὶ ἄνιστος
secl. Trendelenburgius Bk.² Rr. Ia. || 33. ὁ ante ἄνιστος add. Π²
H^a L^b N^b Ald. Hel. Bk. Fr. Rr. Ia. (Trend. Hampk.) || ἄνιστος]
ἄδικος pr. K^b (crx. rc.) || 1129b, 1. γὰρ H^a N^b Ald., δὲ c. c.
Hel. Ar. || καὶ add. H^a L^b N^b Ald. Hel. Ar.

ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶν μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ,
 τινὲ δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται καὶ διώκουσιν.
 5 δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς
 ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ' ἄδικος 1
 οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ πλεόν αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μεῖον κακὸν ἀγαθόν πως
 εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεο-
 10 νέκτης εἶναι. ἔστιν δὲ ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. 11
 3 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιός, 12
 δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστὶν πως δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ
 ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστιν, καὶ ἕκαστον τού-
 των δίκαιον εἶναι φασί. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάν- 13
 15 των, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν [ἢ τοῖς
 ἀρίστοις] ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρό-
 πον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιη-
 τικά καὶ φυλακτικά εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ
 πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀν 14
 20 δρεῖου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν
 μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὄπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοι-
 χεύειν μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν
 μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς
 καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὁρθῶς

8. μὴ Π¹, μεῖον c. c. An. Hel. Ar. || 10. ἔστω ci. Vermehrenus καὶ παράνομος post ἄνισος add. re. K^b || τοῦτο — κοινόν additis verbis τὸ γὰρ ἄνισον περιέχει τὸ πλεόν καὶ ἔλαττον interpretatur Mi., τὸ γὰρ ἄνισον ἔχει τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον. καὶ παράνομος. τοῦτο γὰρ, ἡ παρανομία ἥτοι ἡ ἀνισότης, περιέχει πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν καὶ κοινόν ἐστὶ πάσης ἀδικίας post κοινόν add. Ald., καὶ παράνομος (παράνομον H^a). τοῦτο γὰρ, ἡ παρανομία ἥτοι ἡ (ἡ om. Π²) ἀνισότης (ἡ παρανομία — ἀνισότης om. O¹ Fr., secl. Ia.), περιέχει κ. τ. λ. add. ΓΠ²H^aL^bN^bO^{1.2.3}. Ar. Fr. Ia., om. K^b Hel. || 15. ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις secl. Spengelius Ia. || 16. ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν om. K^b, ἢ om. L^b Bk. Fr. Rr. || 18. τῆς ante εὐδαιμονίας add. Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 20. λείπειν H^aN^bO^b Hel., λειπεῖν c. c. Ald. || 23. κατηγορεῖν Π², κακουργεῖν Hel. † || τὰ add. L^bN^b Hel. Ia., c. c. om. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || κατὰ om. N^b || 24. ὁρθὸς ΓM^b Ald. Ar. et corr.² K^b.



(I)

15 μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χειρὸν δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη²⁵
 μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶν τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν
 ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὔτε ἑὸς
 οὔτω θαναμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φασιν

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ 'στιν.

30

[καὶ τελεία μάλιστα] ἀρετὴ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστίν,
 [τελεία δ' ἐστίν], ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτήν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ
 ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν
 τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον
 16 ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι^{1130a}
 "ἀρχὰ τὸν ἄνδρα δέλξει". πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη
 17 ὁ ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶ-
 ναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερον ἐστίν· ἄλλω
 18 γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. κάκι-⁵
 στος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος
 τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτόν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλ' ὁ
 πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν.

19 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ

25. χειρὸν ΓΠ^b Ald. Ar. et corr.² K^b, χειρὸν c. c. Hel. ||
 29. διὸ καὶ Π^b, καὶ c. c. Hel. Ar. || 30. ἀρετὴ 'στιν Bergkiius
 (Poet. lyr. p. 360. 390), ἀρετὴ 'στί Hel., ἀρετὴ ἐνι Π¹H^aN^bO^b
 Bk. Ia., ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ ΓΜ^b Ald. || 31. καὶ τελεία μάλιστα et 32.
 τελεία δ' ἐστίν locos inter se commutare recte iubet Ia. || ὅτι
 — 32. δ' ἐστίν secl. Muenscher || τῆς τελείας] τελεία τῆς Tren-
 delenburgius, rec. Bk.² Rr., τῆς ὅλης Imelmannus || τελεία post
 ἀρετῆς add. Hampkiius, post χρῆσις ἐστίν Ueberwegius || 32.
 τελεία δ' ἐστίν non vertit Hel., secl. et τελεία — 1130a, 1.
 ἀδυνατοῦσιν alteram recensionem esse antecedentium 25. αὕτη
 — 27. ἕτερον putat Imelmannus || ὅτι ὁ] ὁ K^b, ὁ γὰρ Hel.,
 ἔτι ὁ Imelmannus || 1130a, 2. ἀρχὰ Π^bN^b Ald. Hel., ἀρχὴ Π^a
 Mi. Bk. Ia. || τὸν add. N^bO^b Ald. Mi., c. c. om. Hel. Bk. Rr. Ia. ||
 5. ἀρχομένῳ vel ἄρχοντι <ἢ ἀρχομένῳ> ci. Rr. (male) || κοινῶ
 Γ Ald. Hel. Ar. || 6. καὶ prius secludendum esse ci. Noetelius (haud
 recte) || πρὸς ante τοὺς om. M^b, prb. Noetelius (haud recte) ||
 7. ἀλλ' ὁ ΓH^aN^bO^b Ar., ἀλλὰ c. c. Hel. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 8. χαλε-
 πόν secl. Muretus (nescio an recte).

10 ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία
 (τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ 20
 τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὕτη, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό,
 ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἢ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξεις, ἀπλῶς
 4 ἀρετὴ)· ζητοῦμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην. ἔστι II
 15 γὰρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ
 μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας 2
 μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ
 ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπό-
 τητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ
 20 πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν
 οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δὲ γέ τινα (ψέγομεν γὰρ)
 καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος 3
 τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἀδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ
 τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ 4
 25 προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν,
 οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης,
 ἐκείνος δ' ἀδίκος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ
 κερδαίνειν, ὅτι περὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται 5
 ἢ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινα μοχθηρίαν αἰεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν,
 30 ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπεν τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν,
 εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπὶ ὀργήν, εἰ δὲ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθη-
 ρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία 6

11. <ὅλη> ἀρετὴ Ar. codices Turnebi Coraes || 12. τῷ δ' Co-
 raes || 13. ἡ ΓQ Ald. Ar., ἡ M^b, ἡ cet. H^aN^b || ἡ ante δικαιοσύνη
 add. Π¹H^aN^b Ald. || ἡ ΓM^bN^b Ald. Ar., ἡ Π¹H^aO^bQ || ἕξεις
 ἀπλῶς, ἀρετὴ Trendelenburgius Ia. (nescio an recte) || 14. ἀρετῆς
 secl. Spengelius || 18. ὁ post ἡ add. H^aN^b Ald. Mi. (?) Hel. (?) ||
 22. ἄρα γε] ἄρα O^b Hel., γὰρ K^b || ἄλλη post τις Π² Ald. || τι
 (τί Ald.) post μέρος add. ΓΠ^bN^bO^b Ald. (fors. recte) || 23.
 τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον fort. secludenda esse putat Noetelius ||
 25. προσλαμβάνει Π^bH^a Mi. Hel. Ar., προσλαμβάνοι F^N^bO^b
 Ald. || 26. δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον εἶναι O^b, μᾶλλον δόξει εἶναι K^b || 27.
 ἄρα] γὰρ Γ, prb. Scaliger et Spengelius || 28. ὅτι — 32. ἀδικίαν
 secl. Noetelius || ὅτι K^b, ἔτι δὲ O^b, ἔτι c. c. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. Ia. ||
 31. δ' ante ἐπάταξεν add. Π¹H^aN^bO^b Ald. Hel., om. M^b Ar.

the first of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The second of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The third of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The fourth of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The fifth of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The sixth of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The seventh of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The eighth of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The ninth of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

The tenth of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, and that the results are not always the same.

(II)

παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τιτι ἐχοιμεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.


- 7 [ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν δικαιοσύνη πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις 5 καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δηλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ποία 8 τις, ληπτέον. διώριστα δὴ τὸ ἀδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ 9 μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ 10 δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ παράνομον οὐ πᾶν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον), καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα (μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιο- 15

1130b, 2. ἢ χρήματα] καὶ χρήματα Ob, ἢ καὶ χρήματα Πb † || 6. ὅτι — 29. παντί praeunte Rieckhero secl. Rasso-
vius, neque admodum aliter iudicat Rr.: fort. hausta sunt ex.
Eudemo || εἰσὶν <καὶ> Thurotus || 7. ἀρετὴν secl. Gifanios ||
ὅποια Bk. Fr. Rr., ὅποια H^a, ὅποια N^b || 8. δὲ H^aK^bM^b (fors.
recte) || 11. ἄνισον <καὶ τὸ παράνομον ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄνισον>
vel simile quid ci. Hampkios || παράνομον Ald. Ar. O² et corr.
Ob, παράνομον πλέον K^bP^b, πλέον Π^bQ N^b Mi. Hel. Bk.¹ Fr.
(Hampk. Speng. Verm.), πλέον pr. Ob, πλέον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον
Γ, om. H^a || πρὸς ἕτερον post ἕτερον add. Γ || 12. καὶ ἐπεὶ
τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος
πρὸς ὅλον post ὅλον add. Γ || τὸ μὲν — 13. παράνομον secl.
Spengelios || παράνομον οὐ πᾶν ἄνισον Rr., πλέον ἅπαν ἄνι-
σον Π¹H^aN^b Mi. Hel. Ar. Bk.¹ Fr. (Hampk. Verm.), ἄνισον
ἅπαν παράνομον ΓΠ²Q P^b Ald. Bk.² Ia. || τὸ δ' ἄνισον ἅπαν
παράνομον Vermehrenus, rec. Rr., τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον
Π¹H^aN^b Mi. Hel. Ar. Bk.¹ Fr., τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν
ἄνισον Bk.² Ia., τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ (καὶ τὸ μὲν M^bQ) πλέον ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ
πᾶν (οὐχ ἅπαν M^bQ) πλέον ΓΠ²Q P^bO² Ald. || 14. ἐκείνων
ἐτέρων Hampkios (male).

σύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης), ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύ-
 νης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου
 καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν 10
 τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς
 20 οὕσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφελῆσθαι, καὶ
 τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερόν ὡς
 διοριστέον (σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς
 ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα ἐστίν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν
 προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος·
 25 τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενο- 11
 μοθέτῃται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· περὶ δὲ τῆς
 καθ' ἑκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν,
 πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ
 γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτόν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντὶ·]
 30 τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου 12
 ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων
 ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν
 τούτοις γὰρ ἐστὶν καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἐν
 1131a δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη 13
 δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια ἐστὶν τὰ δὲ
 ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὦνὴ δανεισμός
 ἐγγυὴ χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγε-
 5 ται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν
 δὲ ἀκούσιων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρ-
 μακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία,

16. ὥστε — 18. ὡσαύτως secl. Rr. || ὡς K^b, ὥς N^b || καὶ
 post ὥστε om. Π¹ H^a N^b O^b Ia. || 22. ἀφοριστέον Rassoivius ||

23. προσταττόμενα Γ K^b P^b Ald. Mi. Ar., πραττόμενα mg. O^b ||
 29. πάντῃ Muretus, secl. Spengelius (perperam) || 30. κατὰ ταύ-
 την δικαίου K^b, δικαίου τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν L^b || 1131a, 1. μέρη
 εἰς δύο L^b, δύο μέρη M^b || 2. ἀδικημάτων K^b M^b et pr. L^b, συναλ-
 λαγμάτων c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar. || 7. προαγωγεία Ald., προαγωγή Q
 L^b N^b O^b P^b Hel. et corr. H^a, προσαγωγή K^b M^b et pr. H^a || δολο-
 πατία K^b, δουλαπατεία Ald., δουλαπάτη H^a || δουλοφονία Mi.



(II)

τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἀρπαγή πῆρσις
κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.

- III ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἀδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἀδικον ἄνισον, δηλόν 6
 2 ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστὶ τοῦ ἄνισου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ 11
 3 γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ
 οὖν τὸ ἀδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου
 δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη.
 4 ἔστιν δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον 15
 μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι [καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν], καὶ ἥ μὲν μέ-
 σον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλείον καὶ ἔλαττον), ἥ δ' ἴσον
 5 ἐστί, δυοῖν, ἥ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον
 ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει
 6 ὄν, δύο ἐστίν, καὶ ἐν οἷς, [τὰ πράγματα,] δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ 20
 ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, οὕτω
 καὶ κεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν-
 τεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα
 7 ἡ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχῃσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν 25
 τοῦτο δηλόν· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι
 πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν
 αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ

10. * * ἐπεὶ Rr. (fors. recte) || 14. μέσον, <τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἴσον>? Spengelius || ἂν ante τι Π^a || 15. δυσίν<, πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν> Scaliger || 16. ἴσον <ὄν> Bergius, prb. Speng. et Muensch. || καὶ πρὸς — τισίν secl. Rr., καὶ πρὸς τι post καὶ τισι H^a N^b O^b P^b, om. K^b, secl. Bk., καὶ τισίν om. L^b Ia. || καὶ πρὸς τι] τινῶν Spengelius, καὶ ἐν τισι Muensch. || καὶ ἡ — 18. τισίν secl. Muensch. || 17. ταῦτα — ἔλαττον secl. Scaliger || 18. ἐστί secl. Scaliger, non vertit Ar. || δυοῖν — δίκαιον secl. Spengelius (fors. recte) || τισίν] τισὶ καὶ πρὸς τινάς· πρὸς ἄλλους γὰρ ἐστὶν Γ, τισὶ καὶ πρὸς τινάς Mi. (ut videtur), cf. M. M. 1193 b, 35 sq. || 20. τὰ πράγματα secl. Scaliger Ia. || 21. ἔσται om. Π^a Ar. (fors. recte) || τὰ ἐν οἷς post ἔχει c. c. add. Ar. Bk. Fr., cum K^b om. Ia., secl. Rr. || 22. ἔχει — ἔξουσιν secl. Gifanius || τὰ οἷς post ἔχει add. Γ † || 23. ἡ om. Π^b Ald. || 24. ἡ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα om. Π^b † || καὶ οἱ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα post νέμονται add. L^b † || 25. νομαῖς Π¹ Ald. et pr. O^b || 27. ὑπάρχειν] κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι K^b, om. O^b †.

ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλουτοῦτον, οἱ δὲ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. ⁸
³⁰ τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, ⁹
^{1131b} δῆλον· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής. τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὧς δυσεὶ χρῆται καὶ δὲς λέγει, οἶον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως ἡ τοῦ β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ· δὲς οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται, ὥστ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δὲς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ¹⁰
τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· ⁵ διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ἅ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος ¹¹
πρὸς τὸν β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν δ, καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ⁷
ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει· κἂν οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύ- ¹²
¹⁰ ζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστὶ, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν ¹³
γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκά- ¹⁴
¹⁵ τερον. ἔστιν δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἰς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλογον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ

28. οἱ δὲ] ἡ Scaliger (perperam) || 31. ἡ τε γὰρ Π² || λόγον ΓΚ^b Ν^b Ald. Ar. || 33. χρῆσεται Π^b Η^a Ν^b † || 1131b, 1—9. α β γ δ litteris h. l. non cardinales numeros, sed ordinales significari sciant lectores, πρώτου δευτέρου etc., ut scriptum est in Κ^b ac legisse videntur Mi. et Hel. || 1. οὕτως om. Π^b Ar. || 2. καὶ ante ἡ τοῦ β add. Η^a L^b P^b Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 3. ἀνάλογον Spengelius || 5. διήρηται Π^b Η^a Μ^b Ar. || 6. καὶ — 7. δ om. Μ^b Q † || 8. ὅλον, ὅπερ — συνδυάζει, ὡς ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον > Muenscher || 10. τὸ δίκαιον — 11. παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον secundum Mureti translationem secl. Gifanius, τὸ δίκαιον <τοῦ ἀδίκου> ci. Lambinus || 11. τοῦ] τὸ Π¹ Η^a Ar., τὸ δὲ ἄδικον aut ἄδικον δὲ Γ.

(III)

μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμ-
 βαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος
 15 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ 20
 γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεταί τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον κακόν·
 16 ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ
 δ' αἰρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον.
 17 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτο ἐστίν, τὸ
 IV δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεταί ἐν τοῖς συναλ- 25
 2 λάγμασιν καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ
 δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμη-
 τικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν
 εἰρημένην (καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίνηται ἡ
 διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσιν 30
 πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικεί-
 3 μενον τῷ δίκαιῳ τούτῳ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐστίν)· τὸ δ' ἐν
 τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἔστι μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον
 ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ 1132a
 τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φραῦλον
 ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φραῦλος ἐπιεικῇ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ
 φραῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέ-
 πει ὁ νόμος (καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις), εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδι- 5
 4 κεῖται, καὶ εἰ ὁ μὲν ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον
 τοῦτο ἄνισον ὃν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν
 ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διγ-
 ρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ
 5 ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς 10
 εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισὶν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη,
 τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι·
 6 ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία

32. τὸ ante παρὰ add. Π^a || 1132a, 5. καὶ — ἴσοις fort.
 secludenda esse ci. Ia. || 6. ὁ μὲν om. pr. K^b (suppl. rc.) Bk.
 Rr. (fors. recte) || 8. καὶ κτείνῃ] κτείνῃ Π^a Mi. (?), κατακτείνῃ
 ci. Noetelius || 11. εἴη] ἢ pr. K^b, ἢ corr.² K^b, δοκῇ O^b, εἴη δοκεῖ
 Ald. || 13. ** ἀλλ' Hampkius (perperam).

τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον
 15 μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δὲ ἔλατ-
 τον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεόν τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ ἔλαττον
 κέρδος, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ζημία· ὣν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέ-
 γομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη
 τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, 7
 20 ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἵεναι
 ἵεναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον
 δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν
 ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἂν τοῦ μέσου τύχῳσιν, τοῦ δικαίου τευξό-
 μενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς. ὁ δὲ 8
 25 δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημέ-
 νης, ᾧ τὸ μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ'
 ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τιμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ
 δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτοῦ ὅταν
 λάβῳσι τὸ ἴσον. [τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ 9
 30 ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.] διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
 ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι
 δίκαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστὴς. * ἐπὶ γὰρ δύο ἴσων 10
 <ἴσον> ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θατέρον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυοὶ
 τούτοις ὑπερέχει θατέρον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ
 1132b δέ, ἐνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνὶ, καὶ τὸ μέσον,
 ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνὶ. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωρίζομεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν 11
 δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεόν ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον
 ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ
 5 τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ με-

21. ἵεναι om. Π^b N^b, ἵεναι — εἶναι om. pr. K^b, add. Γ^a H^a O^b P^b Ald. Mi. Ar. et re. K^b || 23. μεσιδίκους (κ corr.) L^b, μεσοδίκους Ald., μεσιδίκην H^a, μεσοδίκην N^b, μεσιτίκους Γ^a, μεσιδίους c. c. Mi. || 28. τὸ αὐτοῦ Γ L^b P^b Ald. Ar., τὸ αὐτοῦ H^a K^b N^b, τὸ αὐτὸ M^b Q, τὰ αὐτοῦ O^b, τὰ αὐτῶν ci. Coraes, rec. Bk. Fr. Rr. Ia. || 29. τὸ δ' — 30. ἀναλογίαν post 32. δι-
 χαστὴς tri. Rassovius Ia. || 33. ἴσον add. Rassovius || 1132b, 1.
 τοῦ — 5. μεγίστον post 9. γδ tri. Spengelius || 2. <τοῦ> ἀφ'
 ci. Zellius, rec. Ia. (fors. recte) || 3. προστεθῆναι Π^b H^a.

IV)

12 γίσθου. ἴσαι αἰ ἐφ' ὧν αα ββ γγ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς αα ἀφηρήσθω τὸ αε, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ γγ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ γδ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ δγγ τῆς εα ὑπερέχει τῷ γα καὶ τῷ γζ· τῆς ἄρα ββ τῷ γδ. [ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τοῦτο· ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει ** τὸ ποιοῦν, καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον 10 καὶ τὸ πάσχον, ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.] ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα ἧ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος ἐκ τῆς ἐκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν ἢ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι, οἶον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν 15 ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλεόν μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασιν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

20

V δοκεῖ δέ τιςι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, 8 ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὠρῖζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλω. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτι-

7. ἀφηρήσθω N^b P^b, ἀφαιρήσθω(?) M^b, ἀφηρεῖσθω Q, ἀφαιρείσθω H^a L^b O^b, ἀφηρεῖσθω Ald., ἀφίρηται K^b || ᾧ O^b, ὧν c. c. Bk.¹ Fr., οὗ Rr. || 8. ὑπερέχειν corr.² K^b || 9. ἔστιν — 11. τοιοῦτον = 1133a, 14—16 secl. Lambinus et Muretus (Fr. Rr. Ia.), om. Bk.² || τοῦτο ante καὶ Π^a P^b (fors. recte) || 11. τοῦτο om. M^b, del. Muretus || 13. αὐτοῦ O^b P^b, αὐτοῦ H^a K^b || 15. πωλεῖν καὶ ὠνεῖσθαι Γ Π^b H^a N^b Ald. † || 16. δέδωκεν Π² (fors. recte) || 17. αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν secl. Gifanius || δι'] <ἀ> δεῖ olim ci. Ia. || <τὰ> δι' αὐτῶν ci. Rassovius, δι' αὐτῶν Γ N^b P^b Q Ald. Bk. Fr., ἢ ταῦτά διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν post δι' αὐτῶν add. Γ || 18. ὥστε — 20. ὕστερον secl. Noetelius, fragmentum esse censet Rr. || 19. τῶι H^a N^b et pr. K^b (crx. rc.) et v. d. ap. Lambinum, τὸ M^b Ald., τῶν c. c. Mi. Hel. || <τῷ> τὸ vel τῷ Bergius, secl. vir ille doctus ap. Lamb. || ἔχει idem v. d. || καὶ om. Π^a || 21. καὶ — δίκαιον fort. secludenda esse ci. Ia. || 23. ἄλλω om. Π^b H^a N^b O^b Ia., aut hoc probandum aut ταὐτῷ scribendum esse iudicat Hampkius † || τὸ δ' — 24. διορθωτικόν post 27. γένοιτο tri. Zwinger, prb. Hampkius, secl. Trendelenburgius || 24. νεμητικόν L^b O^b et pr. K^b (crx. rc.).

25 κόν (καίτοι βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 'Ραδαμάνθυος 3
δίκαιον·

εἴ' κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο·

πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, 4
οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἀρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι
30 μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκού- 5
σιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλ- 6
λακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, κατὰ
ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνά-
λογον συμφέρει ἢ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν, εἰ δὲ
1133a μὴ, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι[, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ]. ἢ τὸ εὖ, εἰ δὲ 7
μὴ, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμφέρουσιν. διὸ 7
καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν ποιοῦνται, ἵνα ἀνταπόδοσις ᾗ·
τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι τε γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χα-
5 ρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ 8
τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύξευ-
ξις. οἷον οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ὧ α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ὧ β, οἰκία
ἐφ' ὧ γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ὧ δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκο-
δόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ
10 μεταδιδόναι τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ἦ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνα-
λογίαν ἴσον, εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμε-
μενον. εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμφέρει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει
κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα
ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνηροῦντο 9


25. καίτοι] καί? Hampkius, prb. Trendelenburgius || 27. τὰ
Rr. || τ' Coraes, κ' Π Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || κ' τ' Ald., δ' Mb Q ||
30. καὶ <ἄλλως> Hampkius, om. K^b, secl. Rr. † || ἀκούσιον καὶ
τὸ ἐκούσιον H^a L^b N^b || 34. ἢ — 1133a, 2. συμφέρουσιν secl.
Hampkius || 1133a, 1. εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ secl. Muretus || 3. ἐμ-
ποδῶν] ἐν πόλεσιν? Ia. || 4. τε add. L^b O^b, secl. Fr., del. Rr.
(nescio an recte) || 9. τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον Γ Q H^a M^b P^b † || 10. τοῦ]
τὸ Γ(?) Turnebus Bk. Fr. Rr. † || αὐτοῦ Π^a, αὐτοῦ cet. || 14. ἔστιν
— 16. τοιοῦτον om. Mi. Hel., asteriscis adhibitis hoc quoque
loco secl. Rr. (nescio an recte) † || ἀνηροῦντο — 16. τοιοῦτον
secl. Muenschcr.

γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει * * τὸ ποιοῦν, καὶ ὄσον καὶ οἶον καὶ τὸ 15
 πάσχον, ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ
 δύο ἱατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ,
 καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
 διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πῶς εἶναι, ὧν ἔστιν ἀλλαγὴ. ἐφ'
 ὃ τὸ νόμισμα ἐλήλυθεν, καὶ γίνεταί πῶς μέσον· πάντα γὰρ 20
 μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα
 ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματα ἴσον οἰκίαν ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ
 οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαυτὰ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν
 ἢ τροφήν (εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία).
 τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἶη πῶς, οὐκ ἔσται. || δεῖ ἄρα ἐνὶ τινι πάντα 25
 μετρεῖσθαι[, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον]. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τῇ μὲν
 ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρεῖα, ἢ πάντα συνέχει (εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο
 ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή). οἶον δ'
 ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρεῖας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονεν κατὰ συνθήκην·
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ 30
 ἐστίν, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται
 δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυ-
 τοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς

15. ἂν add. K^b Ald. || μὴ] δ Imelmannus, μὴ <δ> Bergius
 Bk.² (Trendelenburgius Ueberwegius), secl. Hampkius || ἐποίει
 <τὸ (malim αὐτὸ) πάσχον ὅσον καὶ οἶον ποιεῖ> ci. Ia. ||
 ποιοῦν καὶ — οἶον, καὶ — πάσχον ἔπασχε sic distinguunt edi-
 tores et critici praeter Ia. omnes || καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον] τοιοῦτον
 καὶ τοσοῦτον M^b || τὸ πάσχον <πάσχει>? Susem., ὁ πάσχον
 Hampkius, secl. Imelmannus, τὸ secl. Trendelenburgius || 16.
 ἔπασχε] ἰσαξε Ueberwegius || τοῦτο secl. Muretus, prb. Imel-
 mannus, cf. n. ad 1132b, 11 || 20. ὃ Ald. et pr. K^b, ὃ c. c.
 rc. K^b Fr. (fors. recte) || μέσον] μέτρον Muretus || 23. ὁ οἰκοδόμος
 L^b N^b O^b P^b Ald., οἰκοδόμος <ἢ γεωργός> Felicianus (male) ||
 τόσαδε pr. K^b, τόσα δὲ L^b, τόσαδὲ rc. K^b || 24. ἢ τροφήν secl.
 Rr. (temere) || 25. δεῖ — b, 6. κοινωνία secl. Noetelius, potius
 δεῖ — b, 14. μᾶλλον alteram et b, 14. διὸ — 28. κλῖναι ter-
 tiam recensionem esse antecedentium 19. διὸ — 25. ἔσται in-
 tellexit Rassovius, plures iam ante eum recensiones, sed nimis
 artificiose distinxit Imelmannus || 26. ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον
 secl. Rassovius || 28. αὐτῇ] ἀπλῇ Imelmannus || 31. μεταβαλεῖν
 L^b P^b, μεταβάλλειν cet.

1133b σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται (εἰ δὲ
 μή, ἀμφοτέρως ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον), ἀλλ'
 ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι, καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ
 5 ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι (γεωργὸς α, τροφή γ,
 σκυτοτόμος β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον δ). εἰ δ' οὕτω
 μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία 13
 συνέχει ὥσπερ ἓν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν
 ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ
 ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηται τις, οἷον οἶνον, διδόντες σίτου ἐξα-
 10 γωγὴν. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλ- 14
 λαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἐὰν δεηθῇ, τὸ νό-
 μισμα οἷον ἐγγνητῆς ἔσθ' ἱμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι
 λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό (οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσον
 δύναται). ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. || || διὸ δεῖ πάντα
 15 τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινω-
 νία. τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσά-
 ξει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ
 ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν
 οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γε-
 20 νέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς. ἐν δὲ τι δεῖ 15

1133b, 1. οὐ om. Γ Mi., secl. Bk.² + || ἀλλάττωνται Co-
 raes, ἀλλάξαι ἄρξωνται? Noetelius || εἰ — 2. ἄκρον post 3.
 αὐτῶν tri. et 3. οὕτως — 4. γίνεσθαι secl. Imelmannus || 2. ἐκά-
 τερον Muretus || 3. αὐτῶν Γ Q M^b P^b, αὐτῶν cet. || 8. ἀλλάττονται
 <ἢ οὐχ ἀπλῶς> Imelmannus || ὥσπερ — 10. ἰσασθῆναι aut se-
 cludenda aut lacunam post ea statuendam esse ci. Haecker,
 secl. Rr. || 9. οὐ <οὐκ> Muenscher, prb. Imelmannus || αὐτὸς]
 ἄλλος Vermehrenus || <οὐ> δέηται Bas.³ || τις om. K^b, prb. Imel-
 mannus || οἷον — ἐξαγωγὴν secludenda esse ci. Hampkius || οἶ-
 νον M^b || διδόντες — ἐξαγωγὴν secl. Gifanius || δόντες K^b, δι-
 δόντος Coraes, δοτέον Vermehrenus, <οὐ> διδούς? Hampkius,
 διδούς <τις> Imelmannus || ἐξαγωγῆς Bk. Rr. et pr. K^b (crx. rc.) ||
 10. δεῖ — ἰσασθῆναι secl. Noetelius || 12. δεῖ] ἔστι ex Argyro-
 pyli transl. mg. Bas.³, αἰεὶ Rassovius || εἶναι] ἔσται Rasso-
 vius || 15. ἔσται αἰεὶ (αἰεὶ Ald.) Π² H^a N^b Ald. || 16. μέτρον L^b,
 μέσον H^a M^b N^b Ald., μέσον ἦτοι μέτρον Mi., μετροῦν Ar., μέτρον
 c. c. Hel. || 20. δέ τι δεῖ L^b, δὲ δεῖ τι H^a M^b, δεῖ δὲ τι N^b O^b.





εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομί-
σματι. οἰκία α, μυαῖ δέκα β, κλίνη γ· τὸ δὲ α τοῦ β
ἡμισυ, εἰ πέντε μυῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέ-
κατον μέρος τὸ γ τοῦ β· δηλὸν τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον 25
οἰκία, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα
εἶναι, δηλὸν· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας,
ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι. ||


τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται· 9
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δηλὸν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ 30
τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεον ἔχειν τὸ δ'
ἐλαττον ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τις ἐστίν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν
δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσον ἐστίν· ἡ δ'
ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶν καθ' ἣν ὁ 1134a
δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ
διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον,
οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἰρετοῦ πλεον αὐτῷ ἐλαττον δὲ τῷ
πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' 5
ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δὲ ἀδικία
τοῦναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις
τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἐλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐφ'

21. καλεῖται] πεπόρισται vel simile quid ci. Trendelenburgius || 23. ἐφ' ἧς α Γ^Ob Ald., ἐφ' ὧ α Mi., α c. c. Hel. || δὴ] δὲ H^aM^b, om. Π^a (suppl. rc. K^b) † || 24. ἢ ἴσον secl. Rr. (nescio an recte) || κλίνη <ῆ> Coraes, κλίνη ἢ L^bP^b || 27. εἶναι M^bQ, ἦν Γ^Ha, ἢ Π^aN^bP^b Ald., om. L^b || ἢ] ἢ εἰ Ald., εἰ Cardwellus || κλῖνας Rassovius (nescio an recte) || 29. καὶ πῶς ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον post ἐστίν ex 1134a, 24 sq. tri. Muretus || 32. τις add. Π¹, c. c. om. Mi. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 33. δὲ add. Π¹O^b, c. c. om. Mi. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς Γ^HaM^b Ar.(?) Bk. Fr. Rr., ταῖς προτέραις ἀρεταῖς N^b Hel., ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταῖς πρότερον O^b, ταῖς προειρημέναις ἀρεταῖς Mi. || 1034a, 5. τὸ ἴσον τὸ Noetelius || 7. τοῦ ἀδίκου] τοῦ δικαίου(?) Γ, secl. Spengelius || 8. ἢ] καὶ Spengelius.

- 10 αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως
δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ
δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος
τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
- 10 περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἐκατέρας 19
15 ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου· ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν VI
ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν
ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτῃς ἢ μοιχός
ἢ ληστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; ** καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγέ-
20 νοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδῶς τὸ ἦ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν
ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, 2
οἷον οὐ κλέπτῃς, ἔκλεψεν δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχενσε δέ·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

[|| πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴ- 3
25 ρηται πρότερον· || δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστιν 4
καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν
[ἐπὶ] κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ
ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο,

10. ἐαυτοῦ H^a L^b, ἐαυτοῖς M^b || μὲν ante τοῦ om. Π^b H^a Q^b
Ald. || 13. τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι M^b, ἀδικεῖσθαι K^b || 16. τοῦ ante δι-
καίου add. Bk. Fr. Rr. || ἐπεὶ — 23. ἄλλων + 32. ἐν οἷς δὴ —
33. ἀδικία fort. secludenda esse ci. Susem.: v. quae ad 1135a,
16 adnotabo || 17. ποῖα Vermehrenus || 19. οὐδὲν secl. Spenge-
lius (male) || διοίσει<, ἐπιβλέποντι δὲ εἰς τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα διοίσει>
Muretus, διοίσει<, τῷ δὲ τέλει διοίσει> ci. Coraes, et similia
fort. iam legerunt Mi. et Hel. || 22. οὐ K^b, οὐδὲ c. c. Ar. Bk.
Fr. Rr. || οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχσε δέ secl. Hampkius Rr. (fort.
recte) || 24. πῶς — 32. ἀδίκον post 33. ἀδικία tri. Muenscher ||
πῶς — 25. πρότερον alteram recensioem breviorē esse prae-
cedentium 1133b, 29. τί — 1134a, 16. καθόλου censet Rasso-
vius, secl. Gifanius, praeterea v. quae adnotavi ad 1133b, 29
et in Prolegg. || 25. πρότερον secl. Hildenbrandius (recte, nisi
fallor) || 26. καὶ prius om. Π¹ N^b † || ἔστιν om. K^b || 27. ἐπὶ κοι-
νωνῶν] ἐπικοινωνοῦν Ald. Ar. et, ut videtur, Γ, κοινωνῶν L^b
N^b P^b Ia., κοινωνόν H^a M^b, ἐπὶ secl. Susem.



VI)

οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τι
 δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος ³⁰
 πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δι-
 καίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου·] ἐν οἷς δὴ ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τού-
 τοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία. * τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν τὸ
 πλεον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κα-
 5 κῶν. διὸ οὐκ ἔδωκεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ ³⁵
 τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ ^{1134b}
 6 τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν αὐτῷ
 πλεον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος (οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλεον τοῦ
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογον ἐστίν· διὸ
 ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν ⁵
 7 τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον), μισθὸς ἄρα
 τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας. ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι.
 8 τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτόν τού-
 τοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ ¹⁰
 δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἄν ἡ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ
 9 μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτά· οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν.
 κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος· οὗτοι δ'
 ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον ¹⁵

30. καὶ ante καθ' om. Mi. Ar., secl. Coraes || 31. αὐτούς
 Mb, αὐτούς c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. || ἐστὶ post κρίσις add. L^bO^b ||
 32. ἐν οἷς — 33. ἀδικία non vertit Hel., secl. Zellius, v. quae
 adnotabo ad 1135a, 16 || δὴ Muenscher, δ' ΓΠ Ar. et editores
 omnes || καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν post ἐν τούτοις tri. Spengelius || 33. ἐν
 οἷς — ἀδικία secl. Muretus Rr. || 35. νόμον Mb Q, λόγον c. c.
 Mi. Hel. An. Bk. Fr. Rr. Ia. || 1134b, 2. αὐτῷ — 3. εἶναι] αὐτῷ
 — νεῖμαι Hampkins (perperam) || 5. ποιεῖ Sylburgius Bk. Fr.
 Rr. || 6. ἄρα post 7. τις Π²H^a || 7. τὰ τοιαῦτα Π¹ Hel., ταῦτα
 ΓΠ²H^aN^b Ald. Ar. || 9. τούτῳ ci. Rr. || 11. τὸ om. Π¹ || μὴ
 post καὶ add. Π^bH^a Ald. Mi. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr., om. ΓΠ^a
 N^bP^b et, ut videtur, M. M. 1194b, 14—16 || 13. αὐτά Rr., αὐ-
 τὸν cum fontibus ceteri editores.

πρὸς γυναικὰ ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ VII
νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν,
20 καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μῇ, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν
διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ
μῶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα,
ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρα-
σίδα, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα 2
25 τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν
ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσῃς
καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως 3
ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς· καίτοι παρὰ γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδα-
μῶς, παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι
30 πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον 4
δὲ φύσει [τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν], καὶ ποῖον οὐ
ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἅμφω κινητὰ [ὁμοίως],
δηλον. καὶ <γὰρ> ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων * ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός·
φύσει γὰρ ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφι-
35 δεξιούς γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν 5
1135a δικαίων ὁμοιά ἐστιν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ
οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μέζω, οὗ

22. αἶγας ci. Lambinus || Διὶ θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα ci. Muretus, prb. Lambinus (cf. Herod. II, 42), nescio an recte, θύειν Διὶ ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα Coraes, θύειν μίαν ἢ δύο πρόβατα ci. Ia., δύο secl. Camerarius, πρόβατα secl. Scaliger || 24. εἶναι post πάντα H^a M^b N^b Rr. || 28. καίτοι — 30. οὐ φύσει secludenda esse ci. Susem. (cf. 1137a, 26 sqq. 1178b, 10 sqq.) || 29. ἔχον (ἔχον ἐστὶ L^b) post οὐδαμῶς add. Π² H^a L^b N^b P^b et, ut videtur, Ar. || φύσει κινητὸν οὐ μέντοι Γ, φυσικὸν κινητὸν οὐ μέντοι H^a M^b Ald. Ar. || 31. τῶν — ἔχειν post 33. ἄλλων tri. Muenscher || 32. εἴπερ] εἰ καὶ ci. Rr. || ὁμοίως secl. Rr. || 33. * * καὶ Rr. τὸ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ διαμένον τοῦτο φύσει δίκαιον secundum M. M. 1195a, 3 vel simile quid excidisse ratus (nescio an recte) || γὰρ add. Muenscher || δὲ post ἐπὶ add. Γ || 34. τινὰς Mi. (ut videtur) Wilkinson Bk. Rr., om. Γ, πάντας c. c. Hel. Ar. M. M. 1194b, 33 sq.

I

δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη. 5

6

τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομῶν ἕκαστον ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ' ἕκαστον ἓν· καθόλου γάρ.

7

διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστιν τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτανπραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲπραχθῆναι, οὐπω ἀλλ' ἄδικον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα (καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπραγία τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος)· καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὥστερον ἐπισκεπτόμεν. 15


II

|| ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκεν δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὴ καὶ δικαιοπραγία ὥρισταί τῳ ἐκούσιῳ καὶ ἀκούσιῳ· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ᾗ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότε ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἐστὶν τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὐπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ

1135a, 4. αἱ om. ΓΠ¹N^b Ald. Ar. et, ut videtur, Hel. || πολιτεία ΓN^b Ald. Ar. et, ut videtur, Hel. || 6. τῶν — 8. γάρ secl. Rr. || νομῶν ci. Zwinger || τὸ H^a Hel. et fort. Mi., τὰ c. c. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. Ia. || 10. ἢ τῇ τάξει L^b Mi. || τὸ ante αὐτὸ add. ΓQH^aM^bN^b Bk. Fr. Rr. † || 11. ἐστὶ om. Π¹P^b || 12. ὅτι (K^b) ὅτανπραχθῇ ἀδίκημα ἐστίν post ἄδικον add. Π¹N^bO^bP^b Ald. † || τὸ κοινόν μᾶλλον δικαιοπραγία ΓH^aM^bN^b Ald. || 15. ὥστερον] v. Prolegg. || 16. ὄντων — 1136a, 9. συγγνωμονικά alteram recensionem esse praecedentium 1134a, 16. ἐπεὶ — 23. ἄλλων (+ 32. ἐν — 33. ἀδικία) uberiores intellexit Rieckher, et haec quidem posterior Eudemiorum olim pars fuisse videtur, prior illa utrum ab Aristotele an alio scripta sit, in medio relinquo, v. Prolegg. || 20. δὴ Muenscher, δὲ ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Ia. || ὥρίσθω Spengelius || 22. ἂν Π¹H^a || 24. ἐαυτῷ Π²H^a.

- 25 μήτε ὄν μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ <ἔνεκεν>, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνη καὶ
 τίνος ἔνεκα, καὶ κείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ
 βία (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον,
 οὐχ ἐκῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον
 πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις
 30 γιγνώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διω-
 ρισθῶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὲ
 ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ
 βία, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδό-
 1135b τες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔτε ἐκούσιον οὔτε
 ἀκούσιον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
 καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίῃ τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ
 5 φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον,
 ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον
 καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμ-
 βεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδिका πράττειν. τῶν δὲ
 ἐκονσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελό-
 10 μενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλεύσασθαι, ἀπροαίρετα
 δὲ ὅσα ἀπροβούλευται. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς
 κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτημάτων ἐστίν, ὅταν
 μήτε ὄν μήτε ὁ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ (ἢ

25. <μήτε ὁ> μήτε ὄν vel μήτε ὄν <μήτε ὁ> ci. Bernaysius || μήτε οὗ ἔνεκεν non vertit Ar. || ἔνεκεν add. Γ et fort Mi., ἔνεκα Bk. Fr. Rr. Ia. (num recte, dubius sum) || 27. τύπτει ΓΠ^b H^a O^b || 28. δὲ post ἐκῶν add. Π² H^a N^b P^b || 31. τοῦ K^b, τῶν cet. Ar. || 32. ἐφ' αὐτῷ L^b, ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ O^b, ἐφ' αὐτῷ N^b || ἢ] ἀλλὰ ci. Mi. || 33. γὰρ] δὲ Sussem. || 1135b, 1. <οὐτ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν> οὔτε Rassovius, οὔτε secl. Spengelius || οὔτε ἀκούσιον secl. Spengelius, prb. Rassovius || 2. ἐγγηρᾶν Π² H^a N^b || ἢ] καὶ M^b, καὶ τὸ L^b + || 3. καὶ ante τὸ om. H^a M^b, secl. Hampkiius, c. c. add. Mi. || 5. ὄν add. K^b || οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν secl. Noetelius || οὔτε] οὐ Noetelius || 8. καὶ τὰ ἄδिका πράττειν secl. Noetelius || 11. δὴ] οὖν M^b, δὲ H^a L^b P^b Ald. Ar. Ia. || 13. ὁ] ὁ μήτε ὡς Mi., ὡς Turnebus (male) || ἔνεκεν? Sussem. || ταῦτα ante πράξῃ (πράξοι M^b) add. ΓΠ^b H^a N^b O^b Ald. Ar.



III)

γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν ἢ οὐ τοῦτω ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τοῦτου ἕνεκα ᾤήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾤήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' 15
 7 ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ οὖν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ), ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβῃ γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ
 8 ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν). ὅταν δὲ εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ 20
 θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματα ἔστιν, οὐ μέντοι πῶς ἀδικοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβῃ).
 9 ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδικὸς καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς 25
 τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
 10 ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἢ ὀργῇ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι 30
 μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ. ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ, καὶ 1136a
 κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀδικός, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ, δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν
 12 πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν ἔστι συγγνωμονικά τὰ δ' 5
 οὐ συγγνωμονικά. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ

14. et 15. ἕνεκεν? Susem. || 16. ᾧ K^b, ὡς c. c. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 18. ἐν ἐαυτῷ (αὐτῷ H^aM^b) ἢ ἀρχῇ ΓΠ²H^aN^b Ald. || 19. ἀγνοίας Ia, κακίας H^aM^b, αἰτίας c. c. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. et, ut videtur, Hel. || 21. φυσικά, συμβαίνει editores praeter Ia. || 24. οὐ] οὐδὲ ΓH^aM^bN^b Ald. || 27. ἔτι — 28. δικαίου secl. Noetelius || 29. οὐ γὰρ] οὐκ ἄρ' Susem. || <of> ἐν ci. Ia. || 32. δίκαιον <ἢ οὐ> Coraes (male) || 33. ὁ — ἀγνοεῖ secl. Noetelius et Haecker, dubitanter etiam Rr. in adn. (fors. recte) || 1136a, 1. ἐὰν Π¹P^b || 4. μόνον aut ante ἂν ponendum aut secludendum esse ci. Spengelius.


καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτε ἀνθρωπικόν, οὐ συγγνωμονικά. ||

- 11 [ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ ἀδι-
11 κείσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.
ἐκὼν ἐκοῦσαν, ἢ <οὐ> θέλουσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν;

- 15 πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον; καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ὥστε εὐλογον ἀντι-
20 κείσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον τὸ τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἐκόντες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρᾶτ-

9. ἀνθρώπινον H^a Q Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu et pr. K^b (crx. rc.) || 10. ἀπορήσειε — 1137a, 30. ἔστιν secludenda esse ci. Rassovius: Eudemī esse crediderim (cf. 1136b, 6 sqq. cum E. E. 1223b, 6 sqq. 32 sqq.) || 11. τοῦ post καὶ add. Π² H^a N^b || 12. τὸ πῶς pr. K^b (crx. rc.), πῶς Hel., τὸ πῶς vel πῶς Ar., ἀτόπως πῶς L^b Ald., ἀτόπως τὸ πῶς N^b O^b, οὕτω πῶς Casaubonus, οὐκ ἀτόπως ci. Coraes, ἀτόπως c. c. Mi. || 13. μητέρ' ? Hampkius || κατέκταν Γ Ar., κατεκτα N^b, κατέκτα c. c. Bk. Rr. in textu, ἀδικήσω? Hampkius || 14. ἢ] καὶ Hel. || <οὐ> θέλουσαν Bergius Fr., οὐχ ἐκοῦσαν Ia. (fors. recte), ἀκουσαν Heliodori lectionem esse haud recte contendit Nauckius Trag. Gr. fr. p. 304 || 16. ὥσπερ — ἐκούσιον secl. Noetelius || ἄρα K^b, prb. Spengelius || 17. ἅπαν Π^b H^a N^b || ὥσπερ — ἐκούσιον fort. secludenda esse censet Rassovius, — ἢ secl. Spengelius || πᾶν] ἢ πᾶν Γ K^b N^b, πᾶν ἦν M^b || 20. καθ'] καὶ Rassovius (fors. recte) || τὸ post καὶ om. Π¹ || δικαιοῦσθαι <πᾶν>? Noetelius || 21. ἄτοπον — 29. δικαιοῦσθαι post 30. δικαιοπραγοῦντος transponenda aut 29. ἀδύνατον — 30. δικαιοπραγοῦντος secludenda esse ci. Spengelius || 22. ἅπαν Π² H^a N^b Ald. || 23. ἔτι? Susem. || τότε O^b Ald., τότε cet. Mi.





τειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐν- 25
 δέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων, ὁμοίως
 δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ τὰδिका
 πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδिका πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνα-
 τον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιο- 30
 4 πραγοῦντος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα
 τινά, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δὲ ἀκρα-
 τῆς ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν, ἐκὼν τε ἂν ἀδικοῖτο καὶ ἐν-
 δέχοιτο αὐτόν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν (ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῶν ἀπο-
 5 ρουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν). ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις 1136b
 δι' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἐκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἐκόντα
 ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλά-
 πτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν;
 6 βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τὰ ἄδिका πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' 5
 οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν
 βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὃ μὴ οἶται εἶναι σπου-
 7 δαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρατής ὃ οὐκ οἶται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐ-
 τοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρὸς φησιν δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει
 χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων, 10
 οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐστὶν τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδι-
 κεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.
 8 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον, δῆ- 12
 λον· ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν


25. κατὰ — 29. δικαιοῦσθαι post 30. δικαιοπραγοῦντος
 tri. Muenscher || γ' ἄρ' Muenscher || 27. ἐπὶ secl. Zwinger || οὐκ
 ἄρα Muenscher || 29. ὁμοίως — δικαιοῦσθαι secl. Rr. || ἀδύνα-
 τον κ. τ. λ.] v. quae adnotavi ad v. 21 || 30. τινος post ἀδι-
 κοῦντός add. Π²H^a || 32. ᾧ L^b Ald. Ar., δ ΓΠ²H^aK^bN^b || 34.
 αὐτόν] αὐτὸς Π¹, ἂν αὐτόν O^b || ἔστιν — b, 1. ἀδικεῖν om. M^b ||
 ἐν] ἐν τι ΓH^aN^bO^b Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr., om. L^b || 1136b, 1. ἔτι]
 ἔτι εἰ Γ || 3. τὸ Π^a Ar. || 4. καὶ ὃν om. Π¹ + || ᾧ] δ H^aM^b et
 corr. L^b + || τὸ om. Π^aH^aN^bO^bP^b || 6. οὐδ'] ἀλλὰ οὐδ' Ald. ||
 οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής post ἀλλὰ traicienda esse ci. Mi. || 8. τε K^b,
 δὲ cet. || ὃ οὐκ] οὐχ & K^b Bk. Fr. Rr. +.

- 15 ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεῖον ἢ ὁ ἔχων,
καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ 9
πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων
τὸ πλεόν, εἴ τις πλεόν ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει εἰδῶς καὶ
ἐκῶν, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ. ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέ-
20 τριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ
τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχε, ἐπλεονέκτει,
οἷον δόξης, ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν
διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει
βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
25 βλάπτεται μόνον.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ 10
πλεόν ἔχων [ἀδικεῖ]· οὐ γὰρ ὅ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅ
τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἣ ἐστιν
ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλὰ- 11
30 ὡς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ
καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.
ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἐκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δι- 12
καιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστιν δ' ὡς ἄδικος (ἕτερον
γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον)· εἰ δὲ γιγνώσκων ἐκρι-
1137a νεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας.
ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ εἴ τις μερίσαιο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ 13

15. τὸ — ἔχων] πλεόν ἔχων K^b, τὸ πλεῖον ἐκῶν? Ia. || 18.
τις] τις δὲ Π^b Ar. et rc. K^b, τις τὸ O^b || 19. οὗτος om. Π^a † ||
21. πλεονεκτεῖ Π¹ † || 22. ἢ] οὐ ci. Zwinger || καὶ ante κατὰ
add. Sylburgius Bk. Fr. Rr. || 23. αὐτοῦ Π¹ O^b P^b, αὐτὴν H^a || 26.
δὲ ὅτι καὶ L^b Ia. (fors. recte), διότι καὶ K^b, δὲ καὶ ὅτι c. c.
Mi. Ar. || 27. [ἀδικεῖ] Rassovius, ἀδικεῖ K^b, ἀεὶ c. c. Mi. Bk.
Fr. Rr. Ia. (fors. recte), om. Ar. || 29. λαμβάνοντι. [ἔτι] ἐπεὶ
commate post 31. ἐπιτάξαντος deletο Ia., λαμβάνοντι. [ἔτι] ἐπεὶ
<δὲ>? Susem. || εἰ L^b N^b P^b Ald. Ar., om. Γ, ἐπεὶ c. c. Mi. ||
30. κτείνει H^a, κτήνη P^b, <καὶ τὰ> κτήνη? Ia., κτείνει δὲ
L^b, κτείνει Ald. Ar. || 32. νόμιμον Π² H^a Mi., νομικὸν καὶ
N^b, νομικὸν c. c. Hel. ¶ 34. νόμιμον M^b Mi., νομικὸν c. c.
Hel.





ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν.

οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, διὸ 13 καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾶδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥᾶδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδ' ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾶδιον οὐτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γινῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδिका οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, 10 ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστιν τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι, ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥᾶδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς 15 δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν ἥττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἥττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναται ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν 20 ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστίν, πλήν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδ' ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδ' 25 ἔστιν δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν

1137a, 3. ἐκείνῳ K^bP^b (fors. recte) || 5. οἱ — 30. ἐστίν secludenda esse ci. Rr. || ἀδικεῖν <καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν> Haecker et fort. Hel. || 6. τὸ δίκαιον om. M^b, aut secludenda aut τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν scribendum esse ci. Haecker † || 8. ὥδ'] ὡς δεῖ P^b et pr. O^b † || 13. γεγόμενα K^bM^bH^a, διανεμόμενα O^b † || δίκαια, τοῦτό γε πλέον Thurotus || 15. ἐλλέβορον ΓP^b Hel. et corr.¹ N^b, ἐλέβορον cet. et Mi. et pr. N^b || 22. τὸ post καὶ om. Π¹P^b et, ut videtur, Hel. || 27. δ'] δὲ καὶ ΓH^aM^bN^bP^b Ald. || ἐν τούτοις post ὑπερβολὴν add. ΓH^aM^bN^bP^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr., post ἔλλειψιν O^b.

γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς
 δ' οὐδὲν μόνον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα
 30 βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τού· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινον ἐστίν.]
 14 περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν x
 ἐπιεικεία πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,
 ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὔτε ὡς
 ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοποῦμενοις, καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιει-
 κὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ
 1137b ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιει-
 κέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες, ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσιν
 φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὄν ἐπαι-
 νετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς [οὐ
 5 δίκαιον], εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἢ μὲν 2
 οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς,
 ἔχει δὲ ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον
 ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὄν βέλτιόν ἐστι δί-
 καιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὄν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου.
 10 ταῦτόν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαῖον ὄν-
 τοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπι- 3
 εικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρ-
 θωμα νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, 4
 περὶ ἐνίων δὲ οὐχ οἷον τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν
 15 ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷον τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ
 τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον.
 καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγμα-

29. τοῖς] οἷον τοῖς H^aM^b Ar. || ἀνιάτως K^b, ἀνιάτοις H^a,
 ἀνιάτοις καὶ cet. Ar. || 30. διὰ τοῦτ' ci. Zwinger, τοῦτο δὲ
 Γ, καὶ τοῦτ' Argyropylus † || 1137b, 4. ἐπιεικὲς οὐ, δίκαιον
 εἰ Micheletus Fr., ἐπιεικὲς οὐ, εἰ δικαίου ἄλλο ci. Lambinus ||
 οὐ δίκαιον om. Γ^N^b, secl. Bk.² Rr. Ia. †, οὐ σπουδαῖον ci. Veder ||
 5. εἰ om. N^b || ἄλλα ci. Rr. || 9. ὄν om. K^b Ald. Ar. || 12. τὸ
 om. Π²H^a † || 13. νομίμου post δικαίου Π¹N^b, νομικοῦ Coraes ||
 16. πλεῖον Π^aP^b.





τος ἐστίν· εὐθύς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν
 οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ 20
 τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ
 ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ καὶ ὁ
 νομοθέτης αὐτὸς [ἄν] εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρῶν, καὶ εἰ ἥδει, ἐνομο-
 θέτησεν [ἄν]. διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου,
 οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος. 25
 καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου,
 ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἷτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ
 πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι
 νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ
 ὁ κανὼν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ μολί- 30
 βδινος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται
 καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψηφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.
 τί μὲν οὖν ἐστίν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, καὶ τίνος βέλ-
 τιον δικαίου, δηλόν· φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς
 ἐστίν. ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ 35
 ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίπερ 1138a
 ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικὴς ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη
 ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὕσα καὶ οὐχ ἐτέρα τις ἕξις.
 [πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, φανερόν ἐκ 15
 τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶ- 5

20. τούτω Π^b, τούτοις Ν^bΟ^b Ald. || 23. αὐτὸς Η^aΚ^bΜ^b Hel.
 Ar., οὕτως Γ^NΠ^b Ald., αὐτὸς οὕτως Λ^bΟ^b Bk. Fr. Rr. || ἄν
 om. K^b, secl. Susem. || εἶπεν Hel. et pr. K^b, εἶπε corr. K^b, εἴ-
 ποι c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. || ἐκεῖ om. K^b Ar. || ἥδη Π^aΗ^a Ald. Ar.,
 ἥδει c. c. Mi. Hel. || 24. ἄν om. Π^aΗ^aΜ^b, secludendum esse ci.
 Rr. || δέ ante τινος add. Hel. || 25. ἀπλῶς — ἁμαρτήματος] κα-
 θόλου δικαίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ νομικοῦ τοῦ διὰ τὸ καθόλου ἁμαρτά-
 νουτος Hel. || 30. μολύβδινος Λ^bΝ^b Ald. || 33. ὅτι Γ^ΠΛ^b Hel.
 Ar., τί τὸ Η^aΜ^bΝ^b Ald. || 1138a, 4. πότερον — b, 12. τούτοις
 ante 1137a, 5. οἱ δὲ ponenda fuisse recte viderunt Zeller alii-
 que, simul tamen non minus recte haec omnia secludenda esse
 intellexit Noetelius, sed vix recte eis, qui Endemo tribuunt,
 obloquitur (cf. 1138b, 6 sqq. cum E. E. 1240a, 13 sqq. 17 sqq.
 1224b, 21 sqq.).

σαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀπο-
κτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. ἔτι
ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη (μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων) ἐκῶν, ἀδι-
κεῖ, ἐκῶν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ· ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν
10 σφάττων ἐκῶν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἐξ
ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ;
ἐκῶν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις
ζημιοῖ, καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσσεστιν τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν
πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ
15 ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο
ἐκείνου· ἔστιν γὰρ πῶς ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός,
οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδι-
κεῖ)· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη ἀφηρηθῆναι καὶ προσκειῖσθαι τὸ
αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι
20 τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαι-
ρέσεως καὶ πρότερον (ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθεν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντι-
ποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν)· αὐτὸς δ' ἑαυτόν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ
πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοι-
25 χεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοί-
χον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ λύεται τὸ ἑαυτὸν
ἀδικεῖν κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἐκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι.
[φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδι-

6. ἀποκτενεῖν ἑαυτὸν N^b, ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι L^b O^b, ἑαυ-
τὸν ἀποκτενεῖν H^a M^b Ald., ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι aut ἑαυτὸν
ἀποκτενεῖν Γ, ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτείνειν Hel., ἀποκτείνειν ἑαυτὸν Mi. ||
9. ᾧ] ὡς Γ H^a M^b N^b P^b Ald. Ar. (?), ὡς corr.² K^b || 10. λόγον]
νόμον Γ Π² H^a N^b Ald. Ar. Mi. (?) || 14. μόνον ὁ Lambinus, ὁ
μόνον cum codicibus Ald. Mi. Ar. Bk. Fr. Ia. || 15. ἀπλῶς K^b ||
τοῦτο — 17. ἀδικεῖ secl. Hampkius || 17. ἀδικεῖ] ἀδικεῖ ἂν K^b,
<ἔσται τὸ αὐτόν> ἀδικεῖν ci. Rr. || 18. τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν εἴη L^b Ia.
(fort. recte), ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη K^b P^b Bk. Fr. Rr. † || τῷ αὐτῷ
Π^b H^a Ia. (fort. recte) † || 22. καὶ om. L^b O^b || 23. ἔτι —
ἀδικεῖσθαι secl. Rr. || 27. ἀκουσίως Lambinus || 28. φανερόν —
b, 5. ἀποθανεῖν post b, 13. τούτοις tri. Haecker || δ' ὅτι καὶ
Π^b H^a O^b.





κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλέον
 ἔχειν ἐστὶν τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, ³⁰
 εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ. ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν·
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας
 ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ
 ἐκούσιον μετὰ κακίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας
 καὶ ἀδικίας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἥττον φαῦ- ³⁵
 λον, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν. ^{1138b}
 ἀλλ' οὐθὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῶντι λέγει μεῖζον
 νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίῃ ὑπὸ
 τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανεῖν.] ⁵

κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ
 πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον
 ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς
 λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλο-
 γον. εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ¹⁰
 [ἐν] τούτοις ἔστιν πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ
 οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ
 τούτοις. *]


29. πλεῖον Π^a || 30. τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἔσον καὶ μέσον
 post μέσον add. Hel., τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον Rassovius
 (nescio an recte) || καὶ — 31. γυμναστικῇ secl. Rr. || <ὅπερ
 ἔχει> ὥσπερ cod. Lambini, ὅπερ Gifanius || ὑγιεινοῦ — 31.
 εὐεκτικοῦ Ald. || 32. ἣν post ψεκτόν add. H^aM^bN^b Ald. || 34.
 μετὰ κακίας Rassovius, μετὰ ἀδικίας ΓΠ Ald. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr.
 Rr. Ia. || 1138b, 1. εἶναι add. M^b Hel. et ante μεῖζον Ald. Mi.
 Ar., om. ΓΠ¹H^aN^bO^b || 5. ἢ Π^a, καὶ c. c. Hel. Ar. || 6. οὐκ
 αὐτῷ ΓN^b, οὐχ αὐτῷ Π^aM^b Ar., οὐχ' αὐτὸς H^a, ἀνὸς αὐτοῦ
 L^b, οὐκ αὐτό Ald. || 9. μέρος post ψυχῆς L^b, om. K^b, c. c. add.
 Mi. Ar. || 10. καὶ om. L^bO^b Ald. Hel. Ar. || 11. ἐν secl. Ia. ||
 12. εἶναι secludendum esse ci. Zellius.

Z.

- 15 [περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν Z
 16 ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν I
 18 πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ
 τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν
 20 ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. ἐν πάσαις
 γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσιν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
 ἔστιν τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων
 ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίσχιν, καὶ τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων,
 ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως,
 25 οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως 2
 ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπι-
 μελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν,
 ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ
 τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἂν
 30 τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεισθαι πρὸς
 τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς
 ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔξεις μὴ 3
 μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον
 34 τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.]
 2 τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι 4

Lib. VI. K^b M^b = Π¹, L^b O^b = Π².

1138b, 15. περὶ — 16. τοῦτον cum libro praecedente coniungunt fontes et editiones || τῶν post ἄλλων add. Π^a H^a N^b P^b Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || ἡθικῶν om. H^a M^b + || 18. καὶ om. K^b Ald. Hel. || μήτε Γ M^b Ald., μηδὲ O^b, μὴ c. c. Hel. || 19. μήτε Γ L^b M^b Ald. || 20. διέλθωμεν ci. Spengelius || ἐν om. L^b M^b Ar. || 31. εἴπειεν N^b, εἵποιεν Π H^a Ald. || 33. ἀληθῶς Γ K^b Ald. Ar., ἀληθὲς cet. Eu. || τοῦτο] τοῦτο τὸ Π² || 35. τὰς — 1139a, 3. οὕτως alteram recensionem esse antecedentium 16. ἐπεὶ (rectius 15. περὶ) — 34. ὅρος, quae iam Rieckher alterius sequentium recensionis initium esse demonstrare conatus est, monuit Ras-sovius, et haec quidem posterior Aristotelis, priora illa Eudemi esse videntur, v. Prolegg. || δὲ Γ M^b, δὴ c. c. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu || διελόμενοι] διείλωμεν καὶ Γ Ald. Ar.





(I)

τοῦ ἡθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν 1139a
 ἡθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
 5 πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη
 δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλο-
 γον * * νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δια- 5
 ρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ
 θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐν-
 δέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ
 τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ
 γένει τὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα 10
 6 καὶ οἰκειότητα ἢ γινώσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τού-
 των τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέ-
 σθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταῦτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ
 τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν
 7 ἓν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρα ἐκατέρου τού- 15
 των τίς ἢ βελτίστη ἔξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἢ δ'
 II ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. τρία δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
 2 τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἰσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τού-
 των δ' ἢ αἰσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῇ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ
 τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. 20
 ἔστιν δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατὰφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτο ἐν
 ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγὴ· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἔξις
 προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ
 ταῦτα τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴ-
 περ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι 25
 τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια

1139a, 3. λέγωμεν K^b Ald., λέγομεν cet. || οὕτως secludendum esse ci. Spengelius || οὖν om. Π¹ || 4. εἶναι post μέρη Π² || 5. ἄλογον * * Muretus, ἄλογον<, ὧν ἡδη διαώριστα τὸ ἄλογον> vel simile quid ci. Spengelius || 7. ὅσων] ὧν GL^b M^b Ald. Ar. (Coraes) || 8. ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα] τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνδέχονται K^b, ὧν ἐνδέχονται Coraes || 12. λογικόν Π¹ (crx. rc. K^b) || 18. νοῦς post ὄρεξις tri. Spengelius || 24. ταῦτα] μὲν ταῦτα Π², ταῦτα μὲν K^b †.

πρακτική, τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς
 μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τάληθές ἐστιν καὶ ψεῦδος·
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον, τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ
 30 καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἡ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει
 τῇ ὀρθῇ. [πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις, ὅθεν ἡ κίνη-
 σις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα, προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος
 ὁ ἕνεκά τινος· διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ
 ἡθικῆς ἐστὶν ἔξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ
 35 ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἡθους οὐκ ἐστίν.] διά-
 νοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆ.
 1139b αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γὰρ του ποιεῖ
 πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ
 τινος τὸ ποιητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος,
 ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. [διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις
 5 ἡ ὄρεξις διανοητικῆ, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπος. οὐκ
 ἐστὶν δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἶον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται
 Ἰλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγο-
 νότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γε-
 γονός οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων
 10 μόνον γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
 ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσ' ἂν ἡ πεπραγμένα.]

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ' ἧς
 οὖν μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκότερον, αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

3 ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.

30. ἡ om. Π¹ || 31. πράξεως — b, 11. πεπραγμένα seclu-
 denda esse ci. Rr., — 35. ἐστὶν et b, 4. διὸ — 11. πεπραγμένα
 secl. Susem.: Ramsauerum si sequi malis, lacuna simul sta-
 tuenda videtur, qua exhausta sit melior τοῦ ποιεῖν et τοῦ πράτ-
 τειν quam quae legitur 35 — b, 4 distinctio || 36. αὕτη Γ Eu.,
 αὕτη K^b L^b Ald. Ar. et fort. M^b O^b || 1139b, 1. του γὰρ M^b,
 γὰρ τούτου Γ Ald. † || 2. καὶ — 3. πρακτόν corrupta esse iudicat
 Walter (Jen. Litt.-Z. 1877. p. 28) || καὶ οὐ] ἀλλ' οὐ? Susem. ||
 3. ποιητικόν M^b || ἀλλ' οὐ Ald. Eu. Ar. Fr., ἀλλ' οὐ rc. K^b,
 ἄλλο ci. Krischius, ἀλλὰ καὶ M^b || τὸ om. K^b || πρακτικόν M^b ||
 13. ἀληθεύει Γ Π² Ald. Ar.



(Π)

ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε 15
τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σο-
φία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.

2 ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάν-
τες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεται 20
ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεω-
ρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα
ἐστὶν τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἰδίου ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα
ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰδία, τὰ δὲ αἰδία ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀφθαρτα.

3 ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν 25
μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσ-
περ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπα-
γωγῆς, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἢ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστίν
καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὃ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰδὶν
ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογι- 30
4 σμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἢ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀπο-
δεικτικὴ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτι-
κοῖς· ὅταν γὰρ πὼς πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ
ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος,
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. 35

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης· διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, 4

IV τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητόν καὶ 1140a
2 πρακτόν. ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶν ποιήσις καὶ πρᾶξις (πιστεύομεν
δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)· ὥστε καὶ ἡ
μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιη-

15. ἢ om. Π¹ || 16. τέχνη post ἐπιστήμη tri. Spengelius ||
24. αἰδία πάντα M^b Ald., πάντα αἰδία cet. Eu. || 25. ἢ ἀπᾶσα
Π¹ (fors. recte), πᾶσα c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. || 27. λέγομεν ΓM^b
Ald. Ar. (?), λέγομεν c. c. Hel. || 28. ἀρχῆς L^b Ald. Ar., nescio
an recte (dubitat etiam Bonitzius Ind. Ar. 264a, 8), ἀρχή c. c.
Eu. Hel. || 29. καὶ om. Γ(?), καὶ <πίστωσις> ex Eu. ci. Mure-
tus || 31. ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα secl. Trendelenburgius Bk.² (perperam) ||
1140a, 4. μετὰ λόγον = λογιστική: per c. 4. 5. λόγος opponitur
νόμῳ, cf. 1151a, 17: moneo hoc, ne κατὰ τὸν λόγον expectes (cf.

- 5 τικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποιήσις οὔτε ἡ ποιήσις πρᾶξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ 3 οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστίν καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστίν ἣτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη, τὸ αὐτὸ 10 ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ. ἐστίν 4 δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν [καὶ] θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ 15 τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. [ἐπεὶ δὲ ποιήσις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, 5 ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πρᾶξεως εἶναι.] καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστίν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶν

20 τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

- ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀλη- 6 θοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοῦναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.
- 5 περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες V 25 τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσάσθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ

Susem. Philol. Anz. VII. 1876. p. 136. n. 7), neve cum Doeringio (Die Kunstlehre des Aristot., Ien. 1876, p. 41 sqq.) haec duo capita vehementer adulterata atque ab ipso Aristotele τέχνης et φρονήσεως definitiones sic potius scriptas esse: ἕξις ἀληθῶς λογιστικὴ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν et ἕξις ἀληθῆς λογιστικὴ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν suspiceris || 5. διὸ] καὶ ΓΠ² Ald. et, ut videtur, Ar. || περιέχονται M^b Bk. Fr. Rr. || 7. ὅπερ om. Γ(?), secludendum aut in ὥσπερ mutandum esse ci. Coraes || 9. τὸ αὐτὸ K^b, ταὐτόν c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 11. καὶ secl. Muretus Bk.² Fr. Rr. || 12. γίνηται? Susem. || 14. ἡ om. Π² || 16. ἐπεὶ — 17. εἶναι secl. Rassovius || 18. ταῦτ' Π¹, τὰ αὐτά c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. || 25. δὴ] οὖν M^b, δὲ Γ Ald. || 27. ἡ om. K^b L^b, c. c. add. Eu. Hel. Ar.



(V)


² πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον
 δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὶ φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος
 τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἔστιν τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ³⁰
³ ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθίς περὶ τῶν
 ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
 πρᾶξαι· ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ'
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπό-
 δειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν), καὶ οὐκ ³⁵
 ἔστιν βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ^{1140b}
 ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχε-
 ται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γέ-
⁴ νος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. [λείπεται ἄρ' αὐτὴν εἶναι
 ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ ⁵
 καὶ κακά.] τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ
⁵ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστιν γὰρ αὕτη ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. [διὰ
 τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι,
 ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεω-
 ρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ¹⁰
 πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύο-
 μεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὥς σφῶζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν. σφῶζει δὲ τὴν
 τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει
 οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἥδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν, οἶον ὅτι τὸ τρίγω-

28. πρὸς om. Γ Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. (add. etiam Eu.)
 ποῖα om. Γ L^b Eu. Ar. || ὅλως L^b M^b Ald. Eu. Ar., ἀπλῶς Hel.,
 ὅλον Γ O^b, om. K^b Bk. Fr. Rr. || 34. ἀποδείξις<, τὰ δὲ πρακτὰ
 τοιαῦτα> vel simile quid ci. Thurotus || 1140b, 2. ἡ add. Π²
 3. τέλος L^b Ald. Ar. || 4. λείπεται — 6. κακά + 7. διὰ — 21.
 πρακτικὴν post 25. τέχνη, ut sic enuntiata se excipiant: 6. τῆς
 — 7. τέλος, 21. ἀλλὰ — 25. τέχνη, 4. λείπεται — 6. κακά,
 7. διὰ — 21. πρακτικὴν, tri. Susem., λείπεται — 6. κακά post
 7. τέλος Muretus, recte, si 21. ἀλλὰ — 25. τέχνη secludenda
 potius essent || 5. ἀληθοῦς? Susem. || 7. ἂν εἴη] αἰεὶ M^b Eu.
 Hel. + || αὕτη Π¹, αὐτῇ Γ + || 10. τοὺς post καὶ om. Π² Hel.
 11. ὅθεν Π² || 12. ὥς om. Π¹, c. c. add. Hel. || 13. πᾶσαν Π²
 Ald. || 14. τὸ post καὶ om. Π¹ (fors. recte).

15 νον δυσὶν ὁρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ
πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα
τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθύς
οὐ φαίνεται ἡ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἔνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο
αἰρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ
20 ἀρχῆς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἔξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου
ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν.] ἀλλὰ μὴν
τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ ἐν μὲν
τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων ἀρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν
ἦττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή
25 τίς ἐστιν καὶ οὐ τέχνη. * δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς
τῶν λόγον ἔχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ.
ἢ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ
φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον
δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἔξεως ἔστιν, φρονήσεως δ'
30 οὐκ ἔστιν.

6 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις VI
καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶν δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν
καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς
ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὗτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε
35 φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχά-
1141a νουσιν οὔσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ
σοφία τούτων ἔστιν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπό-
δειξιν εἶναι. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευ- 2
δόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
5 ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστὶν καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τού-

16. ἡ — ἀρχὴ Muretus || 18. ἡ om Π¹ (fors. recte) || ἔνεκεν
L^b, ἔνεκα cet. || 21. ἀληθοῦς Γ^M Par. 1417 Eu. Ar. (fors.
recte), ἀληθῆ c. c. Hel. || ἀλλὰ — 25. τέχνη secl. Rassovius Rr. ||
22. τέχνης] ἐπιστήμης M. M. 1197a, 18 || 24. <ἡθικὰς> ἀρετάς?
Sussem. || 25. δυοῖν — 30. ἔστιν secl. Rassovius, neque multo
aliter iudicat Rr. (vix recte) || 27. ἡ — 28. φρόνησις secl. Walter
(p. 438 sq.), haud recte || 29. τῆς μὲν Γ^N Ald. Hel., μὲν τῆς
Π^H || 32. δ' αἱ Π¹ || ἀποδεικτικῶν L^b M^b || 33. ἡ om. Π¹
(fors. recte) || 1141a, 4. ἢ καὶ] ἢ Ald. Ar.(?), καὶ M^b O^b.





T)

των δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία
φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν
ἀρχῶν.

Π

τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις 7
τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ 10
Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο
σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ
τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι
σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ
τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ' σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα 15
οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία.
3 δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ
ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων. *. 20

*. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπου-
δαιοτάτην οἶεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄν-
4 θρωπος ἐστίν. εἰ δ' ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις
καὶ ἰχθύσιν, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταῦτό

7. νοῦν bis scr. pr. K^b, οὖν νοῦν Γ et corr.² K^b || 9. γε
L^b M^b, om. Ald. || 10. ἀποδιδόαμεν L^b M^b || 11. οὖν om. Π² ||
12. ἐστὶν ante τέχνης L^b, om. O^b || 14. μαργίτῃ Γ L^b Eu. Ar.,
μαργείτῃ cet. Hel. || 17. *. ὥστε Rr. || ἡ post ὅτι add. L^b Ald.
Hel. || 20. καὶ ante ὥσπερ add. Γ Π² Ald. Ar., om. Π¹ Hel. ||
κεφαλὴ Lambinus (male) || ἐπιστήμην M^b Ald. et corr.² K^b,
ἐπιστήμη c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. || τιμιωτάτων. *. 21. *. ἄτοπον
Rr.: deest prioris disputationis, in qua de virtutibus intellectu-
libus in universum agitur, finis, in quo, si quid video, quae-
situm est, cur ipsa τέχνη non sit et qualis eius sit virtus (cf.
1140b, 21 sq.), inprimis autem utrum etiam ἐπιστήμη et νοῦς
rationis theoreticae virtus sit an sola σοφία: deest etiam se-
quentis tractatus, qui ad σοφίαν atque φρόνησιν et praecipue
ad φρόνησιν quidem specialiter et accuratius illustrandas spectat,
particula initium sumens: fortasse tamen potius iam ante 20.
ὥσπερ signa lacunae erant ponenda || 21. γὰρ] δὲ M^b et corr.
Par. 1417 † || ἐπιστήμην ante πολιτικὴν add. Γ Π² Ald. Ar. ||
23. δ' M^b Rr. in adn., δὴ c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu || 24. τὸ ante εὐθὺ
add. Π² || τὸ αὐτὸ K^b, ταὐτόν c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. (fors. rectius).

- 25 πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον· τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ
 ἕκαστα εὖ θεωροῦν φαίεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέ-
 ψειαν αὐτούς. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἕνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι,
 ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικὴν.
 φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ·
 30 εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦσιν σοφίαν, πολλὰ
 ἔσονται σοφαί· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν
 ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ
 πάντων τῶν ὄντων, εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλ-
 λων ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ
 1141 b θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος
 συνέστηκεν. [ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δηλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστίν 5
 καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει.] διὸ Ἀνα-
 ξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρο-
 5 νίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμ-
 φέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαναστικά καὶ χα-
 λεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι
 8 οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ 6
 ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστιν βουλευσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου
 10 μάλιστα τοῦτο ἔργον εἶναι φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι, βου-
 λεύεται δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ'
 ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ'
 ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπου τῶν πρακτῶν στο-

25. τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν Coraes, περὶ αὐτὸν, ut videtur, Eu. || αὐτοῖς ἕκαστα Muretus || 26. εὖ Γ^M^b Eu. Ar., τὸ εὖ cet. Mure-
 tus || θεωρεῖν Ar. Coraes || φησὶν K^b || ἂν add. Γ || φρονίμον Ar.
 Coraes || ἐπιτρέψει K^b, ἐπιτρέψειεν Π² Eu. Ald. † || 27. αὐτούς
 Susem., ἑαυτούς M^b, αὐτά Ald. et corr.² K^b, αὐτό, ut videtur,
 Eu., αὐτὰ c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 29. καὶ ὅτι] ἂν εἴη ὅτι Γ, ὅτι
 Π² Ald. Ar. || 31. τῶν ζώων secludenda esse ci. Muretus || 33.
 τῶν ὄντων] τούτων Coraes, non vertit Ar., secludenda esse ci.
 Muretus || 1141 b, 1. ὁ κόσμος post 2. συνέστηκεν Π² || 2. ἐκ —
 3. φύσει secl. Rr. || 8 sqq. ἡ δὲ κ. τ. λ. verbis haud bene repeti
 quae iam 1140 a, 25 sqq. exposita sunt monet Rassovius, at v.
 quae adnotavi ad a, 20 sq.



II)

7 χαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν
καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν. 15
πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ
ἐνιοὶ οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδότεων πρακτικώτεροι καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις, οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείῃ ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα
κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἄγνοοι, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγι-
ειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια [κοῦφα καὶ] ὑγιεινά 20
ποιήσει μᾶλλον. [ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω
ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχι-
τεκτονικὴ. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ
2 μὲν ἔξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ
πόλιν ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ [[φρόνησις]] νομοθετικὴ, ἡ δὲ 25
ὡς * * τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτικὴ· αὕτη
δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτικὴ· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν
ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον λέγουσιν·
3 μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχνη. δοκεῖ
δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα. καὶ 30
ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν
οἰκονομία ἢ δὲ νομοθεσία ἢ δὲ πολιτικὴ, καὶ ταύτης ἢ
4 μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἢ δὲ δικαστικὴ. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη 9
γνώσεως τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν.

19. ἄγνοοι K^b Ar., ἄγνοεῖ c. c. Eu. Hel. || 20. κοῦφα καὶ
secl. Trendelenburgius Bk.² Rr., κρέα καὶ ci. Rassovius (fors.
recte) || 21. ἡ — 1142a, 11. σκεπτέον secl. Rassovius: Eudemo
tribuerim, cf. E. E. 1218b, 13 sqq. et quae ibi adnotat Fr. et
quae monuit Fischer p. 48 sqq. || 22. εἴη — ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ secl.
Rr. || 23. ἔστιν — 1142a, 11. σκεπτέον in minus commodum
locum migrasse videntur Ramsauero || 25. φρόνησις secl. Sea-
liger || 26. ὡς * * Rr., ὡς <χειροτεχνικὴ περὶ> vel ὡς <πράτ-
τουσα> ci. Rr. || ἡ αὐτὴ Muretus || 27. καὶ om. K^b L^b Ald. Eu.,
c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || καὶ βουλευτικὴ secl. Muretus || 28. μόνους
M^b Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 30. δὲ καὶ] δὲ καὶ ἡ Π², δὲ Hel.
Coraes || 31. ἐκείνη? Spengelius || 34. γνώσεως] φρονήσεως v. l.
ap. Eu., hanc probandam aut verbum secludendum esse cen-
set Spengelius || ὡς τὸ Ald., τὸ τὰ L^b M^b Hel. Ar. Fr., τὸ c. c.
Eu., τὸ αὐτῷ corrupta esse suspicatur Rr. (τὸ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀφέ-
λιμα paraphrasi utuntur Hel. Ar.) || αὐτοῦ M^b, αὐτὸν Ald. et

1142a καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῇν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριθμημένῳ στρατοῦ

5 ἴσον μετασχεῖν;

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον . .

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἶονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθεν τὸ τούτους φρόνιμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας, ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον.] σημειῶν δ' ἔστι τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται 5 γνῶριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δὲ ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν (πληθὺς γὰρ χρόνον ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν)· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν 6 οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; [ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον.] ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται·

corr.² K^b, αὐτῶι pr. K^b, αὐτῶ c. c. Eu. Hel.(?) Ar.(?) || 1142a, 1. τὰ] τὸ pr. K^b (em. corr.¹), om. O^b || 2. φιλοπράγμονες Π² (πολυπράγμονες etiam Eu. Hel.) || διὸ] διὸ καὶ Γ O^b Ald. Hel. Ar. || 4. ἡριθμημένον Γ K^b N^b Hel. † || 5. ἴσων M^b Hel. et corr.² K^b, ἴσον Γ L^b Eu. † || μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχης Hel. || 6. Ζεὺς μισεῖ post πλέον add. Hel. || 8. περὶ τοὺς M^b Ald., τούτους c. c. Eu. Ar. || 9. εἶναι om. K^b Ald., c. c. add. Eu. Ar. || εὖ K^b, εἰδέναι M^b, om. Γ Π² Ald. Eu. Ar. || 14. καὶ om. M^b Eu. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 16. ποιήσει Ald. Eu. † || 17. δήποτε Π² || 19. οὐ secl. Imelmannus || 20. ἄλλοις Imelmannus || οὐκ om. Π¹ (suppl. rc. K^b) † || ἔτι — 23. βαρύσταθμον secl. Susem., nec valde aliter iudicat Rr. || 23. τὸ post τοδὶ add. Π¹.

A 2
10

VIII)

9 τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν 25
 γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν λόγος, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου,
 οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἢ τῶν ἰδίων,
 ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἐσχα-
 τον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ καὶ κεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον
 αἰσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δὲ ἄλλο εἶδος. **. 30

IX ** τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ 10
 βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. — δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβου-
 λίας τί ἐστιν, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ
 2 ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν (οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι
 περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ., δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμε- 1142b
 νος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία. ἄνευ
 τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ εὐστοχία, βουλευόνται δὲ πο-
 λὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βου-
 3 λευθέντα, βουλευέσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον 5
 καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστιν δὲ εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ
 δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευό-
 μενος ἀμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὁρθῶς βουλευέται, δηλον ὅτι ὁρ-
 θότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτε ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης.

25. ἀντιληπτικὸν K^b, ἀντιληπτικὴ pr. O³ (crx. mg.), ἀπι-
 κοὶ Γ O² Ald., ἀπικὴ O¹, ἀντίκειται c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. || μὲν
 ante δὴ om. Π² || 27. οὐ om. Π¹ Ald. † || οὐχ — 30. εἶδος
 utrum genuina sint an spuria dubito || 28. οἷα] οἷα ἢ Π¹ || ὅτι
 — 32. ἐστίν lacunae simul signo posito secl. Rr. || 30. ἡ Γ Π²
 O^b † || 30. et 31. **. ** Susem.: periisse mihi videntur et finis
 noni capitis et initium sequentis, h. e. et melior rectiorque
 earum rerum expositio, quae nunc in verbis post hanc iactu-
 ram ab aliena manu interpositis 1143b, 1. καὶ ὁ — 5. νοῦς et
 9. διὸ — 11. τούτων confuse ac perperam tractantur, et alia,
 cuius clausula olim fuerunt verba 31. τὸ ζητεῖν — 32. ἐστίν,
 quorum nunc frustra, id quod monuit Rassovius, quaerimus
 ullam cum antecedentibus cohaerentiam || 32. δὴ Walter (p. 362) ||
 διαλαβεῖν O^b Ald. || καὶ om. Π¹ Ald., c. c. add. Eu. Ar. || 1142b,
 7 sqq. ἀλλ' κ. τ. λ. sic ordinanda esse: 13. καὶ — 15. λογίζε-
 ται, 12. ἀλλὰ — 13. φάσις, 7. ἀλλ' — 12. ἔστιν ci. Zwinger ||
 8. βουλευέται] ἐργάζεται ci. Coraes || 9. τις post εὐβουλία add.
 Π¹ † || δὲ om. Π¹ Ar.

- 10 ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία),
 δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισταί ἤδη πᾶν οὐ
 δόξα ἔστιν. [ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία. διανοίας
 ἅρα λείπεται. αὕτη γὰρ οὕτω φάσις.] καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα
 οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὃ δὲ βουλευόμενος, εἴαν
 15 τε εὖ εἴαν τε κακῶς βουλευῆται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.
 ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἢ εὐβουλία βουλῆς. [διὸ ἡ βουλή ζη- 4
 τητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί.] ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς,
 δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα. ὃ γὰρ ἀκρατής καὶ ὃ φαῦλος οὐ προ-
 τίθεται τυχεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύχεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται
 20 βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς· δοκεῖ δὲ ἀγαθόν
 τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλευσθαι. ἡ ἅρα τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐ-
 βουλία, ἢ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστιν καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ 5
 συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι'
 οὗ δὲ οὐ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὄρον εἶναι· ὥστε οὐδ'
 25 αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δει μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μὲν-
 τοι δι' οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστιν πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, 6
 τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθό-
 της ἢ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δει καὶ ὥς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι 7
 ἔστιν καὶ ἀπλῶς εὖ βεβουλευσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὶ τέλος. ἡ μὲν
 30 δὴ ἀπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τίς δὲ
 ἢ πρὸς τὶ τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλευ-
 σθαι, ἢ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς
 τι τέλος, οὗ ἢ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις ἔστιν.
 11 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἧς λέ- x

12. ἀλλὰ — 13. φάσις secl. Gifanius || 15. τε καὶ κακῶς Π¹ || 16. διὸ — 17. περὶ τί secl. Rassovius Rr. || 18. οὐ? Spengelius, ὃ ΓΠ Ald. Bk.¹ Fr. Rr. || 19. τυχεῖν? Spengelius, sin malis 18. ὃ retinere, secl. Spengelius, ἰδεῖν Π Ald. Eu. Bk.¹ Fr. Rr., δεῖν Γ || 21. εἶναι post τι add. Π² Bk. Fr. Rr. (c. c. om. Eu. Ar.) || ἅρα Spengelius, γὰρ ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 23. δι' τούτου δι' Π² Ald. † || 25. αὐτὴ ΓΠ² Ald. || πω K^b, πως cet. || 30. τίς δὲ] ἢ δέ τις Π² Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 31. βουλευέσθαι K^b O^b Ald. || 33. τι τὸ K^b Ald. || 34. εὐσυνεσία Spengelius, εὐσυνεσία ΓΠ Ald. Eu. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu.



γομεν συνετούς καὶ εὐσυνέτους[, οὔτε ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη ^{1143 a}
 ἢ δόξη (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία τῶν
 κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν ἢ γεω-
 μετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων καὶ
 ἀκινήτων ἢ σύνεσις ἐστίν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γινομένων ὅτουοῦν, ⁵
 ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλευσαίτο. διὸ περὶ
 τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις
² καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν (τί γὰρ
 δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν), ἡ δὲ σύνεσις
 κριτικὴ μόνον] (ταῦτό γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συ- ¹⁰
³ νετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι) *. ἔστιν δὴ οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε
 τὸ λαμβάνειν ἢ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγε-
 ται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆ-
 σθαι τῇ δόξῃ [ἐπὶ] τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρό-
 νησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ ¹⁵
⁴ τῷ καλῶς τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθεν τοῦνομα ἡ σύ-
 νεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν
 γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

ΚΙ ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν εὐγνώμονας καὶ
 ἔχειν φαμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστίν κρίσις ὀρθή. ²⁰
 σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ μάλιστα φαμεν εἶναι συγ-
 γνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἑνία συγγνώμην.

1143a, 1. εὐσυνέτους Spengelius, ἀσυνέτους ΓΠ Ald. Eu.
 Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu || οὔτε — 10. μόνον post 11. εὐ-
 σύνετοι aut 10. ταῦτό — 11. εὐσύνετοι post 17. εὐσύνετοι tri.
 Spengelius || 3. οἷον] οἷον ἢ Π¹, οἷον ἢ O^b, οἷον κατὰ μέρος
 οὔτε Ald. || γὰρ ἂν ἦν post ὑγιεινῶν add. ΓΠ² M^b Ald. Eu.
 Hel. Ar. || 4. μεγέθους L^b Bk. Fr., μεγέθη c. c. Eu. Hel. Ar. ||
 5. ὅτουοῦν Π² Ald. || 10. ταῦτό κ. τ. λ.] v. quae adnotavi ad
 v. 1. || γὰρ] δὲ Gifanius et fort. iam Γ || γὰρ οἱ ante συνετοὶ
 add. ΓL^b Ald. Eu. Ar., συνετοὶ καὶ om. K^b || 11. δὴ Susem.,
 δ' ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 11. et 12. τῷ L^b M^b † || 14. ἐπὶ
 secl. Thurotus || τῷ ci. Coraes, rec. Fr. || 15. τῷ — 16. τὸ?
 Spengelius || 19. συγγνώμονας Π¹, εὐγνώμονας c. c. Eu. Hel.
 Ar. || 22. ἐπιεικοῦς Spengelius || ἑνία] ἕκαστα v. l. ap. Eu.

ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶν κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὁρθῇ.
ὁρθῇ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

- 12 εἰσὶν δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι.²
26 λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν
ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἥδη
καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται
τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ
30 κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων
ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάν-
των ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ 3
τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον
δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ
35 πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' 4
ἀμφοτέρω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
1143b νοῦς ἔστι καὶ οὐ λόγος[, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις
τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς
τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως.
ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ
5 τὸ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς]. 5
[διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν
οὐδεὶς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ' 6

23. δὴ Trendelenburgius || συγγνώμη secl. Tren-
delenburgius || 24. ἀληθῶς Trendelenburgius || 25. ἔξεις
<αὗται> Rr., *hi habitus* Ar. || 27. ἥδη δὲ M^b, ἥδη c. c. Eu., ἡ
δὴ Spengelius, *cum* Ar., δὴ ci. Zellius, *secludendum esse* ci.
Coraes, εἶναι δὲ (*praemisso commate*) ci. idem || 31. ἡ συγγνώ-
μων secludenda esse ci. Susem. || πάντων Π² Eu.(?) Hel. || 33.
ἅπαντα O^b, πάντα L^b Bk. Fr. Rr., ἀπάντων Γ Π¹ Ald. Ar. et,
ut videtur, Eu. || τὰ πρακτά secl. Rr. || 36. ἀμφοτέρω L^b M^b,
ἀμφοτέρω c. c. Eu. || 1143b, 1. καὶ ante ὁ om. Γ Π² Ald. Ar.,
καὶ — 5. νοῦς secl. Susem. || 2. τοῖς πρακτικοῖς codices Victori,
τοῖς πρακτοῖς O² || 3. <ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ> τῆς? Rassovius (*per-
peram*) || 4. ἕνεκεν? Susem. || ἐκ — 5. καθόλου secludenda esse
ci. Zeller l. 1. p. 651 || 5. τὰ Π¹ (fors. recte), τὸ c. c. Eu. ||
οὖν c. c. Eu. Ar., δὲ M^b, om. K^b || ἔχειν post δεῖ Γ M^b Ald.
Eu. || 6. διὸ — 9. οὗσης post 11. τούτων tri. Rassovius || 7. ἔχει
Γ M^b O^b Eu. †.



XI)

ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία
 νῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὕσης.] [διὸ
 καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις ¹⁰
 καὶ περὶ τούτων.] * ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ
 πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ
 δόξαις οὐχ ἥτιον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ
 τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὅμμα ὁρῶσιν ὁρθῶς.

⁷ τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ ¹³
 περὶ τίνα ἐκατέρα τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ¹⁶
 ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρα, εἴρηται· διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν
 τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοι εἰσὶν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐ-
 θὲν θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρωπος (οὐδεμιᾶς
 γὰρ ἐστὶν γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ²⁰
 τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστὶν περὶ
 τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ'
 ἐστὶν ἂ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐθὲν δὲ
 πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἔξεις αἱ ἀρε-
 ταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα ²⁵
 μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑξέως εἶναι λέγεται; οὐ-
 θὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ γυμνα-
² στικὴν ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ
 τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμον,
 ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ³⁰
 ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πεῖθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ

9. διὸ — 11. τούτων secl. Susem. || 14. ** ὅμμα vel ὅμμα
 ** epitheton exidisse ratus ci. Thurotus || ὁρθῶς] ἀρχὰς Π¹,
 τὰς ἀρχὰς Ald. Hel., ἀρχὰς aut τὰς ἀρχὰς Γ Eu. Ar. || 16. τί
 Π¹ Ar. (fors. recte), τίνα c. c. Eu. Hel. || 19. θεωρήσει Π¹,
 θεωρεῖ c. c. Hel. || ἄνθρωπος <ἢ ἄνθρωπος>? Susem. || 21.
 ἡ post ἐστὶν add. c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu, om. L^b || 22. ἀν-
 θρώπῳ ** Rr., ἀνθρώπῳ <λογιστικῇ> vel simile quid ci. idem ||
 25. <τῷ> τὰ ὑγιεινὰ Rr. || 28. <τὸ> φρόνιμον? Susem. || ἐητέον
 Π¹ + || 29. χρήσιμος ΓM^b O^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 30. μὴ οὖσιν
 Argyropylos, μὴ ἔχουσιν <ἀρετὴν> olim. ci. Rassovius, μέλ-
 λουσιν Imelmannus || αὐτοῖς Π¹, αὐτοὺς c. c. Eu.

καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὁμῶς οὐ
 μανθάνομεν ἰατρικὴν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δό- 3
 ξειν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὕσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται·
 35 ἢ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὲ
 τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἡπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.
 1144a πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰ- 4
 ρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ' οὕσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου,
 καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι 5
 μὲν, οὐχ ὥς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως
 5 ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὕσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς
 τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαιμόνα. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον 6
 ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ
 πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάκτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν
 10 ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράτ-
 τεῖν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέ- 7
 ρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνω-
 θεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ
 δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕτω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον
 15 τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας
 ἢ δι' ἄγνοίαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὰ (καὶ τοὶ πράτ-
 τουσὶ γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρή τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὥς
 ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγα-
 θόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν
 20 πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετὴ, 8

35. ἢ] ἦδε ci. Coraes, οὐ M^b, prb. Rr. † || ποιοῦσα cor-
 ruptum esse intellexit Rr., οὕσα <σπουδαιοτάτη> ci. idem, κρα-
 τίστη οὕσα? Susem. || 36. μὲν om. Γ M^b Eu. || 1144a, 2. γ'] τε O^b,
 δὲ Ald. Ar. || ἑκατέραν] ἑκατέρας Γ K^b Ald., non vert. Ar. || τοῦ
 om. Π² Ald. Eu. (?) || 4. τὰ εὐεκτικὰ post ὑγίεια add. Ald. † || 6. τῷ
 ἐνεργεῖν c. c. Eu. Ar., ἐνεργεῖα pr. K^b, ἐνεργεῖα corr.² K^b, ἐνεργ-
 γεῖ O^b † || εὐδαιμόνα aut τὸν εὐδαιμόνα Γ, τὸν εὐδαιμόνα O^b,
 εὐδαιμονία K^b, εὐδαιμονίαν Π² Eu., εὐδαιμόνας Ar. || 7. κατὰ]
 κατὰ τε Γ Ald. || 10. ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ O^b et pr. L^b, γρ. ἐν αὐτῷ L^b,
 ἐπ' αὐτῷ c. c. Eu. Ar. || 14. λέγομεν om. Π², c. c. add. Hel. Ar.

(II)

τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σα-
 9 φέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστιν δὴ τις δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δει-
 νότητα· αὕτη δ' ἔστιν τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα
 σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχά- 25
 νειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ἦ καλός, ἐπαινετὴ ἔστιν,
 ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινούς
 10 καὶ <τοὺς> πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι. ἔστιν δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ
 ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δὲ ἕξις τῷ
 ὅμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὥς 30
 εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστιν δηλόν· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρα-
 κτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ
 ἄριστον, οἷοιόποτε ὄν· ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν.
 τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ
 μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρ- 35
 χὰς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα
 II ἀγαθόν. σκεπτέον δὲ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ 1144b
 ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει, ὥς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα
 (οὐ ταὐτὸ μὲν, ὅμοιον δέ), οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς
 τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσιν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν
 φύσει πως (καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι 5
 καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς)· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡγούμεθ'

23. τις om. II¹ (fors. recte), c. c. add. Eu. Ar. || 25. ταῦτα
 secludendum aut (id quod mihi non displicet) in πάντα mu-
 tandum esse ci. Spengelius || 28. καὶ <τοὺς> Kleinius Rr., καὶ
 <οὐ> Victorius (male) || 29. ἡ δύναμις] ἡ δεινότης M^b Bk. Fr.
 Rr., αὕτη ἡ δύναμις, ἡ δεινότης Hel. (legit igitur is quoque
 δύναμις, nec non Eu. Ar.) || 31. τε om. II¹ || 33. ἔστω — τυχόν
 secludenda vel certe τὸ τυχόν corrupta esse censet Rr. || 1144b,
 1. σκεπτέον — 1145a, 11. πόλει ab Aristotele haud recte ab-
 iudicat Rassovius || δὲ Ar., prb. Coraes (male) || καὶ om. O^b
 Ar., καὶ περὶ om. L^b || καὶ γὰρ — 2. παραπλησίως c. c. Eu.
 Ar., παραπλησίως γὰρ II², prb. Rr. in adn. (perperam) || 3. οὐ
 — δέ secl. Rr. in adn., at recta interpunctione restituta nihil
 mutandum est || καὶ om. O^b Rr. in adn. (male) + || 6. ἡγούμεθ'
 Rassovius, ζητοῦμεν ΓΠ Ald. Eu. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr.

ἑτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον
 ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρ-
 χουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὔσαι.
 10 πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῶ
 ἄνευ ὅψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ
 τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, 2
 ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει, ἢ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὔσα τότε ἔσται
 κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἔστιν
 15 εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡθικοῦ δύο
 ἔστιν, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἢ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ
 κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινὲς φασιν πά- 3
 σας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν
 ὁρθῶς ἐξήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο
 20 εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρο-
 νήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, 4
 ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασιν τὴν ἕξιν, εἰπόντες
 καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἔστιν, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον· ὁρθὸς δ' ὁ
 κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. εἰκόασιν δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες
 25 ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἔστιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ 5
 δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἢ κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λό-
 γον, ἀλλ' ἢ μετὰ τοῦ ὁρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἔστιν. ὁρθὸς
 δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ φρόνησις ἔστιν. Σωκράτης
 μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι
 30 πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγον. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων 6
 ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ
 φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἡθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος
 ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἂν, ὃ διαλεχθεὶς τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλ-

7. εἶναι post ἀγαθὸν add. Γ Ar., c. c. om. Eu. || ἄλλον τρόπον] εἶναι ἄλλως Ald. || 10. πλὴν — ὥσπερ] ὥσπερ γὰρ ci. Rr. || 11. διὰ — 12. ὄψιν secludenda esse ci. Rr. || 13. δ'] θ'? Susem. || ὁμοία οὔσα] οἷον ὄψιν λαβοῦσα haud male ci. Rr., οὕτως ἔχουσα? Susem. || 17. τινὲς om. Γ Ald. Hel. Ar. (add., ut videtur, etiam Eu.) || 26. μεταθεῖναι Coraes || οὐ γὰρ] ἔστι (ἔστιν pr. K^b) γὰρ οὐ Π¹ O^b † || 27. ἔστιν om. M^b O^b.



λήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυνέστατος πρὸς ἀπά-
 σας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὐπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο ³⁵
 γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς
 δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ ^{1145 a}
 φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ
 μὴ πρακτικὴ ᾗ, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ * * μο-
 ρίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ
 ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ ⁵
 τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία
 γ' ἐστὶν τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
 τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἱατρικὴ· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ
 ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη.
 ἔτι ὁμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίῃ ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ¹⁰
 ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

H.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ¹⁵
 ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἥθη φευκτῶν τρία ἔστιν εἶδη, κακία ἀκρα-
 σία θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα (τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν)· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριό-
 τητα μάλιστα ἂν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν,
 ἡρωικὴν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ Ἑκτορος πε- ²⁰
 ποίηκεν λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός,

οὐδὲ ἑώκει

ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.

22

ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρε-

1145a, 2. οὔσῃ] ὑπαρχούσῃ Π¹ || ὑπάρχουσι Π² Ar. || 3. ἂν
 om. Π¹ || τοῦ <ἑτέρου> aut τοῦ <βελτίονος> ci. Spengelius,
 cf. M. M. 1197b, 6 || 5. τέλος <ποιεῖ ὀρθόν> ci. Rr. || 8. ἡ om.
 Π¹ || 9. γίνηται? Sussem. || οὐ Π¹N^b, γοῦν aut γὰρ Γ, οὖν c. c.
 Eu. Ar. || 11. καὶ δὴ οὕτω ταῦτα post πόλει add. M^b.

Lib. VII. K^bM^b = Π¹, L^bO^b = Π².

1145a, 19. ἂν] ἂν τις L^b Ald. Ar. || 21. οὐδὲ] οὐ γὰρ M^b
 Hel., οὐδὲ γὰρ Π² † || 23. θεοὶ L^bM^b Ald. Hel., θεοὶ c. c. An. Ar.

- τῆς ὑπερβολῆν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει
 25 ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἔστιν κακία
 οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἡ
 δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον 3
 ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν,
 ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του (σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν), οὕτως καὶ ὁ
 30 θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς
 βαρβάροις ἔστιν, γίνεταί δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώ-
 σεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλον-
 τας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως 4
 τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας
 35 εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυ-
 φῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας. οὔτε γὰρ
 1145 b ὥς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἐκα-
 τέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔτε ὥς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δέ, 5
 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶ-
 τον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα, μὲν πάντα τὰ
 5 ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ
 κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλεί-
 πηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
 2 δοκεῖ δὴ ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων 6

24. θηριωδία Γ^L Ald. Hel. || 25. ἀντικειμένη? Thurotus ||
 26. τιμιωτέρα L^b M^b Ar. || 28. καθάπερ — 29. φασιν secl. Zwinger
 (male) || 29. ὅταν <γὰρ> Bergius (temere) || θεῖος L^b M^b Ald.
 An. || (σεῖος ἀνὴρ, φασίν, οὗτος) Gifanius, σεῖος ἀνὴρ, φασίν,
 <οὗτος>, οὕτως Coraes (recte, ut videtur, cf. Plat. Men. 99 D),
 σεῖος — φασιν secl. Stahrius || 31. ἐνίστε? Thurotus || 33. τῆς
 τοιαύτης διαθέσεως Π² Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr., ταύτης τῆς διαθέ-
 σεως Γ¹ || 1145 b, 1. τῶν περὶ ὥς τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων Ald., ὥσπερ
 τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων Canter, ὥς τὰς αὐτὰς ἕξεις ci. Rr. || 2. οὔτε
 ὥς ἕτερον γένος] differentiam specificam temperantiae in hoc
 libro, qualem nos legimus, desiderari, at alio eius loco ab
 Aristotele quoque expositam fuisse, sed nobis periisse, prae-
 sertim cum et ab Hel. post haec verba accurate exponatur et
 eiusdem rei tractatio clara et perspicua etiam in M. M. 1200 b,
 1 sqq. legatur, vix recte censet Haecker || 6. τε om. Π² || 8. δ'
 ἡ Π¹, δὴ c. c. Hel. Ar. || τε om. Π¹.



(I)

καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἣ δὲ ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία
 τῶν φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν. — καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ 10
 ἔμμενενικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ
 λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ
 πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ
 ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. — καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῇ καὶ
 καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἷ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἷ δ' οὐ, 15
 καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῇ ἀκόλαστον συγκε-
 7 χυμένως, οἷ δ' ἑτέρους εἶναι φασίν. — τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν
 οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῇ, ὅτε δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας
 καὶ δεινούς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. — ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ
 καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους.

20

II

τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις 3
 πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις. ἐπιστάμενον [μὲν]
 οὖν οὐ φασίν τινες οἷον τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης,
 ὥς ᾧετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν
 ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν 25
 λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθέννα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράτ-
 2 τειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λό-
 γος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δεῖον ζητεῖν περὶ
 τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας
 (ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶεται γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει 30
 3 γενέσθαι, φανερόν)· εἰσὶν δὲ τινες οἷ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι
 τὰ δ' οὐ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μῆθ' ἐν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμο-
 λογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μῆθέννα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον
 οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῇ φασιν οὐκ ἐπι-

9. τῶν om. Π² || 10. τε om. Π¹ || 15. πάντας O¹, πάντες M^b O²,
 πάντως Ar. et corr. L^b, πάντα c. c. Hel. || 16. καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον
 — 19. εἶναι secl. Wilson, v. Prolegg. || 17. οἷ] ὅτε Π² Ar. || τότε
 Π² || 21. ἀπορήσειε — 1146a, 16. μέγα post 1146b, 2. πράττει red-
 dit Hel. || 22. μὲν om. Π¹ || 23. οὖν] γὰρ? Susem. || 24. αὐτὴν K^b O²
 (cf. Plat. Protag. 352 B. C), αὐτὸν c. c. An. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 26. γὰρ <ὀρ-
 θῶς>? Spengelius (haud recte) || 28. καὶ — 29. ἀγνοίας secl. Wilson,
 v. Prolegg. || 30. ὅτι] ὅτι μὲν O² Ald. || δεῖν πράττειν ἢ πράττει post
 γε add. O² Ald. || 31. δὴ Π¹ (crx. rc. K^b) † || 33. βέλτιστον ci. Coraes.

- 35 στήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδὲ ἰσχυρὰ ὑπό- 4
1146a ληψις ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἡρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς δι-
στάζουσιν, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυ-
μίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν
ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης· 5
5 αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς
ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φρονίμου
εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φανυλότερα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ
ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. — ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν 6
10 τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φανύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ
ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατής οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατής σώφρων· οὔτε
γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρωνος οὔτε τὸ φανύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν
δεῖ γε. εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρῆσται αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φανύλη ἢ κω-
λύουσα ἔξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἢ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα
15 σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φρεῖλαι, οὐδὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ'
εἰ φρεῖλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα. — ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ 7
ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἢ ἐγκράτεια, φανύλη, οἶον εἰ καὶ τῇ
ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἢ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται
τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἶον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν
20 τῷ Φιλοκλήτῃ. ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπέσθη ὑπὸ
τοῦ Ὀδυσσεως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. — ἔτι ὁ σοφι- 8
στικός λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα
βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ
γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἢ

1146a, 2. ἐμμένειν ἐν ταύταις Ald. An., μένειν ἐν ταύ-
ταις Γ, ἐμμένειν αὐταῖς Coraes || 4. φρονήσεως — 9. ἀρετάς] v.
quae adnotabo ad 1152a, 6 sqq. || 5. ἰσχυροτάτη M^b et re. K^b ||
6. ἂν οὐδ' εἰς Π² M^b, ἂν οὐδὲ Ald. || 8. γὰρ post 9. ἐσχάτων Π²
Ald. || 11. ἔστιν Π² † || 13. ἄγεσθαι(?) An. || 14. μὴ om. Π² et re.
K^b, c. c. add. An. || 15. ἀσθενεῖς — 16. εἰ secl. Garvius || 21. ἔτι
— 27. λόγον secl. Garvius, non reddunt Hel. et M. M. 1201a,
16 sqq. || 22. ψευδόμενος ἀπορία secl. Bergius, ψευδόμενος non
vertit Argyropylus, secludendum esse ci. Zellius, secl. Coraes.



(II)

διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν <μὲν> μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν 25
 τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ
 9 ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου ἢ ἀφροσύνη
 μετ' ἀκρασίας ἀρετῇ· τάναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει
 διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ εἶ-
 ναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ 30
 10 πράξει. — ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ
 ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ
 λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν. εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μετα-
 πεισθῆναι ἂν· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ
 φαμέν “ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;” εἰ μὲν γὰρ 35
 ἐπέπειστο ἂν πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο, νῦν δ' οὐ 1146b
 11 πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἤτιον ἄλλα πράττει. — ἔτι εἰ περὶ
 πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶν καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς;
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμέν δ' εἶναι τι-
 νας ἀπλῶς. 5

12 αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων 4
 δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς
 III ἀπορίας εὐρεσις ἐστίν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον
 εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες· εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ
 καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν 10
 ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περὶ τινὰς ἀφωρισμένας· καὶ τὸν
 ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος
 ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῇ τῆς

25. μὲν Ald., om. ΓΠH^aN^b Ar. || 32. ἂν om. Π¹ (suppl. re. K^b) || 35. πνίγει M^b, τὴν φάρυγγα πνίγη Ald. Ar., πνίγη c. c. An. || τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν secl. Bergius (male) || ἔτι πίνειν Γ L^b Ald., γ' ἔτ' ἐμπίνειν ci. Coraes † || 1146b, 1. μὴ ante ἐπέπειστο add. ΓΠ² Ald. An. Bk. Fr., c. c. om. Hel.(?) Ar., secl. Rr. || δ' οὐ Lambinus, δὲ ΓΠ Ald. An. Ar. Bk. Fr. (Haeck.), δὲ <μὴ> Coraes, δὲ <ἄλλα> Rr. || 2. πεπεισμένος secludendum esse ci. Haecker || 3. ἅπαντα Π², πάντα c. c. An. || 4. πάσας Π² An. || 7. ἀναλύειν Coraes, λύειν ci. Coraes || 9. εἰδότες <ἀκρατεύονται> vel εἰδότες <ἀκρατεῖς> ci. Spengelius.

θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. [ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ²
¹⁵ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής εἰσιν τῷ περὶ ᾧ ἢ τῷ πῶς
 ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι
 μόνον ἀκρατής ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ'
 ἐξ ἀμφοῖν[· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ
 ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ]. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρα-
²⁰ τής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα
 ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταυτόν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ
 ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων αἰεὶ
 δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢδὺ διώκειν· ὃ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, διώκει δέ.]
⁵ περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ³
²⁵ εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λό-
 γον (ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται
 ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι· εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζον- ⁴
 τες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξου-
 σιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν
³⁰ ἥττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡρά-
 κλειτος· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ⁵
 ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος
 λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα
 δὲ ἢ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. τοῦτο
³⁵ γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. — ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο ⁶
^{1147a} τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρως οὐδὲν κω-
 λυεὶ πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ

14. ἔστι — 24. δέ = 8. πρῶτον — 14. ταύτης secl. Ras-
 sovius et Haecker, nec multo aliter indicat Rr.: Eudemo tri-
 buerim, praeterea v. Prolegg. || δ'] δ' ἢ Π² || 15. ὁ post καὶ
 om. Π² Ald. || 17. ὥς — ἀλλ' om. Ald. Ar., ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν
 om. Π² || 18. ἔπειτ' — 19. οὐ secl. Rr. || ἢ om. K^b L^b || ἢ om.
 K^b Ald. || 19. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν post οὐ add. Π² + || ἅπαντά Ald.
 An., πάντ' Π² Bk. Fr. Rr. || 21. ἂν om. Π² Ald. || 27. εἰ — 30.
 Ἡράκλειτον alteram recensioem esse antecedentium 24. περὶ
 — 27. εἰδέναι haud recte putat Imelmannus, prb. Wilson, v.
 Prolegg. || 29. ἐπιστήμη δόξης secl. Imelmannus || γὰρ] τε γὰρ
 Π² || 34. καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα post δέ add. Π² K^b Ald. An. Ar.

(III)

καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐστίν. οἶον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ⁵ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι οὗτος ἄνθρωπος· ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε, ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμα-
⁷στόν. — ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ὁρηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν¹⁰ μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἶον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινό-
 μενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων¹⁵ καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν
⁸λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πά-
 θεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους,²⁰ καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τούτῳ δὲ χρόνῳ δεῖ· ὥστε κα-

1147a, 3. τὰ ante πρακτὰ transponendum esse ci. Coraes || 4. καθόλου] κατὰ μέρος ci. Rr. (perperam) || 6. καὶ secl. Rieckher, καὶ — ἄνθρωπος secl. Spengelius (male) || αὐτὸς οὗτος Π² et rc. K^b et, ut videtur, An. et Hel., οὗτος ΓΝ^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr., ὁ αὐτὸς Π¹ H^a, αὐτὸς? Rassovius (fors. recte), ὁ τοι-
 οὔτος? Spengelius (haud recte) || ἄνθρωπος <ἔχει> Haecker (haud recte) || ἢ — 7. τὸ τοιόνδε secl. Haecker (haud recte) || 7. ἢ prius om. Π¹ (suppl. rc. K^b) || 8. γε Coraes || 9. εἶναι Π² An. et rc. K^b, εἰδότες Lambinus (perperam) † || 10. ἔτι — b, 9. ἀκούειν alteram recensionem esse antecedentium 1146 b, 31. ἀλλ' — 1147a, 9. θαυμαστόν et sequentibus 1147 b, 9. ἐπεὶ — 17. αἰσθητικῆς priorem illam continuari vix recte ci. Wilson, v. Prolegg. || 14. γε om. Π¹ Bk. Fr. Rr. || 19. τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην post σημεῖον add. Π² Ald., τοῦ εἰδέναι add. O², c. c. om. An. Ar. || 21. οἱ] τὸ O^b et rc. K^b || πρῶτον Π¹ (crx. rc. K^b) † || μανθάνοντες? Thurotus (nescio an recte) || συνεείρουσι Π¹, συνείρουσι c. c. An. Hel. Ar. et rc. K^b || 22. συμφυῆ εἶναι Ald., συμφῦναι Π² M^b Hel. Bk. Fr. Rr. || τοῦτο Π¹ Ald. †.

θάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους. — ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψειεν 9
 25 τὴν αἰτίαν. ἥ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἥ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς, οἶον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὥς
 30 ἔν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενόν καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δὲ ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει
 35 (κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναιται τῶν μορίων)· ὥστε συμβαίνει 1147b ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία 11 ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα) τῷ ὁρθῷ λόγῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπό-
 5 ληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. — πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ 12 ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. — ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε 13
 10 αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην <δὲ> ἡ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὧν, ἡ οὕτως ἔχει ὥς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπιστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους,

28. ταῖς πρακτικαῖς ci. Coraes, τοῖς πρακτοῖς Lambinus || 32. δέ om. L^b et pr. K^b, c. c. add. An. Ar. et rc. K^b || τὸ post πᾶν add. Π² An. Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 34. οὖν add. Π¹ Ald. (del. rc. K^b), c. c. om. An. (?) Bk. Fr. Rr. || 1147b, 4. τῶν] τὴν An., om. Π¹ (suppl. rc. K^b) † || 6. πῶς — 9. ἀκούειν post 17. αἰσθητικῆς tri. Haecker (nescio an recte) || 7. καὶ περὶ] ὁ περὶ K^b, ὁ καὶ περὶ ΓM^b, καὶ ὁ περὶ Bergius, ὃς καὶ περὶ? Susem. || 10. δὲ add. Rr. || ὁ post ἔχει add. O^b Ald. Bk. Rr., om., ut videtur, etiam An. || 11. ἦν τῷ] ἦν τῷ ΓΠ², ἦν τῷ corr. (i. e. aut corr.² aut rc.) K^b, ἐν τῷ M^b, ἦν ἐν τῷ Gifanius, εἶναι τὸ Coraes.

(III)

καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδὲ ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι
δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐξήτει
14 Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι 15
δοκούσης παρουσίας γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδὲ αὕτη περιέλεκεται
διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς.

IV

περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μὴ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα 6
ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω· πότερον δ' ἐστὶ
τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, 30
περὶ ποῖα ἐστίν, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδο-
νὰς καὶ λύπας εἶδιν οἷ τε ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ
2 οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν
ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ'
αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά 25
(λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὴν
τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρεῖαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν
περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην), τὰ
δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτά (λέγω δὲ
οἶον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ 30
ἡδέων)· τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρα-
τεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους
καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιό-
τητα λεγομένους[, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὃ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικη- 35
κώς, ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὃ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρῷ διέφερεν, 1148
ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν (σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία

16. αὐτὴ ΓΠ² Ald., αὕτη c. c. Hel. Ar. || 17. ἀλλ' ἡ αἰσθη-
τική ci. Rr. || 18. <πότερον> εἰδότα olim ci. Spengelius, <εἰ>
εἰδότα olim ci. Rassonius || καὶ] ἢ Γ || εἰδότα post 19. ἐνδέχε-
ται Π² || 23. οἱ ante μαλακοί add. Π² M^b || 26. τὰ τοιαῦτα secl.
Coraes (male) || 29. οὗ Π² Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || δὲ ante λέγω pr.
K^b (crx. re.), om. M^b || 31. οὖν om. Π¹, c. c. add. Hel. || 34.
ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ post 35. λεγομένους tri. Thuratus || 35. ὥσπερ —
1148a, 4. οὐδεῖς secl. Haecker || ἄνθρωπος Alex. in Top. 262 b,
13. An. Mi. f. 59^b || 1148a, 1. μικρὸν L^b M^b || 2. ἦν ** Gar-
vius.



V)

μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ 25
 κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 καὶ τὰ μεταξύ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν
 ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν· διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ
 τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν
 καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες 30
 ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς (καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
 ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστιν
 τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μά-
 χοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλο-
 πάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει 1148b
 μωραίνειν) — μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν διὰ
 τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό,
 φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ καὶ ἀμαρτήματα αὐτῶν εἶδιν αἱ ὑπερ-
 βολαί· ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία (ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευ- 5
 κτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν), δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πά-
 θους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον
 κακὸν ἱατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτὴν, ὃν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν
 κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἐκά-
 στην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι 10
 καὶ ἐπὶ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις
 ἐστὶν περὶ ταῦτά τῃ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ
 θυμὸν καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῇ
 θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.]

V

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ 15

25. διειλόμην Π¹ † || 26. δὴ Bas.³ Rr. (male) || 28. καὶ om. Π¹
 Ar. Bk. Rr. || 29. ἀκρατοῦνται L^b M^b Ar., κρατοῦνται c. c. An. ||
 34. καὶ om. Π¹ Ald. Ar. || 1148b, 2. signum interruptae orationis
 ante μοχθηρία posuit Rassovius || 4. φαῦλα — φευκτά K^b || καὶ
 ἀμαρτήματα om. Γ Π² Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || αὐτῶν — ὑπερβολαί
 om. K^b, εἰσὶν om. M^b † || 7. τὴν] πρὸς τὴν Γ Muretus || περὶ] πρὸς
 K^b † || ἕκαστον Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. || 12. τῇ post καὶ om. Π¹ O^b (fors.
 recte) || περὶ δὲ θυμόν] καὶ περὶ θυμόν δὲ ci. Rr. || 13. θυμοῦ
 K^b Ald. || λεγομένην ci. Muretus || 15—34] v. quae adnotabo ad
 1149b, 23 sqq.

μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων,
 τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθνη
 γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστιν καὶ περὶ τούτων
 ἕκαστα παραπλησίως ἰδεῖν ἔξεις. λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις,
 20 οἷον τὴν ἀνθρωπὸν ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυοῦσας ἀνασχίζουσιν τὰ
 παῖδια κατεσθίειν, ἣ οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπη-
 γριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς [τοὺς δὲ] ἀνδρῶν
 κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παῖδια δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν,
 ἣ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὐταὶ μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ
 25 δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ
 τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φagών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου
 τὸ ἥπαρ. αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἣ <φύσει ἣ> ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τρι-
 χῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς,
 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἣ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 30 φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαλίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις
 ἐκ παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν
 εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπνίου-
 σιν ἀλλὰ ὀπνιούνται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς νοσηματωδῶς
 ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν
 1149a ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸ δ'
 ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἀπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλὰ
 ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμὸν ἔχοντα

17. πηρώσεις] θηριότητα Imelmannus || 19. ἕκαστον L^b, om.
 O^b † || 21. οἷοις] οἷς K^b, οὖς Coraes || 22. μερῶν post ἀπηγριω-
 μένων add. Ald., γενῶν ex Ar. add. Coraes || τοὺς δὲ secl.
 Onckenius || ἀνθρώπων ΓΠ² Bk. Fr. Rr., ἀνθρωπέοις O¹ Ar.
 et post 23. κρέασιν Ald. || 23. καὶ ἐσθίειν καὶ post παῖδια add.
 Γ || ἄλλοις δανείζειν Π², δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις c. c. An. Hel. Ar. ||
 25. διὰ] διὰ τε M^b O^b Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || διὰ post καὶ add. K^b,
 c. c. om. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 27. ἣ om. K^b, del. Zwinger † || φύσει ἣ
 add. Rassovius || τριχῶν c. c. An. Hel. Ar., αἱ τῶν Π² M^b || 30.
 γυναιζομένοις Π¹ An., ἐθιζομένοις ΓN^b Ar. („consuetis“) ||
 32. εἴπειεν Par. 1417, εἴποιεν Π¹ L^b Ald., εἴποι O^b || οὐχ Π¹
 N^b Ald. || ὀπνύουσιν Ald., ὀπνύουσιν Π¹ N^b || 33. ὀπνιούνται Ald.,
 ὀπνύονται Π¹ N^b || δὲ om. Π¹ Ar. || 1149a, 2. κρατεῖν] καρτε-
 ρεῖν K^b O^b.



τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους <ἀκρατῇ>, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεπτέον.
 πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκο- 5
 λασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις
 6 εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, καὶ
 ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἔδε-
 δίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλο-
 γιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια 10
 γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπι-
 7 ληπτικὰς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν
 τινὰ ἐνίοτε μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ Φά-
 λαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδι-
 8 σίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον 15
 ἔχειν. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρία ἢ μὲν κατ' ἀνθρώπον ἀπλῶς
 λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ
 νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
 ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης ἢ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς
 δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη. 20
 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ 7
 ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ
 10 οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον· [ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἥττον αἰσχροῦ ἀκρασία ἢ
 τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ 25
 θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ

4. <τούτου> τοῦ Lambinus || <ἀκρατῇ>, ἀκρατῇ Lambinus ||
 5. κακία ante καὶ ἀφροσύνη add. Γ Ald. An. Hel. Ar. et mg.
 L^b (fors. recte) || 12. τούτων — 20. μόνη alteram recensio-
 nem praecedentium 1148b, 34. τὸ — 1149a, 12. νοσηματώδεις ter-
 tiamque 1149b, 30. τούτων — 1150a, 5. ἀρχὴ esse censet
 Wilson, v. praeterea Prolegg. et quae adnotabo ad 1150a, 6 sqq. ||
 13. μόνον] μὲν μόνον Π¹ || λέγω δ' om. Π² Ar. || 16. μοχθηρίας
 K^b (fors. recte) || 20. μόνην Π¹ L^b, μόνον Γ Ar. || 24. ὅτι —
 1150a, 8. θηρίου secl. Rassovius, nec omnia haec in hunc locum
 non admodum quadrare negat Rr., v. etiam quae ad b, 8 sqq.
 adnotabo (agnoscunt iam M. M. 1202b, 9—29. 1203a, 11—29) ||
 25. ἢ ἢ] ἢ pr. K^b, ἢ M^b et rc. K^b || 26. καθάπερ <γὰρ> ci.
 Bergius.

ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων [[οἷ]] πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον
 ἐκθέουσιν, εἴτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν
 σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως
 30 ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκού-
 σας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμω-
 ρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλι-
 γωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ
 τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν
 35 μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ [[ὁ λόγος ἢ]] ἢ αἰσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν
 1149b ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἢ
 δὲ ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχιῶν οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς
 τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.
 ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμῃ ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, 2
 5 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ
 πᾶσιν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ
 ἢ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν
 μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα
 τύπτει “καὶ γὰρ οὗτος” ἔφη “τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνω-
 10 θεν”, καὶ τὸ παιδίον δέλτας “καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ” ἔφη, “ὅταν ἀνὴρ
 γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν”, καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ
 παύεσθαι ἐκέλευεν πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύν-
 σαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβου- 3
 λότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός,
 15 ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν·
 “δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς” καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὀμηρος·

27. οἷ non vertit Ar., secl. Jackson, nescio tamen an
 tolerari queat || 28. προστάξεως K^b L^b An. Hel. Ar., πράξεως
 cet. || 29. ἐὰν Π² || 30. ὁ add. Π² Ald. Hel., <καὶ> ὁ ci. Ber-
 gius || 32. ἢ ἡ φαντασία secl. Garvius || 34. δὴ add. K^b || 35. ὁ
 λόγος ἢ secl. Garvius || 1149b, 3. τῆς ἐπιθυμίας <τῆς ἐπιθυ-
 μίας> Spengelius (fors. recte) || καὶ οὐ] καὶ K^b, οὐ L^b M^b † ||
 4. ἀκολουθεῖ L^b M^b, ἀκολουθεῖ An., ἀκολουθεῖν c. c. Hel. Ar. ||
 7. τῶν alterum et καὶ secl. Spengelius || 8 sqq. non usquequa-
 quam germana videbantur iam Camerario, cf. quae ad a, 24 sqq.
 adnotavi || 9. τύπτει L^b M^b Hel. † || 13. ἐπίβουλοι Spengelius.



πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος.

ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα, καὶ αἰσχίων ἢ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς
περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστιν, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως.
4 ἔτι οὐδείς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ 20
λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργί-
ζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικωτέρα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία
5 ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. — ὥς μὲν
τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυ-
μόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυ- 25
6 μίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικὰς, δῆλον, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς
διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ
μὲν ἀνθρωπικαὶ εἰσιν καὶ φυσικαί, καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ
μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσή-
ματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολα- 30
σία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σῶφρονα οὔτε ἀκό-
λαστα λέγομεν ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τιτι ὅλως
ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζώων ὕβρει καὶ σινα-
μωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν
οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαι- 35
7 νόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας <κακόν>, 1150a
φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμ-
βάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κακίον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἢ
φανυλότης αἰὲ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. 5

23. ὥς vel potius 26. αὐτῶν — 29. νοσήματα alteram re-
censionem esse antecedentium 1148b, 15. ἐπεὶ — 34. ἔθος putat
Wilson, v. Prolegg. || 25. ἢ prius om. K^b, utrumque om. M^b,
posterius Ald. || 29. διὰ καὶ διὰ O^b Ald., om. Γ[†] || 30. του-
των — 1150a, 5. ἀρχή] v. quae adnotavi ad 1149a, 12 sqq. ||
33. σινομωρία K^b L^b Ald., συνομωρία Γ Ar. || 1150a, 1. ἔλαττον
— 8. θηρίου] in his verbis non multum sani inesse censet Rr. ||
δὲ <κακόν> Rassovius || κακίας <κακόν> Susem. || 2. βέλτιον Π¹,
βέλτιστον c. c. An. Hel. Ar. || 3. ἡμάρτηται καὶ ante οὐκ add.
Γ O^b O¹ Ald. Ar. || συμβαλεῖν Π² Ald.

|| παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον
 ἄδικον· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἐκάτερον κᾶκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν
 κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίον. ||

8 περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύ-
 10 πας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φονγὰς, περὶ ἃς ἢ τε ἀκολασία καὶ
 ἢ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε
 ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστιν δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ
 ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡττους· τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατῆς
 ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερι-
 15 κός. μετὰ δ' ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἔξις, καὶν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλ-
 λον πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους. [ἐπεὶ δ' ἔναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί
 εἰσιν αἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ οὐδὲ αἱ
 ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας·
 ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν
 20 καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαί-
 νον, ἀκόλαστος, [ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,

6. παραπλήσιον — 8. θηρίον alteram recensionem esse antecedentium 3. ὁμοιον — 5. ἀρχή intellexit Rassovius, prb. Wilson, cf. Prolegg., παραπλήσιον — 7. κᾶκιον om. Garvius || οὖν τοῦτο συμβάλλειν ὥσπερ εἴ τις συμβάλλοι ἀδικίαν Π² M^b † || <θηριότητα πρὸς> ἀδικίαν <ἢ θηρίον κακὸν> πρὸς ci. Rr. || 7. μυριοπλάσια K^b L^b Ald., μυριοπλάσια c. c. An. || 11. διωρίσθη πρότερον secl. Gifanius || μὲν] μὲν οὖν M^b || 15. καὶ Γ Π² || 16. ἐπεὶ — 32. ἀκόλαστος = 1147 b, 23. ἐπεὶ — 1148 a, 22. ἰσχυρά (et = 1150 b, 29 — 1151 a, 28 et = 1151 b, 33. ἐπεὶ — 1152 a, 6. οὐκ οἰόμενος, id quod vidit Rr.) secl. Rassovius, ἐπεὶ — 24. προαίρεσιν et 31. τῶν — b, 19. ἐατὴν alteram recensionem antecedentium 9. περὶ — 16. χεῖρους tertiamque 1152 a, 25. ἔστι — 27. θυνάμειος, et 25. τῶν — 31. ἀκρατοῦς duo fragmenta esse olim cum 1148 a, 22 — b, 14. ita copulata, ut 27. παντὶ — 31. ἀκρατοῦς altera sint recensio verborum 1148 a, 17. διὸ — 22. ἰσχυρά, ci. Wilson, v. Prolegg. et quae adnotavi ad 1148 a, 22 sqq. || 17. καὶ] ἢ ci. Wilson || 18. λύπας] φονγὰς Rassovius || 19. ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν M^b Ar., ἢ μὴ καθάπερ ὑπερβολαὶ Muretus, ἢ καθὸ ὑπερβολαὶ vel ἢ [καθὸ] ὑπερβολὰς Bywater, ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς c. c. An. Bk. Fr. Rr. || καὶ διὰ M^b, διὰ Hel., ἢ διὰ c. c. An. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. (Byw.), ἀλλὰ διὰ Muretus, εἰ διὰ Gifanius, ἢ διὰ Micheletus || 21. ἀνάγκη — 22. ἀνίατος post 31. ἀκρατοῦς recte




Π)


ὥστ' ἀνιάτος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνιάτος.] ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύ-
γων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἥτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προ-
3 αἵρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὃ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν 25
ἡδονήν, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπι-
θυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειεν χεί-
ρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν,
ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ
εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὦν; διὸ ὁ ἀκό- 30
λαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. * τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μα-
4 λακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὃ δ' ἀκόλαστος.] ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ
μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια
ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ 35
καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκρά-
5 τεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ 1150b
ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν (καὶ
γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τις ἐστίν), ὃς ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα
μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν
6 κάμνοντα οὐκ οἶεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὦν. ὁμοίως 5
δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις
ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν,
θανμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ

tri. Rr., sed perperam idem vel sic: 27. παντὶ — 31. ἀκρ.
21. ἀνάγκη — 27. ἀλλήλων vel sic: 24. προαίρεσιν. 27—31.
21—22. 25. τῶν — 27. ἀλλήλων totum locum ordinandum esse
credit || 25. δι' ἡδονήν Π² || 26. τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας secl.
Gifanius Rr. || 27. πάντῃ Γ || 28. μὴ τις Π², τις μὴ c. c. An. ||
πράττει ΓL^b M^b et, ut videtur, An. † || 29. τύπτοι O^b Ar.,
τύπτει ΓL^b M^b Ald. An., τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος om. K^b N^b,
εἰ om. M^b † || 31. τῶν — 32. ἀκόλαστος secl. Stahrius (temere) ||
δὲ Ald., δὴ c. c. An. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu || 32. ὁ δ' ἀκρα-
τής An. Hel., τὸ δὲ ἀκολασίας Turnebus, τὸ δ' ἀκρασίας Spenge-
lius Rr. in adn. (perperam) || 33. ἐγκρατής — μαλακῷ | μαλακός
— ἐγκρατεῖ ci. Wilson || 1150b, 1. καὶ ante οἱ Π² (fort. recte),
om. M^b || 3. ὃς] ὃς οὐχ Hel. || 5. οὐκ secl. Schneider.

Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεις πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ
 10 Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύνων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν
 πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσεν
 Ξενοφάντῳ, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέ-
 χειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ
 φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασι-
 15 λεῦσιν ἢ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ
 ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι,
 ἔστιν δὲ μαλακός. ἢ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσις ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἀνά-
 παυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης
 ἐστίν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια. οἷον
 20 μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ
 πάθος, οἷον δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πά-
 θους. ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται,
 οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προῖδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες
 ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὗτ'
 25 ἂν ἡδὺ ἢ οὐτ' ἂν λυπήρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγ-
 χολικοὶ τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἷον μὲν γὰρ
 διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἷον δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένου-
 σιν τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.
 9 ἔστιν δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος[, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη,] οὐ μετα-
 30 μελητικός (ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει)· ὁ δ' ἀκρατής μετα-
 μελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνιάτος ὃ δ' ἱατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἢ μὲν μοχθη-
 ρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία
 τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἢ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἢ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς

11. ξυνέπεσε Π² M^b || 14. ὥσπερ O^b O² Ald. Hel., οἷον c. c. An. || Σκυθῶν] Περσῶν An. † || 16. ἀκρατής Zwinger || 17. δέ] γὰρ Π² † || οὐν post εἴπερ add. Γ Π¹ Ald. † || 19 sqq.] v. quae adnotabo ad 1152a, 28 sqq. || 22. προγαργαλισθέντες L^b M^b Hel. Ar., οἱ προγαργαλίσαντες O^b || 23. προαισθανόμενοι Π¹ (crx. rc. K^b) || 24. αὐτοὺς Π² || 29. ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη secl. Susem. || 31. πᾶς] πῶς O² Ald. || 32. ἀλλ' — ἀνιάτος om. pr. K^b (suppl. rc.) || εὐιάτος — ἀνιάτος Π² Ald. Ar., ἀνιάτος — ἱατός c. c. An. et, ut videtur, Hel.





III)

1 πονηρία. [καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κα- 35
 κίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δὲ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.]
 2 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον 1151a
 ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους
 ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ
 ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστίν τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπὸ ὀλίγου
 3 οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ 5
 ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστιν, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐστίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
 ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλη-
 σίους "Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἵαπερ
 οἱ ἀξύνετοι", καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικοῦσιν 10
 4 δέ. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεισθαι διώ-
 κειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σω-
 ματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὃ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶος
 διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὐ·
 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ 15
 δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσιν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν
 τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος δι-
 δασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ
 ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ
 5 τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστιν δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκ- 20
 στατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν

35—1151a, 11] v. Prolegg. et quae adnotabo ad 1152a,
 28 sqq. || πονηρία secl. Scaliger || καὶ ὅλως — 36. οὐ λανθάνει
 secl. Susem. || 1151a, 2. μὲν ἔχοντες Π² An. || 6. οὐκ om. L^b
 An.(?) Hel.(?) et pr. K^b (suppl. rc.) † || ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως secl. Rr. ||
 7. τὴν om. M^b Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 9. Μιλήσιοι — 10. ἀξύνετοι
 finem hexametri et pentametrum esse censet Richard-
 sius || γὰρ post Μιλήσιοι add. ΓΠ² Ald., om. Π¹ An. Hel. ||
 10. οἱ om. O^b Richardsius || ἀξύνετοι Richardsius || 14.
 οὗτος δὲ] ὁ δ' Victorius Bk. Fr. Rr. || 15. ἡ post καὶ om. Π¹
 Ald. (fors. recte) || 17. ὁ om. Π² || 19. ἐθιστὴ ΓΚ^b L^b An. Hel.
 Ar.(?), ἐθιστικὴ M^b, ἡθικὴ O^b Ald. || σώφρων — 28. φανύλη alte-
 ram recensionem esse antecedentium 11. ἐπεὶ — 19. ἀρχὴν de-
 monstrare frustra conatus est Wilson, v. Prolegg.

κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον
οἷον πεπεισθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς
οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων τοῦ ἀκολάστου,
25 οὐδὲ φανῦλος ἀπλῶς· σφίζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή.
ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικός διὰ γε
τὸ πάθος· φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἔξις,
ἡ δὲ φανύλη.

10 πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποι- IX
30 οὖν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὁρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατής δὲ ὁ
ὁποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ
τῷ ἀψεύδει λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὁρθῇ, ὥσπερ
ἡπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιοῦν,
καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὁρθῇ προαιρέσει
35 ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γὰρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ
1151b αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται,
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ
καθ' αὐτό. ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει
ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ [ὁ] τῇ ἀληθεῖ. — εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ
5 ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσὶν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας,
οἷον δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἳ ὅμοιον μὲν τι ἔχου-
σιν τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρα-
σύς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ

23. ἀνείδην M^b, ἀναίδην Ald. et pr. K^b (em. corr.²) || 24.
βελτίων] βελτίων ὦν O² Ald. † || 25. οὐδὲ] ὁ δὲ K^b L^b et fort.
An. † || 27. τούτου ΓM^bO¹ Ald. Ar. || 29. ὁ om. Ald. Hel. et
pr. K^b (suppl. rc.) || 32. <μῇ> τῷ Wilkinson || ἀψευδεῖ Coraes,
ἀληθεῖ Muretus Rr. in adn., μῇ ψευδεῖ L^b, ψευδεῖ c. c. An.
Ar. Wilkinson Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu || ὁρθῇ L^b Muretus Wilkinson,
μῇ ὁρθῇ c. c. An. Ar. Bk. Fr. || 33. μὲν om. ΓM^b Ald., c. c.
add. Hel. || ὁ ante ὁποιοῦν add. ΓM^bO^b An. Hel.(?) † || 34. ὁ
post δὲ add. ΓΠ¹ Ald. An. Hel.(?) † || 1151b, 4. ὁ del. Tur-
nebus, secl. Rr. || οἳ corr.² K^b, καὶ M^b Bk. Fr. Rr. (fors. recte),
οἳ c. c. Ar. et pr. K^b || 5. εἰσὶν K^b, εἰσὶ δὲ ΓΠ² Ald. Ar., om.
M^b An. Bk. Fr. Rr. (fors. recte) || 6. οἷον] οἳ corr. L^b et pr. K^b
(crx. rc.), fors. recte || 7. οἷον] ὥσπερ Π² Bk. Fr. Rr. || τῷ om.
Ald. et pr. K^b (suppl. rc.).



(IX):

διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει, ὁ ἐγκρατής], ἐπεὶ
 εὐπείστος, ὅταν τύχη, ἔσται [ὁ ἐγκρατής]. ὃ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὲρ λό- 10
 γου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ
 3 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες
 καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι'
 ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἔαν μὴ μετα-
 πείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἔαν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὥσπερ 15
 ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἰοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρα-
 4 τεῖ. — εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι'
 ἀκрасίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεο-
 πτόλεμος. καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ
 γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπέσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσ- 20
 σέως ψεῦδесθαι, οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων οὐτ'
 ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὐτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχροάν.
 5 ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς 11
 σωματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ ἢ τοιοῦτος,
 τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρα- 25
 τὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ
 τὸ ἥττον τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον
 μεταβάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέ-
 ρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἔξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνον-
 ται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι 30

9. <οὐ> διὰ Imelmannus || ὁ ἐγκρατής om. An. (?), secl. Scaliger, prb. Vermehrenus || 10. ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής secl. Vermehrenus, ὁ ἐγκρατής non vertunt Argyropylus et Ar., secl. Scaliger || δ] οἱ Γ (nescio an recte) || 11. ἐπεὶ Lambinus || 15. ἂν M^b Ald., om. pr. K^b (ἂν suppl. corr.², ἔαν suppl. re) || αὐτῶν Rr., αὐτῶν Γ Π Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. || 18. ὁ om. Π² M^b || 20. καλόν] ἡ δὲ ci. Rr. | 21. τι om. Π², c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || οὐτ' ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὐτ' K^b, ἐστὶν ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὐτ' Rr. in textu, ἐστὶν ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτε Ald. et mg. O¹, ἐστὶν ἀκόλαστος εἴτε φαῦλος εἴτε Γ et pr. O¹, ἐστὶ φαῦλος εἴτε ἀκόλαστος εἴτε ci. Rr. (nescio an recte), ἢ (om. Hel. Ar.) ἀκόλαστος ἢ φαῦλος ἢ Π² M^b Hel. Ar. || 23. οἷος <ὁ> ci. Coraes || 24. χαίρειν Muretus Rr. in adn., χαίρων Γ Π Ald. Cor. Bk. Fr. Rr. in textu || ἐμμένειν Muretus || ἢ M^b, ὁ cet.

φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ.

ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκρά- 6
τεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡκολούθηκεν· ὁ τε γὰρ
35 ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μὴδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδο-
1152a νὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων
φάυλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἡδεσθαι
παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἡδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, 7
5 ἀμφοτέρω δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ
οιόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος.

οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῇ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· x
ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὢν. ἐτι 2
οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικῷ· ὁ δ'
10 ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός. τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῇ εἶ-
ναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναι τινες ἀκρατεῖς
δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημέ-
νον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον
ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν.

15 οὐδὲ δὴ ὥς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὥς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ 3
οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρόπον γὰρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ ποιεῖ καὶ
οὐ ἔνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὐ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ'
ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐ-
τῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικός οἷς ἂν βουλευσῇται, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός
20 οὐδὲ βουλευτικός ὅλως. καὶ ἔοικεν δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἢ ψη-
φίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους,
χρηται δ' οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωπεν

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἡ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·

31. εἶναι ἐναντίον Π² || 33—1152a, 6] v. quae adnotavi ad
1150a, 16 sqq. || 1152a, 7. οὐδ' — 14. προαίρεσιν alteram re-
censionem esse verborum 1146a, 4. φρονήσεως — 9. ἀρετὰς
censet Wilson || 11. μὲν om. ΓM^b Ald. || 20. οὐ Π², οὐδὲ c. c.
An. Hel. || 22. οὐδὲν K^b, οὐδενὶ c. c. Hel. || καθάπερ Π², ὥσπερ
c. c. Hel. || 23. ἐβουλεύετο Π², ἐβούλευσεν Par. 1417, ἐβούλεν
Lambinus, ἐβούλετο K^b, ἐβούλεθ' c. c. Hel. Ar.

The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science.

The second part of the paper is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science. The third part of the paper is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science.

The fourth part of the paper is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science. The fifth part of the paper is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science.

The sixth part of the paper is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science. The seventh part of the paper is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science.

The eighth part of the paper is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science. The ninth part of the paper is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and most difficult in the history of science.

(X)

4 ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένῃ.

ἔστιν δὲ ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς 25
τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὃ δ' ἥττον τῆς
τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως.

εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύον-
ται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμού
ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φνσικῶν· ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ 30
γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐή-
νος λέγει

φημι πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ 32
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

5 τί μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί 12
καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται 35

XI πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται· [περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεω-
ρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος. οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ 1152 b
τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν

2 τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιῶν
ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κα-
κίαν τὴν ἡθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονᾶς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν 5
εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλείστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι φασιν, διὸ καὶ
τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.

3 τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε
καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταυτόν ἀγαθὸν
καὶ ἡδονήν)· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι· 10
ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέ-

24. τοῖς et χρωμένῃ alterum secl. Scaliger || 25. ἔστιν — 27.
δυνάμεως] v. quae adnotavi ad 1150 a, 16 sqq. || 28. εὐιατοτέρα —
33. εἶναι olim cum 1150 b, 19. ἀκρασίας — 28. φαντασία coniuncta
fuisse alteramque esse recensioem verborum 1151 a, 1. αὐτῶν —
5. πολλοὶ arbitratur Wilson, v. Prolegg. || 29. βουλευομένων Π¹
Ald. (fors. recte) || 30. φύσει ci. Rr. || 32. ἔμμεναι K^b L^b N^b, ἔμμεν
M^b, ἐμμεῖναι Γ¹ Ar., μίμνεν ci. Coraes, ἔμμεναι c. c. Hel. || 34. τί ante
καρτερία et 35. om. Γ¹ M^b Ald. Ar. || 36. περὶ — 1154 b, 31. ἐπεικὴς
Eudemo recte tribuunt Asp. aut alii ap. Asp. (v. Spengel Ueb. die ...
eth. Schrr. p. 519 sqq.) Casaubonus alii 1152 b, 2. ὃν M^b, ὃ ἂν K^b, ὃ c.
c. An. Ar. || 7. μάλα ante χαίρειν add. codices Lambini, μάλιστα M^b †.

χεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ⁴
 πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γέ-
 νεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία.
 15 ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυ-
 πον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί,
 καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τῇ τῶν ἀφροδισίων·
 οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαι τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδε-
 μία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία
 20 καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ⁵
 ὅτι εἰσὶν καὶ αἰσχροὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμενοι, καὶ ὅτι βλαβεραί·
 νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐ τ'ἄριστον ἢ ἡδονή, ὅτι
 οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις.

13 τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅτι δ' οὐ ^{XII}
 25 συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον,
 ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις ἀκολου-
 θήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι
 δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι <αἱ δὲ τινὶ μὲν φαῦλαι>
 30 τινὶ δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ
 καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον αἱρεταί<, αἱ> δ' οὐ· αἱ δὲ οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ
 φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ λατρείας ἔνεκον, οἷον αἱ τῶν
 καμνόντων. — ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἔξις, ²

13. αἰσθητήν Scaliger || 17. μᾶλλον alterum fort. secluden-
 dum esse putat Spengelius || τὴν Γ^O^b Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. et pr. L^b,
 ἢ Scaliger || 21. καὶ ἔτι Π² Bk. Fr. Rr. (fors. recte) † || 22. οὐ
 τ'ἄριστον Spengelius, οὐκ ἄριστον Γ^{II} Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 24. σχε-
 δὸν τοιαῦτ' ἐστίν O^b, ταῦτ' ἐστὶ σχεδόν K^b Ar. (?) || 27. ἀκολου-
 θοῦσιν Γ Ar., secl. Muretus et Scaliger, ἀκολουθήσουσιν ὥστε
 om. Par. 1417, secl. Coraes || ἀκολουθήσουσι post γενέσεις add.
 Par. 1417, ἀκολουθοῦσι Muretus, illud repetunt hoc loco O^b Ald.,
 hoc Γ Ar. || 28. αἱ φαῦλαι — 29. εἶναι secl. Gifanius || 29. εἶναι
 αἱ μὲν om. ΓK^b Ald. † || <αἱ δὲ τινὶ μὲν φαῦλαι> aut <αἱ δὲ
 τινὶ μὲν> Rassovius || 30. τινὲς ci. Zellius || ἀλλὰ] ἀλλ' ἢ ci. Bk.,
 recte, nisi ἀλλὰ pro ἀλλ' ἢ positum est, cf. Ind. Aristot. 33b,
 14 sqq. || 31. δ' οὐ secl. Coraes, <αἱ> δ' οὐ ci. Rassovius et
 legit sic fort. Hel., <αἱ> δ' οὐδ' ci. Rr.





(II)

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσθαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν ἡδεῖαι
 εἰσίν. ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου 35
 ἔξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσίν
 ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδε- 1153a
 ούσης. σημειῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ χαίρουσιν ἡδεῖ ἀναπληρου-
 μένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας
 μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις·
 καὶ γὰρ ὁξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ 5
 οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλ-
 3 ληλα συνέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. — ἔτι οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασι
 τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσίν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέ-
 σεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμ- 10
 βαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι,
 ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ
 οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν,
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, ἀντι-
 δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, 15
 ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἶονται εἶναι,
 4 ἔστιν δ' ἕτερον. — τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα,
 τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν.
 ταύτη οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο,
 5 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτε βλέπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. — ἐμποδίζει 20
 δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἔξι οὐδεμιᾷ ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ'

35. ὑπολοίπου K^b et γρ. An., ὑπολύπου M^b Ald. An. Ar.,
 ἐπιλοίπου Π², ἐπιλιποῦς, ut videtur, Γ („indigentis et imper-
 fecti“) et Hel. (τὴν ἐλλείπουσαν ἔξιν), ὑπελλιποῦς vel ἐπελ-
 λιποῦς ci. Muretus, ὑπολιποῦς ci. nescio quis ap. Scalig., ἐπι-
 λύπον ci. Gifanious fors. recte, cf. Ind. Arist. 800b, 32 sqq. ||
 1153a, 1. ἐνδεοῦσης pr. K^b (crx. rc.), ἐνδεοῦσης οὔσης O^b, ἐν-
 δεοῦς οὔσης Π² Bk. Fr. Rr. || 2. ἡδεῖ (ἦδη K^b) ante χαίρουσιν
 ΓΠ¹ Ald. || 7. αἱ ἡδοναί ἀπὸ τούτων pr. K^b (em. corr.²), αἱ ἀπὸ
 τούτων ἡδοναί M^b || 12. τὴν om. L^b M^b || τελείωσιν Π² M^b Ald. ||
 14 sq. respicit Alex. l. l. p. 258 || 15. τιςιν Rassovius Bk.² et fort.
 Hel., τις ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk.¹ Fr. Rr. || 16. ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν
 secl. Gifanious || <οὐ> κυρίως ci. Coraes || ἄλογον? Vermehrenus.

αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσιν θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν. — τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. — τὸ δὲ τὸν σῶφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλμπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ' ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σῶφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σῶφρονος.

1153 b 14 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τε καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυνεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. — τᾶριστον δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης ἔξεως εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνεργειᾶ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἡ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ

23. μὴ εἶναι τέχνην μηδεμίαν ἡδονῆς M^b + || 24. ἡδονὴν post μηδεμίαν Γ L^b Ald. || 25. ἀλλ' ἢ ci. Coraes, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως secl. Rr. || 27. φεύγειν <τὸ ἡδὸν> vel φεύγειν <τὰς ἡδονάς> ci. Spengelius || 1153b, 1. καὶ ante ἡ om. Π¹ Ar. || 2. τῷ post πῇ An. Hel. + || 3. τε K^b, τι cet. Ar., om. An. || ἢ post κακόν add. Γ et corr.² K^b, ἢ pr. K^b, c. c. om. An. Ar. || 5. ἔλεγε M^b et fort. An. || 7. τᾶριστον Spengelius, τὸ ἄριστον An., ἄριστον Γ Π Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || δ' Γ Ald. Ar., τ' Π² K^b Bk. Fr. Rr. (τε K^b), om. M^b.



(II)

ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φάυλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἀπλῶς.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἶονται βίον εἶναι,
καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως·¹⁵
οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἥ δ' εὐδαιμονία
τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγα-
θῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται
³ ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις
περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἡ ἀγαθός, ἡ²⁰
⁴ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς
τύχης δοκεῖ τισιν ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ
οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιος ἐστίν, καὶ ἴσως
οὐκ ἐτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
⁵ ὁ ὄρος αὐτῆς. — καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀν-²⁵
θρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημείον τι τοῦ εἶναι πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·
φήμη δ' οὔτι γε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἣν τινα λαοὶ
πολλοί.

⁶ ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἢ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν
οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὔδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσιν τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν³⁰
μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἶονται οὐδ' ἣν
ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον.
ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ
ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτάς καὶ
πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οἶν γινώσκουσιν εἶναι³⁵
⁷ ταύτας μόνας οἶονται εἶναι. — φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἡδονὴ^{1154a}
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα·
τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ


19. <διὰ> ταῦτα ci. Coraes || 23. αὕτη L^b M^b Ar., αὐτῇ N^b || 24. οὐκ ἔστιν Γ M^b, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι L^b † || 25. πάντα Π² Hel. || 27. λαοὶ Γ Ald. Hel. Ar. et post 28. πολλοὶ An., οἱ K^b, om. Π² H^a M^b N^b || 28. πολλοί] πολλοὶ φημίζωσιν Γ Ald. Ar., πολλοὶ φημίζουσιν Hel., φημίζωσιν add. etiam An. || 30. ἅπαντες Π² || 33. γε post εἰλήφασί add. M^b N^b O^b, om. K^b L^b Ald. An. || 1154a, 1. ἡ add. M^b O^b Hel., c. c. om. An. Bk. Fr. || 2. ἡ post καὶ add. Π² K^b An. Hel. Ald. Bk. Fr., om. M^b.


καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν· οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἢ
 5 λύπη, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ
 δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι
 αὐτοῦ.

περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς XIV
 λέγουσιν ὅτι ἐνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί,
 10 ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ αἷς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. διὰ τί οὖν αἱ 2
 ἐναντίαι λῦται μοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. ἢ
 οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν
 ἔστιν; ἢ μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων
 ὅσων μὴ ἔστιν τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων
 15 δ' ἔστιν, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔστιν. τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν
 ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
 ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσιν πως καὶ
 ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ἐναντίως
 δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως·
 20 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι
 τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

15 ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τάληθές εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ 3
 αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους (τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν·
 ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθές οὐκ ὄν
 25 ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον)· ὥστε λεκτέον
 διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἰρετώτεραι. πρῶτον 4
 μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκροῦει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
 τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσιν τὴν ὑπερ-
 βάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν· σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται
 30 αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον
 φαίνεσθαι. [[καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἢ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα,
 ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φανύλης φύσεώς εἰσιν πρᾶξεις (ἢ

8. τοῖς] πῶς Coraes || 10. καὶ secl. Spengelius (temere) ||
 20. ἢ] ἢ An.(?) || 27. οὖν om. L^b M^b O² || 30. αἱ om. K^b L^b Hel. ||
 31. καὶ — b, 2. σπουδαῖαι neque huius loci neque integra esse
 censet Rr.





ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίον, ἢ δι' ἔθους, οἷον αἱ τῶν φανύλων
 ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι, ὅτι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ
 γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσιν τελεουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβη- 1154b
 κὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι.]] ἔτι διαώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ
 τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας
 τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον,
 ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἔφ' οἷς 5
 χαίρουσιν, τὸ τε μῆδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν.
 αἰ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι μαρ-
 τυροῦσιν, τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν·
 ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὥς φασίν. ὁμοίως δὲ ἐν μὲν τῇ
 νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ 10
 ἡδὺν ἢ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν αἰ δέονται
 ἱατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν
 κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰ ἐν ὁρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴν
 λύπην ἢ τε ἐναντία καὶ ἢ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ἢ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ
 ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν 15
 οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. αὗται δὲ αἱ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ
 μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα
 τὰ ἱατρεύοντα (ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἱατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπο-
 μένοντος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺν δοκεῖ εἶναι),
 φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. 20

οὐκ αἰ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺν τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῆν ἡμῶν
 εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναι τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτά, ὥστε
 ἂν τι θάτερον πράττη, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν
 δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺν τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ
 εἴ του ἢ φύσις ἀπλῆ εἴη, αἰ ἢ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. 25

1154b, 3. ἐαντοῖς Π² Hel., αὐτοῖς K^b || 5. βλαβεραὶ Π² ||
 ἑτέραν K^b Ald., ἕτερας Ar., ἕτερα c. c. An. || 6. χαί-
 ρωσιν vel χαίρησόνσιν ci. Coraes || 8. καὶ add. M^b Hel. Ar.
 (num recte dubito) || 10. διάκεινται ante ὥσπερ Π² Hel. || 11.
 αἰ post δέονται Π¹ (fors. recte) || 12. θεραπείας Π² Hel., ἱατρεῖαι
 aut ἱατρεῖαις pr. K^b, ἱατρείας c. c. An. Ar. et corr.² K^b || 15.
 λύπης Γ^M O^b Ald. Ar. || 17. λέγω — συμβεβηκός om. L^b M^b,
 c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || 19. ἡδὺν post δοκεῖ L^b M^b.

διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιος, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ
 30 γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις [[ἡ]] δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῇ οὐδ' ἐπιεικῆς.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.]

(-).

1155 a μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν. ἔστι
 γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν
 5 βίον. ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα (καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσιν καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεῖα· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης ^{ἀφαιρῶντος τοῦ θεοῦ} εὐεργεσίας, ἢ γίνεται μάλιστα καὶ ^{ἐκ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως} ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθῇ καὶ σώζοιτο
 10 ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα)· ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστιχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους· καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθείας τοῖς τε ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις·

29. γλυκύ, ut legitur et apud ipsum poetam citatum (Eurip. Or. 234) et E. E. 1235a, 16. Rhet. 1371a, 28, mg. Bas.^a (fors. recte) || 30. ὁ secl. Spengelius (perperam) || ἡ post καὶ om. Π² || ἡ post φύσις aut secludendum aut in ἡμῶν mutandum esse ci. Rassovius: fort. non illud, sed hoc praestat || 32. περὶ μὲν — 34. ἐροῦμεν secludenda esse ci. Asp. vel alii ap. Asp., secl. Rr. || 34. καὶ om. ΓΚ^b O^b Hel. Ar. || ἐροῦμεν c. c. Hel. Ar., ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν καὶ ποῖόν τι καὶ τίς ὁ φίλος Π² Fr.

Lib. VIII. K^b O^b = Π¹, ΓΜ^b Ald. = Π².

1155a, 5. ἂν ἔλοιτο M^b Ald. Asp. Hel. || 11. δὲ Turnebus || 12. δέ] δεῖ L^b O^b || 14. βοήθεια H^a M^b, βοηθεῖ Par. 1417 Bk. Fr. Rr. et pr. N^b (crx. rc.).

chap. I. The discussion of friendship is justified here first on the ground of its connection with virtue, secondly on the ground that it is a means to happiness in all conditions of life.

4. ἀρετή τις. There is here no reference to that harmonious manner in society, the mean between flattery and moroseness called φιλία (II. 7. 13) but afterwards (IX. 6. 4) said to be nameless and to be devoid of the feeling of affection.

28. and the height of justice appears to be of the nature of friendship.

30. This popular opinion is considerably modified on further examination (IX. 19. 6)

31. 'And some think that the term "good friend" is convertible with that of "good man".'

2. *οὐκ ὁρίσασθαι* - not limiting their view to the phenomena of friendship itself but bringing in the analogies of the whole of nature. Aristotle sets aside such speculations as not belonging to Ethics.

σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένω... 15

καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ προᾶξαι δυνατότεροι. φύσει τε ἐννιπάρχειν
 ὅκειν πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι [καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆ-
 σαν τῷ γεννηθέντι], οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι
 καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλ-
 ληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους 20
 ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ^{travelling} πλαναῖς ὡς οἰκεῖον
 ἅπας ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπου καὶ φίλον. ὅκειν δὲ καὶ τὰς πό-
 λεις συνέχειν ἢ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν
 σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἢ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίον τι τῇ
 φιλίᾳ ὅκειν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστα ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στα- 25
 σιν ἐχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελεύουσιν. καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων
 οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας,
 καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον
 δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους
 ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἢ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι εἶναι, 30
 καὶ ἐνιοι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἶονται ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.
 διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν 2
 γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους,
 ὅθεν τὸν ὁμοίον φασιν ὡς τὸν ὁμοιον, καὶ κολοῖον ποτὶ κο-
 λοῖον, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας 35
 τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀλλήλοις φασιν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων 1155b
 ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσιν καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων
 ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρον γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν
 πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ
^{theophrasti conclusion}
ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἀρ- 5

17. πρὸς — καὶ om. K^b, καὶ secl. Casaubonus Fr. || πρὸς
 (πρὸς om. Ald.) — γεννηθέντι add. K^b O¹ Ald. Ar., om. c. c.
 Asp. et Hel., secl. Casaubonus Fr. || 18. ὁρνέοις M^b Ald. || 26.
 ἐχθραν K^b Hel., ἐχθρὰν cet. Ar. || 29. δ'] δὲ Ald. Hel., τε L^b O^b ||
 φιλοφίλους Γ L^b Ald. Hel. Ar., φίλους cet. || 31. καὶ ἐνιοι Γ M^b
 Hel. Ar.(?), ἔτι καὶ ἐνιοι Ald., καὶ ἔτι Π¹ L^b || 34. ποτὶ παρ
 L^b, παρὰ O^b || 35. τὰ] ὅσα Π² Hel. Bk. Rr. || 1155b, 4. εἰς Π¹
 Ald. Rr. (errore typogr.).

μονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δὲ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ
 10 ἀνῆκει εἰς τὰ ἥδη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτα ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσιν γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷον τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἔστιν ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπιστεύνασιν σημείω· δέχεται γὰρ
 15 τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. [εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.] (εἰρημα)

τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον. δόξειε δ' ἂν χρή-
 20 σιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τὰγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τὰγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἕκαστῳ
 25 δὲ τὸ ἕκαστῳ. φιλεῖ δὲ ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὃν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαίνόμενον. τριῶν δὲ ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύ-
 3 χων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ σφῆζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς
 30 ἔχη)· τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.

8. παρείσθω M^bN^b, παραφείσθω Ald. || 15. τὸ ἥττον καὶ ἥττον L^bO^b† || εἴρηται — 16. ἔμπροσθεν secl. Rr. (fors. recte) || 17. περὶ αὐτῶν post φανερόν M^b Ald. || 20. φιλητόν K^bL^b Fr. || 21. ἂν εἴη] εἶναι K^b Fr. || 23. αὐτὸ post ἡδὺ add. Π²O^b† || δὲ] δὲ καὶ Π²† || 27. δὴ Spengelius, δ' ΓΠ Ald. Hel. Bk. Fr. Rr. || δι' om. K^b, secl. Fr. Rr. (fors. recte), c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || ἐπὶ] ἐν K^bM^b Ald. Hel.(?) || 29. ἐκείνοις Spengelius, ἐκείνων <ἕνεκα> ci. Rr. || ἀγαθοῦ secl.(?) Scaliger.

For they who think that there is only one species of friendship, because it admits of degrees, must to an insufficient proof. For things also that differ in species admit of degrees. — Aristotle shows immediately that there are three distinct species of friendship in accordance with the three objects of liking. Friendships for pleasure or profit are less friendships than that for the good. All three kinds admit of the idea (λόγος) of good: that they agree in genus and are comparable in point of degree.

• For in that case the object of liking will be an apparent and not an absolute good object

14. But we add the proviso that this good feeling is not unknown?

And one of these latter might reciprocate the feeling

16. [read ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν] - 'not by reason of the existence of the person
who is loved, but by reason of his being useful or pleasant.'

- 25 καὶ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνν δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων. ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ᾧσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
- 30 γὰρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὔτοι ζῶσιν, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσιν τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται
- 35 φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἢ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἢ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρω-
1156b τικοί δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ
5 συζῆν οὔτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν οὕτως.
- 4 τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίω. οὔτοι γὰρ τάγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ εἰσιν καθ' αὐτούς· οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τάγαθὰ
10 τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι (δι' αὐτούς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσιν, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾧσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον· καὶ ἔστιν ἐκότερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ. οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς·
15 καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκαστὸν γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,

26. καὶ νέων secl. Gifanius || 27. οὐδὲ om. L^bO^b, c. c. add. Hel. || 28. δὴ post προσδέονται M^b, om. K^b, secl. Fr. † || 30. εἰς — 31. τιθέασιν secl. Rr. || 1156b, 2. δ'] γρ. γὰρ Asp. || 3. τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς M^b et v. l. ap. Asp. || 5. τὴν om. L^bM^b Ald. Bk. || 8. ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις βούλονται Π², βούλονται σὺν ἀλλήλοις K^b || 9. ἀγαθοὶ δὲ om. L^bO^b † || 15. οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις L^b Ald. Hel. †.

8. The friend being other self, the delight of friendship is that it gives an increased sense of existence.

19. For every friendship is for good or for pleasure, either absolute or else relative to the person who feels the ~~pleasure~~ is doing, and only bearing a certain resemblance to the absolutely good or pleasureable. καὶ ὁ ἐφ' ᾧ οὐδὲν ἔστι - (1) friendship implies similarity, i.e. (2) every friendship, whether the genuine type or one of the secondary and reflected species, aims at either good or pleasure. (see cap. H. 4)

20. But this friendship has all the specified qualities essentially, belonging to the persons who feel it (καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων) - (I say essentially, for even the other kinds of friendship are resemblances of this (the perfect kind). [Aristotle here reads οὐσία].

21. For indeed can they be satisfied that they are friends at all

II)

7 τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. || ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία
μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν. συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα
τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστίν
ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα 20
τινά· ταύτη δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς
(ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ λοιπά), τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν καὶ
ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά, καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν
8 δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. — || σπανίας δ'
εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσ- 25
δεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ
ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλλας συναναλῶ-
σαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν
9 ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως
τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, 30
οὐκ εἰσὶν δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ ^{ῥηστέως} φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν
γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὐ.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ 5
τελεία ἐστίν, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἑκα-
IV τέρω παρ' ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν· ἡ δὲ 35
διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδέεις 1157a
ἀλλήλοις), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον (καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦ-

17. αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ L^bM^b Ar., αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ Hel., αὐταὶ K^b,
τοιαῦται ἢ ΓO^b Ald. || ἡ — 24. ἀρίστη alteram recensionem
esse antecedentium 11. διαμένει — 17. ὅμοιαι docuit Rasso-
vius || δὴ Gifanius || 18. μόνιμος] τελεία vel simile quid ci. Rr. ||
19. τοῖς φίλοις post δεῖ Π² || πᾶσα — 23. ἐστίν secl. Rr. || 21.
αὐτὸ M^b, αὐτὰ Muretus (non recte) || 22. ταύτη — λοιπὰ seclu-
denda esse ci. Muretus || γὰρ ὅμοιοι ΓK^b Asp., γὰρ ὅμοια c. c.
et Hel.(?) et Ar. Bk. Rr. in textu, δὲ ὅμοια v. l. ap. Asp.
23. ἡδὺ post ἀπλῶς L^bO^b || δὲ M^bO^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. ||
24. δὲ] δὴ ci. Rr. (fors. recte), δὲ <δὴ>? Susem. || 27. συναλῶσαι
L^bM^b Hel. † || 28. δεῖ ΓL^bM^b, δὲ O^b || ἂν add. O^b || 32. γὰρ]
οὖν Π² Fr. † || 34. ταῦτα Muretus et Victorius (in mg. Aldi-
nae Monacensis), ταῦτα Π²L^b Hel. Ar., om. Π¹ || ὅμοια Γ Ar.,
ὁμοία ΠH^aN^b Ald. Hel. || 1157a, 2. ἡ Turnebus, οἱ ΠH^aN^b
Ald. Ar. || οὗτοι Π¹ †.

τοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί). μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φι-
 λία διαμένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον
 5 ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον
 τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκείνων, ὃ
 δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας
 ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ
 10 ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία). πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμέ-
 νουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἥθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοῖοι
 ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἥδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ
 χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἥττον φίλοι καὶ δια-
 μένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμ-
 15 φέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ
 λυσιτελοῦς. — δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ
 φεύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς
 φεύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῶν, δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι
 μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ
 20 μὴ τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. — καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 φιλία ἀδιαβλήτος ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ
 τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑπ' αὐτῶν δεδοκιμασμένου. καὶ τὸ πι-
 στεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα
 ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλία ἀξιοῦται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις
 25 οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. — ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ἄνθρωποι
 λέγουσιν φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις
 (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ
 συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥς-

3. οἱ H^aM^bN^b Ald. Hel., om. Π¹L^b || 4. μένουσιν Π¹ ||
 αὐτὸ c. c. Hel., ἴσον Π² Ar. || 7. ἐρῶν M^b Ald., ὁρῶν c. c.
 Hel. Ar. || 9. ἐνίοτε secl. Rr. || οὐκ <ἔτι> ἔστιν Ar. Coraes,
 οὐκ ἐτι Rr. || ἡδεῖα post ἡ ὄψις Π² || 13. ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς
 secludenda esse ci. Susem. || 14. δὲ] γὰρ ci. Susem. || 17. εἶναι
 post ἀλλήλοις Π²K^b Fr. || 22. ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ΓL^b Fr., ὑφ' αὐτοῦ
 K^b || 24. ἑτεραίαις K^b, ἄλλαις ἐταιρίαις O² Ald., ἄλλαις L^b,
 ἑτέραις aut ἄλλαις Γ Ar., ἑτέραις c. c. Hel. || 25. δὲ M^b et, ut
 videtur, Asp. Hel., γὰρ c. c. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr., οὖν Zwinger.

13. Are both friends in a less degree and are less abiding

14. He who is, either good nor bad may be a friend either to the good or to the bad or to him who is neither one nor the other.

15. And the sayings about 'having faith' and that the friend 'could never wrong one' and all the other points which are demanded in ideal friendship, are realized in the friendship of the good. But in the other kinds nothing prevents such estrangements arising.

32. For so far as (these kinds of friendship exhibit) something good and resembling the good, so far (those who exercise them) are friends.
33. But the above mentioned kinds of friendship do not always coincide, nor do the same men become friends for the sake of the useful as for the sake of the ~~pleasant~~ pleasant. For things only accidentally connected are not always found together.
34. In this respect, as affording and seeking pleasure and utility, being like the good.
35. 'do not exercise friendship, though they have all the disposition to exercise it'. Notice ἐπεὶ οὐκ οἶον... ἔχοντες

IV)

περ οἱ παῖδες, ἕως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς
 τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ ³⁰
 κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ'
 ὁμοιότητα· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιον ταύτῃ, φίλοι·
⁵ καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὐταὶ
 συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
 καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμ- ³⁵
⁶ βεβηκός. — εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημέ- ⁶ ^{1157b}
 νης οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσι-
 μον, ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ
 ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμ-
 βεβηκός καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωθῆναι τούτοις. ⁵

V

ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέρ-
 γειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συ-
 ζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσιν ἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύ-
 δοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι ^{καὶ μακρότατον} τοῖς τοποῖς οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ'
 ἔχουσιν ὥστ' <ἄν> ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι ¹⁰
 τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπου-
 σία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
 πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.

² οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶ-
 ναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συ- ¹⁵

29. μὲν δεῖ λέγειν Γ^L Ald., δεῖ λέγειν M^b || 30. καὶ post
 μὲν om. O^b Ald., c. c. add. Asp. Hel. Ar. || 32. ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ]
 ἀγαθῷ τινι ci. Coraes || ὅμοιον τι ταύτῃ Π² K^b Fr., ὅμοιον τι
 <ταύτῃ>, ταύτῃ ci. Rr. (non male) † || 33. τι post ἀγαθόν add.
 Π² Ar. || 35. διὰ τὸ om. M^b Ald. Ar. || τὰ] ἀλλὰ M^b O^b † ||
 1157b, 1. κατανεμεμένης L^b O^b, νενεμημένης c. c. Asp. || 3.
 φίλοι om. K^b, secl. Fr., c. c. add. Hel. et; ut videtur, Asp. ||
 10. ὥστ' <ἄν> Onckenius Rr., ὥστε καὶ L^b, ὥστε καὶ ci. Rr. ||
 ἐνεργεῖν] ἔχειν ci. Fr. (male) || 12. γίνηται K^b Asp., γένηται
 L^b M^b O^b Ald. Hel. || λήθην δοκεῖ (δοκῇ[?] Asp.) ποιεῖν K^b Asp.
 Fr., λήθην ποιεῖν δοκεῖ O^b || 14 sqq. οὐ κ. τ. λ.] v. quae ad-
 notabo ad 1158a, 1 || 15. προσημερεύειν K^b, συνημερεύειν M^b,
 συνδιημερεύειν(?) Asp., συνημερεύειν c. c. Hel.

νημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὖνοις ὁμοίᾳσι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔστιν φίλων ὥς τὸ συζῆν·
 20 ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συννημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονῶταις μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει. συνδιαγείναι δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστιν μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἔταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν.
 7 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἔστι φιλία ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ 4
 26 πολλάκις εἴρηται. δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἅμφω ταῦτα. [(ἔοικεν δ' ἡ μὲν φί- 5
 λησις πάθει, ἢ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἢ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἥττον
 30 πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀπ' ἔξεως).] καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔξιν *
 καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὃ φίλος. ἐκάτερος
 35 οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσιν τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἢ ἰσότης.
 1158a μάλιστα δὴ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. — || ἐν δὲ τοῖς v
 στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἥττον γίνεται ἢ φιλία, ὅσῳ

17. μὲν Π² H^a, om. Π¹ L^b || 20. συννημερεύειν Asp. || 23. ὅπερ — 24. ἔχειν secl. Rr. || 27. ἢ c. c. Hel., καὶ K^b Asp. (?) Ar. Fr. || ἐκάστῳ — 28. ἀγαθὸς om. K^b Fr., c. c. add. Asp. Hel. Ar. || 28. ἀγαθῷ δι' c. c. Asp. Hel. Ar., δ' ἀγαθῷ K^b Fr. || εἔοικεν — 31. ἔξεως post 32. ἔξιν tri. Rassovius || 34. γινόμενος K^b, γενόμενος cet. Hel. || 35. τε post τό K^b, om. O^b || 36. ἡδεῖ (quod leg. etiam Asp. Hel. Ar.) corruptum, εἶδει Γ et pr. L^b vix melius, ἀληθεῖ ci. Vermehrenus || ἢ om. K^b, secl. Fr., nescio an recte, c. c. add. Hel. || 1158a, 1. δὴ] δὲ Gifanius || ἐν — 10. φιλικὰ alteram recensioem esse antecedentium 1157b, 14. οὐ — 24. ἔχειν intellexit Fr., utrum recte secluserit an potius priora illa secludenda sint, cum Rassovio in medio relinquo || 2. πρεσβύταις? Spengelius.

27. And this (-pleasure and sympathy) seems the property of companionship.

28. Now the good man is a friend to the good man for the sake of both these things: i.e.

the absolutely {good or the {absolutely} good.
pleasant or the {relatively} good.

29. Loving is like an emotion, but friendship is like a settled disposition of the mind. For loving exists just as well towards inanimate objects: but when men reciprocate friendship it implies purpose and purpose proceeds from a settled disposition of the mind. — In Eth. IV. 6. 5 (c.p. II. 5. 2) Aristotle makes friendship to be an emotion, or characterised by emotion. This passage does not contradict it, as "E.F." is merely the result of regulated emotions and the tendency to reproduce them.

30. Each of the two then loves that which is a personal good to himself, as & he makes an equal return both in wishing good and in (actual) pleasure.

11. It is not possible to be a friend to many men on the footing of the perfect-kind of friendship, just as one cannot be in love with many at the same time. For the perfect friendship is a sort of excess of feeling, which naturally arises towards one person alone; again, it is not easy for many persons to be intensely pleasing to the same individual, and perhaps not easy that many should be good. ὑπερβολή = 7n. abandon - a giving up of one's whole self.

26. And perhaps (in seeking friends) one ought to require that even good men should have this qualification (= pleasantness), and moreover not in a merely universal way, but relatively to oneself.

28. 'Make use of their friends separately' - i.e. they keep one set, - friends for profit or business, and another for pleasure.

I)

δυσκολώτεροί εἰσιν καὶ ἤττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα
 γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ
 νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ γί- 5
 νονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυ-
 φνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις (βούλονται
 γὰρ τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας). φίλοι δ' οὐ
 πάνυ εἰσὶν διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεῦν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις,
 2 ἃ δὴ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. — || πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον 10
 κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐρᾶν
 πολλῶν ἅμα· ἔοικεν γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτον δὲ πρὸς ἓνα
 πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφό-
 3 δρα οὐ ῥᾶδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπει-
 ρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. 15
 διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχε-
 ται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπη-
 4 ρεσίαι. — τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν
 ταῦτα ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς
 αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν 20
 ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον· ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων.
 καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ.
 συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονται τισιν, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν
 χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ
 τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦ- 25
 σιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς <καθ' ἑαυτοὺς> τοιούτους ὄντας,
 καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. —
 5 οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοι φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς

3. ταῦτα — 4. φιλίας secl. Rr. || 13. πολλοῖς L^b M^b † || ἀρέ-
 σκειν post σφόδρα K^b Fr. || 14. ἀγαθοὺς Π¹ M^b Hel., ἀγαθοῖς
 L^b Fr., ἀγαθὸν Γ Ald. Asp. Ar. Thomas Aquinas || εἶναι] ἦν
 Thomas || 16. πολλοὺς c. Rr. || 18. φιλία Rr. et, ut videtur,
 Asp. et Argyropylus (fors. recte) || 19. ἀπ' K^b M^b Fr., nescio
 an recte || 22. δὲ add. Γ L^b Ar. || 24. αὐτὸ Γ K^b M^b Asp. Hel.,
 αὐ L^b O^b Ald. || 26. ἀγαθοὺς <καθ' ἑαυτοὺς> Rassovius, καθ'
 αὐτοὺς Muretus || 27. αὐτοῖς Ald. Hel. Ar., αὐτοῖς c. c. Bk. Fr.
 Rr. || ὑπάρξει post αὐτοῖς Π² L^b.

φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσι χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἄμφω δ' (V)
 30 οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρη-
 σίμους εἰς τὰ καλὰ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμε-
 νοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινούς ** πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν· ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνν
 γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπου-
 δαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἂν μὴ
 35 καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον
 ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνν δ' εἰώθασιν τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

1158b 8 εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλῖαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ 7
 αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἣ ἕτε-
 ρον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἀντικαταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδοιγὴν ἀντ' ὥφε-
 λείας. ὅτι δ' ἥττον εἰσὶν αὗται φιλῖαι καὶ μένουσιν,
 5 εἴρηται. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα
 ταύτου εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλῖαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ
 τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλῖαι (ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει
 ἣ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κἀκείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν
 μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως
 10 μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φι-
 λῖαι δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης. ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος
 τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυ-
 τέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρ-
 χοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσιν δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων·
 15 οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσιν πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρ-

29. αὐτοί pr. K^b (em. corr.²) || [εἰσι] εἰσιν εἰ pr. K^b, εἰσιν
 οἱ O^b et corr.² K^b † || 32. <εἰς τὸ> πρᾶξαι Rassovius, an
 <τοῦ> πρᾶξαι? Susem. || ἐπιταχθέν <τοῦ χρησίμου> ci. Bergius ||
 33. ὅτι om. K^bM^b || 35. κατ' ἀρετὴν vel [καὶ] τῇ ἀρετῇ Co-
 raes (male: subiectum est ὁ τοιοῦτος) || 36. <ὑπερέχων καὶ>
 ὑπερεχόμενος olim ci. Rassovius, <ὁ> ὑπερεχόμενος Fr. (per-
 peram, v. la. p. 91) || γενέσθαι ci. Rr. || 1158b, 2. ἐπ' L^b
 Ald. || 3. καταλλάττονται K^bM^b, ἀντικαταλλάττονται c. c. Hel. ||
 4. δ' L^b Ald. † || αὗται] αἱ τοιαῦται L^b † || αἱ post
 αὗται add. M^bO^b Ald. Bk., c. c. om. Asp., secl. Fr. Rr. || 5.
 καὶ post δὲ om. Π¹, secl. Fr. (fors. recte) || 9. καὶ μόνιμον post
 εἶναι M^b Ald. || 14. καὶ ante αὗται Asp., om. ΓL^bM^bO^b
 Hel. Ar.

3. Now we have already said that the good man is both useful and pleasant at once. But such a man does not become a friend to his superior (in rank) unless he be surpassed (by that superior) in virtue also. For he does not find himself in that position of equality which is produced by superiority in proportion to merit. Such persons however as potentates who surpass the good in virtue are not produced every day. — Thus equality is not produced by one man having all the merit and the other all the power: but proportionate equality is produced by each man having in proportion to his merits.

23. *ἔκδος* - Where friends are not equal their friendship must be regulated by force.

29. But equality seems to stand differently in justice and in friendship. In justice proportionate equality is primary, and quantitative equality secondary: in friendship quantitative equality is the first and proportionate equality, the second consideration - Justice cares little about bringing men to quantitative equality: this, at all events is aimed at only in democracies while the proportionate equality belongs to aristocracies and constitutional governments. Friendship on the other hand begins by presupposing equality between the parties, and notwithstanding the principle of proportionate affection, a wide interval of inequality will render friendship altogether impossible.

4. For after many deductions (from equality) have been made, the friendship still abides: but when the one friend is far removed from the other as for instance, God is from man there is no friendship any longer.

VII)

χομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἑτερα δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτὰ φιλοῦσιν· ἑτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.

2 ταῦτά μὲν δὴ οὕτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὕτε δεῖ 20
ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ αὐτοῖς δεῖ τοῖς
γεννήσασιν, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν αὐτοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἡ
τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πά-
σαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὖσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν
δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, 25
καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως·
ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεται πως
ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

3 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ 9
φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον 30
πρώτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν
4 δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', εἰς πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς
ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσίν,
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖ- 35
στον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ 1159a
πολὺν καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ μη-
5 δυνάμει ἀξιοί. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρί-
σμός, ^{ὡς τίνος} [οἱ] φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι
6 μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ 5
ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ
μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι
ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ^{ἀγαθὰ} οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθὰ. εἰ

21. α — 22. υἱέσιν om. M^b, 22. υἱέσιν om. K^b, secl. Fr. † |
33. τὸ ante διάστημα add. M^b Asp. Hel. (?) Fr. || γίνηται L^b M^b
Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 1159a, 3. τοῖς om. O^b Ald. || 4. ἕως — φίλοι
secludenda esse suspicatur Rr. || οἱ secl. Rr. || 7. οὐδὲ L^b O^b Ald.
Bk. Fr. Rr. || 8. οἱ] ἢ ci. Zwinger || ἀγαθὰ L^b M^b O^b Ald. Fr.

δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ
 10 ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνος· ἀνθρώπων
 δὲ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα
 αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰγαθὰ.

οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι
 μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν (διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος
 15 γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος <εἶναι> καὶ μᾶλ-
 λον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι)· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ
 τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δι' αὐτὸ δ' εἰκόασιν
 αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. χαίρουσι
 γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι
 20 διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἶονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἂν του
 δέωνται· ὡς δὴ σημείῳ τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσιν τῇ τιμῇ)·
 οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βε-
 βαῖωσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν. χαίρουσιν
 δὴ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.
 25 τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖτ-
 τον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ
 εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι 3
 εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔναιαι
 γὰρ διδόασιν τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν μὲν εἰδύναι,
 30 ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἔαν ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται,
 ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς εἴκειν εἶναι ἔαν ὀρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας,
 καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προσή-
 10 κει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας 4
 οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων
 35 ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν εἴκειν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν,

9. δὲ ci. Rr. || 10. ἐκεῖνος] ἐκεῖνον ci. Coraes || 11. δὲ] δὴ
 Zwinger || εἶναι ante ἀγαθὰ add. ΓΜ^b Ald., post ἀγαθὰ L^b O^b,
 om. K^b Hel. Ar. || 15. εἶναι add. Sylburgius || 16. δὲ] γὰρ?
 Susem. || 23. ἐφίενται (καὶ add. L^b) post περὶ αὐτῶν Π² L^b || 32.
 μὴ δύνωνται τῇ μητρὶ αἱ προσήκει ἀπονέμειν Π² L^b Ar. || 33.
 ἄνοιαν K^b L^b || 35. ἀρετῇ Bk. Rr. et pr. K^b, ἀρετὴ εἶναι M^b,
 ἀρετὴ c. c. Hel. Ar. et corr.^a K^b.

of them it has been rightly said that the friend is not a man
to grow to us but that friends are it will be necessary to
that friend to grow as he is, and to be able to bring
a man, the greatest good.

— That is, no human friendship can be utterly disinterested
selfless. See IX. cap. 8.

Though the essence of friendship consists in loving rather than
being loved, the mass of men prefer the latter as ministering
to their vanity. Being loved is akin to being honored. We
desire that honor is sought not for itself but on account
of things variously associated with it — (1) to be honored
the great affords hope of promotion. (2) to be honored by the
wise and good is an evidence to men of their own worth.
The honor is desired as a means to the consciousness of virtue.

It is this active spirit of love which constitutes the virtue of
friendship and it causes us to praise those who are of a
friendly disposition.

friendship is based on equality and similarity, as in the case of the good.

2. Friendship is based on equality and similarity, as in the case of the good. Friendship is for those who are equal in the good, as e.g. in the community of rich and poor. But after all one would not say that the courtier sees its contrary (but that the courtier is to be) (see 5-7)

25. 'about the same things and in the same persons'

οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. — οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ 1159b
 ἄνισοι μάλιστα εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζονται γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης
 καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
 μένουσιν, καὶ οὕτε δέονται φανύλων οὐδ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, 5
 ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ'
 αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μο-
 χθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμέ-
 νουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι,
 χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς 10
 ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ
 ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ
 τὸ χρησίμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὲς
 εἰδότε· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὢν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀν-
 τιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστήν καὶ 15
 ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ
 ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὥς φιλοῦσιν·
 ὁμοίως δὲ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιοτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον
 ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναν-
 τίου καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ 20
 μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ὑγρῷ οὐ ξηρῷ γε-
 νέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ὁμοίως.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω (καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀλλοτριώ- 11
 τερα). ἔοικεν δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ 25
 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἀπάσῃ
 γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσ-

1159b, 1. τούτων] τῶν τοιούτων Π² L^b + || 7. ὑπηρετεῖν
 post ἐπιτρέπειν add. Π² Hel. Ar., ὑπηρετεῖ add. L^b || 11. ἡ]
 καὶ O^b Ald. † || 12. ὠφελῶσιν O^b † || 18. ὅμως Γ L^b, ὁμοίως c. c.
 Hel. Ar. || δὲ Γ O^b, γὰρ Hel. Ar., nescio an recte || 20. τοῦ
 om. L^b M^b || 21. ὑγρῷ οὐ ξηρῷ Π¹ Asp., ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ Π² L^b
 Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || γίνεσθαι L^b M^b || 27. προσαγορεύουσιν Γ
 Ald. Ar.

αγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρα-
 τιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ'
 30 ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
 δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων", ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοι-
 νωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστιν δὲ ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἐταίροις
 πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀπωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
 πλείω τοῖς δὲ ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μάλ-
 35 λον αἱ δ' ἦττον. διαφέρει καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ
 1160a τὰντὰ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
 οὐδ' ἐταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων, καὶ 3
 αὕξησιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρή-
 5 ματα ἀποστειρῆσαι ἐταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ
 βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντιν οὖν
 ἄλλον. αὕξασθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δί-
 καιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα.

αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοίκασιν τῆς πολιτικῆς. συμ- 4
 10 πορεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινὶ συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοι τι τῶν
 εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος
 χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν. τού-
 του γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι
 τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη 5
 15 τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφλένται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν
 πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται
 δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πό-
 λεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται·

28. οὖν Γ Ald. Ar., γὰρ L^b, δὲ M^b || 1160a, 3. φίλων Ald.,
 om. Asp. (?), secl. Gifanius || τὰ δίκαια Γ L^b Asp. Ar. et γο. rc.
 K^b, τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα Ald., τὰ ἄδικα καὶ τὰ δίκαια M^b O¹.
 4. μᾶλλον aut secludendum aut ante τῷ transponendum esse ci.
 Spengelius, post πρὸς Zellius || 8. καὶ ἐπ' ἴσων διήκοντα L^b,
 om. pr. K^b (suppl. rc.), secl. Fr. † || 18. ὁμοίως — δημόται post
 20. συνουσίας et 19. εἶναι — 20. συνουσίας + 18. ὁμοίως —
 δημόται post 23. βίον traicienda esse haud recte ci. Muretus.

Justice of necessity becomes more binding as friendship becomes
close, for they exist in the same subject and are co-existent
in their applications.

iv. 'awarding honor to the gods, while providing recreation and pleasure for themselves.

Ch. x. This chapter containing a classification of forms of government and of the persons to whom they are applied, must have been written previous to the Politics, in which the present no changes were introduced in detail and partly modified.

31. $\pi\acute{o}\rho\epsilon\kappa\ \beta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$. In Pol. iii. 6. 11. a form of government is pronounced to be normal as long as it aims at the public good: abnormal where its end is private interest.

6. $\kappa\tau\eta\pi\omega\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ - i.e. no genuine king, but a parvenu

(X) ἔναιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασω-
 τῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν. αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας. 20
 πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκόασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ
 τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἢ πολιτικῇ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς
 ἅπαντα τὸν βίον, θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας
συνόδους, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύ-
σεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ 25
 σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκο-
 μιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον·
 τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς
 πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δ' αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς
 τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις. 30
 X πολιτείας δ' ἔστιν εἶδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβα- 12
 σεις, οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασι-
 λεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν
 τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτεῖαν δ' αὐτὴν
 εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ 35
 βασιλεία, χειρίστη δὲ ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρεκβασίς δὲ βασι-
 λείας μὲν τυραννίς. ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ 1160b
 πλείστον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ,
 ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι βασιλεὺς
 ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ
 τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ 5
 ἂν σκοποῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρω-
τὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς. ἡ δὲ τυραννίς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτη·
 τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύ-

21. δ'] δὲ <καὶ>? Susem. || 23. ** θυσίας? Susem., <διὸ>
 θυσίας — ποιοῦνται Coraes (male), θυσίας — 25. ἡδονῆς post
 28. καιροῖς tri. Bergius (perperam) || τε secl. Muretus || τὰς post
 ταύτας add. K^b L^b Fr. (perperam) † || 24. τιμὰς τε ἀπονέμοντες
 Γ Ald. Fr. Rr. (fors. recte) † || ἀπονέμουσι M^b Ar. || ἑαυτοῖς
 L^b M^b Ald. || 26. γενέσθαι Susem. || 31. καὶ] αἱ L^b, καὶ αἱ O^b † ||
 1160b, 2. ἑαυτοῦ Par. 1417 Ald. Hel. || 7. εἴη O^b, εἴη ἡ cet.
 Hel. Ar. || 8. γὰρ Hel. Ar. Casaub., δὲ ΓΠ Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr.,
 δὴ Thurotus.

της ὅτι χειρόστη· κάκιστον γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ.
 10 μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φανυλότης γάρ³
 ἐστὶ μοναρχίας ἢ τυραννίς, ὃ δὴ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραν-
 νος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν
 ἀρχόντων, οὗ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ
 πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
 15 αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι
 δὴ ἄρχουσιν καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ
 τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται·
 πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι
 πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστὶν ἡ
 20 δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας
 εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλιστα· οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι
 (ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαλίνουσιν)· ὁμοιώτατα⁴
 δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασι-
 25 λείας ἔχει σχῆμα (τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει· ἐν-
 τεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πα-
 τρική γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἢ βασιλεία εἶναι)· ἐν Πέρσαις
 δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική (χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς
 υἱέσι), τυραννική δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους (τὸ γὰρ
 30 τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται· αὕτη μὲν οὖν
 ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόν-
 των γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι)· ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρι-⁵
 στοκρατικὴ φαίνεται (κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ
 περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἀρμόζει,
 35 ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν)· ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλι-
 γαρχίαν μεθίστησιν (παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ
 1161a οὐχ ἡ ἀμείνων), ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναικες ἐπὶ κληροῖ

11. δὴ K^b, δὲ cet. Ar. || 15. πλεῖστον L^b Ald. et pr. K^b
 (crx. re.) || 16. δὲ] δὲ δὴ Π² Bk. Rr. || 31. δ'] δὲ <τῶν παί-
 δων> ci. Rr. || 36. αὐτὸς M^b, αὐτῷ Ald., αὐτῷ Ar., αὐτὸ c. c.
 Hel.

11. 'Those who differ should be governed differently': and so the Persian system (see l. 25) is wrong.

20. 'All these friendships imply superiority on one side: and
since it is that parents are honored' - is because superiority
demands honor as well as love.

οὔσαι, οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦ-
τον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις· τιμοκρα-
τικῇ δὲ ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν (ἴσοι γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον
ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις 5
διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία)· δημοκρατία
δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκίσεων (ἐνταῦθα
γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενῆς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ
ἐκάστῳ ἐξουσία.
I κατ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' 13
ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους 11
ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους,
εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν,
ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέ-
μνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρικὴ, 15
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ
εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. καὶ
τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται. φύσει τε γὰρ ἀρχι-
κὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασι-
λευμένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὐται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶν 20
ταὶ οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ
τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς
γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν
γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλεον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκά-
στῳ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἐται- 25
ρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιωταί, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δὲ ὁμοπα-

1161a, 2. γίνεται — ἡ ἀρχή ci. Rr. (haud male) || διὰ]
κατὰ K^b Fr. || 6. δημοκρατία K^b Fr., δημοκρατία c. c. Hel. Ar.,
δημοκρατικὴ ci. Rr. || 13. εὖ πράσσωσιν L^b O^b, εὐπραγῶσιν M^b ||
15. εἶπεν om. K^b, secl. Fr. Rr., nescio an recte || 17. εἶναι
ante δοκοῦντος K^b Asp. Hel. Ar., post μεγίστου L^b O^b Ald.,
utrobique ΓM^b || καὶ τοῖς — 18. προσνέμεται secludenda esse ci.
Rr. || 18. ἀπονέμεται M^b Ald. Asp. Hel. Bk. Rr. et γρ. re. K^b
(fors. recte) || γὰρ om. Π¹ Bk. Rr. (suppl. re. K^b) || 22. γὰρ ἂν
καὶ Π² || 25. δὴ Thurotus, δὲ ΓΠ Ald. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. ||
26. ὁμομαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ΓO^b Hel., ὁμοήθεις καὶ ὁμομαθεῖς

- θεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔοικεν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ
κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν. ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ
^{ἐπιεικεῖς} εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὲ
30 καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐστὶ, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν
τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς
γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστιν τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ [τῷ] ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ
φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ὄργανον
35 καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελει-
1161b ται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ'
οὐκ ἔστιν πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον
ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν·
ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦ-
5 λος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἄν-
θρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς
πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμον καὶ συνθήκης, καὶ
φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς
τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρα-
10 τiais ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.
14 ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρη-
ται· ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἐται-
ρικήν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοικαί,
καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς εἰκάσι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ

L^b M^b N^b, ὁμοήθεις καὶ ὁμοιοπαθεῖς Asp. Ald. † || 27. δὲ Γ L^b O^b Bk. Fr., δὲ c. c. Asp. || 28. βούλονται post 29. ἐπιεικεῖς L^b O^b, βουλεύονται pr. K^b (em. corr.¹), φαίνονται M^b || 29. δὲ τὸ M^b Ald. Ar. || 31. ἐστὶ om. K^b Hel.(?), secl. Fr., id quod haud displicet Ramsauero (nescio an recte) || 33. ἐστὶ ante κοινόν L^b, om. O^b || τῷ post καὶ om. Π¹ Ald. Asp. Hel., secl. Fr. || 35. καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον secl. Rr. || 1161b, 1. πάντα] πάντα καὶ Par. 1417, καὶ M^b, om. L^b || 3. ἢ c. c. Hel. Ar., οὐδὲ Π¹ || 7. νόμον] καὶ νόμον K^b Fr. || 8. φιλία Ar. Rr., φιλίας Γ Π Ald. Bk. Fr. || δὲ καὶ L^b O^b, δὲ τὸ Ald., δὲ Ar. || 10. πλεῖον K^b Fr. || εἰσοίσουσιν ἴσοις οὖσιν Γ, εἰσοίσουσιν L^b, ἴσοις οὖσιν c. c. Asp. Hel. Ar.

28. Βούνοται - of a natural tendency.
29. ἐπικηρῆς - see note.

10. 'For though all these things receive benefit from those who make use of them, yet neither friendship nor just ice is possible towards inanimate objects' - The instrument receives just so much care from its master as will keep it in proper condition for the exercise of its functions: and so the slave. Friendship and justice imply the recognition of personality: they imply treating men not as instruments but as ends in themselves.

11. In saying that all friendships imply concert of interests, an exception is to be made of the friendships of relations and companions, which depend on feeling rather than on any sort of compact.

31. For their identity with the parents identifies them with one another.

1. But cousins and all other relations get their bond of union from these (the 6 others): for it depends on their coming from the same stock

I) καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τὰς 15
 2 ξειεν ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνε-
 ται πολυειδῆς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς·
 οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσιν τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα,
 τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον
 δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ 20
 τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνωκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ
 τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον
 τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἶον ὁδοὺς θριξὶ ὅτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι, ἐκείνω δὲ οὐδὲν
 τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἦττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οὐ μὲν
 γὰρ εὐθύς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρό- 25
 νοῖς τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ
 3 δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν
 τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἶον ἕτεροι
 αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πε-
 φνυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφνυκέ- 30
 ναι· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταῦτοποιεῖ·
 ὅθεν φασὶν ταῦτόν αἷμα καὶ ῥίξαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰσὶν
 4 δὴ ταῦτό πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν
 καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἡλιξ γὰρ ἡλικά,
 καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἐταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἐταιρικῇ 35
 ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων 1162a
 συνωκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ'

17. ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ c. c. Asp., καὶ ἡρτῆσθαι Π² K^b Hel. Ar.
 Fr. || 23. ὁδοὺς θριξὶ ὅτιοῦν K^b O^{1.3}. Fr., θριξὶ ὁδοὺς ὅτιοῦν L^b
 O^b, ὁδοὺς ἢ θριξὶ ὅτιοῦν Ald., ὁδοὺς ἢ θριξὶ ἢ ὅτιοῦν Γ M^b
 Hel.(?) Bk. Rr., ὁδοὺς καὶ θριξὶ καὶ ὅτιοῦν Ar. || τῷ ἔχοντι om.
 pr. K^b, secl. Fr., c. c. add. Hel. Ar. et rc. K^b || ἐκείνων δ'
 οὐδενὶ O^b Ald. Ar., ἐκείνων δ' οὐδὲν Asp., ἐκείνω δ' (δὲ K^b)
 οὐδὲν c. c. Hel. || 24. τὸ Γ K^b L^b Hel. Ar., τῷ M^b O^b Asp., om.
 Ald. || 25. γενώμενα L^b, γεννάμενα M^b et corr.² K^b, γεννόμενα (?)
 Hel. || προελθόντος χρόνου K^b O³ || 27. οὖν c. c. Hel., γὰρ M^b
 Ald. Ar., om. Γ(?) || 31. ἀλλήλους ci. Camerarius || ταυτοποιεῖ
 Ald. Bk.², ταῦτό ποιεῖ M^b O^b, τοῦτο ποιεῖ K^b || 32. ὁθεν] διό
 M^b Ald. Hel. || 33. δὲ c. c. Hel. Ar., δὴ K^b, om. O^b || 1162a,
 2. συνοικεοῦνται L^b O^b Ar., συνωκείωνται c. c. Hel.

οὐ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οὐ δ' ἄλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω
 τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. ἔστιν δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις
 5 (καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς), ὥς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον·
 εὖ γὰρ πέποιθήκασιν τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι
 αἵτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ
 ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων,
 ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ
 10 ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ εταιρικῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς
 ἐπιεικέσιν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ
 γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέ-
 στεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες
 ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ
 15 βεβαιωτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγε-
 νῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ
 φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
 μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία
 πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῳοῖς. τοῖς μὲν οὖν
 20 ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον
 τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν
 βίον· εὐθύς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς
 καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέν-
 τες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ
 25 καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν,
 εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἴεν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἑκατέρον ἀρετῇ, καὶ χαίρουεν ἂν
 τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θάττον
 οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμ-
 φοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ

5. καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς secl. Rr., nescio an recte ||
 ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον K^b, ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχοντα vel ἀγαθοῖς ὑπε-
 ρέχοντα ci. Fr., ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον c. c. Hel. Ar. || 7. καὶ
 post δὲ om. M^b Ald., c. c. add. Hel. || 11. ἐν om. II² L^b || 12.
 ὅσῳ] ὡς ΓM^b† || 16. καὶ ante ἀνδρὶ add. Rr. || 18. ὅσῳ K^b
 Hel. Ar., καὶ ὅσῳ cet. || 19. τοῖς ante ζῳοῖς om. M^b O^b Ald.
 Hel. || 26. γὰρ c. c. Hel. Ar., δὲ ΓM^b || ἐκάτερον Hel. || 29. βιω-
 τέον II¹, βιωτέον ἐστίν L^b, συμβιωτέον c. c. Hel.

portion as their common ancestor is more or less near.

3. πρότερον -- ἀνὰ καὶ ὁπίωτερον. In point of time the family is prior to the state, but in point of idea (νόμος) and essentially (οὐσιαστικῶς) the state is prior. The family is more necessary as a means the state as an end.

10. No one takes it ill that one loves and benefits him, but if he be of gentle mind pays his benefactor back in good deeds.

II)

πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον 30
φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται
τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον
καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

II

τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ^{(N¹. 2. 1. 115 (p. 7))} ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, 15
καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ 35
καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ
ἀμείνων χεῖρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσι- 1162b
μον ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους
μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν,
τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. —
2 γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμφεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ 5
τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνη ἢ μάλιστα εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν
γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δοῶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται
(τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι (τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ
εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἡ χαρεῖς, ἀμύ- 10
νεται εὖ δοῶν· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται,
οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ, ἐκότερος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρε-
3 γεται)· οὐ πάννυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν (ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν
γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιαγείν χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος
δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ 15
4 συνδιημερεύειν)· ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική. ἐπ'
ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται,
καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται
ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ

32. πρὸς post φίλον καὶ add. Rr. (temere) || 34. δὴ Γ Ald.
Hel. Ar. || 36. φίλοι post γίνονται Π² || 1162b, 4. τῷ Γ et corr.
Par. 1417, τὸ ΠΗ^aN^b Ald. et pr. Par. 1417, τῷ τὸ Coraes ||
5. γίνονται M^b Hel. || 10. ἀμείβεται Γ^aN^b Ald. Asp. Hel. Ar. ||
12. ἐκότερος — ὀρέγεται secl. Rr. (nescio an recte) || ἕκαστος
K^bL^b, ἐκότερος c. c. Hel. Ar. || ὀρέγεται] ἐφίεται Π² Hel. Bk.
Rr. (nescio an recte) || 15. μὴ] μὲν N^b, om. M^bO¹⁻³. Par. 1417
Hel. † || 16. συνδιημερεύειν K^bM^bO¹⁻³. Ald. Fr. (nescio an recte).

- 20 δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πά-
 σχοντες δέονται. ἔοικεν δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, 5
 τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ
 χρήσιμον φιλίας ἢ μὲν ἡθικὴ ἢ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται
 οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλιστα ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συ-
 25 ναλλάξωσιν καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἐπὶ 6
 ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ
 δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντι
 τίνος (δῆλον δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα οὐκ ἀμφίλογον,
 φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶν τοῦτων
 30 δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλά-
 ξαντας)· ἡ δ' ἡθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται 7
 ἢ ὀτιδῆποτε ἄλλο. κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεον,
 ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλ- 8
 λάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει
 35 διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλὰ,
 προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα. κατὰ δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ
 1163a ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. δυναμένῳ 9
 δὲ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἐκόντι· ἄκοντα
 γὰρ φίλον οὐκ οἰητέον, ὡς δὲ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ
 καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι'
 5 αὐτοῦ τοῦτο δρωῖντος· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα
 διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν·

23. φιλίας K^b Asp. Hel. Ar., ὠφελείας cet. || 25. δ' ἢ] δὴ Bk. Fr. et pr. K^b, δὲ Γ^L et re. K^b, δὲ aut δ' ἢ Ar. || ἡ post μὲν add. Π¹L^b Bk. Fr., om. M^b Par. 1417 Ald., secl. Rr. || 28. ἀμφίβολον M^bO³ et γρ. O^b, ἀμφίλογον c. c. Hel. || 29. φιλικὸν pr. K^b, φιλικὴν cet. Ar. et re. K^b || διὸ παρ' c. c. Hel., διόπερ Ald. Ar. et pr. K^b, διόπερ re. K^b, διόπερ παρ' ci. Fr. || οὐκ εἰσὶ post τούτων Π² || 32. ὥτινι δήποτε Γ^M, ὀτιδῆποτε c. c. Hel. Ar. || ἄλλω Π²O^b, ἄλλο c. c. Hel. Ar. || 33. δὲ] δὲ καὶ M^b Ald. || 1163a, 2. καὶ ἐκόντι om. Π¹Fr., c. c. add. Ar. et γρ. mg. re. K^b || 3. οὐκ οἰητέον Rassoivius, οὐ ποιητέον c. c. fontibus Asp. Ar. et editiones || 6. καὶ <γὰρ> Muretus || ὁμολόγησε Victorius et Muretus (haud male, ut iudicat etiam Rr.), ὁμολογήσαι Γ^O 1³. Ald. Fr. et pr. K^b (perperam), ὁμολογήσῃ re. K^b || δ'] μὲν Muretus.

1. Now as justice is twofold the one is given the other according to law so also is utility in friendship there appears to be two branches the one moral & the other legal. The complaint then which arises chiefly takes place when men do not conclude their connection in the same branch in which they began it: when they enter with a fixed stipulation of certain advantages to be received, but this is denied and only a general moral obligation to render services is admitted.

5. That which is on stated conditions there is legal. One sort of it is wholly commercial, in paying pay, not on the spot: another is more liberal, allowing time but still the understanding of a specified return. In this then the debt is plain and undoubted, but the delay is so short that it admits of no friendly. Hence in some states no suits are allowed in cases of this kind, but one thinks that those who have contracted in friendship should abide by the issue.

On the other hand the moral is not on stated conditions, but the gift or whole or else it be, is made as if to a friend. Yet the giver claims to get as much, or more, as though he had given but lent. And if he does not come off in the course then as well as he commenced, he will complain. Now this sort of disappointment takes place because all men most men wish that which is noble but practically choose that which is expedient. It is noble to do good not with a view to receive it back, but it is expedient to be well fitted. In utilitarian friendships a man at one moment thinks very generously of the ~~other~~ (BONDAGE) of doing at the good and noble, and makes a gift as if he expected no return. But presently the more definite but prosaic of his mind returns to the profitable, and the claims to get back as good as he gave.

If one is able then one ought to pay back the full value of what one has received, for one must not make man a friend against his will (i.e. treat him as if he were interested) when he did not really mean to be so. One must not say one has made a mistake at the outset and had received a benefit from one from whom one ought not to have received it that is to say, not from a friend or from one doing a friendly action: one must conclude the business therefore as if one had been benefitted on stipulated conditions.

one's utility:—if one were unable not even the giver would demand it: should it if it is able one should repay. But one might to consider them lost by force or by accident and on what terms, so that one may agree to accept those terms or not.

16. Surely as the friendship is for the sake of utility, the benefit accruing to the recipient is the gauge of what is to be repaid. For the recipient is the asking party, and the other assists him on the understanding that he will receive the same value. The assistance rendered them is exactly so much as the recipient has been benefited: and he ought therefore to repay as much as he has reaped, or more.

24. Differences arising in friendships between a superior and an inferior ought to be settled (say, A.) by the one receiving more money or good, the other receiving more honor.

XIII)

ἀδυνατοῦντα δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ δοὺς ἡξίωσεν ἄν· ὥστ' εἰ δυνατός, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετῆται καὶ ἐπὶ
 10 τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη ἢ μή. — ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ 10
 πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασιν λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἢ μικρὰ ἢν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρύνοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἢ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν 15
 11 κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις. ἄρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρησίμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὥς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσῃν· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἢ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρατο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· 20
 κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρω δ' ἔοικεν ἢ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθους ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει τὸ κύριον.

XIV

mentioned differences
 διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς κατ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις. 16
 ἀξιοὶ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται, 25
 διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλέον ἔχειν (τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον)· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος. ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασιν δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἴονται 30
 γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεής καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι

9. ὑπομένοι M^b, ὑπομένη L^b, ὑπομένηνι rc. K^b, γρ. ὑπομήνη mg. O^b || ἀμφισβήτησιν — 23. κύριον] v. quae adnotabo ad 1164a, 22 sqq. || 14. κατασμικρύνοντες rc. K^b, κατασμικρύνοντες Ald. || 19. ὠφελεῖται ΓL^bM^bO^b† || 20. ἐπηύρατο H^aN^bO^b, ἀπηύρατο L^bM^b, ἐφεύρετο pr. K^b, ἐφεύρατο Ald. et rc. K^b || 28. ὁ om. K^bM^b Ald. || 29. τε male secl. Rr. || 31. πλεῖον ΓL^bO^b Ald., πλέον Hel. || 32. πλέον L^b Hel., πλεῖον ΓO^b Ald., om. M^b†.

τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίω
 35 ἢ δυνάστη φίλον εἶναι, μηδέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν;
 1163b ἔοικεν δὲ ἐκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἐκατέρῳ πλέον
 νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερ-
 έχοντι τιμῆς τῷ δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς
 καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία
 5 τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαί- 3
 νεται. [οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων.
 τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδεται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ
 κοινόν.] οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν
 καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. * ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει·
 10 τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσιν καὶ
 τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ
 σφῆζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνί-
 σοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς
 ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀνταποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.
 15 τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ ἢ φιλίᾳ ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ 4
 γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς
 καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίη, εἰς
 δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ καὶ δό-
 ξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπειπαῖσθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν.
 20 ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δέ, ποιήσας, ἄξιον τῶν
 ὑπηρεγμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ' ἀεὶ ὀφείλει· οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται,
 ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι, καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δῆ. ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδεὶς ποτ'

34. φασίν om. K^b, secl. Fr., c. c. add. Asp. Hel. Ar. ||
 1163b, 1. δὲ] δ' οὖν K^b Fr. † || 6. οὐ — 8. κοινόν post 9. τι-
 μᾶσθαι tri. Susem., contra 8. οὐ — 9. τιμᾶσθαι alteram re-
 censionem verborum illorum antecedentium esse putat Rasso-
 vius || 10. τιμὴν post ἀπονέμουσι L^bO^b || 11. ἀδωροδόκῳ O³ Ald.
 Ar. et rc. K^b, δωροδόκῳ c. c. Asp. Hel. || 12. καὶ <ἐν φιλίᾳ>
 ci. Rr. || 14. ἀποδοτέον M^b Par. 1417 || ἀποδιδόντα K^bO³ et γρ.
 O^b† || τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον Π² Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 17. τοὺς om.
 M^b Ald. Hel. || τὴν ἀξίαν ποτ' ἂν Π²K^b Fr. || 20. ὀφείλοντι
 L^bO^b, τὸν ὀφείλοντα υἱὸν Ald., ὀφείλοντα c. c. Asp. Ar. et,
 ut videtur, Hel. || 22. ἀφιέναι K^bM^b, γρ. ἀφιῆται mg. O^b || ἅμα
 δ'] ἀλλ' ci. Coraes.

1. For it is not allowable that a man should at once gain money and honor out of the public, for no one endures to have the inferior position in it paid to.

24. For independently of matter of affection, it is a ^{natural} inclination not to reject the ^{claims} (which one might receive from his son)

ch. I. In heterogeneous friendships, ^{the rule} is to be obtained by the rule of proportion. The same rule holds good in political economy, where the most heterogeneous

32. τροποποιεῖσθαι - This is not quite the same as τὰς καὶ ἐν τῷ φιλίᾳ. It implies relationships in which the two parties have respectively different objects in view, as e.g. in the case of the employer and the employed, the ἐρωμενος and the ἐραστής, &c.

12. ἡ τῶν ἡθῶν = ἡ κατ' ἀρετήν. - friendship based on character

xiv)

ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίας (χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι)· τῷ δὲ φρενκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, 25 μοχθηρῶ ὄντι. εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὥς ἄλυσιτελέες.

I.

- I I [περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω·] ἐν 28
 πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει 32
 καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ
 πολιτικῇ τῷ σκντοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ
 γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντη καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. 35
 2 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, 1164a
 καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται·
 ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερ-
 φιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
 πολλάκις δὲ ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος 5
 3 πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπει-
 δὲν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρή-
 σιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχη. διὰ
 ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὴν μὴ
 γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ 10
 τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἱ φι-
 λίαί. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὕσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρη-
 4 ται. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ
 μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν
 οὐ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἶον καὶ τῷ κιθαρωδῷ ὁ ἐπαγ- 15

23. δοκῇ L^b M^b Ald. || 25. δ' ἐπίφρενκτον M^b N^b Ald. Asp. Lib. IX. K^b M^b = Π¹, L^b O^b = Π².

28. περὶ — εἰρήσθω secl. Fr. Grantius Rr. || 32. ἀπάσαις Π² Ald. || ἀνομοιοειδέσι L^b M^b Ald. Mi., ἀνομοιοειδῶν vel ἀνομοιοειδῶν Γ, ἀνομοιοειδέσι c. c. Hel. || 1164a, 2. καὶ prius add. Γ L^b || 10. ἕνεκεν? Susem. || 12. ἡθικῶν O^{1.3}. Ald. Ar. Mi.(?) || 15. ἐπαγγελάμενος secundum Mi. et Hel. ci. Coraes.

γελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἄρσειεν, τοσοῦτῳ πλείω· εἰς
 ἔω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνδ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀπο-
 δεδοκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς
 ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει
 20 ὁ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς. ὦν
 γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου
γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. — || τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξει ἐστίν, 5
τοῦ προϊέμενον ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ'
 ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶν καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν·
 25 ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, ^{εὐθύνοτε} τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν
 ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανεν τοσοῦτον. ἐν 6
 τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ". οἱ
 δὲ προλαβόντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἴτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὦν ἔφα-
 σαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλή-
 30 μασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ^{ἐπιτελοῦσιν} ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὠμολόγησαν. τοῦτο 7
 δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν
 δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὦν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὦν ἔλαβον τὸν
 μισθόν, μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσὶν· ἐν οἷς
 δὲ μὴ γίνεται ^{διομολογία} διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς
 35 προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἢ κατ'
 1164b ἀρετὴν φίλᾳ), τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαί-
 ρεσιν (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· οὕτω δ' ἔοικε
 καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήματα
 ἢ ^{ἀξία} ἀξία ^{μετρεῖται} μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τε ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ'

20. τὴν om. L^b Ald., c. c. add. Hel. || 22. τὰ αὐτὰ O^b et
 v. l. ap. Mi., τὰ αὐτοῦ Muretus † || τὴν — b, 21. ἐτίμα alteram
 recensionem esse eamque uberiorem antecedentium 1163a, 9.
 ἀμφισβήτησιν — 23. κύριον monuit Rassovius || 23. προεμένου
 ci. Coraes || 25. μαθητόντα Π² Mi. || 26. ἐν — 27. ἀνδρὶ secl.
 Rr. || 27. ἀρκεί Γ Ald. Hel. Ar. et ante ἐνίοις M^b (ἀρέσκει etiam
 Mi.) || ἀρκίος ἔστω post ἀνδρὶ add. L^b M^b, ἀρκίος εἴη Hel., ver-
 sum dimidium vacuum K^b, c. c. om. Mi. Ar. || 28. προλαβόντες
 M^b Ald. Mi. Hel. Ar., προλαμβάνοντες Π² K^b Fr. (fors. recte) ||
 τὸ om. Π² || 34. γίννηται Π² Ald. || 1164b, 2. ἔοικε κ. τ. λ.
 non sana esse censet Rr.

21. For a man sets his mind on the things he happens to want, and for the sake of that he will give what he himself possesses.
22. But whose part is it to settle the value of a benefit - is it the part of the giver in the first instance, or of the recipient?

1. 'But this course the Sophists are ^{perhaps} obliged to adopt, because no one would like to give money for the things which they know

2. οἱ μὲν - In the first place, with regard to those who give purely for personal reasons, we have said that they are free from all chance of complaint: for this is the mode of friendship.

2. οἷον - i.e. they should measure the benefit received by the action of the teacher.

6. $\mu\eta\tau\alpha\delta\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ - 'not of this kind' i.e. not $\delta\iota'\alpha\iota\tau\acute{o}\iota\varsigma$.
 $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota$ - for some end or object.

12. For this is what is done in the market (i.e. the buyer, who is the recipient, settles the price): and in some places it is the law that there must be no actions on voluntary contracts, it being right that one should conclude with a person whom one has trusted on the same terms as those on which one has entered on the contract with him.

(I.)

ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ 5
 8 ἐνδεχομενον), μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
 τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δο-
 κοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει,
 οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον. ὅσον γὰρ ἂν οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου 10
 τὴν ἡδονὴν εἴλετ' ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ
 τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμε-
 9 νον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶν νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας
 μὴ εἶναι ὡς δέον, ὃ ἐπίστευσεν, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον
 καθάπερ ἐκοινωνήσεν. ὃ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἶται δι- 15
 καιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
 τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ
 γὰρ οἰκεία καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια·
 ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τāt-
 τωσιν οἱ λαβόντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτον τιμᾶν ὅσον ἔχοντι 20
 φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσον πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα. ||

II

ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερα δεῖ 2
 πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πελθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα
 μὲν ἱατρῷ πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολε-
 μικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, 25
 καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον,
 2 ἢ ἂν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται. — ἄρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκρι-
 βῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾶδιον; (πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει

5. ὁ post ἴσως add. ΓΚ^b Fr. || καὶ post καθάπερ om. Γ
 K^b, secl. Fr., c. c. add. Hel. || 9. εἶναι post ἀναγκαῖον add. Γ
 Ald. || 10. ἂν om. L^b M^b Bk. Rr. (fors. recte) || 11. <ὁ> ἀντι-
 λαβὼν vel ἀντιλαβὼν <ἐκεῖνος> vel ἀντιλαβὼν <ἄτερος> ci.
 Zellius || 15. ὃ — 20. λαβόντες partim non suo loco partim
 supervacanea esse censet Rr. || οἶονται Hel. Coraes || 18. ἄξια ***
 Susem. || 20. λαβόντες M^b Ald. Mi. Ar., λαμβάνοντες Π² K^b Fr.
 (fors. recte) || 22. τοιάδε M^b Ald. Bk. Rr. || 24. πιστευτέον Π²
 (γρ. πειστέον mg. O^b), πιστεύειν K^b (πειστέον etiam Hel.) ||
 26. δοτέον c. c. Mi. Ar., προστέον K^b Fr. || 27. ἄμφω K^b Fr.,
 ἀμφοῖν c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar.

διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ
 30 ἀναγκαίῳ). ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδη- 3
 λον. καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
 μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἐταίροις, καὶ ὥσπερ δάνειον, ᾧ ὀφεί-
 λει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτ' 4
 αἰεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερον τὸν λυσά-
 35 μενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, καὶν ὅστισοῦν ἤ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐαλωκότι
 1165a ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε
 γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, 5
 καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ
 δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκλιτέον.
 5 ἐνίστε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προὑπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι,
 ἐπειδὴν ὃ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἢ ἀντα-
 πόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ
 δανείσαντι ἐνίστε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οἴομενος κο-
 μιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι
 10 παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον
 τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δό-
 ξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ 6
 πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν τὸ ὠρισμένον
 τοῖς περὶ ἃ εἰσὶν. — ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταῦτα πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον,
 15 οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ ^(πάντα) θύεται, οὐκ
 ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἐταίροις 7
 καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα
 ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους
 μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσιν τοὺς συγγενεῖς (τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος
 20 καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις), καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστα
 οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ^{μετ'} ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταῦτό. δόξειε δ' 8

32. ἐτέρῳ Par. 1417 Muretus || καὶ ὥσπερ] ὥσπερ K^b Fr.,
 ὥσπερ καὶ Argropylos || 33. ἐτέρῳ Muretus || 34. πότερα
 K^b Fr. || 35. καὶ add. Ald. Mi. Ar., om. ΓK^b L^b N^b O^b Hel. (de
 H^a M^b incertus sum) || 1165a, 4. τοῦτο Hel. || 11. δόξειεν ΓM^b
 O^b Ald. Ar. || 15. Διὶ <πάντα> Ar.(?) Rr. || 17. ἀρμόζοντα Π^a.

3. As a general rule the debt should be repaid: but if the giving (to some one else) preponderates in moral glory or in the urgency of the case (over repaying, as a rule) -
4. to requite the former favour - primary obligation

12. Πόλλ' αἰς - Eth. i. 3. 1., ii. 2. 3., and sec. 2.

29. rising up to greet them and conducting them to the seat of
honor

7. 'when they are not really friends to each other in the way they
think'.

11. To counterfeit friendship is worse than counterfeiting the
singing.

II)

ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστα' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὥς ὀφείλον-
 τας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὢν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς
 ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσιν καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ
 πᾶσαν δέ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ, οὐδ' αὖ 25
 τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν, ὁμοίως
 9 δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὴ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν
 [τὴν] καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς
 τοιούτοις. πρὸς ἐταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρορησίαν καὶ
 ἀπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ φυλῆταις καὶ 30
 πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν αἰεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον
 ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ'
 10 οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων
 ἢ κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ γε
 τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτως διοριστέον. 35

II

ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας 3 —
 ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ 1165b
 χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχω-
 σιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; (ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν
 ἀπολιπόντων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν)· ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἂν τις,
 εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ 5
 τὸ ἡθος. ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ
 γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὧσι
 2 φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖ-
 σθαι διὰ τὸ ἡθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν
 αἰτιῶτ' ἂν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, 10
 δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ
 νόμισμα κибδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία. —

22. τροφὴν secundum Hel. ci. Zellius || 23. ὢν] ὄντως ὢν
 L^b, c. c. om. Fr. Rr. fors. recte || 24. θεοῖς c. c. Hel., καὶ
 θεοῖς Π² || 25. δέ] δὲ γονεῦσιν L^bM^b Ar. et, ut videtur, Asp. ||
 26. ἢ] ἢ τὴν ΓΚ^b Hel. Ar. Fr. || 27. τὴν om. K^bO^b || δὴ K^b,
 δὲ c. c. Hel. Bk. Rr. || 28. τὴν om. K^b, secl. Rr., c. c. add.
 Hel. || 30. πάντων Π² || δὲ Π² Ar., δὴ c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 31.
 αἰεὶ post πειρατέον Π² || 1165b, 5. ἢ c. c. Hel., ἢ διὰ ΓΛ^b
 Ald. || 6. ὁ K^bL^b, ὅπερ c. c. Hel. || 7. οἴονται ΓΚ^b Ald.

ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ 3
δοκῇ, ἄρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δύνατον, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλη-
15 τὸν ἀλλὰ τὰγαθόν, [οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρόν] οὐδὲ δεῖ;
φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρη-
ται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἄρ' οὖν εὐθύς διαλυτέον;
ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπαν-
ὀρθώσιν δὲ ἔχουσιν μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν
20 οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον; δόξειε δ'
ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν. οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ ἢ τοι-
ούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίστα-
ται. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δὲ ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ 4
διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἄρα χρηστέον φίλῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται;
25 ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δηλὸν γίνεται, οἷον ἐν
ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διά-
νοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι
μῆτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μῆτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπού-
μενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ
30 δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷον
τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἄρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς 5
αὐτὸν ἐκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ
μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις
μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς
35 γενομένοις ἀπονειμντέον τι διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην φιλίαν,
ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ἢ διάλυσιν γένηται;

13. καὶ] ἢ καὶ Ald., ἢ ci. Coraes || 14. δοκεῖ K^b O^{1.3}. Mi. Hel. || 15. οὔτε δὲ — δεῖ secl. Fr., — πονηρόν om. Γ Hel., secl. Rr. || δὴ φιλητὸν πονηρόν ci. Zwinger, δὴ φιλητὸς πονη-
ρός, Thurotus || οὐδὲ δεῖ om. O^{1.3}. Mi. Hel., secl. Gifanius et
Zwinger, οὐδὲ δεῖ φιλοπόνηρον om. K^b || οὐδὲ Rr., οὔτε Π²
M^b Ald. Bk. Fr. (Thurotus) || 21. τούτῳ ἢ Par. 1417 et corr.²
K^b et γρ. O^b, τούτῳ ἢ Γ Π¹ Ald., τῷ Π² Ar. Bk. Rr. || 22. γοῦν
Ald., δὲ Π², οὖν c. c. Hel. Ar. || 23. γένοιτο Π² Ald. Mi. Hel. Bk.
Rr. || 26. παιδικαῖς] ἐκ παιδιᾶς N^b Ald. Hel., ἐκ παιδίας Γ, ἐκ
παιδικῆς Camerarius † || 35. τι om. Π¹, c. c. add. Mi. Hel. Ar. ||
προγεγενημένην Π¹ Hel., προσγεγενημένην Ald. || 36. ἢ add. N^b
Ald. Hel. || γίνηται? Susem.

10. But without these things it is not possible as we said (for VIII.3.9, VIII.3.3) that they should be friends.

11. in so far as they set up to be good;— wherever they fall short in these feelings, they fall short also in their attempt to be good— For, as we have said, virtue and the good are the standard for everything. Cp. Eth. iii. 4.5: X. 5. 10.

τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἰ φι- 4 1166a
λίας ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τι-
θέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ
ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ
ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέ- 5
κνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρονηκότες· οἱ δὲ
τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναγοῦντα
καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ
τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δὲ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν
ὀρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρ- 10
χει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι.
ἔοικεν γάρ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ
ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν. καὶ βούλεται
δὲ ἑαυτῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ 15
γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα· τοῦ
γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ζῆν
δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σφῆζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ὃ
φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. [ἕκαστος δ'
ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖ- 20

1166a, 1. τὰ φιλικὰ — 1167b, 16. ποιεῖν haud idoneo
loco posita esse iudicat Spengelius, legisse ibidem videtur iam
scriptor M. Moraliū 1210b, 32 — 1212b, 23, quippe qui, cum
quae 1166a, 1 — 1168a, 27, iam ante ea, quae 1159b, 25 sqq.
leguntur, in E. E. 1240a, 8 — 1241b, 12 tractentur, alterum
ordinem cum altero miscuerit: ceterum v. quae ad b, 30 sqq.
adnotabo || τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους secl. Muretus || τὰ] καὶ Ob, om.
Ald. || πέλας καὶ ὅσαι φίλαι post φίλους add. Kb, cf. E. E.
1240b, 37 || καὶ οἷς] οἷς καὶ? Spengelius || 5. τῶν φίλων Kb Ob,
τῷ φίλῳ Γ, τὸν φίλον c. c. Hel. Ar. || 6. καὶ — προσκεκρον-
ηκότες secl. Rr. || <καὶ> of? Susem. || 9. δῆ? Susem. et Thurotus
et 10. cum Rieckero ὀρίζονται, πρὸς? Susem. || 12. γάρ ΓLb
Nb Ald. Hel., δέ ΠH^aOb Ar. || ἑκάστων Kb (nescio an recte),
ἑκάστου? Spengelius † || 15. δὲ Rr., δῆ ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Bk. Fr. ||
16. διαπονεῖ Kb Fr. † || 19. ἕκαστος — 22. ἐστίν secl. Rr.,
— 23. μάλιστα Susem. || 20. οὐδεὶς post αἰρεῖται Kb Fr.

ται πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ
 θεὸς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὧν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν
 ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα.] συνδιαγρῖν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ
 βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμέ-
 25 νων ἐπιτερεῖς αἱ μνημαί, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
 ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ
 τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλιστα· ἑαυτῷ·
 πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ
 ἄλλοτε ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς
 30 αὐτὸν [μὲν] ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ φίλος
 ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φί-
 λοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. — ^{low and small} πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ
 οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· [δόξειε δ' ἂν
 35 ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ἢ ἔστιν δύο ἢ πλείω ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέ-
 1166b νων, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιού-
 ται.] φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν,
 καίπερ οὔσι φάυλοις. ἄρ' οὖν ἢ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ
 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν;
 5 ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φάυλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ'
 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φάυ-
 λοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦ-
 σιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ
 ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλα-
 10 βερὰ ὄντα· οἷ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται
 τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἶονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι· οἷς δὲ πολλὰ

21. πάντας Ald., ταῦτά ci. Bergius, ταῦτ' Coraes † || ἐκεῖνο
 τὸ γενόμενον secl. Vermehrenus || 23. ἢ om. Π¹ † || 24. αὐτῷ
 corr. L^b O^b † || 25. μνεῖται Π¹, μνημαί c. c. Mi. Ar. || 28. πάντῃ
 O^b Mi., παντὶ Ald. || 29. ἄλλωι Γ Ald. et pr. K^b (em. corr.²) † ||
 30. μὲν add. M^b, c. c. om. Fr. Rr. || 31. αὐτὸν Π¹ || 34. δόξειε
 — b, 1. ὁμοιοῦται secl. Rr. || 35. ἢ ante φιλία add. Π² (in O^b
 supra versum) Ald. || ἢ οὐκ ἔστι δύο M^b et γρ. O^b, ἢ οὐκέτι
 δύο τὰ αὐτὰ v. l. ap. Mi., ἢ οὐκ ἔστι δύο ταῦτα eandem re-
 vera olim fuisse ci. Coraes †.

sees no good thing.

2. It is better to read τὸ γὰρ θέν· ἄλλ' οὐ:- making ἀν- ἐστιν in opposition to γένεσθαι ἄλλος, and not referring it to the unchangeableness or the personality of God. Aristotle says that to every man his personality is what is dear to him; he would not wish this to gain all the world, for by losing it he would not gain anything. With a changed personality, he would no more possess any good, he now possesses it because God possesses all good. All his wishes are made on the basis of being still what he is. The good man, who fosters his thinking faculty, most of all takes care of his proper self.

3. 'It would seem to be possible in so far as two or more of the above mentioned (sec. 1) conditions exist, and because the extreme of friendship resembles one's feelings towards oneself'

4. 'But one might almost say that these things do not depend on the good at all. For they are at variance with the nature of the desire for the good, while they wish another, just like the incontinent: instead of what seems to them to be good they choose the pleasant though it be hurtful: and then through cowardice and want of spirit abstain from doing what they think best for themselves: and then, though wickedness have committed many evils in their life and fled from it and put an end to themselves: - Cp. viii. 13. 8 - The "desire" of the wicked as being of the particular and subject to the domination of the senses, is at variance with the "wish" which is of the universal and includes a conception of the good.'

1. For this soul is in two - all, the one part of it the rough
side is more grieved at abstaining from certain things
while the other part is pleased at this abstinence, and
the one pulls this way the other that way, as though
tearing the man in pieces

30. Now good will is like friendship but yet it is not friendship,
for good will is exercised both towards one known person, or
towards its existence is unknown to the object, which is not
the case with friendship

32. It is not even the same as loving: for it exhibits neither
violence nor longing, which are the accompaniments of
loving.
Good will (says A.) is engendered by the appearance of noble
qualities: it is rapidly conceived but is passive in its as-
sents, and is only the prelude of friendship.

34. μετὰ ὀνείδεας -- ἐκ προσμαίον. While loving implies acquaint-
ance and familiarity, good will is conceived in its infancy

καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται, καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται,
 φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσιν τε οἱ
 μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιημερεύουσιν, ἑαυτούς δὲ φεύγουσιν·
 ἀναμιμήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ' 15
 ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτούς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες
 ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδὲν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν
 πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγκαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλ-
 γοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ,
 καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν, τὸ 20
 δ' ἡδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ δια-
 σπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷον τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι,
 ἀλλὰ ^{after a little while} μετὰ μικρὸν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἡσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
 ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· ^{rele} μεταμελείας γὰρ
 οἱ φαῦλοι ^{very foolish} γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς 25
 ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ
 δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθη-
 ρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῇ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ
 καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

ἡ δ' εὐνοία φιλία μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία. 5
 γίνεται γὰρ εὐνοία καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φι- 31
 λία δ' οὐ. καὶ ^{very little or 2-3} προτερόν δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φι-
λησις ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει
 δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ
 δ' εὐνοία καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστάς 35

1166b, 12. καὶ ante διὰ om. Π² Bk. Rr. (hand male) † ||
 μισοῦνται Γ^M N^b Hel. Ar., μισοῦνται καὶ K^b O^{1.3}. Ald., μι-
 σοῦσί τε καὶ Π² O² Bk. Rr. (hand male) || 14. συνημερεύουσιν
 K^b Ald. Hel. Fr. (nescio an recte) || 15. τοιαῦτα ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι
 etiam Hel., ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐλπίζουσι Π², τοιαῦθ' ὑπερελπίζουσι
 M^b || 19. οἱ τοιοῦτοι post ἑαυτοῖς Π² || 20. τὸ Γ^M Mi. Hel.,
 τότε Π², τότε Ald. Ar., om. K^b || μὲν om. K^b || τὸ Γ Π¹ Mi.
 Hel., τότε Π² Ald. Ar. || 29. καὶ ante πρὸς om. Π¹ † || 30. ἡ
 — 1168a, 27. εἶναι post 1169b, 2. χρη traicienda esse ci.
 Susem. || φιλία c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar., φιλικῶ K^b Fr. || 32. τοιαῦτ'
 Γ Π¹ || 34. φιλία ci. Rr.

1167^a συμβαίνει. εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμ-
 πράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι
 γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. — ἔοικεν δὲ ἀρχὴ φιλίας
 εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἢ διὰ τῆς ὕψεως ἡδονῇ· μὴ γὰρ
 5 προησθεῖς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οὐδέν
 μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρον-
 σίας ἐπιθυμῇ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι μὴ
 εὖνους γενομένους, οἳ δὲ εὖνοι οὐδέν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βού-
 λονται γὰρ μόνον τὰγαθὰ οἷς εἰσιν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ'
 10 ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη
 τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς
 συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ
 χρησίμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖνοια ἐπὶ τού-
 τοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν
 15 ἀπονέμει τὴν εὖνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρωῖν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός
 τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ'
 εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ
 φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινὰ χρῆσιν. ὅλως δ' ἢ
 εὖνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιεικειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῇ
 20 καλὸς τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀγωνιστῶν εἵπομεν.

6 φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται· διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν
 ἂν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτονοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φα-
 25 σίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ
 τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν
 περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσιν καὶ ταῦτά προαι-

1167a, 7. ἐπιθυμεῖ ΓΚ^b Ο^b Ald. || 10. ἂν οὐδέν c. c. Hel.,
 οὐθὲν ἂν ΓΛ^b Ald. || 11. ἀρχὴν — φιλίας Γ Μi. Ar., ἀργὴν —
 φιλίαν c. c. Hel. || 12. ἀγομένην L^b O³, συνηγομένην pr. O^b,
 ἀφικνουμένην c. c. Hel. et γρ. mg. O^b || 16. εὐ πράττειν L^b
 Ald. Mi., εὐπραγεῖν c. c. Hel. || ἐλπίδα ἔχων post εὐπορίας Π² ||
 18. ἢ om. Π¹ (fors. recte) || 24. ὁτιοῦν Π², ὁτοοῦν Ald. || 27.
 ταυτὰ L^b, τὰ αὐτὰ Ald. et corr. O^b, ταῦτα Κ^b et pr. O^b †.

Goodwill (says A.) is the prelude of friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the prelude of love. This, however, does not constitute love. The test of love is longing for a person in absence.

12. i.e. Goodwill is essentially disinterested in its character.

22. ὁμόνοια -- ὁμοδοξία. 'Unanimity also appears to be the nature of friendship: therefore it is not the case of agreement of opinion.' - Cp. VIII. 1. 4.

25. Cp. Eth. iii. 3. 3: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδὲ τις βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου.

26. Arist. arrives at his definition of ὁμόνοια inductively: - we do not find the name applied to agreement of opinion in general, nor again to agreement of opinion about one of particular subject, but we do find it used of states of one citizen are unanimous on the measures to be adopted for the common weal. Hence we get the idea that unanimity is political friendship.

32. 'supposing this to be during the period when he himself was
 going to die. - If after he designed the citizens had finished
 his design, his own will would have been wanting to make
 unanimity in the state.
33. *Stoics and Polyneiss.*

10. grasping at the larger share ^{in good things} and shirking their part in la-
 bours and ~~night watches~~ services

Lk. vii. It is noticed that those who do a kindness exhibit
 greater love than those benefited to their benefactors. The
 common explanation of the paradox is that benefactors do not
 do good to obtain a return for their kindness, they thus
 cherish the persons of those who are indebted to them. It is
 a selfish theory views mankind on the dark side (κακογονία)
 but it is not altogether devoid of truth. A deeper (δυσκω-
 τέρη) reason, however, may be assigned, viz. that virtue can
 only be said to exist when we are conscious of our vital
 powers (ἐνέργεια), so anything which gives or increases the
 sense of those powers is dear to us. The benefited person
 who does to be benefactor in the relation of the work to the
 artist, he is an exponent of the benefactor's self, and is
 thus regarded with feelings of affection as being associated
 by the benefactor with the sense of his own vitality; these
 feelings cannot be without effect on the benefactor's own

I)

2 ῥῶνται καὶ πράττωσιν τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ
 δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδε-
 χόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν 30
 πᾶσιν δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακε-
 δαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιπτακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν
 δ' ἐκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις,
 στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν
 ὁδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος 35
 καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γί- 1167b
 νεται οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φίλλα φαίνεται ἡ ὁμό-
 νοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἔστιν |
 3 καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. — ἔστιν δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια
 ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικεσίν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσιν καὶ 5
 ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὥς εἰπεῖν· τῶν τοιούτων
 γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὐριπος,
 βούλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ
 4 καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φανύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν
 πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας 10
 ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς
 λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα
 τὸν πέλαις ^{ἐπιτελεῖ} ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοι-
 νὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους
 μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια 15
 ποιεῖν.

II

οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον 7
 φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὥς παρὰ
 λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαί-
 νεται ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται, καθάπερ οὖν 20

29. τὰ post μεγέθει καὶ add. Π² Bk. Rr. || 34. ἔστιν K^b, ἐσθ' c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. || αὐτὸ O^b Ald. Mi. Hel. Ar., αὐτῷ c. c. Fr. || ἐννοεῖν ΓK^b L^b, ἐννοεῖν c. c. Mi. Ar. || 35. τὸ <αὐτό> Muretus || αὐτῷ <αὐτό> ci. Rr. || 1167b, 2. δὴ Mi. Hel. Rr., δὲ Γ Π Ar. Ald. Bk. Fr. || 4. ἦγοντα M^b, εἰκότα K^b, ἀνήκοντα c. c. Hel. || 18. οἱ om. Π¹.

ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς
ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δανείσαντες δὲ καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν
ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βού-
λεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὥς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας,
25 τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι (Ἐπὶ χαρμῶς
μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ
θεωμένους, ἔοικεν δ' ἀνθρωπικῶ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί,
καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται). δόξειε δ' ἂν 2
φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς
30 δανείσαντας. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
σφῆζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες
φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας καὶ μὴδὲν ὥσιν
χρήσιμοι μὴδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἂν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 3
τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ
35 μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου.
1168a μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπερ-
ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ
τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικεν καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν. τὸ γὰρ εὖ 4
πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ
5 τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἷτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν
αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμέν δ' ἐνεργεῖα· τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ
πράττειν· ἐνεργεῖα δ' ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶν πῶς· στέργει
δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὁ γὰρ
ἐστὶ δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. — ἅμα δὲ καὶ 5
10 τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν προᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν
ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δρᾶσαντι,
ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἦττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν.
ἡδέϊα δ' ἐστὶν τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνεργεῖα, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος 6

22. οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελονται Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. ||
27. θεωρουμένους K^b Mi. et pr. O^b, θεωμένους c. c. Hel. || 29.
οὐδ' Π¹, οὐχ c. c. Mi. Hel. || 32. πεπονθότας] εὖ πεπονθότας
ΓΝ^b Ald., εὐεργετηθέντας Π² || 33. γένοιντ' L^b M^b Ald. || 1168a,
1. τοῦτο post ποιητὰς Π² (sed non Hel.) || 7. δὴ ΓΚ^b Ald. Ar.
Bk. Fr. || 13. τοῦ — 14. ἐλπίς secludenda esse ci. Rr.

... of his good deeds: the other consists of the only
... idea of the profitable, and this is a less lovable idea
the profitable especially, when mixed in the past and becomes
a matter of ... Again, the ... by the
benefactor has more affinity to the active principle of
being.

3. The cause of benefactors there is something of the same kind
For the object benefited is their "work".

5. The cause of this is that existence is desired and loved
by all, but we exist by conscious acts, that is to say, by
living and acting. Thus he who has made the work exist
consciously, and therefore he loves the work because he
loves his existence. And this is a principle of nature.
For that which exists potentially, the work proceeds to exist
actually.

- Any work of art or creature of the mind a moral a-
chievement, shows us externally to ourselves. It causes us
to exist *ερεπεία*, that is not only in ourselves, but for our-
selves. It thus becomes a union of the objective and the
subjective. This philosophical principle explains not
only the feelings of benefactors towards the benefited,
but of poets towards their poems, of parents, and esp.
mothers, towards their children, and of those who have
made fortunes towards their property. p. Plato. Rep.

330. B-C.

7. *ερεπεία* - *προς*. may be rendered: 'thus by means of consci-
ous activity, the maker is in a sense his work.'

Ch. VIII. "Ought one to love oneself especially, or some one else?" - On the one hand 'self love' is used as a term of reproach; on the other it is one's feelings towards oneself are made the standard of one's feelings towards friends. But the word 'self' has two senses - the lower & the higher self, the one consisting in appetites and passions, the other in the intellect and the higher moral faculties. He that gratifies his lower self at the expense of others is self-loving in the bad sense of the term. He that ministers to his higher self promotes at the same time the good of others and is worthy of the praise. Such self love as this may lead a man even to die for his friends or for his country. A man grasping at life, who may give up honor, power, life itself; and thus the greatest self sacrifice will be identical with the greatest self love. Thus we see how we ought to love ourselves."

33. 'he does nothing apart from himself' - *nihil a seis rationibus alienum*

35. 'with these theories men's actions not unreasonable, a great variance. λόγος - ἐργα: ap. Eth X. 1. 3: X. 9. 12. Men do not act so if they considered self love to be wholly bad

Π)

ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγεννημένου ἢ μνήμη. ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ
 τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι 15
 μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι
 τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα,
 τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἥτιον· ἢ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπα-
 λιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. — καὶ ἢ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσῃ ἔοικεν, τὸ φι-
 λεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν. τοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν δὴ περὶ τὴν πρᾶ- 20
 ξιν ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. — ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως
 γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα
 οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ
 πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα
 δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἢ γέν- 25
 νησις[, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν]. δόξειεν δὴ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ
 τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

Π

ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα 8
 ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγα-
 πῶσιν, καὶ ὡς ^{καὶ ἐν ἀσχηρῶ} ἐν ἀσχηρῶ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσιν, δοκεῖ τε 30
 ὁ μὲν φραυλὸς ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
 μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον (ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον
 ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει), ὁ δὲ ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν,
 καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλον ἔνεκα,
 2 τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησι. — τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα δια- 35
 φωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν 1168b
 μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλούμενος ᾧ βούλεται

18. ἢ — 19. ἔχειν ἔοικεν om. M^b, secludenda esse ci. Rr. † ||
 19. ἔχειν post ἔοικεν Ald., om. Π² † || 22. γινόμενα πάντες
 μᾶλλον M^b Coraes, μὲν μᾶλλον πάντες γενόμενα O^b || 23. δὲ
 M^b O³ Hel. Ar., δὴ c. c. Bk. Fr. Rr. || μὲν post εὖ Ald. Fr. ||
 25. γένεσις E. E. 1241 b, 9, γέννεσις K^b || 26. καὶ — αὐτῶν secl.
 Rr. || δὴ Thurotus, δ' ΓΠ Ald. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 28. καὶ om. ΓL^b
 Ald. Ar. || 30. δὲ Π² M^b † || 32. ἐγκαλοῦσι — 33. πράττει secl.
 Gifanius || οἷον om. Π² O^b Bk. Rr. || 33. οὐδὲν <οὐκ> Imel-
 mannus || ἀφ' αὐτοῦ K^b, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Ald., ἀπ' αὐτοῦ <καλόν
 vel φιλικὸν ὧν> ci. Coraes || 34. διὰ τὸ καλόν secl. Bergius ||
 1168b, 2. ᾧ] ἢ ᾧ pr. K^b, ἢ ᾧ corr.² K^b, ᾧ μάλιστα L^b O¹ Ald. †.

τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται. ταῦτα δ'
 ὑπάρχει μάλιστα αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάντα
 5 οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ
 φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ
 πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ "μία ψυχὴ" καὶ "κοινὰ
 τὰ φίλων" καὶ "ἰσότης φιλότης" καὶ "γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον".
 πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτόν μάλιστα· ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ
 10 φίλος αὐτῷ, καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται
 δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπεσθαι, ἄμφοιν ἐχόντων τὸ πιστόν.
 ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διο- 5
 ρίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι-
 μεν τὸ φίλαντον πῶς ἐκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο
 15 δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι 4
 τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς
 καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγον-
 ται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ
 περιμάχητα ἐστίν. οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται
 20 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς
 ψυχῆς. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία
 γεγέννηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φανύλου ὄντος. δικαίως δὲ τοῖς
 οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς 5
 ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδη-
 25 λον· εἰ γὰρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζει τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς
 μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὅποιον ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ
 τὰς ἀρετὰς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖτο, οὐδεὶς
 ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαντον οὐδὲ ψέξει. — δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος 6
 μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαντος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα
 30 καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ,

3. μηδὲν οἴσεται Gifanius || 4. μάλιστα post αὐτῷ Π³ || δὲ
 Gifanius || 5. ἀφ' αὐτοῦ Scaliger || 7. κοινὰ τὰ φίλων καὶ ante
 μία Π² Mi. (sed non Hel. Ar.) || 9. μάλιστ' ὑπάρχει Γ Π² Ald.
 Bk. Rr. || 11. δὴ post χρεῶν add. Π² || ἐχόντων L^b, σχόντων
 M^b || 15. οὖν om. Π¹, secl. Fr., c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || 25. σπου-
 δάζοι K^b Ar., σπουδάζει cet. Hel. || 27. αὐτῷ Π².

31. But as the predominant part in a state seems to govern all things so be it that the predominant part in every other system seems to be that system, so the predominant part in man seems above all things to be reason.

11. τοιοῦτον - one of the greatest of goods.

16. ἡθικὸς - Cp sec. 8-10 with the description of the self-sacrificing of the brave man, Eth. iii. 9. 4-5.

(Π)

καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πεῖθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώ-
 ταιτον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ
 ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαντος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ
 τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται
 τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πε- 35
 πραγμέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. 1169a
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ
 ὅτι ὁ ἐπεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαντος μάλιστ'
 ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων
 τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέ- 5
 γεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν
 περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες
 ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς
 τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ'
 ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν 10
 ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτον ἐστίν. — ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν
 δεῖ φίλαντον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράτ-
 των καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ
 (βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν
 8 ἐπόμενος). τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν 15
 καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δὲ ἐπεικὴς, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει.
 πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπεικὴς
 9 πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν
 φίλων ἔνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρὶδος, καὶ δέη,
 ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς 20
 καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ

34. δὴ Γ || 35. τοῦτο Π¹ N^b O^b Fr. || 1169a, 2. τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον M^b, τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστος L^b † || ἢ om. O^b Ald. Mi. Hel. Ar. || 6. ἢ ante τοῦ καλοῦ add. Π¹ Ald. Mi., ἢ ἀπλῶς add. Γ, om. Π² Bk. Rr. || 7. σπουδάζοντα Π¹ || 10. πάντ' ἂν εἴη M^b, ἂν παντὶ ἢ Π², ἂν παντὶ εἴη Ald., ἂν πάντων εἴη, ut videtur, Γ || 11. ἐστίν om. Π² || 15. πράττειν om. Π¹ † || 16. ἃ δεῖ post ταῦτα Π¹ (sed non Mi. Ar.) || 18. δὲ] γὰρ Γ || περὶ] τὸ περὶ Γ L^b Ald. Ar.

καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιτ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα, καὶ βιωσαὶ καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν προᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς
 25 καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δὲ ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἰροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ' ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀρχᾶς ὁ
 30 αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ προᾶξεις τῷ φίλῳ προῖσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν προᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς
 35 ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλεον νέ-
 1169b μων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαντον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὥς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρη·

9 ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσε-
 ται φίλων ἢ μὴ. οὐθὲν γὰρ φασὶ δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακα-
 5 ρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰγαθὰ· αὐτάρ-
 κεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἢ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων; —

ἔοικεν δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντα ἀπονέμοντας ^{ἡσθῆναι} τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι
 10 φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶ-
 ναι. — εἴτε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶν τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φί-
 λους ὁθνεῖων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ

28. δὴ c. c. Mi., δὲ ΓL^b Ald. Hel. Ar. || 29. τὰς post περὶ add. Π^a Ald. || δὴ K^b O^b || 34. γίνεσθαι M^b || 1169b, 1. δεῖ φίλαντον εἶναι L^b Ald. Hel., φίλαντον εἶναι δοκεῖ M^b || 5. ὑπάρχειν N^b Ald. Ar., ὑπάρχει ΓΠH^a Ar. || ἀγαθὰ K^b, τὰγαθὸν M^b || 6. μηδενὸς Π^a || 7. τὸ post ὅθεν add. Turnebus Bk. Rr. || 11. εἰ δὲ Π^a || 13. ὥν ante δεήσεται add. ΓK^b.

Ch. IX. "Does the happy man who is all sufficient need friends or not?" Arist. argues:-

- (1) As happiness is the sum of all human goods, the possession of friends, one of the greatest of external goods, is necessarily included.
- (2) Friends would be required by the happy man: not so much as the givers, but rather as the recipients of his happiness.
- (3) The happy man should neither be condemned to be a solitar nor to live with strangers and chance persons.
- (4) Those who take the negative side have an unworthy conception of friends as persons affording profit or pleasure. The happy man is almost independent of such, but yet he may want friends in a higher sense. Happiness consists in the play of life ($\epsilon\rho\epsilon\upsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$) and he that sees before his eyes the virtuous action of a friend has a delightful sense of the play of life, seeing his own action and identifying it with himself.
- (5) Again the sympathy and inclination to participate enable a man to prolong that vivid action and glow of the mind which is the essence of happiness.
- (6) It also confirms him in the practice of virtue.
- (7) Finally the necessity of friends depends on our love of life. That sympathetic consciousness ($\sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\alpha\tau\eta\tau\iota\kappa\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\lambda\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) which we have of a friend's existence, by means of intimate course with him, is, only in a secondary degree ($\eta\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon$), the same as the sense of our own existence.

17. $\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omega\tau\eta\varsigma$. Cf. I. 7. 6.

27. $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\acute{\alpha}\kappa\tau\omicron\upsilon$ - 'adventitious pleasure'. Cf. i. 8. 12.

31. But if being happy consists in the play of life, and the actions of the good man are good and essentially pleasurable, as we said before (Eth. i. 8. 13) and also the sense of a thing being identified with oneself is one of the sources of pleasure, but we are able to contemplate others better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, then the actions of good men being their friends are pleasurable to the good: for such actions contain both the elements that are essentially pleasurable.

3. good and identified with himself.

(X)

καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυ-
 χίαις, ὥς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ 15
 3 τῶν εὐτυχοῦντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. — ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ
μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὐτὸν
 τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συ-
 ζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ
 τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιει- 20
 κῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν·
 δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων.

4 τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ
 πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν
 οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ, 25
 οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὧν οὐ-
 δὲν δεῖται ἐπείσάκτου ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων
 5 φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. — τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές.
 ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἢ δ'
 ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ 30
 δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ
 ἢ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ
 εἴρηται, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον
 τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ
 τὰς οἰκέας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων 35
 ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσιν τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα). 1170 a
 ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαι-
 ρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγα-
 θοῦ φίλου ὄντος. — οἴονται τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα·

14. ζητεῖται Π² Hel. et, ut videtur, Mi. || ἀτυχίαις — εὐ-
 τυχίαις O^b Ald. (sed non Mi. Hel. Ar.) || 18. τὰ πάντ' — ἀγαθὰ]
 παντ' — τὰγαθὰ Π² Hel. || 21. καὶ om. K^b, c. c. add. Mi. Hel.
 Ar. || τῶν om. Π¹, secl. Rr., c. c. add. Hel. || 22. καὶ τῶν ante
 φίλων add. Π¹ Fr. (fors. recte), c. c. om. Mi. Hel. Ar. || 31. δ'
 post ἀγαθοῦ Π² Ald. || 33. ἔστιν — 1170a, 8. εἶναι post 1170a,
 11. λυπεῖται tri. Susem. || 35. δὲ O¹ Ald. Ar., δὴ c. c. Bk. Fr.
 Rr. || 1170a, 4. οἴονται δὲ δεῖν Γ Ald. Ar., εἰ οἷόν τε δεῖν K^b.

5 μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος, οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν
 ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον. ἔσται 6
 οὖν ἢ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἥδεῖα οὕσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὃ δεῖ
 περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι.] (ὁ γὰρ σπονδαῖος, ἢ σπονδαῖος, ταῖς
 κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραί-
 10 νει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδέται, ἐπὶ δὲ
 τοῖς φανύλοις λυπεῖται) *. — γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησις τις τῆς 7
 ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεόγνης
 φησὶν. — φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπονδαῖος φί-
 λος τῷ σπονδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει
 15 ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπονδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν καθ'
 αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις ^{in the animal kingdom} δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,
 ἀνθρώποις δὲ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως. ἢ δὲ ^{in the human mind} δυνάμει εἰς τὴν
 ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔοικε δὲ
 τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν
 20 καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων. ὠρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὠρι-
 σμένον τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως. τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ
 τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. διόπερ ἔοικεν πᾶσιν ἡδύ εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμ- 8
 βάνειν ^{vicious} μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ ^{corrupt} διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις.
 ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. [ἐν
 25 τοῖς ^{following} ἔχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον.] εἰ δ' 9
 αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας
 ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους.

6. ῥάδιον ΓΠ² Mi. Hel. Ar. || 8. ὁ — 11. λυπεῖται secl. Rr., v. quae adnotavi ad 1169 b, 33 || 15. ἀγαθὸν καὶ c. c. Mi. Ar., om. K^b, καὶ ante haec verba add. L^b || 16. ὁρίζεται Mi. || δυνάμιν L^b M^b N^b Hel., δυνάμει c. c. Mi. Ar. || αἰσθήσει(?) Mi. || 17. ἢ] καὶ Zellius et, ut videtur, Mi. || 18. ἀνάγεται, τό τε? Susem. || ἔοικε δὲ c. c. Mi. Hel., ἔοικε δὲ ΓM^b Ald. Ar. || 19. εἶναι post κυρίως Π² || 20. καὶ — 21. φύσεως secludenda esse ci. Rr. (haud male) || 21. τὸ — 22. εἶναι secl. Gifanius || 22. διόπερ — 24. αὐτῇ secludenda esse ci. Rr. (haud male) || 24. ἐν — 25. φανερώτερον secl. Rr. || 25. εἰ — b, 8. παραπλησίως] in hoc monstro periodi diversas recensiones esse confusas veri haud dissimile videtur Bonitzio || ἐπομένοις Π² M^b || τῆς om. M^b || λύπης] αὐτῆς Π¹ †.

life is p...
difficult to maintain long a vivid state of life, but with others and in relation to others this is easier

9. - The good man, feeling the same sort of pleasure in the moral acts reciprocated between himself and his friend as the musical man feels in good music, will prolong and enjoy that reciprocation, and thus know what is good by associating with the good. The advantage of friendship is that by adding the element of pleasure to the best functions of our nature, it cultivates and develops them. Cp. Eth. x. 5. 2.

10. On the moral sense in its analogy to the musical ear cp. Eth. x. 3. 10.

17. But the word power has its whole meaning in reference to the exercise of that power, and the distinction of the conception lies in the exercise. Thus the act of living appears distinctively to be an act of perceiving and thinking.

18. For such a life is unharmonised, like its characteristics. ἀρμονία - 'unlimited'; 'without law, balance order harmony'.

30. 'And with respect to all the other functions, in like manner there is something wh perceives that we are exercising them, so then we can perceive that we perceive, and think that we think. But this (perceiving) that we perceive or think, is perceiving that we exist: for existing, as we said, consists in perceiving or thinking.'

10. οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοῦ - 'Therefore we ought to have a sympathetic consciousness of the existence of our friends'

12. τὸ οὐσὶν - This is the true meaning of 'living together' in the case of man: it does not mean, as with cattle, simply herding in the same spot.' - see ch. xii.

Ch. X. Plurality of friends. The number of one's friends for use or pleasure is limited by convenience. The number of one's friends properly so called is limited by one's incapacity to feel the highest kind of affection (ὑπερβολή) for many individuals, and by the practical difficulties wh would attend a close intercourse with many persons at once, who would also have to associate harmoniously with each other.

(IX)

τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη
 ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκροῖ
 καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστιν 30
 τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι
 αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ νοοῦμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανό-
 μεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ
 νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό (φύσει 1170b
 γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ), αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγα-
 θοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ (συναισθανό-
 10 μνοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτό ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονται), ὥς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν 5
 ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ
 φίλος ἐστίν). καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετὸν ἔστιν ἐκάστω,
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν
 αἰρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος· ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη
 αἰσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν· συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ 10
 φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνουι' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν
 λόγων καὶ ^{διανοίας} διανοίας. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκομάτων
 τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρε-
 τὸν ἔστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλή- 15
 σιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν
 εἴη. ὁ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἰρετὸν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ
 ταύτῃ ἐνδεής ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσουσι φίλων
 σπουδαίων.

X ἄρ' οὖν ὥς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ 10
 τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς ἐρησθῆναι δοκεῖ

21

31. ὥστε om. Π² M^b Ald. Ar. || αἰσθανοίμεθ' Γ, αἰσθανό-
 μεθ' K^b, αἰσθανοίμεθα δ' Π² M^b Ald. Ar. || 32. νοοῦμεν K^b ||
 1170b, 2. ἡ ante ζωή add. Π² Ald. Mi. || 3. αἰρετὸν — 4. ἡδύ
 secl. Rr. (non male) || 8. ἢ om. Π¹ † || 10. αὐτήν Π² Ald. ||
 11. γένοιτ' Π² || 16. καὶ Γ Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. || ἂν post
 αἰρετῶν add. Π² Ald. Bk. Rr. || 21. τῆς om. M^b O^b Mi., c. c.
 add. Hel.

μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξεινος,

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ πολύ-
 φιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν καὶ πάννυ δό- 2
 25 ξειεν ἂν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν (πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπιπο-
 νον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτῷ τοῦτο πράττειν· οἱ πλείους δὴ
 τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν περιέργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς
 τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν)· καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρ-
 κοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα· τοὺς δὲ σπου- 3
 30 δαίλους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ἢ ἔστιν τι μέτρον καὶ
 φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων
 γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ
 ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὠρισμέ-
 1171a νων. καὶ φίλων δὴ ἔστι πληθὸς ὠρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλείστοι
 μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον
 εἶναι)· ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν αὐτόν, 4
 οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ κακείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοισι φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλ-
 5 λουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεῦειν· τοῦτο δὲ ἐργῶδες ἐν
 πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγκαίρειν 5
 καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα
 τῷ μὲν συνῆδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὔ ἔχει μὴ
 ζητεῖν ὥς πολυφιλότατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ
 10 συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι
 φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ
 τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφό-
 δρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρα- 6
 γμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν

22. καλεοίμην post ἄξεινος add. Π² Ald. † || 25. ἂν add. Ob || 26. αὐτοῖς L^b Ald. Ar. Bk. Rr. (qui secl.) et, ut videtur, Mi., αὐτὸς K^b Ob, αὐτὸς Argyropylus Fr. || 27. ἱκανῶν ΓOb, ἱκανῶς cet. Ar. Bk.¹ || 1171a, 1. τι post ἔστι add. ΓN^b Ald. † || 2. δύναιτό τις c. c. Ar. et, ut videtur, Mi. Hel., δύναιντο K^b Fr., δύναιτο Ob † || 3. διότι K^b Fr., ὅτι c. c. Hel. || δ²] γὰρ Hel. || 6. ὑπάρχει Π² Ar. (?) || 10. ἐνδέχεσθαι post ἂν Π² || 11. διόπερ] ὥσπερ ci. Gifanius.

3. 'and this seems to be practically the case: for we do not find that people have many friends together on the footing of companionship. Companionship is much more akin to the perfect and ideal friendship than it is to either of the lower forms of friendship. It is essentially based on personal considerations, though not necessarily on moral considerations.

15. And the classical friendships of story are recorded to have been between pairs. But they who have many friends and who associate familiarly with all, seem to be friends to none except in a civil way, and men call them "over-complaisant". In a civil way indeed it is possible to be a friend to many without being over-complaisant, but being really kind: but on a moral and personal footing this is not possible in relation to many. One must be content to find even a few worthy of this.
15. Ευφροσύνη. Theseus and Pirithous, Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades, Pythias and Damon, Epaminondas and Pelopidas.
17. ὑπερκούρ. Cp. Eth. II. 7. 13: IV. 6. 9.

Ch. XI. In ~~adversity~~ adversity friendship is more necessary, and in prosperity more beautiful.

φιλιαν. αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι 15
καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι,
πλήν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν
οὖν ἔστιν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὥς
ἀληθῶς ἐπεικεῖ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν πρὸς
πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιούτους. 20

1 πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυ- 11
στυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἳ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες
δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἳ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ
ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δεῖν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ
ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον 25
δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους
2 γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστιν
γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῇ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυ-
χίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις· κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι
συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν τις πότερον ὥς- 30
περ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἢ παρουσία δ'
αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὕσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην
ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω·
3 συμβάλειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικεν δ' ἡ παρουσία
μικτὴ τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ δεῖν τοὺς φίλους 35
ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία 1171b
πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι· παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ
τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἂν ἢ ἐπιδέξιός· οἶδεν γὰρ τὸ ἥθος
4 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἡδεται καὶ λυπεῖται. — τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθά-
νεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει 5

15. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ φίλοι καὶ K^b, οἷς δὲ πολλοὶ φίλοι καὶ
<οἱ> ci. Rr., οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar. || 17. καὶ
om. O^b Ald. Ar., c. c. add. Mi. || 23. δ' Π¹O^b, τ' c. c. Hel.
Ar. || 28. καὶ ante ἢ om. M^b Ald. Ar., c. c. add. Mi. Hel. ||
αὐτῇ ΓH^aL^b Hel., αὐτῇ N^b, αὐτῇ cet. Mi. || εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν
ταῖς om. K^b Bk. Fr. Rr., ἐν ταῖς om. Ald., c. c. add. Mi. Ar.,
καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις non vertit Hel. || 29. δυστυχίαις Π¹ Mi.,
ἀτυχίαις Π² Ald. || 1171b, 4. λυπουμένων Muretus.

- λύπης· αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, κὰν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἁλυντίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐκ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μὴδ' αὐτὸς
- 10 εἶναι θρηνητικός· γυναῖα δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἡδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς.
- 15 διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως (εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν), εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα (μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ “ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν”). μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλα αὐτὸν ὠφελῆσειν. —
- 20 ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρεῖᾳ καὶ τὸ μὴ ^{πολλὴν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ πολλὰ καλὰ} ἀξιώσαντος· αμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεῖα φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχο-
- 25 λαίως (οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι). δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὲ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἰρετὴ φαίνεται.
- 12 ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἑρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότάτον ἐστὶ
- 30 καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἰσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου,

7. συλλυπεῖσθαι Γ^{Nb} O^b Ald. Mi. Hel. || αὐτοῖς cum fontibus Bk.¹ Fr. || 10. συστενάζουσι L^b Ald. Mi., στένουσι M^b, στενάζουσι Hel. || 14. ἔννοιαν Γ Ald. Mi. Ar., εὐνοίαν Π Hel. || αὐτοῦ Γ Ar., αὐτῶν M^b Par. 1417 Hel., αὐτοῖς L^b Ald. || 16. εὐεργετητικόν O^b Bk. Fr., εὐεργετικόν c. c. Mi. || 22. τὸ] τοὺς Ald., om. M^b Hel., aut τοὺς aut om. Ar. || ἀξιώσαντος K^b, ἀξιώσαντας c. c. Hel. Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 27. δὲ M^b, δ' ἢ K^b, λοιπὸν δὲ L^b †.

'And such a one unless he be excessively impassive, cannot endure the pain which is brought upon them; and altogether he does not like sympathetic wailers, nor being given to wailing himself.

26. 'But one should beware perhaps of getting the reputation of the kind man in rejecting benefits: for this sometimes happens.

Ch. XI. The best thing in friendship is intercourse. This gives vividness to the pursuits of life: and when good men have intercourse with each other they mutually strengthen and increase the good that is in them.

35. 'But it is by living together that they attain the ful-
ness of life ($\eta \lambda \rho \theta \eta \iota \varsigma \delta \tau \epsilon \epsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu$).'

9. 'For being of an unstable nature, they have fellowship in
evil, and become bad by assimilation to each other.'

12. 'For they take the stamp of one another in those things
which they like.'

19. $\pi \epsilon \rho \iota \eta \delta \omega \nu \eta \varsigma$. The treatise on Pleasure opens analogous-
ly to the one on the Voluntary (*Eth. N. III. 1.*) and that on Friendship
(*VIII. 1.*): justifying the introduction of the subject (1) as con-
nected with Ethics, (2) as having been made matter of controversy.
 $\kappa \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \alpha \gamma \alpha \varsigma$ - for it seems to be most intimately connected with
the human race.

οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία
 γὰρ ἢ φιλία. καὶ ὥς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν
 φίλον· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἢ αἰσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἰρετή, καὶ περὶ
 τὸν φίλον δὴ· ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, 35
 ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὁ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ 1172a
 εἶναι ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φι-
 λων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ
 συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν
 ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὁ τι 5
 περ μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμε-
 νοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν
 οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἢ μὲν τῶν φανύλων φιλία
 μοχθηρά (κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φανύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μο-
 χθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιοῦμενοι ἀλλήλοις), ἢ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν 10
 ἐπιεικῆς, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμίλαις. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελ-
 τίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάτ-
 τονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλά. (*theognis*)

K.

περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρησθῶ· [ἐπό- 15
 μενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα 16
 περὶ ἡδονῆς ἕως ἔπεται διελθεῖν. μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ 19
^{αισθαιεῖται} συνώκειν τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ ^{τραίν} παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους 20
 οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
 ἡθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μι-

35. αὐτοῖς Ar. Bk. Fr. Rr. || 1172a, 1. ὁπότ' K^b, ὁπότε
 Ald., ὁ τι ποτ' M^b Bk. Fr. Rr. || 8. συζῆν corruptum, εὖ ζῆν
 ci. Bk., αὐτοὶ ζῆν ci. Rr.

Lib. X. K^bM^b = Π¹, ΓL^b Ald. = Π².

1172a, 15. περὶ — 16. ἡδονῆς secl. Rr. || ἐπόμενον — 16.
 ἡδονῆς secl. viri docti ap. Lambinum nescio qui et ipse Lam-
 binus || 19. ἕως om. L^b O^b, c. c. add. Mi. Ar. || 22. ἀρετὴν Π²
 O^b Mi. Ar., ἀρετὴν Π¹N^b.

σεῖν ἂν δεῖ. ^{intend} διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντός τοῦ βίου,
 ῥοπήν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα
 25 βίον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύ-
 γουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἦκιστ' ἂν δόξειεν παρετεῖν εἶναι,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἳ μὲν γὰρ ^{altogether}
 τὰγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἳ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον,
 οἳ μὲν ἴσως ^{convinced} πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχουσιν, οἳ δὲ οἴομενοι βέλ-
 30 τιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν
 φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς
 αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοῦναντίον
 ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μη ποτε δὲ οὐ
καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ
 35 ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν
 διαφωνῶσιν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονοῦμενοι καὶ
 1172b τὰληθὲς ^{as they are well} προσαναιροῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὁφθαλμοὶ
 ποτε ἐφίεμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην
 οὔσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. ἐοί-
 κασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι
 5 χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνωδοὶ γὰρ
 ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας
 ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλλισ, τὰ δὲ εἰρημμένα
 περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

2 Εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν ὥς εἶναι διὰ τὸ
 10 πᾶνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφίεμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλλογα (ἐν
 πᾶσιν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον·
 τὸ δὴ πᾶντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτο φέρεσθαι ^{proove} μὴνυειν ὡς πᾶσιν τοῦτο ἄρι-
 στον· ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ

26. δὴ Thurotus (nescio an recte) || τούτων L^b O^b, τῶν τοι-
 ούτων c. c. Hel. Ar. || 33. ἂν om. L^b O^b || 1172b, 2. ὡς] ὡς οὐ
 Ald. || 11. γὰρ sec. Rieckheri transl. Spengelius, δ' ΓΠ Ald. Mi.
 Ar. Bk. Rr. || καὶ — κράτιστον secludenda et 12. τὸ — ἄριστον
 post 14. τροφήν traicienda esse perperam ci. Rr. || 12. δὴ K^b,
 δὲ cet. Hel. Ar. || μὴνυειν post ἄριστον L^b Ar., μὴνυει ΓΜ^b et
 post ἄριστον Ald. || τοῦτο om. Π² Ar., c. c. add. Hel. || ἀγαθὸν
 vel αἰρετὸν Spengelius, prb. Rr. (male), ἄριστον ὃν Π¹.

οὐκ αὖ γὰρ. In all probability the allusion is to two sections of
the Platonists, (1) the party represented by Eudorus, (2) that
headed by Speusippus who wrote two anti-hedonistic works
Ἐπὶ ἡδονῆς and Ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν.

ὁ γὰρ ὁ βλάπτει. For he who blames pleasure (unreservedly), yet
is seen occasionally desiring it, is thought to incline towards
it as being altogether good; for ordinary persons cannot
discriminate.

The decline of philosophy having commenced, some of the
Platonists enunciated theories which were meant to be
practically useful rather than true, overstating the truth
about pleasure in order to counteract men's universal
tendency towards it. Aristotle doubts whether this is good
policy; their whole theory is likely to be upset by their occa-
sionally indulging in the higher kinds of pleasure.

Σωκ. Α. Aristotle approves generally of the argument. His whole con-
clusion (L. 3. 3) is that Eudorus was more right than his oppo-
nents but wrong in not discriminating between the different
kinds of pleasure, and in going so far as to say that pleasure is
the chief good (see note).

15. Eudorus of Cnidus who lived about 366 BC enjoyed great fame as an astronomer. He appears to have introduced the sphere from Egypt into Greece. The poem of Aratus is a versification of his $\Phi\alpha\delta\iota\sigma\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$. Aristotle is the only authority for his ethical opinions.

27. $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \gamma\alpha\rho$. for that every good is better in combination with another good than alone. This is indeed the very argument by which Plato proves pleasure not to be the highest good. For the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without. — Plato (Philebus p. 21-2) only argued that as the highest conception of good implied a combination of both pleasure and knowledge, pleasure separately could not be the chief good. It is a deduction of Aristotle from the terms used by Plato, $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\nu\theta\epsilon\upsilon\kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\upsilon$, that the chief good is incapable of addition or improvement. Cf. I. 7. 8.

34. $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ - What is there, then which has these characteristics (ie supreme goodness without the capability of addition) which we men can partake of? for such is the very object of our enquiries — that is, not a transcendental good, but something to be practically realised.

τροφήν, τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τὰγα-
 θὸν εἶναι)· ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετὴν 15
 μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς. ^{ἀλλ' οὐκ} διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι·
 οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως
 ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. — οὐχ ἦττον δ' ὥς εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ
 ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσιν φευκτὸν εἶναι,
 ὁμοίως δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον αἰρετόν. — μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν ὃ 20
 μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτο δ' ὁμο-
 λογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα
 ἡδεται, ὡς καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. — προστι-
 θεμένην τε ὁπωσοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δι-
 καιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· αὔξεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν [αὐτὸ] 25
αὐτῷ. ἔοικεν δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀπο-
 φαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πάν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ
αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιοῦτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων
 ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι
 τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρὶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτόν 30
 κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστε-
 θέντος αὐτὸ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ'
 ἄλλο οὐθὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τίνος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ
 ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἔστι τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς
κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται.

35

οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν
 λέγωσιν. ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν· ὃ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύ- 1173a

14. δὲ Hel. Ar. Spengelius, δὴ ΓΠ Ald. Bk. || καὶ male
 secl. Spengelius || 17. <ὡς> οὕτως ἔχον Coraes || 20. <καθ' αὐτὸ
 πᾶσιν> αἰρετόν. <ἔτι τὰγαθὸν τὸ μάλιστα αἰρετόν> ci. Spenge-
 lius || 25. καὶ ante αὔξεσθαι add. M^b O^b Ald. Mi. Ar. Bk., secl.
 Rr. || δὲ Rr., δὴ ΓΠ Ald. Mi. Ar. Bk. || αὐτὸ add. M^b O^b Ald.
 Bk. Rr. in textu (fors. recte) et ante τὸ ἀγαθὸν Mi. || 26. δὲ
 Γ || 28. οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτον post μονούμενον add. Mi. || 32.
 αὐτὸ pr. K^b, αὐτῷ cet. Mi. Ar. et corr.² K^b (fors. recte) || 34.
 οὖν] δ' οὐκ ex Garvii translatione Schneider || 1173a, 1. λέ-
 γουσιν Γ(?) L^b N^b Par. 1417 Ald., nisi fallor, recte || 2 Π¹, ὃ
 c. c. Hel. Ar. Bk. Rr. || ταῦτ' Π¹, τοῦτ' (τοῦτο Ald.) c. c. Hel.
 Ar. Bk. Rr. || ὁ δ'] ὁ τ' Susem.

την τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἔρεϊ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὠρέ-
 γετο αὐτῶν, ἦν ἄν τι <τὸ> λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς
 λέγοιεν ἄν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φανύλοις ἔστιν τι φυσικὸν [ἀγα-
 5 θὸν] κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. —
 οὐκ ἔοικεν δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γάρ
 φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ἐστὶ, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικει-
 σθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, λέγοντες
 ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες.
 10 ἀμφοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι,
 τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται
 τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δὲ αἰρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν·
 οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται. — οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς
 15 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. — λέγουσι
 δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὠρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι
 δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τοῦτο
 κρίνουσιν, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς,
 καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρ-
 20 χειν καὶ <πράττειν> κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται τὸ αὐτό (δίκαιοι

2. ἀνόητα μόνα duo codices Lambini et fort. Mi. || ὠρέ-
 γετο L^b Mi., ὠρέγοντο Hel., ὠρέγεται cet. Ar. || 3. τὸ add. Tur-
 nebus || καὶ om. Π¹ O^b, c. c. add. Ar. et, ut videtur, Mi. Hel. ||
 4. ἀγαθὸν offendit Thurotum, secl. Sasem. || 8. καὶ post γὰρ
 add. L^b Mi. Ar., c. c. om. (ut videtur) Hel. || μηδετέρῳ Γ Mi.
 Ar., μηδέτερον M^b, μηδετέρα N^b, μηδέτερα K^b L^b O^b Ald. et
 corr. H^a (fors. recte), μηδ' ἑτέρα pr. H^a || λέγεσθαι K^b || 9. οὐ'
 δ' οὐ Γ K^b Ald., δὴ οὐ Scaliger (fors. recte) || ἀληθεύονται
 Scaliger || 10. μὲν om. Γ Π¹ || ὄντοι κακοῖν L^b M^b, ὄντοι κα-
 κῶν Ald. || 11. τῶν — ὁμοίως aut corrigenda aut secludenda
 esse censet Rr., τὸ μηδέτερον δὲ <μήτε φευκτὸν> μητ' αἰρετὸν
 ἢ ὁμοίως ci. idem || ἢ ἕτερον Γ Ald. Ar. et corr.² K^b, ἢ ἕτε-
 ρον pr. K^b, μηδέτερον c. c. Mi. || ἦ] ὄν Ald. || 18. καὶ — ἀρε-
 τὰς non vertit Argyropylus, offenderunt Victorium || ἀρετὰς]
 δυνάμεις ci. Zellius || 19. καθ' — 20. ἀρετὰς secl. Gifanius ||
 20. καὶ om. K^b Bk, Rr. † || πράττειν add. Vahlenus (Aristot.
 Aufs. II. p. 36) || καὶ αὐτάς ci. Coraes, κατὰ τὰς αὐτάς Ver-
 mehrens, secl. Scaliger || ταυτά O^b, ταῦτα Π¹ †.

ἐν τοῖς φθύλλοις (θηρίοις) - in the lower creatures

13. $\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}\nu$ - This points to the moralising tendency of the Platonists, as if they said that nothing could be called good which did not form part of man's moral character.

17. Pleasure may be said to admit of degrees, as, in reference to men's different capacities for feeling it: but in this respect it will stand on the same footing as courage and justice.

ted as existing not in the recipients of pleasure, but in the pleasures themselves, perhaps they omit to state the reason of the fact, namely that while some pleasures are unmixed, others are mixed.

Plato (Philebus) divides pleasures into mixed and unmixed. Mixed pleasures are (1) bodily pleasures, where the bodily pain of want is mixed up with the bodily pleasure of gratification; (2) the pleasure of expectation of these, where the bodily pain of want is mixed up with the mental pleasure of the idea of relief; (3) pleasure in the ludicrous, where the mental pain of seeing the ridiculous is mixed with the mental pleasure of laughing at it. - These are *ἐμμεσεία*.

The unmixed pleasures are (1) those of smell; (2) those of sight and hearing; (3) those that belong to the intellect. These necessarily possess *ἐμμεσεία*.

24. *ἰσότης*. Even the mixed pleasures admit of the idea of proportion (*ὀυμμεσεία*), just as health is a proportion, though relative and variable, of the elements in the body.

27. *ἀνισότης*. but with a certain laxity of variation it still remains health, though admitting of difference in the degree.

30. This is the doctrine of the Cyrenaics adopted by Plato of bodily pleasures. The higher pleasures he had no formula to express. Speusippus probably applied the argument not merely ad homines (as Plato) but as if absolutely valid.

31. *κίνησις*. motion has speed and slowness properly belonging to it, if not relatively to itself, as for instance the motion of the universe has no speed or slowness in itself - because it moves equally - at all events in relation to other things. - If pleasure be identified with *κίνησις*, this argument holds good. But if pleasure were defined as the consciousness of a transition, there might then be degrees of speed in the transition, though not in the consciousness of it.

4. *γένεσις*. And how can it be a creation? for it does not seem to be the case that anything can be created out of any thing: a thing is resolved into that out of which it is created. And (as the Platonists say) pain is the destruction of that of which pleasure is the creation. [and where are the elements which begin and end the processes?]

11. neither is pleasure therefore a replenishment, though one may feel pleasure while replenishment is taking place, just as one may feel pain while one is being cut. - Pleasure may be synchronous with replenishment, but not identical with it, for pleasure is a state of the mind, and not of the body.

γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ
 σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον). εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μὴ ποτ'
 οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὧσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. τί
 δὲ κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὠρισμένη οὕσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλ-
 λον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτή 25
 συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις αἰεὶ, ἀλλ'
 ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. —
 τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέ-
 σεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν πει- 30
 ρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰλόκασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν. πάσῃ
γὰρ οἰκείον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ
καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τού-
των οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ
 ὀργισθῆναι, ἡδεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ 1173b
 αὖξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτήν
οὐκ ἔστιν ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδεσθαι. γένεσις τε πῶς ἂν εἴη;
 δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ 5
 οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διάλυεσθαι· καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τού-
 του ἡ λύπη φθορά. — καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἐνδειαν τοῦ
 κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ
 σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλή-
 ρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδοιτο· τὸ 10
 σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή,
 ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοιτο' ἂν τις, καὶ τε-

22. δὲ K^b, δ' ἐν c. c. Ar. Bk. Rr. || 23. τί δὲ κωλύει Γ,
 τί κωλύει δὲ L^b Ald. Ar., τί γὰρ κωλύει M^b Bk. Rr., τί γὰρ
 κωλύεται O^b, καὶ τί κωλύεται K^b || 28. τὸ om. L^b Ald. || 29. τε]
 δὲ L^b M^b O^b + || 33. τῇ τοῦ K^b Ald. et, ut videtur, Mi. Hel.
 Ar., τὸ τοῦ cet. || 1173b, 4. οὐκ ἔστι post ταχέως Π² || 7. τοῦ
 κατὰ φύσιν post 8. εἶναι Π² Hel. || 11. οὐδ'] οὐκ Π² Ar. et,
 ut videtur, Mi. Hel. || ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ c. c. Mi. Hel., ἡ ἀναπλή-
 ρώσις Π¹ || 12. τεμνόμενος corruptum, κενούμενος ci. Spenge-

μνόμενος λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ
 τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενο-
 15 μένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἡδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ'
 οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλλοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ
 τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθησεις αἱ διὰ τῆς
 ὁσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνη-
 μαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς
 20 γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. — πρὸς δὲ
 τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν
 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ταῦθ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις
 ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ
 οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδὲ αὖ
 25 λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν. ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτ' ἂν,
 ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὀτιοῦν
 φργόντι. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί. ἔτεροι γὰρ αἱ
 ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθηται
 30 τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα
 μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δο-
 κεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος, οὐκ οὕσαν ἀγαθὸν
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει· ὃ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ὁμι-
 λεῖν δοκεῖ, ὃ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν
 1174a δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν
 παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίον, ἡδόμενος ἔφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία

lius, rec. Rr., τητώμενος ci. Vermehrenus, δεόμενος ci. Zeller
 (l. l. p. 477. n. 2 ed. II.) || 14. γενομένους M^b Hel. (?), γινομέ-
 νους c. c. Bk.¹ || 17. αἱ] καὶ ΓO^b Ald. Ar. et, ut videtur, Hel. ||
 18. πολλὰ K^b, πολλὰ δὲ cet. Ar. || 20. ἐνδεια γεγένηται Π²,
 ἐνδεια γεγένηται c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar. || γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπληρώσεις
 L^b Ald. Ar., γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις Hel. || 23. ταῦτ' ante
 ἐστίν add. Π²O^b Hel. Ar. || ἀπλῶς ante πλὴν add. Π²N^b O^b
 Ar. et, ut videtur, Mi. Hel. (nescio an recte) || 25. δῆ post
 οὕτω add. Π² Ar. (fors. recte) || 34. τὸ L^bO^b Ald. Ar., τῷ c.
 c. Mi. (ut videtur), ὁ Coraes || τὸ O^b Ald. Ar., τὸν c. c. Mi.
 (ut videtur) || 1174a, 1. τ'] δ' Π²O^b Ar., om. Γ.

32. The arguments to prove that pleasures differ in kind are:
- (1) that some men are incapable of feeling certain pleasures.
 - (2) that the flatterer is different from the friend.
 - (3) that the pleasures of childhood differ from those of maturity.
- The whole reasoning is repeated in better form in Ch. V.

32. Common language which contrasts the flatterer who ministers pleasure from the friend who ministers good, testifies to the non-identity of pleasure (in all forms) with good.

6. If pleasure were, as Eudomus says, the chief good, all pleasures would be prized in proportion to their affording pleasure: but this is not the case.
12. Chap. IV. Aristotle now proceeds synthetically, to state
 1. Pleasure is, like sight, something whole and entire, not gradually arrived at, but a moment of consciousness arising at once perfect, independent of the conditions of time.
 2. It arises from any faculty, obtaining its proper object, but is better in proportion of the excellence of the faculty exercised. ~~It is thus~~
 3. It is thus the perfection of our functions but is distinct from the functions themselves.
 4. It cannot be continuously maintained owing to the weakness of our powers.
 5. Pleasure in short results from the sense of life and is inseparably connected with the idea of life.
12. The genus of pleasure ($\tau\acute{\iota} \kappa\omicron\tau\iota$) given is that it is $\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota$, one of those moments of consciousness which are complete in themselves: the differentia ($\pi\omicron\delta\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota$) that it results from the exercise of any faculty upon its proper object.
15. For it stands in need of nothing beyond itself, the subsequent addition of which will make it perfect in its kind.
19. Therefore it is not a process, for every process is under conditions of time, and aims at some end: for instance (the process of architecture is perfect when it has effected what it aims at, (perfect) in the time viewed as a whole, or in the particular time. But in the separate parts of the time occupied all processes are imperfect, and are different in species both from the whole process and from one another. For the collecting of the stones is different from the fluting of the pillars, and both from the making of the temple, and the making of the temple is a perfect process for it wants nothing towards its proposed object: but that of the basement and the triglyph are imperfect, for they are, each the making of a part. Therefore they differ in species, and it is not possible to find a process perfect in species in any time whatsoever, unless it be in the time occupied viewed as a whole.

(II)

ὥς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχυρίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλὰ τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, 5 μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοιμέθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτο ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. [ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τὰ γὰθὸν ἢ ἡδονή οὔτε πᾶσα αἰρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰδὲν τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν.] 10

τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης 3
IV ἱκανῶς εἰρησθῶ· τί δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ποιῶν τι, καταφανέ-
στερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ
ἢ μὲν ὅρασις καθ' ὄντινον χρόνον τελεία εἶναι (οὐ
γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον τε- 15
λειώσκει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος)· τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικεν καὶ ἡ ἡδονή.
ὅλον γὰρ τι ἐστίν, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν
ἡδονήν ἥς ἐπὶ πλείῳ χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ
2 εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστίν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις
καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ 20
ἐφίεται, ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς
ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἢ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἕτερα τῆς
τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὐταὶ τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ
ἢ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμε- 25
νον), ἢ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής (μέρους
γὰρ ἑκατέρου). τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁρω-
οῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ
3 ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ

8. ὅτι — 10. ὧν secl. simulque (qua de re admodum dubito) corrupta esse censet Rr. || 9. τὰ γὰθὸν Γ^L^b, ἀγαθὸν cet. || 10. ἀφ' τοῖς ἀφ' corr. Par. 1417 || 15. ἐς L^b M^b || γινόμενον K^b (fors. recte) || 17. ὅλον] τέλειον Π¹ O^b † || 20. ἢ οἰκοδομικῇ] οἰκοδομικὴ καὶ K^b, οἰκοδομὴ M^b, οἰκοδόμησις ci. Rr. (nescio an recte) || 21. δὴ om. K^b O^b Par. 1417 † || ἢ] δὴ O^b Par. 1417, om. L^b M^b Ald., secl. Micheletus et Grantius † || 29. παντί L^b M^b Ald.

- 30 γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ
κατ' εἶδη, πτησίς βάδις αἰσῖς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οὐ μόνον
δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει. τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ
οὐ ταῦτόν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει
καὶ ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κάκεινην.
- 1174b οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ
οὔσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ
κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικεν δ' οὐδ' ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ
τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ
5 εἶδει, εἵπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁτιοῦν
χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὥς ἕτερά τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλ- 4
λήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν
τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδε-
σθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. — ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ
10 ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς. οὐ
γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων·
οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεως ἔστι γένεσις οὐδὲ συγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ
τούτων οὐθέν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γὰρ τι.
- 4 αἰσθησεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, 5
15 τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ
τὴν αἴσθησιν (τοιούτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνερ-
γεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, μηθὲν διαφε-
ρέτω), καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἁριστα

31. καὶ om. Π¹ † || 33. τὸ αὐτὸ Π¹ O^b || ἐν ante τῷ μέρει om.
Π² || μέρει alterum post 34. ἑτέρῳ Π² || 34. καὶ] καὶ ἐν K^b || 1174b,
3. εἰρήσεται temere ci. Grantius || οὐδ' Ar., οὐκ ΓΠ Ald. Mi.
Hel. Bk. || ἅπαντι τῷ M^b, <τῷ> ἅπαντι Rr. || 10. οὐ] οὐδὲ?
Sussem. || τῆς ἡδονῆς Rr., τὴν ἡδονὴν cum fontibus Ar. Bk. ||
13. οὐθέν] οὐδενός codex Turnebi || ἡδονὴ Argyropylos || 14.
αἰσθησεως — 23. αὐτὴν citat Alex. l. l. p. 258 sq. Speng. ||
δὴ (aut <οὐδὲ>) αἰσθησεως πάσης — ἐνεργούσης <ἔστι κίνησις
ἢ γένεσις> ci. Mi., δὲ καὶ M^b Alex. † || 16. κειμένων post αἰ-
σθησιν add. Π² O^b Ar.(?), cum Π¹ om. Alex. (ut videtur) ||
17. μὴ Π¹ || 18. ἐκάστην M^b Alex. || δὴ Lambinus (fors. recte),
γὰρ fort. Γ.

such as a process from place to place, such as from one place to
feeling it a series, like e.g. climbing, jumping, and the like, and
not only this but even in walking itself there are different
species, for the whence and the whither are not the same in
the whole course and in the part of the course, and in one
part and the other part: nor is it the same thing to cross this
line and that. For a person, not only passes a line but
a line in space, and this line is in different space from
that line. We shall treat exactly of process elsewhere,
but it seems not to be perfect in every time, but the ma-
jority of processes seem imperfect and differing in spe-
cies, if the whence and the whither constitute a differ-
entia. But pleasure seems perfect in kind in any time
(of its existence) whatsoever.

- One moment of pleasure does not lead up to another
as a preparative (a more advanced moment). Pleasure
when felt is ipso facto complete.

3. ἐν ἑκάστῳ in quolibet tempore. Not the same as ἐν ἑκάστῳ
τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ and ἐν τῷ ἑκάστῳ, above.

6. It is clear then that (process and pleasure) must be dif-
ferent from one another, and that pleasure belongs to the
class of things whole and perfect.

23. *τὸ λείον*. pleasure renders the exercise of a faculty perfect, but not in the same way in which the goodness of the faculty itself, and of its object does so; just as health and the physician are in different ways the cause of one's being well.

24. But if the object and the percipient be in this (highest) condition, there will always be pleasure, so long as the subject and object remain.

1. For from similar pairs of relatives bearing the same relation to one another, that is, active and passive, the same result is naturally produced. — an abstract way of stating the universality of pleasure attendant on the harmony between a faculty and its proper object.

IV)

διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτήν· αὕτη δ' ἂν
 τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἔστιν 20
 ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τε-
 λειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δὲ ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιό-
 1 τaton τῶν ὑφ' αὐτήν. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν ἢ ἡδονή. οὐ
 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον· ἢ τε ἡδονή τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε
 καὶ ἢ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα. ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ 25
 7 ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. [καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθη-
 σιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· φαμέν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ
 ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴ
 ἢ τε αἴσθησις ἢ κράτιστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιοῦτων
 δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰ ἐστὶ ἡδονή 30
 8 ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου.] τελειοῖ δὲ
 τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν ἢ ἡδονή οὐχ ὥς ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς
 ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἢ ὥρα· ἕως ἂν
 οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ
 θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ ἡδονῇ· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ 1175a
 πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχοντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ
 9 καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. — πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς
 συνεχῶς ἡδεῖται; ἢ ^{αἰσθάνεται} ~~καμνεῖ~~; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυ-
 νατεῖ συνεχῶς ^{activity} ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ 5

19. ὑπ' αὐτήν ΓΚ^b (nescio an recte) || 20. <καὶ> τελειο-
 τάτη Rr. (fors: recte) || 23. ὑπ' αὐτήν Γ (nescio an recte) || 24.
 τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις] τὴν αἴσθησιν corr. Par. 1417 et ci. Mi. ||
 26. αἰτία ἐστὶ O^b, αἰτία ἐστὶ ΓΚ^b, αἰτία εἰσι. vel αἰτιά εἰσι pr.
 L^b, αἰτία εἰσι rc. L^b Hel., ἔστιν αἰτία M^b || καθ' — 31. πεισο-
 μένου om. Hel., secludenda esse ci. Zellius, secl. Rr. || 28. δὴ
 Ar., γὰρ δὴ L^b O¹ Ald. || 29. ἢ] εἴη L^b M^b Ald. || 32. ἢ post οὐχ
 ὥς add. K^b O^b Bk. Rr. || 33. ἕως οὖν ἂν ποτε τὸ νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθη-
 τὸν εἴη οἷον δὴ τὸ M^b O^b, ἕως οὖν ἂν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἢ νοητὸν
 ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ L^b, ἕως δ' οὐ ἂν ποτε τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἢ νοη-
 τὸν ἢ (ἢ Ar.) οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ Ald. Ar., ἕως δ' οὐ τὸ αἰσθητὸν
 ἢ νοητὸν Γ || 1175a. 3. πῶς — 10. ἀμνηστούται citat Alex. l. 1.
 p. 260 Sp. || 4. ἢ <ὅτι> ci. v. d. nescio quis ap. Wilkinsonem,
 nescio an recte || κάμνει corruptum esse putat Rr. || 5. ἡδονή
 <συνεχῆς> Rr.

τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως
 διὰ ταυτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἢ διάνοια καὶ
 διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν αἱ
 ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δὲ οὐ τοιαύτη ἢ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ
 10 παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμειβοῦται. — ὁρέγεσθαι δὲ
 τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθεῖν τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες
 ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα
 καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἅ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσι-
 κὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ
 15 τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τε-
 λειοὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ, οὗ ὁρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν
 καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοὶ γὰρ ἕκαστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἰρετόν
 5 ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν
 τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεξεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα
 20 φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ
 γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοὶ ἢ ἡδονή.

ὅθεν δοκοῦσιν καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶ-
 25 δει ὅφ' ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ
 φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῶα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ
 26 ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς
 διαφερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. δια-
 27 φέρουσιν δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ
 αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. —
 φανερὴ δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνεκκλειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκά-
 30 στην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ

7. ταῦτα Π² M^b || παρακέκληται Γ Mi. Hel. || 9. δὴ K^b, δ'
 ἢ M^b O^b, om. Γ, δὲ c. c. Mi. Hel. || οὐ τοιαύτη ἢ ἐνέργεια Bk., οὐ
 τοιαύτη ἐνέργεια K^b, οὐ γίνεται τοιαύτη ἢ ἐνέργεια Π² Alex.
 Hel. Ar. (nescio an recte), τοιαύτη ἐνέργεια οὐ γίνεται M^b O^b ||
 11. ὅτε Bk. errore typogr., Rr. in textu || 16. δὴ Ar. Thurotus, δὲ
 Γ Π Ald. Bk. Rr. || 21. πᾶσάν — ἡδονή om. Γ || τε L^b Ar., γὰρ M^b,
 τε γὰρ K^b O^b Ald. || 23. οὕτω — 25. σκεῦος secludenda esse ci. Ver-
 mehrens || 24. ἀπὸ ci. Zellius || 25. τὰς post ἐνεργείας om. Π¹ ||
 26. διαφόρων M^b Hel. (?), φερόντων τῷ Ald. || 28. αὐταὶ αὐταὶ Γ,
 αὐταὶ K^b Bk., αἰται c. c. Hel. Ar. || 29. τῶν] τη τῶν pr. K^b,
 τὴν τῶν corr.² K^b (crx. rc.), δὴ τῶν M^b, δὲ τῶν O^b.

in the activity of the faculties. Some things please us while they are new but afterwards not in the same way. For at first the intellect is excited and acts strenuously on the objects in question (as in the case of sight, where one first fixes one's glance) but afterwards the attention is not equally vivid but relaxed, and so one's pleasure also fades.

22. Pleasures may be thought to differ in kind:
 1. because our several functions differ in kind, and are thus perfected by things different in kind.
 2. because while its own pleasure promotes any particular exercise of the faculties, an alien pleasure impedes it.
 3. because the human functions differ from each other in a moral point of view, and the pleasures therefore which are so closely connected with them as almost to be identical must differ in the same way from one another.
 4. creatures different in kind must have different pleasures.
 5. The pleasures of man when in a morbid state must be different from the pleasures of man when in a healthy state.
25. These *εὐπρεπείαι* must be those of the rational faculty. Thus things capable of being made perfect are classified into natures, art, and the moral and intellectual life of man. Cf. *Eth. III. 3.7.*
29. This would also seem to be shown by the intimate connection existing between each pleasure and the function which it perfects.

12. τρυμνιστοὶ - And those who munch sweetmeats
in the theatres do so especially when the actors are bad.

(V)

οἰκεία ἡδονή. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν
οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαί-
ροντες τῷ γεωμετρῆν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
λων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. 35
συναύξουσιν δὴ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα. τοῖς
3 ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. — ἔτι δὲ 1175b
μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμπο-
δίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ φίλανθοι ἀδυνατοῦσιν τοῖς
λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν ἀλλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαί-
ροντες ἀνλητικῇ τῆς παροῦσης ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνλή- 5
4 τικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴν τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνεργείαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως
δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο
ἐνεργῇ· ἢ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ δια-
φέρει κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ
τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁρῶσιν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν 10
ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον
καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεατροῖς οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φανῶσι οἱ ἀγω-
5 νιζόμενοι ὧσιν, τότε μάλιστα αὐτὰ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν
οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ
βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἄλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δηλὸν ὥς πολὺ 15
διεστᾶσιν· σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἄλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ
οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι,
οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὃ
μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὃ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρὰς οὗσης τῆς ἐνε-
ργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰ- 20
κείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰδὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ
καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἄλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παρα-
πλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γὰρ, πλην οὐχ ὁμοίως.

34. φιλοδόκιμοι K^b, φιλόνοσμοι M^b† || 36. δὴ corr. Par.
1417, δὲ c. c. Ar. Bk. || 1175b, 4. κατακούωσιν Π¹ || 10. διο-
ρῶμεν K^bO^b, διορῶμεν τὸ M^b, δρῶμεν c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar. || 11.
οἷον om. Π¹ Bk. Rr., c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || 19. γὰρ om. Π² Ar. ||
22. κατ' αὐτὴν Scaliger || εἴρηται L^b, εἴρηται cet.

διαφερόντων δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία καὶ φανυλότητι, ⁶
 25 καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φρενικῶν τῶν δ' οὐδέ-
 τέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ
 ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἔστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ
 οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φανύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπι-
 θυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν ψεκταί.
 30 οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναί τῶν ὀρέ-
 ξων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶν καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ
 φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως
 ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
 οὐ μὴν ἔοικέν γε ἡ ἡδονὴ ^{διάνοια} εἶναι οὐδ' αἰσθησις ^{(ἄτοπον}
 35 γὰρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται ^{εἰς τὰς αἰσθησεις} τισι ταύτου.
 ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ
 1176 a ὄψις ἀφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοή καὶ ὁσφορησις γεύσεως·
 ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσιν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν
 διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ζῳῳ· 8
 καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέρ-
 5 γειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα
 γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλει-
 τὸς φησιν ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἡδίων
 γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἶδει
 διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφύρους εὐλόγον εἶναι.
 10 διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ 9
 αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ
 καὶ μισητὰ ἔστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητὰ. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκῶν
 δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρεττοντι
 καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ
 15 εὐενκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ 10
 δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.

29. δὲ post αἰσχυρῶν K^b O^b || 1176a, 2. δὲ K^b M^b O^b Ald. |
 αἱ post καὶ om. O^b et pr. K^b (add. corr.²) || 7. ὄνον H^a, οἶον
 M^b, ὄνους K^b O¹ Ald. Mi. Ar., ὄνον c. c. Hel. || 10. διάλλάσσουσι
 K^b L^b O^b || σμικρὸν M^b P^b, σμικροῖς K^b, μικρὸν c. c. Bk. Rr. ||
 11. τέρπει — 1177a, 30. ἱκανῶς om. K^b.

32. 'and they are so indivisible as to raise a doubt whether the function is not identical with the pleasure attached to it. And yet the pleasure can hardly be thought or perception, this would be absurd: but through this not being separated some people fancy them to be identical.' — Pleasure, though not divided, should be distinguished from the vital functions. The author of the Eudemian books however (Eth. III. 12. 3) identifies them.

7. This forms the counterpart to that other saying 'Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape'.

15. $\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\iota$ - That there is a definite standard of pleasure and of taste, Aristotle clearly lays down in his discussion upon the saying of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things. Those who are vicious are pronounced not to be right judges of what is good or pleasant: their pleasures are to be pronounced not pleasures at all.

30. Chap. VI. Returning to the general question of the nature of happiness, he takes up from the first book the following fundamental propositions: - (1) that happiness must be an action and not a state of the faculties; (2) that it must be final and satisfying; (3) that it must consist in some development of the faculties sought for its own sake. Games and amusements must however be excluded: though exercises of the faculties sought for their own sake, (4) they are patronised by unworthy judges - tyrants, children and the like; (5) after all, they are rather the means to working strenuous ends in themselves; (6) they do not represent the highest faculties in man.

V)

εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου
 μέτρον ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶναι
 ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ
 τούτῳ ^{καὶ βέλτερον} δυσχερὲς εἰ τῷ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολ- 20
 λαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ
 11 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμο-
 λογουμένως αἰσχροῦς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν
 τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποῖαν ἢ
 τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; 25
 ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους
 αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδο-
 ναὶ κυρίως λέγουντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ
 δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

VI

εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλλας καὶ 6
 ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέ- 31
 λος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προει-
 2 ρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ ^{discussio} λόγος. ἐπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχει ἂν, φυ-
 τῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα 35
 μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθά- 1176b
 περ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν
 ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον
 ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτάς αἰρετῶν τινα θετέον καὶ
 οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρ- 5
 3 κης· καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰδὼν αἰρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται
 παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρε-
 τὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι'
 αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι'
 ἕτερα αὐτάς αἰροῦνται· βλέπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον 10

17. καὶ ante ἐκάστον add. Γ^H P^b Ald. || 18. ὁ add. Ald.
 22. τοῖς add. M^b, c. c. om. Bk. Rr. || ὁμολογουμένος Ald., ὁμο-
 λογουμένης Γ^M Mi., ὁμολογουμένως c. c. P^b Hel. || 29. αἱ
 καὶ αἱ Hel. Argyropylus Coraes || 32. δὲ Γ^L O^b Hel. (?) †
 34. φυτοῦ Γ^O Ald. Ar., φυτῶν c. c. P^b Hel. || 35. δὲ Hel.

ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως.
 καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμο-
 νιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν
 οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίεν-
 15 ται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδέεις· δέονται δὲ τοιού-
 των. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν
δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως σημείον 4
οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς,
ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὔτοι ὄντες
 20 ἡδονῆς ἐλλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς κατα-
φεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ
γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται
εἶναι. εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαί-
νεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φανούσις καὶ ἐπιεικῆσιν. / καθάπερ οὖν 5
 15 πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ
τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἰρετω-
τάτῃ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ 6
 ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία. καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
 παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
 30 ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὥς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου
 ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
 σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ
 λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν,
ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνα-
 35 τοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὲ τέλος
 1177a ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ
 εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς,
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν 7
 γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος αἰεὶ καὶ

1176b, 15. τούτων L^b O^b Ald. Ar., τοιούτων c. c. P^b Mi. || 17. ἀποσχολάζειν H^a L^b M^b || 18. οὐδ' ὁ L^b Ald. Hel., οὐδὲ P^b, ὁ δὲ H^a M^b O^b || 27. δὴ ἡ Par. 1417, δὴ aut δὴ ἡ Ar., δὲ ἡ O^b Bk., δὲ c. c. P^b || 31. ἕνεκεν? Sussem. || 1177a, 1. δ'] θ' Sussem. || 4. τῶν add. L^b P^b, c. c. om. Mi. || καὶ post αἰεὶ om. ΓH^a Ald.

These things are fancied to be constitutives of happiness because monarchs spend their ~~time~~ ^{leisure} in them. But perhaps after all monarchs are no evidence: for neither virtues nor reason on which the higher functions of man depend are involved in kingly power. — Cp. Eth. I. 5.3.

8. For no one allows a slave to share in happiness, any more than in the social life of a citizen.

12. Chap. VII. Happiness in the highest sense consists in philosophy: (1) because this is the function of the most excellent part of our nature: (2) because it most admits of continuance: (3) because it affords most pure and solid pleasure: (4) because it has pre-eminently the character of being self-sufficient: (5) because it is above all things an end in itself and not a means to ulterior results: (6) because it is a sort of repose, and as it were the fruits of our exertions. It is indeed attainable by man only through virtue of a divine element that is in him, yet we should endeavour to live in harmony with our noblest part.

15. 'Whether it be, itself too, absolutely divine, or relatively speaking the divinest thing in our nature'. - In *Metaphys.* I. 2. 14. philosophy is said to be most divine as being kindred to the thought of God, and as being knowledge of things divine.

18. τῆς ψυχῆς - perhaps *Eth.* I. 13. 20 or I. 5. 7. is meant.

26. 'And it is reasonable to suppose that those who know pass their time more pleasantly than those who are enquiring.' - not that the εἶς or κτήσις τῆς σοφίας constitutes happiness, but the ἐπέχειν κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, the play of the mind under the guidance of philosophy; contrasting the peace and repose of conviction with the restlessness of doubt. Aristotle strangely leaves out of account that sense of ignorance which the wisest man will always retain. His statement is chargeable with philosophic pride from which Plato and Socrates were free.

I)

μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπονδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ ⁵
 8 βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἦδη. ἀπολαύσειέ
 τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ
 ἦττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδω-
 σιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ
 εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ ¹⁰
 καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

II

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον ⁷
 κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς
 τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖ-
 σθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θειῶν, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν ¹⁵
καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια
 κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι
² δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν
 εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε γὰρ
 αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν ²⁰
 γνωστῶν, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς, ἔτι δὲ συνεχεσιάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ
³ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὅτιοῦν. οἰόμεθά τε
 δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῆχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν
 κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως
 ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν κα- ²⁵
 θαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζη-
⁴ τούντων ἡδῶ τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρχεια
 περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ
 ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται,
 τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται ³⁰
 πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώ-

5. σπονδαιοτέρον M^b, σπονδαιοτάτην L^b || ἡ ci. Coraes
 17. ὅτι — 18. εἴρηται] at haec nusquam sic leguntur: lacunae
 igitur habes in libro VI. indicium || 19. τε add. L^b P^b Ald.,
 om. H^a M^b O^b || 21. τε male secl. Rieckher Rr. || 25. γοῦν] τοίνυν
 (= οὖν?) Hel. || σοφία P^b Ald. Ar., φιλοσοφία c. c. Mi. Hel.
 καθαριότητι P^b Ald. Mi. Hel., καθαρσιότητι L^b O^b, καθαρσιότητι
 M^b || 26. βεβαίῳ] τιμίῳ Mi. || 27. ἀγωγὴν L^b Ald.

φρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς
καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύνатаι θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος
ἦ, μᾶλλον βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοῦς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὁμῶς
1177b αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶ- 5
σθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ
δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἕλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν
πραξίν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχο- 6
5 λούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνα εἰρήνην
ἄγωμεν. [τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς
ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἢ ἐνέργεια· αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
δοκοῦσιν ἀσχοιοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς,]
οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ πα-
10 ρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος
τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ
φόνοι γίνοντο. * ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ
παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένην δυναστείας καὶ τι-
μὰς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἐτέραν
15 οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὥς ἐτέραν οὖσαν.
εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ 7
πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἀσχο-
λοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν,
ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικῇ
20 οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν

34. δ'] γὰρ? Susem. || ἔχειν Γ^{Mb} || 1177b, 1. δόξαι τ' K^b,
δόξαι δ' cet. Mi. Hel.(?) || 3. πρακτικῶν K^b Hel., πρακτικῶν c. c.
Bk. Rr. || περὶ L^b M^b, παρὰ c. c. Hel. Ar. || 6. τῶν — 8. παντελῶς
post 12. γίνονται tri. Rassovius || 7. αἱ ἐνέργειαι Π² Mi. Hel. Ar. ||
8. εἶναι ** Rr., εἶναι <καὶ ἄλλου χάριν> vel simile quid ci. Rr.
(perperam) || 9. τὸ secl. Coraes || ἕνεκεν? Susem. || παρασκευά-
ζειν Π² M^b Ar. et fort. Hel., rec. Coraes || 12. γίνηται K^b O^b,
γίνονται M^b Hel. || 14. ἐτέραν — 15. πολιτικῆς secl. Gifanius ||
15. ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν post οὖσαν tri. Gifanius || δῆλον <ὅτι>
vel δὴ ci. Rr., δῆλον — οὖσαν secludenda aut δῆλον ὥς
ante 14. ἐτέραν ponenda et ἐτέραν οὖσαν secludenda esse ci.
Zellius || 19. σπουδῇ] σχολῇ Vermehrenus.

12. But moreover the function of the politician also is restless, and beyond mere administration it aims at power and distinctions, or, if happiness for the man himself and his citizens, at all events a happiness which is something distinct from the exercise of the political art.
- πολις while producing happiness is identical with it: but πολιτική is to happiness as means to end.

24. For though (this noblest part) be small in proportionate bulk, yet in power and dignity it far surpasses all the other parts of our nature. You bear a small proportion to the whole of our composite nature. And so, elsewhere, he says that only at short and rare intervals can man enjoy the fruition of his divine nature.

9. Chap VIII. The philosophic life is of paramount excellence. The life of practical morality holds a secondary place:—

1. because it is bound up with the passions.
2. because it is more dependent on external circumstances
3. because such a life cannot possibly be attributed to the gods.

The philosopher will require only a very moderate degree of external prosperity: and if the gods watch over men, they surely will over the philosopher.

II)

τελείαν οἰκείαν (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὐτὰρ-
 κες δὲ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτροτον ὡς ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὅσα
 ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν
 φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεῖα δὲ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀν-
 θρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστίν 25
 τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ
 κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐστὶν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ'
 ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συν-
 θέτου, τοσοῦτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν·
 εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος 30
 θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραι-
 νοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν
 θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν
 πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ
 τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον 1178a
 πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ
 τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν
 αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότε-
 ρον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κρᾶ- 5
 τιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὁ κατὰ
 τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ
 εὐδαιμονέστατος.

II

δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ 8
 ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ 10

21. τελείως Ob, om. Π² Ar. Bk. Rr. || 22. δὲ Mb Ob Mi., δὴ
 c. c. Bk. Rr. || ἀνθρώπινον Π² Ob Ar. || 23. κατὰ] τὰ κατὰ Π¹ ||
 26. εἴη ἂν κρείττων βίος Lb, ἂν εἴη κρείττων βίος Γ Ald. || 28.
 ὅσῳ — 29. ἀρετὴν secl. Rr. || 31. οὐ χρὴ δὲ Π¹ Hel., χρὴ δὲ
 οὐ Π² Ob || 33. ἀπαθανατίζειν Nb Ald. Mi. Hel. et γρ. Ob, ἀπο-
 θανατίζειν Lb || 1178a, 1. ἀλλὰ ante δυνάμει add. O¹ Ald. Hel.
 Ar. || τελειότητι Ob, ποιότητι Kb, τιμιότητι c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar. ||
 2. δ' om. Π¹ || εἶναι ἕκαστον Mb Ob, ἕκαστον εἶναι Γ, ἕκαστος
 εἶναι Lb Ald. || 3. κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον] κράτιστον καὶ κύριον ci.
 Rr. || 6. ἐσθ' Lb, ἔσθ' Ald. || 7. τοῦτο post μάλιστα Π² || 9. κατ'
 αὐτὴν Π² Ob Hel. Bk. Rr.

τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν
 συναλλαγμασιν καὶ ^{contracta} χρεῖαις καὶ ^{business} πράξεσι παντοίαις ἐν τε
 τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω, ταῦτα δ' εἶναι
 φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ 2
 τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνφρικεῖσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν
 ἢ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ. συνέξενται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ 3
 ἡθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρο-
 νήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἡθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὁρεθόν ^{staidness}
 τῶν ἡθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρημέναι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ
 20 τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ σύνθετου ἀρε-
ταὶ ἀνθρωπικά. καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαι-
 μονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς
 εἴρηται· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν.
 || δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἑλατ- 4
 25 τον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἡθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεῖα
καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἐστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ
πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα (μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρει).
πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ
 δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ
 30 δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλῆσεις ἄδηλοι,
προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν),
τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν

11. τὰ ante ἄλλα add. L^b Ald. Mi. Hel., c. c. om. Bk. Rr. || 12. καὶ <ταῖς> πράξεσι ci. et post 13. πάθεσι tri. Rassovius || 13. διατηροῦντες (διαιροῦντες Ald.) post ἐκάστω Π² Hel. (?) || 19. δ' αὐταῖς καὶ K^b Mi., δ' αὐταὶ Ald. Ar., δὲ ταύτῃ τε καὶ ci. Rr., δ' αὐτῇ τε καὶ Susem. || 20. περὶ] καὶ περὶ M^b Ald. Ar. || 21. κατ' αὐτάς L^b O^b Ald. Bk. Rr. (fors. recte) || 22. γὰρ] δὲ M^b Hel. † || 23. εἰρήσθω Argyropylus Ar. Bk. Rr. || γὰρ] δὲ cod. Victori (nisi fallor, recte) || 24. δόξειε — b, 32. τις verbis similia repeti atque iam 1177a, 12 — 1178a, 8 exposita sunt, monuit Rassovius, δόξειε — 34. τις cum insuper quodammodo praeripiant argumentum eorum, quae b, 33 sqq. tractantur, offenderunt iam Spengelium || 24. ἐπὶ] ἢ ἐπὶ Π¹ || ἑλαττόν <γε> haud male ci. Rr. || 27. διαφέρει M^b, διαφέρη L^b O^b Ald., διαφέρει aut διαφέρη Γ, διαφέρειν K^b || 32. τὴν add. K^b.

16. Thought moreover seems inseparably connected with excellence of the moral nature, and this with thought, since the major premises of thought are in accordance with the moral virtues, and the right in morals is that which is in accordance with thought. But as thought and moral virtue are bound up with the passions, they must be concerned with our composite nature: and the virtues of the composite nature must be purely human. $\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\eta\ \delta\iota\alpha\sigma\phi\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\eta$ is closely united with $\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\eta\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ and depends on $\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\eta\ \theta$. for its maintenance, no less than $\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\eta\ \theta$ is blind without it.

25. For though on the one hand (the philosopher and the practical man) will have an equal need of the order and means of life, even if the practical man takes more trouble about the concerns of the body and such like (for there will be but little difference in this respect), on the other hand there will be a wide difference with regard to the discharge of their respective functions.

27. $\sigma\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ - here opposed to $\delta\omicron\omicron\phi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, not as distinctive indicating the politician but as representing the whole class of the active virtues which are subsequently analysed.

17. See § 508 & 51. 'And if we went through all the virtues, we should see that whatever relates to moral action is petty and unworthy of the gods.'

The argument is that we cannot attribute morality to the gods, without falling into anthropomorphism: but it might be replied that there is the same difficulty in conceiving of God as engaged in philosophic thought. Aristotle himself felt this difficulty, and elsewhere defined the thought of God as 'the thinking upon thought'; which would not only deprive the Deity of all those fatherly and tender functions which the human race is prone to attribute to him, but would also remove ~~from~~ Him from the conditions of all human thinking. And if the life of God be only analogous to that of the philosopher, why not also analogous to the life of the good man. Plato by placing the idea of justice in the supra-sensible world, allowed a more than mortal interest to morality. And he speaks of the just man, by the practice of virtue, being 'made like to God.'

(II)

ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σῶφρονι ἐξουσίᾳς. ^{opportunity} πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἡ
 5 οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται τε πότερον κυριώτε-
 ρον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν 35
 οὔσης· τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ 1178b
 τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσιν καὶ
 ■ καλλίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων
 πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεῖα, ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστιν
 πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἥ δ' ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ, 5
 αἰρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεῖσεται οὖν τῶν τοιού-
 7 των πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. — ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεω-
 ρητικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανεῖη. τοὺς θεοὺς
 γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι·
 πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεῶν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δι- 10
 καίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακατα-
 θήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους,
 ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν; ἢ
 τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται
 αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σῶφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; 15
 ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν φάυλας ἐπιθυμίας;
 διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ
 καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν
 αὐτούς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν
 Ἐνδυμῖωνα. τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένον, ἔτι δὲ 20
 μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ
 ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. καὶ
 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὲ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. —

34. ἀμφισβητεῖται Π¹ O^b Mi., ζητεῖται Π² Hel. (quaeritur
 Γ) || δὲ Π² O^b Ar. Bk. Rr. in textu || 1178b, 6. τὸ ΓΜ^b, καὶ
 τὰ O^b, τὰ c. c. Hel. Ar. || κατὰ τὴν K^b Hel., κατ' c. c. Bk.
 Rr. || 7. δὲ] γὰρ Zellius || 12. ἄλλα post ὅσα add. Π² Hel. †
 15. αἱ L^b, εἰ cet., οἱ Lambinus || τί] ἄρα Lambinus || 19. δὴ]
 δεῖ ΓO¹ Ald. Hel. || 20. δὲ Hel. Ar. Thurotus, δὴ ΓΠ Ald. Bk.
 Rr. || ἀφαιρούμενον N^b, ἀφηρεμένω L^b O^b || 21. θεωρίας L^b
 N^b O^b.

σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας,
 25 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον
 ὁμοίωμα τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων
 ζῶων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ'
 ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μάλ-
 30 λον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τι-
 μία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.
 9. δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ
 αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ σῶμα
 35 ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν.
 1179a οὐ μὴν οἷητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαι-
 μονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακά-
 ριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶ-
 ξις, δυνατόν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν
 5 τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἂν τις πράττειν
 κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶ-
 ται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥτιον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ^{τὰ μετρία}ἐκὰν δὲ τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ
 ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων
 10 δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως
 τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς
 ᾔετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνους· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μετρία

26. τοιαύτης οὕσης τῆς ἐνεργείας post μακάριος add. M^b
 O^b, c. c. om. Hel. Ar. || 28. οὐδαμῶς L^b, οὐδαμοῦ O^b Ald. Hel. ||
 30. <τὸ> εὐδαιμονεῖν Rr. (fors. recte) || 31. αὕτη Ald. Bk. Rr.,
 αὕτη N^b, αὕτη c. c. Hel. || 1179a, 3. ἡ πρᾶξις K^b Ald., ἡ πρᾶ-
 σις οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις ΓL^b Mi. Hel. Ar., ἡ πρᾶξις οὐδ' αἱ πρᾶξεις
 M^b O^b, ἡ χρῆσις οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις ci. Bergius, nescio an recte ||
 4. δὲ] γὰρ Ald. Hel. Micheletus (hand male) † || ἄρχοντα Π¹
 Hel., ἄρχοντας Π² O^b Ar. || θαλάσσης L^b M^b || 6. κατὰ] τὰ κατὰ
 M^b O^b Ald. Ar. || 8. δὴ ci. Bergius Rr. in adn. (fors. recte) || 11.
 πεπραγότας Spengelius || ὡς om. ΓK^b || 12. ᾔετο] οἶόν τε ci.
 Lambinus (nescio an recte).

9. ἀρετήν - whether philosophy or moral excellence.
Σόλων - see the story in Herodotus I. 29. 299, where Solon pronounced
Tellus the Athenian the happiest man he has ever known.

15. *ἡνὲρ καὶ ὑπὸς*. (Thaenagoras moreover seems not to have conceived of "the happy man" as a rich man or a potentate when he said he should not be surprised if his "happy man" appeared a strange person to the crowd, for they judge by externals, having no sense of aught beside.)

16. The opinions of philosophers then appear to coincide with our arguments. Authority of this kind affords a certain ground of belief. But truth in practical matters is settled by an appeal to facts and human life, for in them rests the decision. We ought then to consider previous sayings with a reference to facts and life: if those sayings agree with facts we should accept them, if they differ we must account them mere ~~facts~~ theories.

25. *Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι θεὸς*. Aristotle expresses here no opinion one way or the other, as to the reality of a Divine Providence. Plato had said that moral virtue placed men peculiarly under the care of the gods - Aristotle differing from Plato in his conception of the Deity, says, if there be any care of men by the gods, it must surely be extended in an especial degree, not to the just man, but to the philosopher, since philosophy is most akin to the life of the Deity himself.

Π)

κεκτημένους πράττειν ἂν δεῖ. ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ
 πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι
 οὐκ ἂν θανμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι 15
 12 γὰρ κρίνουσιν τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφω-
νεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἑοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν
 μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς
 πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ
 τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρή ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα 20
 καὶ τὸν βίον ^{experience} ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις
 ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον.

13

[ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ δια-
 κείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια
 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ ^{care} δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐ- 25
 λογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο
 δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τι-
 μῶντας ἀντενυποιεῖν ὥς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους
 καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα
 τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. 30
 τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη
 ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.]

IX

ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ 10
 φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν
 οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς 35
 πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἑκάστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ 1179b
 2 μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ

16. μόνων L^bM^b, μόνον c. c. Hel. Ar. || 19. πρακτοῖς Π¹
 Mi. Hel., πρακτικοῖς Π²O^b || 20. σκοπεῖν δὴ Par. 1417 et, ut
 videtur, Hel., δὴ σκοπεῖν K^b, σκοπεῖν δὲ cet., σκοπεῖν γὰρ(?)
 Ar. || 21. φέροντας Π¹ Hel. || 23. ὁ — 32. εὐδαίμων secludenda
 esse ci. Rr. || 24. εἶναι post ἔοικεν add. Π² Ar. Bk. Rr. || 25.
 τῷ post καὶ om. K^bO^b (fort. recte) || 29. πάντα post ταῦτα L^b
 M^b Ald. || 30. θεοφιλέστατον Π¹, θεοφιλέστατος c. c. Hel. Ar.
 et, ut videtur, Mi. || 31. δ' add. Π² Hel. || 33. τε om. ΓΠ¹ Bk.
 Rr. || καὶ post δὲ om. K^bO^b || 35. λέγομεν ci. Rr.

ειδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως
 ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ ^{θεοὶ}λογοὶ αὐτάρκεις πρὸς
 5 τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δι-
 καίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέονιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορρίσ-
 σθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται ^{disposui}προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ ^{stimulati}παρορμησαι
 τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἡθὸς τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς
 ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν ^{in dei pietate inflammati virtute}κατακώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς,
 10 τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι·
 οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδὲ ἀπέ-
 χεσθαι τῶν φανύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροὺν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμω-
 ρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσιν καὶ
 δι' ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένους λύπας,
 15 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοϊαν ἔχουσιν, ἀγεν-
 στοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσει; οὐ
 γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡθεσι κατελιη-
 μένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι. ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων
 ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλλάβοι-
 20 μεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. — Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἷονται οἱ μὲν φύσει
 οἱ δ' ἔθει οἱ δὲ διδασκῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς
 οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς
 ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ ^{αὐτὴν}διδασκὴ μὴ
 ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ᾧ πᾶσιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργασθαι τοῖς
 25 ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ
 μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 ἀκούσειεν λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος
 ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπειῖσαι; ὅλως τε

1179b, 3. πως] περ Mi. || 4. γινόμεθα ΓΚ^b Mi. Ar. || 7.
 προτρέψαι L^b N^b Ald. Mi. || 9. κατακώχιμον K^b Ald. Bk. Rr. in
 textu, κατακώχιμον c. c. Mi. || 15. ἐννοίας L^b O^b Ald., ἔννοϊαν
 c. c. Mi. Hel. || 22. ὑπάρχειν Rr. || τινος L^b O^b Ald. Hel. Ar. ||
 ὡς om. K^b Ald., c. c. add. Hel. || 24. ἰσχύη mg. Bas.³ Bk. Rr.,
 ἐνισχύη M^b O^b || δεῖ ΓΜ^b, δέει L^b, δέη c. c. Bk. Rr. || 25. ἡθεσι
 L^b Ald., ἔθεσι c. c. Hel. || 27. ἂν L^b O^b || συνείη L^b Ald., συνή-
 σιν M^b, συνίη Coraes.

6. The saying of Theognis was that the Asclepiades would have deserved great rewards had they known how to heal the minds of men.

23. To those who are in the most ideal sense of the term to be called fortunate.

1. It is not enough, perhaps, that, while young, people should
meet with right nurture and superintendence, but, as
when grown up, they must practise the things in ques-
tion and accustom themselves to them, so we shall
need laws about these things and about the whole
of life.

Pericles on the other hand (Thuc. II. 37) boasted of the free-
dom enjoyed by the Athenians from all vexatious in-
terference with the daily conduct of individuals.
As opposed to the free system of Athens, Aristotle praised
the ~~for~~ organised and educational system of Sparta.
He was probably led into this political mistake partly
by the state of society in Athens itself, partly
by the influence of Plato, from whom he imbibed
one of the essential ideas of communism, viz, that
the state should arrange as much as possible,
instead of as little as possible.

X)

8 οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπεῖκειν τὸ ^{φαινομένου} πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος
 προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ 30
 δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ
 γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τεταχῆναι τὴν τροφήν
 καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γινό- 35
 9 μενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας 1180a
 τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν
 αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων,
 καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη
 10 μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσιν καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ 5
 οἴονται τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὥς ἐπακουσομένων
 τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφνε-
 στέροις οὖσιν κολάσεις [τε] καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιά-
 11 τους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν 10
 ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρε-
 γόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καὶ φασὶ
 δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται
 12 ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. — εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν
 ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφεῖναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἰθ' 15
 οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μὴτ' ἄκουτα μὴτ'
 ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν βιουμέ-
 2 νοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν· ἢ μὲν
 οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον,

29. ἔθος Hel., ἦθος c. c. Mi. || 35. γενόμενα O^b Ald. Hel. ||
 1180a, 3. αὐτὰ corruptum esse suspicatur Rr. || ἂν om. Γ L^b ||
 7. ἐπακουσομένοις M^b, ὑπακουσομένων O^b Ald. Bk. Rr. || 8.
 ἐπιεικῶν Π² O^b Hel. Ar. || προηγμένων K^b Hel., προηγμένοις
 M^b, προηγουμένοις Γ et pr. Par. 1417, προηγουμένως L^b O^b
 Ald. et corr. Par. 1417 || 9. τε Γ H^a N^b Bk. Rr., om. Π Ald.
 Hel. || ἐπιτιθεμένους M^b, ἐπιτιθέμεναι O^b, ἐπιτιθέναι c. c. Hel.
 Ar. || 10. καὶ om. Π¹, c. c. add. Hel. Ar. || 17. δὴ Ar. (male) ||
 19. οὐδὲ Γ Ald., οὔτε δὴ L^b, οὐδὲ δὴ c. c. H^a N^b.

- 20 οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοιού-
του, ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό
τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι
τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, καὶ ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ
νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς ταύτων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ
25 Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν
δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς
πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέλῃται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῆ
ἕκαστος ὥς βούλεται, κυκλωτικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ'
ἀλόχου. κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ
30 ὁρθὴν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δυνασθαι· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων
ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φί-
λοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μάλιστα
δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς
γενόμενος· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νό-
35 μων γίνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς δὲ αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων. γεγραμ-
1180b μένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δὲ ὢν
εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ
γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, οὕτως καὶ ἐν
5 οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ
τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέρ-
γοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ
καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς· κα-
θόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία,
10 τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὐ, ὅ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην

22. ἐχθαίρουσι K^b Hel., ἐχθραίνουσι c. c. Mi. || 29. τὸ om. L^b O^b, c. c. add. Hel. || γίνεσθαι Hel. Ald., γίγνεσθαι L^b Bk.¹ Br., γενέσθαι Π¹ O^b || 32. μᾶλλον Π¹ † || 33. δύνασθαι c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar. et rc. K^b, τιμᾶσθαι pr. K^b, om. O^b || 1180b, 1. δὲ Hel., καὶ Ald., om. K^b || 4. ἔθνη M^b Ald. Mi. Hel., ἥθνη K^b L^b O^b || 5. ἥθνη L^b O^b Hel. || 7. καὶ post δὲ om. M^b O^b || 8. ἱατρικῆς <καὶ γυμναστικῆς> ci. Coraes || 9. ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία Π¹ O^b Mi., ἀσιτία καὶ ἡσυχία Π² Hel. Ar. || 10. μάχην] ἀνάγκην Scaliger.

29. ΚΥΚΛΩΠΙΚΩΣ - see Hom. Od. ix. 114 - ΘΕΜΙΣΤΕΥΕΙ Δ' ἘΚΛΟΙΣ
 ΠΑΙΔΩΝ ἢ Δὲ ἑΛΥΧΩΝ, ΟὐΔ' ἄΛΛΗΛΩΝ ἄΓΟΥΣΙΝ.
 Aristotle considers that any people among whom the
 state does not settle by law the questions of daily
 life is unworthy to be called a society at all. He
 ignores that element called 'public opinion', which
 in so many respects and more naturally supplies
 the place of legislation.

31. ΤΟῦΤΟ ΔΥΝΑΘΕΙ - But from what we have said, it will
 appear that a person would best be able to do this
 (i.e. help his children and friends towards virtue)
 after learning the principles of legislation.
 Aristotle considered legislation to be the superior
 form of political thought. A person possessing
 the general principles of scientific legislation would
 be best able to deduce rules for the guidance of his
 family and at the same time to allow of such ex-
 ceptions as individual peculiarities might call for.
 Aristotle held (Pol. I. 2. 12) that the family is a deduc-
 tion from the state, which is prior in point of idea.

16. And yet perhaps nothing hinders a man even without scientific knowledge treating well some particular case, from an accurate observation, empirically, of what results on each thing being tried.

20. $\mu\acute{o}$ prov - for, as we said, legislation is generally considered to be a branch of politics. (see Eth I. 2:7)

(IX)

περιτίθῃσιν. ἔξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκα-
στον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου
τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖν μὲν <ἂν> ἄριστα καθ' ἕν καὶ
ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστής καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς, ὅτι
πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε· τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονται τε 15
καὶ εἰσίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως καλύει καλῶς
ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς
τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ
ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι
ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γε- 20
νέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν
ἂν, κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ'
αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὴ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας
βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον
γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἂν. ^{αὐτὴν αὖτε ἴσως} ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν 25
καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ'
εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμελεία τις καὶ φρόνησις. — ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπι-
σκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; ^{αὐτὴν αὖτε ἴσως} μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει 30
τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολι-
τικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν
γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παρα-
διδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ γραφεῖς·

11. δὲ Π² Ar., δὲ δὴ M^b || 13. ἂν add. Bk.² || τοῦ post
ἄριστα add. O^b Ald. || καθ' ὃ Γ, καθόλου O^b, καθ' ἕνα Mi.,
καθ' ἕν aut καθ' ἕνα Hel. || 14. τοῦ καθόλου (sic etiam Par.
1417) et τοῦ καθέναι variae lectiones ap. Mi., καθόλου K^b,
universa (= τὰ καθόλου?) Ar., τὸ καθόλου c. c. Mi. Hel. || τί
K^b Mi., ὅ τι Γ, ὅτι c. c. Hel. || 15. τοιοῖς δεῖ Γ et pr. K^b,
τοιοισδί corr.² K^b, τοιοῖσδε c. c. Mi. et, ut videtur, Hel. Ar. ||
16. ἀλλ' K^b, ἀλλὰ καὶ c. c. Mi. Hel. Ar. Bk. || 19. ἑαυτῶν ΓK^b
L^b Hel., ἑαυτοῖς c. c. Ar. || 23. δὴ Rr., δὲ Π¹ Bk., δ' ἂν Π²
O^b || 27. ἰατρικῆς] ἐπικικῆς Mi. || 33. ταῖς ἄλλαις Π¹ Hel., τοῖς
ἄλλοις c. c. Bk. Rr. || 34. ἰατρικοὶ ΓK^bL^b, ἰατροὶ καὶ Ar. Bk.
Rr. (fors. recte).

35 τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ^{ἐπαγγέλλονται} ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί,
 1181a πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν
 ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δια-
 νοίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε
 5 καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφε-
 τέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὖλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ
 ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον
 ἂν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλουντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης
 δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἢ
 10 ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντο ἂν διὰ τῆς πο-
 λιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολι-
 τικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ
 ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι·
 ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἔστιν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 15 τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ρητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρῳ ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο
 ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας
 τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
 τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὐσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον,
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν. οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἕκαστα
 20 κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συ-
 νιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποιοῖς ^{προδύγει} ^{incomparable} συναρδεῖ· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν
 τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσ-
 περ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἔοικασιν·
 1181b πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους
 κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἱατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμά-

1181a, 3. γὰρ secl. Scaliger || 7. ἡδύναντο L^bM^b, ἐδύναντο
 c. c. Hel. || 10. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνοντο Γ, ἐγίνοντο γὰρ ἂν L^b
 O^b, γίνονται γὰρ Par. 1417 Hel. † || πολιτικῆς om. L^b Ar., del.
 rc. K^b, c. c. add. Mi. Hel. || 11. μᾶλλον post συνηθείας add.
 Π² O^b Mi. Hel. Ar. et rc. K^b || 18. τοῦ Π¹, τὸ c. c. Hel. Ar. et
 rc. K^b || 20. συνίσασιν Π¹, ἀ δεῖ συνίσασι Ald., συνίσασιν ἀ δεῖ
 O², et sic ἀ δεῖ post συνιᾶσιν add. etiam Γ || 22. τὸ om. Π¹ ||
 εἰ c. c. Mi. Ar., ἢ pr. K^b, ἢ Γ et corr.² K^b || 23. τῆς πολιτικῆς
 pr. K^b, τοῖς πολιτικοῖς c. c. Mi. Ar. et rc. K^b.

itical science is not a science, but a habit of that on the teaching of virtue in the men.

24. But laws are as it were the results of political science. Aristotle's account of the sophists' method of teaching politics is exactly analogous to his account of the way in which they taught dialectic. They made politics an inferior branch of rhetoric: moreover they adopted a superficial eclecticism, making collections of laws without touching upon the principles from which legislation must depend. They thus imparted mere results, which to those who are uninstructed in principles are wholly useless: just as they gave various specimens of argument to be learnt by heart.

2-3. for men do not appear to learn the physicians art from treatises, though (the writers of them) aim at stating not only modes of treatment, but how people can be cured and how each person is to be treated, according to a classification of habits (of body).
The οὐκ ὀνόματα here mentioned were perhaps reports of cases or monographs on particular diseases.

9. But those who without proper training study such things would not be able to judge of them correctly (except by mere accident), though they might gain an appreciative faculty with regard to the subject. $\epsilon\zeta\iota\varsigma$ denotes the state of mind formed by scientific training: such a training especially produces judgment.

(IX)

των γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θερα-
 πεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς λαθεῖν ἂν καὶ ὥς δεῖ θεραπεύειν
 ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἔξεις. ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις 5
 ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως
 οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς
 μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοῦναντίον
 καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ
 ἔξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσιν τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν 10
 ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα
 τάχ' ἂν γένοιντο.

- 22 [παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς
 νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ
 ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα 15
 23 φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται
 καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ
 τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σφῶζει καὶ φθείρει
 τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας
 αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ δὲ τοῦναντίον πολιτεύονται· θεωρηθέν- 20
 των γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία
 ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρω-
 μένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.]

1181b, 13. παραλιπόντων — 23. ἀρξάμενοι secl. Schlosser
 in transl. Politicorum (Lubec. et Lips. MDCCXCVIII) I. p. 18,
 cf. Susem. Arist. Polit. griech. u. deutsch I. p. 71 sqq. || 15. δι'
 om. Π¹ Ob || ἀνθρώπεια Π¹, ἀνθρώπινα c. c. Hel.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

1094a, 19. l. ἔστι || 1096a, 34 — b, 5. * ἀπορήσειε — ἐφημέ-
ρον*, quae legit iam Eudemus 1218a, 8 — 15. asteriscis sic melius
quam uncis circumscripsissem: videntur enim ab ipso potius
Aristotele ad v. 16 sq. in margine esse adiecta || b, 23. l. ψιμν-
δίω et adde: ψιμνδίω K^b N^b Ald., ψιμμιδίω M^b, ψιμνδίω c. c.
Hel. Bk. Rr. || 1097b, 1. αὐτήν K^b, αὐτήν Ald. Bk.¹ Rr. || 1100a,
6. εὐσθενοῦντα K^b, εὐθυνοῦντα H^a, εὐθηνοῦντα c. c. Eu. Hel. ||
b, 15. τιμίαι corr.² K^b (crx. rc.), om. pr. K^b || 1102b, 15. inter-
punge: ἐπαινοῦμεν ὁρθῶς || 17. l. ὁ || 1105a, 32. ἐὰν καὶ] καὶ
ἐὰν K^b || 1108a, 2. in nota l. ἡ μὲν ὅτι ἐστὶν (v eras.) K^b || b, 25.
pro ὁ l. ὁ || 1113a, 9. pro ἄ l. ἄ || b, 12. τοῦτο — εἶναι fort. se-
cludenda esse ci. Susem. || 1114a, 24. ἥς] ἡ pr. K^b, ἡ corr.² K^b ||
b, 21. in nota pro ἔστιν l. ἐστὶν || 1116a, 28 sq. nescio an rectius
Rr. sic verba distinguat: γίνεται (δι' αἰδῶ γάρ) καὶ διὰ καλοῦ
ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φνγὴν ὀνειδους || 1117b, 29. l. φιλομαθία
et adde: φιλομαθία K^b, φιλομάθεια c. c. Hel. Bk. Rr. || 1118b,
27. καὶ ἡ ὥς corr.² K^b, καὶ ἡ ὥς pr. K^b || 1122b, 18. ἐν μεγέθει
secl. Scaliger || 1123a, 10. καὶ post τάφω secl. Scaliger || ἔτι
Scaliger || 1124b, 26. l. τὰ || 1128b, 8. περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν secl.
Scaliger (male) || 1130b, 23. προσταττόμενά lectionem fortasse
probendam esse, si v. 22. ὑπὸ restituas, monet Rr. || 33. ἐτέρω
ἐτέρω ci. Rr. || 1132a, 33. in nota l. <ἴσον> Rassovius, <ἐν> Rr. ||
b, 13. ἡ secl. Scaliger || 1134a, 29. l. ἀλλὰ τι || b, 32. fort. κυ-
νητά, ὁμοίως δῆλον || 33. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει
διορισμός post 35. γενέσθαι tri. Antonius (Doctr. Aristot. de nat.
hom. p. 18. 26), et si quid nunc video, non Muenscheri con-
iecturam, sed hanc potius recipere debebam || 1135a, 20. δὲ
etiam Rr. || 31. τοῦ] τῶν Scaliger || b, 11. l. ἀπροβούλευτα ||
1137b, 30. οἰκοδομίας K^b, οἰκοδομῆς c. c. Mi. Hel. || 1140a, 7.
ᾧσπερ Scaliger || 20. ἔτεξε Scaliger || b, 7. ante διὰ adde *
1149b, 7. φρονεόντων M^b Hel. et, ut videtur, An. || 1155b, 15.
εἴρηται — 16. ἐμπροσθεν iam secl. Grantius || 1161b, 11. πάσῃ
ci. Rr. || 1170a, 24. ἐν — 25. φανερώτερον secludenda esse iam
ci. Grantius || 1173b, 31. interpunge: ἄλλων. — ἐμφανίζειν ||
1177a, 9. scribe οὐκ ἄρ' et adde notam hanc: οὐκ ἄρ' Susem.,
οὐ γὰρ ΓΠ Ald. Ar. Hel. Bk. Rr.

1. The Platonists allow that, where there is an essential succession between two conceptions, these cannot be brought under a common Idea - but there is such between different manifestations of good e.g. the useful is an essentially later conception
2. If all good be one, it ought to fall under only one category, whereas it can be predicated under all
3. If it were one, it would be ~~predicated~~ treated of by only one science
4. The idea is after all only a repetition of the phenomena, for with these it is really identical.
5. Even the most essential and absolute goods seem incapable of being reduced to one idea
6. It is more natural to consider good an analoguous word and to assign to it a nominalistic, rather than a realistic, unity.
7. But however this may be, it is plain that the idea can have no relations to practical life, and therefore it does not belong to Ethics.

Spensippus (I. 6)

The Eleatic principle 'that the one is the only really existent' was developed by the Megarians 'the one is identical with the good'. This Plato adopted with modifications - the one is the idea, opposed to plurality or phenomena; the highest idea, and most essential is that of the good: this is transcendental, self-existent, the cause of existence to phenomena, and also of our knowing them.

The Pythagoreans ignored any transcendental principle, any principle otherwise than as exhibited in phenomena.

Some of the Platonists considered the idea as identical with the good, others not as identical but as an essential element. If the one be identified with the good, multiplicity or matter will be the principle of ~~matter~~ evil. To avoid making the many identical with evil, some, as Spensippus, denied the identity of the one with the good: they adopted a Pythagorean formula that the one must be ranked among the good.

..... Aristotle is not of course entering upon a metaphysical consideration of the good: his words relate only to ~~the~~ its ethical bearing

Aristotle's definition of the Chief Good (I.7).

Though the conception of good may vary in each art and action yet it has this unvarying characteristic that it is the end. Then the argument easily comes round to the position already anticipated that the $\pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\iota}\nu$ is identical with the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu$ or end-in-itself of all action. With this basis, by a series of a priori principles, some already enunciated by Plato and others peculiar to his own system, Aristotle develops his conception of happiness or the chief good.

1. It is $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu$ (P)
2. also, it must be $\epsilon\upsilon\tau\alpha\rho\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ (P)
3. It must be found in the $\epsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ of man
4. This $\epsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ is a rational and moral life
5. We must conceive of it as actuality, in other words as conscious life
6. We must add the condition of conformity to its own proper law.
7. And also the external condition of sufficient duration, and prosperity

$\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ (I.7).

$\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, substituted for the previous term $\xi\omega\eta$, denotes the entire principle of life, thought and action in man. The additional term $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ gives an equivalent to $\pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\eta$, since the reason necessarily introduces a moral point of view into every part of life. The word $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is ambiguous: partly it means reason, partly a law or standard. As compared with $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ would express a marked direct and prominent control. In the $\epsilon\iota\phi\rho\eta\varsigma\ \&\ \sigma\omega\phi\rho\omega\nu$, where the desires flow naturally to what is good, reason would seem rather to be supposed ($\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$) than directly to assert itself. As to the words $\pi\rho\acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$, a machine might be said to move $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ 'in accordance with a law' but not $\mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ 'with a consciousness of law'. It is this consciousness of the law which, according to Hegel, distinguishes morality from mere propriety.

INDEX. *)

ἀβέβαιος 172^a 9.
 ἀβλαβεῖς ἡδοναί 154^b 4.
 ἀγαθὸς δραμεῖν 106^a 20. ἀγα-
 θοὶ πῶς γίνονται 179^b 20 sqq.
 180^b 25. τὸ ἀγαθόν 96^a 19.
^b 21. 25. 155^b 21. 173^b 33.
 ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι, ἐν πάσαις
 κατηγορίαις 96^a 23 sqq. καὶ
 τὸ εὖ 97^b 27. τὸ ἀγαθόν opp.
 τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν 113^a
 15 sqq. τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν
 ἀγαθόν 114^b 7. τὸ κυρίως
 ἀγαθόν 144^b 7. τὸ ἀγαθόν
 = εὐδαιμονία 94^a 3. 95^b 14.
 25. 98^a 21. 101^b 30. 172^a 28.
^b 9. 14. 25. 31. 33. 173^a 29.
 174^a 9. cf. 97^b 27. τὸ πρακτὸν
 ἀγαθόν = εὐδαιμονία 97^a 23.
 τὸ ἄριστον = εὐδαιμονία
 97^a 28. ^b 22. 152^b 12. 22. 25.
 153^b 7. 12 sq. 26. τὸ ἀγα-
 θὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον 94^a 22.
 τὸ βέλτιστον 145^b 27. τὸ τέ-
 λειον ἀγαθόν 97^b 7 sq. τὸ
 ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγα-
 θῶν 95^a 16. τὸ ἀνθρώπινον
 ἀγαθόν 94^b 7. 102^a 14 sq.
 141^b 8. ἀγαθὸν καθ' αὐτό,
 αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, αὐτὸ τάγα-
 θόν = Platonis idea boni
 95^a 27. 96^b 33. 97^a 9. τὸ ἄρι-
 στον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ 141^a
 22. τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὲν καθ'

αὐτὰ (τέλη) θάτερα δὲ διὰ
 ταῦτα 96^b 13 sqq. cf. 96^b
 16 sqq. τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μὲν
 ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί 152^b 27.
 cf. 97^a 2. 129^b 2 sqq. 155^b
 21 sqq. 156^a 14. ^b 13. ἐκά-
 στης πράξεως καὶ τέχνης
 τὰ ἀγαθόν 97^a 18. cf. 94^a 1 sq.
 τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τῆς τύ-
 χης, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν, τὰ περὶ
 σῶμα 98^b 13 sqq. 153^b 17 sq.
 cf. 154^a 15. φίλος μέγιστον τῶν
 ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν 169^b 9 sq. immo
 τιμὴ 134^b 7. τὰ (ἐκτὸς) ἀγαθὰ
 ἀπλῶς μὲν ἀγαθὰ τινὶ δ' οὐκ
 αἰεὶ 129^b 2 sqq. τὰ περιμά-
 χητα ἀγαθὰ 168^b 19. 169^a 21.
 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια
 τὸ δ' ἔξις 152^b 33. πρακτὰ
 καὶ κτητὰ ἀγαθὰ 95^a 16. 97^a
 1. 141^b 12 sqq. cf. 96^b 34.
 φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν(?) 173^a 4.
 ἀλλότριον 130^a 3. 134^b 5.
 Ἀγάθων 139^b 9. 140^a 19.
 ἀγαλμα 175^a 25. ἀγαλματοποιός
 97^b 25.
 Ἀγαμέμνων 161^a 14.
 ἄγενστος ἡδονῆς ἐλλειπνοῦς
 καὶ ἐλευθερίου 176^b 19 sq.
 τοῦ καλοῦ 179^b 15 sq.
 ἄγνοια, ἄγνοεῖν v. ἀκούσιον.
 ἀγοραῖος 158^a 21. 162^b 26.
 ἄγραφος v. δίκαιον. νόμος.

*) 94^a—99^b = 1094^a—1099^b. 100^a—181^b = 1100^a—1181^b.

- ἄγριος 128^a 9. ^b 2. ἄγριος αἶξ 118^a 22.
 ἄγροικία, ἄγροϊκος (ἄγροικος) 104^a 24. 108^a 26. 151^b 14.
 ἄγυμνασία 114^a 24.
 ἀγχίνουα 142^b 5.
 ἀγωγή 179^b 31.
 ἀγωνία 114^a 8. ἀγωνιζόμενοι 99^a 5. 175^b 12. ἀγωνισταί 166^b 35. 167^a 21.
 ἄδεής 115^a 33.
 ἄδεια 132^b 15.
 ἀδέκαστος 109^b 8.
 ἀδελφική φιλία 161^a 6. ^b 35. 162^a 10.
 ἀδέσποτοι οἰκήσεις 161^a 7.
 ἀδικεῖν, ἀδίκημα, ἀδικία, ἄδικος 114^a 5. 12 sqq. 149^b 18. 22. 150^a 6. 151^a 10. 152^a 17.
 ἄδικος καὶ ἀδικῶν, ἀτύχημα ἀμάρτημα ἀδικία 134^a 16 — 23. 32 sq. 135^a 9 — 136^a 9. εἰ ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι 136^a 10 — ^b 12. εἰ ἔστιν ἀντὸν ἀδικεῖν 136^b 16 — 25. 138^a 4 — 27. ^b 6 — 13. πότερον ὁ νείμας ἀδικεῖ ἢ ὁ ἔχων 136^b 14 sq. 26 — 137^a 4. φανλότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι 134^a 12 sq. 138^a 28 — ^b 5. praeterea v. δικαιοσύνη.
 ἀδολέσχης 117^b 35.
 ἀδοξία 115^a 10. 128^b 12.
 ἀδυναμία 121^b 14.
 ἀθανασία 111^b 22. ἀθανατίζειν 177^b 33.
 Ἀθηναῖοι 124^b 17.
 ἀθλητής 111^b 24. 116^b 13.
 ἀθλοθέτης 95^b 1.
 αἰδήμων, αἰδώς 108^a 30 sqq. 115^a 14. 116^a 28 sqq. 128^b 10 — 33. 179^b 11.
 αἰδῖος 96^b 3. 111^b 32. 112^a 21. 139^b 23 sqq.
 αἰκία 131^a 8.
 αἶμα 116^b 29. 161^b 32.
 αἰρέσεις 104^b 35. αἰρέσεις καὶ φρυγαί 104^b 30 sqq. αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν 106^b 6. 113^b 1 sq. 116^a 11 sqq. 172^b 19 sq. 173^a 12.
 αἰσθάνεσθαι, αἰσθησις iudicium cum sensuum perceptione coniunctum vel sensus moralis 98^b 3. 109^b 23. 113^a 1. 126^a 6. ^b 4. 142^a 26 sqq. 143^b 5. 147^a 26. 149^a 35. 161^b 26 (cf. ὄμμα. ὄραν). αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα 170^a 29 sqq. αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος 170^b 9. αἰσθησις οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον 142^a 27 sqq. αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ἐκτὸς μόνον 179^a 16. αἰσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις 139^a 18. αἰσθησις καὶ αἰσθητόν 174^b 14 sqq. αἰσθησις ἢ (καὶ?) νόησις 170^a 16 sqq. τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῆν 149^a 10. — αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη 147^b 17.
 αἰσχροκέρδεια 122^a 2. αἰσχροκερδής 122^a 8. 12.
 αἰσχρολογία 128^a 23.
 αἰσχροπραγεῖν 120^a 15.
 Αἰσχρὺλος 111^a 10.
 αἰσχύννη 128^b 21 sq. αἰσχυντηλός 128^b 19 sq.
 αἰτητικός 120^a 33.
 αἵτια φύσις ἀνάγκη τύχη νοῦς 112^a 31 sqq. τὸ πρῶτον αἵτιον ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατον 112^b 19.
 αἰφνίδιοι φόβοι 117^a 18.
 ἀκινησία 154^b 27.
 ἀκολασία, ἀκόλαστος 103^b 19. 104^a 23. ^b 5 sqq. 107^b 5 sq. 108^b 21. 109^a 3 sqq. 14 sqq. 114^a 5. 12. 27. 117^b 23 —

1. minuteness of detail - Pl. Rep. 3:414. 2:7:6.
2. mathematical exactness (which implies every link of argument being stated, and the whole resting on demonstrative grounds):-
3. definiteness or fixedness:- Ar. Eth. 2:2:4.
4. finish (applied to the arts):- Ar. Eth. 1:3:1-2:6:9.
5. metaphysical subtlety (when applied to sciences, by a slight transition from (4):- Ar. Eth. 10:9:3.

Proofs that Happiness is εὐστυχία (I.9).

1. it is better that happiness should be attainable by certain definite ends - hence we may conclude that it is so - a belief in the fitness of things.
2. The chief good is a certain development and awakening of the consciousness under the law of virtue, and with certain necessary or favorable external conditions. Happiness then can not be entirely a contingency or chance.
3. The chief good is the end of Politics whose main business it is to educate and improve the citizens: so that education is the recognized means of happiness.
4. Animals are not called happy, because they are not capable of this awakening of the moral consciousness.
5. And so of boys whose age renders them incapable of that which has real moral worth.

Ἐνέπρηξις (I.10)

To speak of human Ἐνέπρηξις as μόνον οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔχουσιν is a sort of contradiction of Aristotle's own philosophy (E. 4.9). The more accurate way would be to say that while the Ἐνέπρηξις is perpetually blooming out and then disappearing, the εὖ εἰς αἰὶν ἀβδύσκει and is ever tending to reproduce the Ἐνέπρηξις. Life then may be regarded as a series of vivid moments, with slight intervals, or ideally as a vivid moment of consciousness. The Ἐνέπρηξις then is our life and being and it would be absurd to speak of forgetting this. It is more abiding than the sciences, the separate parts of knowledge which do not constitute the mind itself. The opposition is not between the

ἀκράτης is a man who acts wrongly after a struggle between good and bad desires.

εὐκράτης is a man who acts rightly in a similar case.

ἀκόλαστος is one in whom vice has become a habit and the desire of good is eradicated: he does wrong without a struggle.

σώφρων is one in whom virtue has become a habit: he does right without any effort.

Πυθαγόρειοι - (I. 6.)

Some Pythagoreans held that the variety of existence in the universe might be divided into two antithetical or opposed classes, and that in two different ways, the one being the οὐτοχία of good, the other of evil. Among the manifestations of good is found unity (ἑν); among those of evil, multiplicity (πληθος). All that is one is good: all that is multiplex, that lacks unity, is evil. The former involves the idea of order, the latter of confusion.

Proofs that νοῦς is innate (II. 1).

1. Intellectual excellence arises by instruction; moral virtue by habit - both by training.
2. The laws of nature are unalterable and independent of habit.
3. Moral faculties as distinguished from physical faculties are developed out of acts and do not merely find a development in acts.
4. The whole idea of legislation is based on this, that virtue may be cultivated.
5. The analogy of the arts shows that out of practice grows perfection.

φύσις - Chief Applications of the word to moral subjects in Aristotle (II. 1).

He defines φύσις (Metaph. IV. 4.8) as "the essence of things having their efficient cause in themselves, by reason of what they are."

Here we have

- (1) the essence of things, their matter and form.
- (2) the productive principle of that essence, which is nothing external, but in the things, themselves.

From this general conception the term is applied in various ways:-

1. The self-produced or self-producing principle opposed especially to that which is produced by

- 119^b 18. 119^b 31. 121^b 7 sqq.
 130^a 26 sq. 30. 145^b 16. 146^b
 20 sq. 147^b 28. 148^a 6. 13.
^b 12. 149^a 5. 22. ^b 30 sqq.
 150^a 10. 19 sqq. ^b 16. 29 sqq.
 151^b 31. 152^a 4. 153^a 34. 154^a
 10. ^b 15. ἀκολασία = παι-
 δικαὶ ἀμαρτία 119^a 34 sqq.
 cf. etiam ἐγκράτεια.
 ἀκολασταίνειν 107^a 19. 114^a 12.
 ἀκολουθητικός τοῖς πάθεσι 95^a
 4. τῇ φαντασίᾳ 150^b 28.
 ἀκούσιον καὶ ἐκούσιον 109^b 30
 — 111^b 3. 113^b 3 — 114^b 24.
 114^b 30 sqq. 135^a 19 sqq.
 ἀκούσια ἢ τὰ βίᾳ (110^a 1 —
^b 17) ἢ τὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν (110^b
 18 — 111^a 21) γενόμενα 110^a 1,
 οὐ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυ-
 μίαν 111^a 22 — ^b 3. 136^a 15 sqq.
 ἀκούσματα 174^b 28.
 ἀκουστικός 103^a 3.
 ἀκρασία, ἀκρατεύεσθαι, ἀκρα-
 τῆς 95^a 9. 102^b 14 sqq. 119^b
 31. 136^a 32 sqq. 142^b 18 sqq.
 145^a 15 — 152^b 36. 154^b 32.
 θυμοῦ, ὀργῆς, τιμῆς, κέρ-
 δους, χρημάτων 145^b 19 sq.
 147^b 31 sqq. 148^a 11. ^b 12 sq.
 149^a 24 sqq. ἀκρασίας τὸ μὲν
 προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια
 150^b 19 sqq. cf. 147^a 10 — ^b
 17. 152^a 18 sqq. 27 sqq. —
 ἀκρατῶς 114^a 15. — praeterea
 v. ἐγκράτεια. νοσηματώδης.
 φυσικός.
 ἀκριβής 106^b 14. 112^b 1. 141^a
 17. 159^a 3. οἱ ἀκριβέστατοι
 141^a 9. τὰκριβές 94^b 12 sq.
 104^a 6, cf. ἀκρίβεια 93^a 26 sqq.
 174^b 2.
 ἀκριβοδύναμος 138^a 1.
 ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι 139^b 19.
 ἀκριβολογία 122^b 8.
 ἀκροάματα 173^b 18.
 ἀκροατῆς τῆς πολιτικῆς 95^a 2.
 12. cf. ^b 4 sqq. 179^b 25.
 ἄκρος 108^b 15. ὁ ἄκρος, οἱ ἄκροι
 107^b 31. 108^a 7. ^b 24. 123^b
 14. 125^b 25. ἄκρον, ἄκρα
 106^a 30. 107^a 23. 108^a 6 sq.
 15 sq. ^b 27. 31. 109^a 7. 125^b
 18. 27. 127^a 11. 133^b 2. 134^a 1.
 ἀκρότης 107^a 7.
 ἀκρόχολος 126^a 18 sqq.
 ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι 111^a 15.
 ἄκυρος 151^b 15.
 ἀλαζονεία, ἀλαζονεύεσθαι, ἀλα-
 ζών 108^a 21 sq. 115^b 29. 127^a
 13 — ^b 32. — ἀλαζονικός 127^b
 29.
 ἀλέα 148^a 8.
 ἄλας συναναλῶσαι 156^b 27.
 ἀλείπτῃς 106^b 1.
 ἀλήθεια μεσότης ἀλαζονείας καὶ
 εἰρωνείας 108^a 19 sq. πρα-
 κτική 139^a 26 sq. praeterea
 v. δόξα.
 ἀληθεύειν 127^a 19. 33. ^b 4. 139^b
 13. 15. 141^a 3. 19. 151^b 20.
 168^b 13. 169^b 23. 173^a 9.
 ἀληθεντικός 124^b 30. 127^a 24.
 32. ^b 32.
 Ἀλκμαίων v. Εὐριπίδης.
 ἀλλακτικαὶ κοινωνίαι 132^b 31.
 Ἀλόπη v. Καρκίνος.
 ἄλνπια 153^a 31. 171^b 8. ἄλν-
 πος 119^a 29. 126^b 14. τὸ
 ἄλνπον 120^a 26 sq. 152^b 15.
 βίος ἄλνπος 153^a 28. ἄλνποι
 ἡδοναί 173^b 16. — ἀλύπως
 120^a 26.
 ἀμαθής 151^b 13. 159^b 13.
 ἀμάρτημα 135^b 12. 18. 137^b 17. 25.
 ἀμαρτητικός 104^b 33.
 ἀμαρτία 110^b 29. 115^b 15. 142^a
 20 sqq. ^b 10. cf. 125^a 18 sq.
 135^b 18 sqq.
 ἀμαρτωλός 109^a 34.
 ἀμεταμέλητος 150^a 22. 166^a 29.

- ἀμιγεῖς ἡδοναί 173^a 23.
 ἀμυντικός 126^a 7.
 ἀμφιδέξιος 134^b 34.
 ἀμφίλογον ὀφείλημα 162^b 28.
 ἀναγράφειν 98^a 22.
 ἀνάθημα 122^b 20. 123^a 5.
 ἀναιρεῖν ἑαυτὸν 166^b 11 sqq.
 cf. ἀποκτινύνει et σφάττειν.
 ἀναισθησία 109^a 4. 119^a 7. ἀν-
 αίσθητος 104^a 24. 107^b 6 sqq.
 108^b 21 sq. 114^a 10.
 ἀναισχυντία 107^a 10. 128^b 31.
 ἀναισχυντος 108^a 35. 115^a 14.
 ἀναληγσία 100^b 32. ἀνάληγτος
 115^b 26.
 ἀναλογία 131^a 31. 133^b 1. ἀρι-
 θμητική 106^a 35 sq. 132^a 1 sq.
 30. γεωμετρική 131^b 12 sq.
 διηρημένη καὶ συνεχῆς 131^a
 29 sqq. ^b 15. τὸ κατ' ἀνα-
 λογίαν ἴσον 133^a 10 sq. 134^a
 5 sq. ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν
 ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν 134^a 28. ἢ
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἀντίδοσις
 133^a 6.
 ἀναλύειν 112^b 20. ἀνάλυσις
 112^b 23.
 ἀναμάρτητον 155^a 12.
 ἀνάμνησις 118^a 13.
 Ἀναξαγόρας 141^b 3. 179^a 13.
 Ἀναξανδρίδης 152^a 22.
 ἀνάπανσις 127^b 33. 128^b 3. 150^b
 17. 160^a 24. 176^b 34 sqq.
 ἀναπληρεῖσθαι 153^a 2. ἀνα-
 πλήρωσις 118^b 18. 173^b 8 sqq.
 ἀναπόδεικτοι φάσεις καὶ δόξαι
 143^b 12.
 ἀνατολαί 112^a 25.
 Ἀνάχαρσις 176^b 33.
 ἀνδράποδον 145^b 25. 177^a 8.
 ἀνδραποδάδης 95^b 19. 118^a 25.
^b 20 sq. 126^a 8. 128^a 21. 177^a 7. 8.
 ἀνδρεία, ἀνδρεῖος 102^b 28. 103^b
 16 sq. 104^a 18 sqq. 35 sqq.
^b 7 sq. 107^a 33 sqq. 108^b 19 sqq.
 23 sqq. 109^a 2 sqq. 8 sqq.
 115^a 5 — 117^b 22. 137^a 20.
 144^b 5. 167^a 20. 177^a 32. 178^a
 10. 32. ^b 12. λεγόμεναι ἀν-
 δρεΐαι, πολιτική 116^a 17 sqq.
 στρατιωτική 116^b 3 sqq. θυ-
 μοειδής 116^b 23 sqq. εὐελ-
 πίδων 117^a 9 sqq. ἀγνοούν-
 των 117^a 22 sqq.
 ἀνδριαντοποιός 141^a 11.
 ἀνδροφονία 107^a 11.
 ἀνδρώδης 109^b 17. 125^b 12.
 126^b 1. 171^b 6.
 ἀνελευθερία, ἀνελεύθερος 107^b
 9 sqq. 108^b 22 sq. 119^b 27 sqq.
 121^b 13 sqq.
 ἀνεμπόδιστος 153^a 15. ^b 10 sq.
 ἀνεπιστήμων 180^b 17. 181^b 6.
 ἄνεσις 150^b 17.
 ἀνεψιοί 162^a 1.
 ἀνθρωπενέσθαι 178^b 7.
 ἀνίαιτος 121^b 13. 150^a 22. ^b 32.
 165^b 18. 180^a 9. — ἀνιάτως
 137^a 29.
 ἀνόητος 119^b 9. 123^b 4. 173^a 2.
 ἀνοσιουργεῖν 166^b 5.
 ἀντίδοσις v. ἀναλογία.
 ἀντιπεπονθός v. δίκαιον. ἀντι-
 πεπονθότες 155^b 33.
 ἀντιφίλησις 155^a 28. 156^a 8.
 ἀντιφιλεῖν 157^b 30. 159^a 30.
 164^a 4.
 ἀνώνυμος 107^b 1 sq. 30. ^b 5.
 17. 115^b 25 sq. 125^b 17. 21.
 26. 29. 127^a 12. 14. cf. 126^b
 19. 127^a 7.
 ἀξία v. ἴσον.
 ἀξίωμα 117^a 24. 122^b 33. 123^a
 2. ^b 19. 25. 124^b 19. 126^b 36.
 165^a 11.
 ἀξύνετος 151^a 9.
 ἀοργησία, ἀόργητος 108^a 8.
 126^a 3.
 ἀόριστος ζωή 170^a 24. ἡδονή
 173^a 16.

- the mirror to itself (ib): the last outcome of test
 VI. 11. 61: that which is in nature and not of it
 of it (ib). It is opposed to habit as
 the original tendency to that which is such
 induced (VII. 10. 4): and to the result of circum-
 stances (III. 5. 15).
2. From the idea of the self-caused ($\kappa\alpha\theta' \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$), it
 comes to mean that which is under a fixed
 law, opposed to the variable (V. 7. 2), or to the
 arbitrary and conventional (I. 3. 2): the law
 is opposed to the relation. (III. 4. 3.)
 3. It means not only a law, but also a tend-
 ency.
 4. The character and attributes of a thing (i.e.
 whether good ~~and~~ or bad, the powers possessed
 by a thing (I. 3. 4: III. 1. 17).
 5. The whole constitution of a thing viewed as
 realizing its proper $\epsilon\kappa\delta\omicron\varsigma$, or the idea of good
 in itself, the perfect or normal state of any
 thing (VII. 11. 4: III. 12. 2)

Virtue concerned with Pleasures and Pains - Proofs (II. 3)

1. Pleasures and pains induce and deter.
2. Virtue is an affair of actions and feelings: hence
 pleasure and pain which are inseparable from
 them.
3. So much have pleasures and pains to do with the
 corrupting of the mind that some have defined vir-
 tue to consist in insensibility to these.
4. Of the three principles which form the principles to
 action, viz the good, the profitable, the pleasant,
 the pleasant enters into both the others.
5. Pleasure is a natural instinct from which we
 cannot get rid of.
6. The very difficulty of contending with this prin-
 ciple constitutes its claim to be the sphere of vir-
 tue.

These arguments might have been more scien-
 tifically stated. The deeper way would have
 been to state the connexion of pleasure with
 $\epsilon\rho\epsilon\sigma\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ and of $\epsilon\rho\epsilon\sigma\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ with moral virtue and
 the one hand and happiness on the other. Ob-
 viously, the passage was written previously to
 the analysis of pleasure (Bk X).

Here commences the formal definition of virtue, according to substance or genus, and quality or difference. This distinction already existed in Plato, like other parts of logic it was elaborated and made systematic by Aristotle.

In ch. 5, the $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ of virtue is established as a $\epsilon\tau\iota\varsigma$ or formed state of mind. Every mode of the mind must be either a feeling, a faculty, or a state: it is neither a feeling nor a faculty; therefore it is a state.

Cp. I. 7. 9-14: where he defines the proper function of man. But the present division is not as the reference established in some other part of his works. It grew out of his ethical reasonings. It manifests some affinity to his doctrine of $\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ and $\epsilon\kappa\pi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$ as applied to morals. Thus the $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ is a sort of $\epsilon\kappa\pi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$, $\epsilon\tau\iota\varsigma$ is a sort of determinate $\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$.

Granting to the human mind the power of development and of self-determination by the law of habits, it follows that every mode of the mind must either be its innate, undeveloped and potential faculties, its moments of consciousness ($\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$, $\epsilon\kappa\gamma\gamma\epsilon\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$), or its acquired and formed tendencies and states.

Virtue is not a feeling, for

1. no moral character attaches to isolated feelings.
2. virtue implies deliberate will, whereas the feelings do not.
3. We speak of being moved in regard to the feelings: of being disposed in regard to virtue and vice.

Virtue is not a faculty, for

1. no moral character attaches to mere faculties or capabilities for feeling.
2. ~~Because~~ a faculty is something innate and physical, whereas virtue is not (see cap. 1).

More Accurate Definition of $\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\eta$ (II. 6)

Every excellence is the perfection of an object and of its functions of that object. Thus human excellence (virtue) will be the perfection of man and of the functions of man.

What then is a perfect $\epsilon\pi\chi\omega\upsilon$? - From the ideas of space and time we get the ideas of more, less, equal, or excess, deficiency & the mean.

Now the perfection of any work of art consists

ἀπηγριωμένοι 148^b 21.
 ἀπάθεια 104^b 24.
 ἀπαιδαγωγότης 121^b 11.
 ἀπαίδευτος 128^a 21.
 ἀπαρχαί 160^a 27.
 ἀπάτη 113^a 34.
 ἀπειροκαλία 107^b 19. 122^a 32.
 ἀπόγονοι 97^b 12. 100^a 21. 101^a 22.
 ἀποδεικτικός 139^b 31. ἀπο-
 δεικτός 140^b 32. 35.
 ἀπόδειξις 94^b 27. 140^a 33 sqq.
 141^a 2. 143^b 1. 10. 13. 147^a 20.
 ἀποθανετέον 110^a 27.
 ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτόν 138^a 6 sqq.
 cf. 116^a 13 sqq. 166^b 11 sqq.
 ἀπόλαυσις 118^a 30. 127^b 19.
 148^a 5. 149^b 1. — ἀπολαν-
 στικός v. βίος.
 ἀπομάττεσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
 172^a 12 sq.
 ἄπρονος 168^a 24.
 ἀπορητά 111^a 9.
 ἀποστήματα 100^a 26.
 ἀποστολαί ξένων 123^a 3.
 ἀπεσχεδιασμένος νόμος 129^b 25.
 ἀποσχολάζειν 176^b 17.
 ἀποφάναι 139^b 15. ἀπόφασις
 139^a 21.
 ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίον 95^b 33.
 ἀπροαίρετος 135^b 10. ἀπρο-
 αιρέτως 106^a 3.
 ἀπροβούλευτος 135^b 11. 151^a 3.
 ἀπροσηγορία 157^b 13.
 ἀπώλεια 120^a 2.
 Ἀργεῖοι 117^a 26.
 ἀργία 102^b 7. 166^b 10.
 ἀργός 97^b 30. 124^b 24. 167^a 11.
 ἄρεσκος 108^a 28. 126^b 11 sqq.
 127^a 7 sqq. 171^a 17 sq.
 ἀρεταί ἡθικαί (τοῦ ἡθους) καὶ
 διανοητικαί (τῆς διανοίας)
 102^a 5—103^a 10. 103^a 5. 138^b
 35 sq. πόθεν γίνονται 103^a
 14—^b 25. 105^a 17—^b 18.

109^a 20—^b 26. cf. 179^b 20 sqq.
 180^b 25. ἡθικὴ ὑφ' ᾧν γί-
 νεται τούτων καὶ πρακτικὴ
 104^a 27—^b 3. ἔστι περὶ ἡδο-
 νὰς καὶ λύπας 104^b 8 sq.
 152^b 4 sq. σημείον αὐτῆς ἡ
 ἐπιγινωμένη ἡδονὴ τοῖς ἔρ-
 γοις 99^a 17 sqq. 104^b 4—
 105^a 13. 172^a 21 sqq. τί ἐστι
 105^b 19—107^a 27. 106^b 36 sqq.
 108^b 11—109^a 19. 109^b 30—
 114^b 24. 114^b 30—115^a 3.
 διαγραφὴ τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρε-
 τῶν 107^a 28—108^b 10. αἱ
 ἡθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καθ' ἑκαστον
 115^a 4—138^b 13. αἱ δια-
 νοητικαὶ 138^b 16—145^a 11.
 λογικαὶ (= διανοητικαὶ) ἀρε-
 ταὶ 108^b 9 sq. ἀρετὴ ἡθικὴ
 πῶς ἔχει πρὸς φρόνησιν 144^a
 6—9. 20 sqq. ^b 15 sqq. 178^a
 16—19. ἀρετὴ ἀρίστη καὶ
 τελειοτάτη 98^a 17. κρατίστη
 τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡ θεωρητικὴ 177^a
 13 sqq. αἱ τοῦ συνθέτου (=
 τοῦ ἡθους) ἀρεταὶ καὶ ἡ
 (θεωρητικὴ) τοῦ νοῦ 178^a
 20 sqq. ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ καὶ
 κυρία 144^b 3 sqq. 36. cf. 103^a
 23 sqq. ἀρετὴ ἡ φυσικὴ ἡ
 ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὁρθοδοξεῖν περὶ
 τὴν ἀρχὴν 151^a 18 sq. ἀρετὴ
 καὶ ἐγκράτεια 145^a 17 sq.
 33—^b 2. 150^b 29—151^a 28.
 151^b 32—152^a 6. καὶ τέχνη
 ἐτ τέχνης v. τέχνη. θεωρη-
 τικὴ 177^a 18 sq. 28. ἡ ἀρετὴ
 καὶ ἡ κακία ἡ ἡθικὴ 152^b
 4 sq. ἡ περὶ τὰ χοήματα
 ἀρετὴ 120^a 7. ἀρετὴ=ἡθικὴ
 ἀρετὴ 103^b 14. 104^a 33. 140^b
 24. 144^a 20 sq. 30. ^b 1 sqq.
 22. 25. 34. 145^a 5. 177^a 16.
 178^a 11. ἡ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴ
 145^a 19 sqq. ἀρετὴ ἵππου

- 106^a 19. ὀφθαλμοῦ 106^a 17.
σώματος 102^a 16. γ. etiam
ἡρωική. καλόν. μεσότης. μέ-
τρον.
- ἀριστεία 101^b 28.
- ἀριστοκρατία 160^a 33 sqq. 161^a
24. ἀριστοκρατική κοινωνία
160^b 32. οἱ ἀριστοκρατικοί
131^a 28 sq.
- Ἀριστοτέλης ἄλλοθι 108^b 7 =
Rhet. B, 9. 10(?). ἐν τοῖς
ἀναλυτικοῖς 139^b 27. 32 =
Anal. post. A, 1 et 2. 71^b
21. ἐν ἄλλοις 174^b 3 = Phys.
Z—Θ. ὕστερον 130^b 28 et
135^a 15 γ. Append. et Prolegg.
p. XII. n. *.
- ἀρμονία 155^b 5.
- ἀρπαγή 131^a 8.
- ἀρρωστία 115^a 2.
- ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ 140^b 34.
οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ οἱ
ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λόγοι, ὁ ἀπὸ
κ. τ. λ. ὁδός 95^a 31 sqq. 98^b
2 sqq. 139^b 26—31. ἀρχαὶ
ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός 139^b 30.
34. τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν καὶ πά-
σης ἐπιστήμης 140^b 32 sqq.
ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἢ
μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν
139^a 7 sq. 140^a 33 sq. ἢ
ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ (ἀρχῆς?) καὶ
τοῦ καθόλου 139^b 28 sq. ἀρ-
χαὶ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τῆς
σοφίας ἐξ ἐμπειρίας 142^a 18.
ὁ νοῦς ἀρχὴ 150^a 5. τὰ ἐν
τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι καὶ περὶ
ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν 141^a 17 sq.
τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει
τὴν ἀρχὴν 140^a 15. ἀρχὴ
ἀνθρώπου 139^b 5. ἀρχὴ τοῦ
πράττειν ἐν ἡμῖν ἢ ἔξωθεν
110^a 16 sq. 112^b 28. 113^b 20.
32. 114^a 19. 135^b 18 sq. τοῦ
ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἄλλα
- μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ 140^a 13.
ἀρχαὶ πρακτικαί, τῶν πρα-
κτικῶν συλλογισμῶν 144^a 31
— 35. ἀρχὴ τῶν πρακτικῶν
τὸ οὐ ξενεκα, ἢ εὐδαιμονία
102^a 2 sqq. 140^b 16 sqq. 151^a
15 sq. ἀρχαὶ τοῦ οὐ ξενεκα
143^b 4. ἀρχαὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθημα-
τικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις 151^a 16.
αἱ τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ 177^a
17 sq. τὸ βέλτιστον ἢ ἀρχὴ
151^a 25.
- ἀρχηγός 162^a 4.
- ἀρχιθεωρός 122^a 26.
- ἀρχιτεκτονικά 94^a 14. ἀρχι-
τεκτονική 94^a 27. 141^b 22, 25.
ἀρχιτέκτων 152^b 2.
- ἀσεβής 122^a 6.
- ἀσθενεία 114^a 25. 150^b 19. 155^a
14. cf. ἀκρασία.
- ἀσθενής 124^b 22. 146^a 15. 161^a 8.
- ἀσινής 150^a 4.
- ἀσιτία 180^b 9.
- ἄσκησις 99^b 9 sqq. 170^a 11.
- ἀστεῖος 123^b 7.
- ἀσύμμετρος 112^a 23.
- ἀσχημοσύνη 126^b 33. ἀσχημο-
νεῖν 119^a 30. ἀσχήμων 123^a
33. 127^b 13.
- ἄσχυλος, ἀσχυλεῖσθαι 177^b 4.
8. 17.
- ἄσωτία, ἄσωτος 107^b 9 sqq.
108^b 22 sq. 32. 119^b 27 sqq.
121^a 16 sqq. 151^b 7.
- ἀτάραχος 117^a 19. 31. 125^b 34.
- ἄτεκνος 99^b 4. 162^a 28.
- ἄτεχνία 140^a 22 sq.
- ἄτιμία 100^a 20. 123^b 21. 124^a
11. 138^a 13.
- ἄτιμος 116^a 21.
- ἄτοπος ἡδονή 149^a 15.
- ἄτροπος 177^b 22.
- ἀτύχημα 101^a 10. 135^b 17.
- αὐθαίρετος 114^b 6.
- αὐθιέαςτος 127^a 23.

spoiling the effect. And so virtue aims at the mean, avoiding excess and deficiency, in feeling and action. Of course it is from an abstract point of view alone we can call virtue a mean state. From a moral point of view it is an extreme, utterly removed from its opposite, vice.

Ὁ μεγαλόψυχος - (TP. 3).

The famous description of the virtue of high-mindedness we must notice rather as a picture of what is rather than an investigation into what ought to be. High-mindedness is nothing else than a certain loftiness of spirit possessed by great men. It can only belong to great men, for unless accompanied by greatness superior to those of the rest of the world it would be simply ridiculous.

High-mindedness, as he represents it, is not something which is prompted by duty, rather it stands quite beside the idea of duty. Greatness and the sense of moral obligation are essentially distinct from each other, however much they may accidentally coincide.

The high-minded man (says Aristotle) has all virtues. But we find on nearer inspection that this means that the high-minded man is above all those minor interests that might induce to vice: he does not care about money, so he will never cheat: he does not value even life very high, so he will not be a coward. There is no self-subjection to a law: the high-minded man does not avoid vice because it is wrong (in the modern sense) but because it is unworthy of him. Thus he is most essentially a law to himself and above all other law. Aristotle speaks (sec. 16) of high-mindedness as being a sort of culmination of the virtues, and justly so, for it is the culmination of his moral system. His system is based on the idea of self-respect: loftiness of spirit is the highest form of self-respect. This principle goes a long way in elevating the character and purifying the conduct, but its natural development is also a dislike of all limitations of the individuality, is in short a sort of noble pride.

High-mindedness, however fine may be the qualities that go to make it up is essentially not a human attitude. It is something exceptional, and in this account it is true, but not a

is impossible not to have been familiar with that conception of moral goodness which has arisen out of later associations.

Is Pleasure the chief good? (X 2)

The arguments of Eudoxus are:-

1. that all things seek pleasure
2. that pain is essentially an object of aversion, and therefore pleasure must be essentially an object of desire.
3. that pleasure is always desired as an end in itself and not as a means to anything.
4. that pleasure when added to any other good makes it more desirable.

The objections to these arguments are:-

1. that the chief good must be incapable of being added to any other good and is made better. The opinion of Plato - this is allowed
2. that the testimony of irrational creatures is of no value - urged by Speusippus - disallowed.
3. that not pleasure but the neutral state is contrary to pain - an argument of Speusippus - refuted.

See Kant. Vol I. 195. "Aristotle now mentions other general arguments that have been brought against pleasure - that it is not a quality: that it is indefinite ($\alpha\phi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$): that it is a motion, a becoming, or a replenishment ($\kappa\iota\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\pi\lambda\eta\pi\omega\iota\varsigma$): again, that there are many disgraceful pleasures." - all of which he answers. (ch 3)

X. 9.

For virtue three things are required, nature, teaching, custom. The first is beyond man's control: the second may be identified with theory, which we have now supplied: the third requires institutions for the regulation of life, which may either be (1) of public or (2) of private ordinance. The state too much neglects the arrangement of daily life, and therefore private individuals must address themselves to the task, in a scientific spirit, and must first learn the principles of legislation. But from whom? For practical politicians neither write nor speak on the principles of their art; and again the sophists who profess to teach politics are far from understanding even what they are, and their mode of teaching is merely empirical. So far from imparting principles they go to work in an eclectic way, collecting laws which are mere results lying as it were

ἀλήτης 97^b 25. ἀλητική 175^b 5.
 ἀλός 97^a 27 (?).
 ἀνάρκεια 97^b 7 sqq. 134^a 27.
 177^a 27.
 ἀνάρκης 125^a 12. 160^b 4. 169^b
 5 sq. 176^b 5. 177^b 21. 178^b
 34. 179^b 4.
 τὸ καθ' αὐτό 96^a 20.
 αὐτοέκαστον 96^a 35.
 αὐτόματος 181^b 11.
 αὐχμός 112^a 26.
 ἀφαίρεσις 142^a 18.
 ἀφανρός 101^b 2.
 ἀφειδής τοῦ βίου 124^b 8.
 ἀφή 118^a 26. 31. ^b 1. 5. 148^a
 9. 150^a 9. 176^a 1.
 ἄφθαρτος 139^b 24.
 ἀφιλία 145^a 11. ἄφιλος 101^a
 23. 170^b 23.
 ἀφιλοτιμία, ἀφιλότιμος 107^b
 29 sqq. 125^b 1—18.
 ἀφοβία 107^b 1. ἀφοβος 115^a
 16. 19. 117^a 19.
 ἀφόρητος 126^a 13.
 ἀφροδίσια 118^a 31. 152^b 17.
 τοῖς ἄρρεσι 148^b 29 sq. =
 ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπος ἡδονή
 149^a 14 sq.
 Ἀφροδίτη 149^b 15.
 ἀχορήγητος 99^a 33.
 ἀχώριστος 102^a 30.
 βανανσία, βάνανσος 107^b 19.
 122^a 32. 123^a 19 sqq.
 βάρβαροι 145^a 31. 149^a 11.
 βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα 142^a 22.
 βασιλεία 160^a 31 sqq. βασιλεύς
 113^a 8. 160^b 3 sqq. 161^a 11 sqq.
 180^a 20. βασιλευόμενοι 161^a
 11 sqq.
 βανκοπανοῦργοι 127^b 27.
 βέβαιος 159^b 8. 162^a 15. 177^a
 26. βεβαίως 105^a 33.
 βεβαιότης 100^b 13.
 βίαιον τί ἐστι 110^a 1 sqq.

Βίας 130^a 1.
 βίος ἀπολαυστικός, πολιτικός,
 θεωρητικός, χρηματιστής 95^b
 14 sqq. βοσκημάτων βίος 95^b
 20, cf. 170^b 13 sqq. βίος φν-
 τῶν v. φντῶν. βίος κατὰ τὸν
 νοῦν = θεωρητικός 177^b 30.
 178^a 6 sq. ἄλυπος 153^a 28.
 τέλειος 98^a 18. 100^a 5 =
 μῆκος βίου τέλειον 177^b 25.
 βλάβη 94^b 18. 126^b 34. 135^b 11.
 17. 24.
 βλάβος 132^a 4.
 βοήθειαι 155^a 14.
 βοήθημα 97^a 6.
 βορά 118^a 23.
 βόσκημα v. βίος.
 βουλεύεσθαι, βούλευσις, βουλή
 112^a 18—113^a 12. 139^a 12 sqq.
^b 5 sqq. 140^a 26 sqq. 141^b
 9 sqq. 142^a 20 sqq. ^b 1 sqq.
 143^a 6. 150^b 20 sq. βουλευ-
 εσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταυτόν
 139^a 12 sq.
 βουλευτικός 113^a 11. 139^a 23.
 140^a 31. 141^b 27. 33. 152^a 20.
 βουλευτός 112^a 18. 19. ^b 33.
 113^a 10. ^b 3.
 βούλημα 103^b 4. 167^b 7.
 βούλησις, βούλητόν 111^b 11.
 19 sqq. 113^a 14—^b 2. 136^b
 24. 155^b 29. 156^b 31. 157^b 36.
 167^b 31. 178^a 30.
 Βρασίδα θύειν 134^b 23.
 βριθός 101^a 29.
 βρώμα, βρώσις 118^a 15. 19.
 119^a 8.
 βωμολοχία, βωμολοχός 108^a
 24 sq. 128^a 4 sqq. 14. 34 sqq.
 γάμος 123^a 1. 165^a 18. γαμι-
 κῶς ἐστιᾶν 123^a 22.
 γαργαλίζεσθαι 150^b 22.
 γαστρίμαργος 118^b 19.
 γένεσις 103^a 16. 104^a 27. 112^b

24. 140^a 11. 143^b 20. 152^b 9.
 13. 23. 28. 153^a 9. 13. 15.
 173^a 29. ^b 4. 6. 19. 174^b 10. 12.
γεννάδας 100^b 32.
γέννησις 168^a 25.
γεννητής τῶν πράξεων 113^b 18.
γεράνου φάρυγξ 118^a 32 sq.
γέρας 134^b 7. 163^b 4.
γεῦσις 118^a 26 sq. 148^a 9. 150^a
 9. 176^a 1. *γεύεσθαι* 147^a 29. 32.
γεωμετερεῖν 175^a 33. *γεωμέτρης*
 98^a 29. *γεωμετρία* 143^a 3.
γεωμετρικός 142^a 12. 175^a 32.
Γλαῦκος 136^a 9.
γλίσχρος 121^b 22.
γνώμη 143^a 19—24. 26. 27. ^b 7. 9.
γνωρίζειν 96^b 35. 129^a 17. 132^b
 2. 141^b 15. 180^b 22.
γνώριμα ἡμῖν καὶ γνώριμα
ἅπλως 95^b 2 sqq.
γνώσις 95^a 6. 9. 14. 97^a 6. 102^a
 22. 117^a 25. 139^a 11. 141^b 34.
γνωσιὰ 177^a 21.
γράμματα 112^b 2. *γραμματική,*
γραμματικός, γραμματικῶς
 105^a 20 sqq.
γραμμή 132^a 25. 174^b 1.
γραφεὺς 180^b 34. *γραφική* 181^a
 23. *γραφή* 118^a 4. 175^a 24.
γυμνάσια 104^a 15. 106^b 4. 118^b 5.
γυμναστής 180^b 14.
γυμναστική 96^a 34. 112^b 5. 138^a
 31. 143^b 27. 180^b 3.
γύναια 171^b 10.

δαιμόνιον 122^b 21. 141^b 7.
δαίμων 169^b 8.
δακνόμενον σῶμα 154^b 12.
δάνειον 164^b 32. 167^b 21.
δανεισμός 131^a 3.
δαπάνη opp. *φυλακή* 120^a 9.
δαπάνημα 122^b 4. 19. 34.
δαπανηρός 119^b 31. 121^b 9. 122^a
 22. 123^a 4. 11. 14. 18. 21.
δεητικός 125^a 10.

δειλαίνειν 107^a 18. 137^a 22.
δειλία, δειλός 103^b 17. 104^a
 21. ^b 7 sqq. 108^b 19 sqq. 23 sqq.
 109^a 2 sqq. 7 sqq. 115^b 33 sqq.
 116^a 12 sqq. 20. ^b 16. 119^a
 21 sqq. 130^a 30. 138^a 16. 149^a
 5. 166^b 10.
δεινός, δεινότης 144^a 23 sqq.
^b 2. 15. 145^b 19. 146^a 23.
 152^a 10 sqq. 158^a 32. *δεινά*
 101^a 33. 103^b 16. 110^a 27.
 166^b 12.
δεσμός 131^a 8.
δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος 160^b 29 sqq.
 161^a 35 sqq.
δεσποτικός 134^b 9. 136^b 8.
Δηλιακὸν ἐπύγραμμα 99^a 25.
δημηγορικοὶ λόγοι 181^a 5.
δημιουργούμενα 94^b 14.
δημογέροντες 109^b 9.
Δημόδοκος 151^a 8.
δημοκρατία 160^b 16 sqq. 161^b 9.
δημοκρατικοί 131^a 27.
δημόται 160^a 18.
διάγραμμα 112^b 21.
διαγραφή 107^a 33.
διαγωγή 127^b 35. 171^b 13. 176^b
 12. 14. 177^a 9. 27.
διάθεσις 107^b 16. 30. 108^a 24.
^b 11. 145^a 33.
διαιρετόν 106^a 26.
δίαιτα 96^a 27.
διάκονος 149^a 27.
διακριβοῦν 112^b 6. 178^a 23.
διαλέγεσθαι 144^b 33.
διάμετρος 112^a 22. 133^a 6.
διανέμειν αὐτόν 171^a 3.
διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον 130^b 30 sqq.
 131^a 10—^b 24. 27 sqq. 132^b 24.
διανοητικὸν 139^a 29 sq. 166^a
 17. *διανοητικὴ ἄρετή* 103^a
 5 sq. 14 sq. 138^b 17—145^a
 11. *ὄρεξις* 139^b 5.
διάνοια 139^a 21. 33. 35. 142^b

lations and existing constitutions, and developed a conception of the best form of government. — The connecting link between ethics & politics is thus found ~~there~~ in the word $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$, custom, or mode of life.

ΜΙΚΤΑΙ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ (III. 1)

There seem to be four cases which Aristotle conceives as possible:—

1. Praise is deserved where pain or degradation is endured for the sake of some great and noble end: 2. but blame where what is degrading is endured without a sufficiently great and noble end.

3. Pardon is conceded where human nature succumbs under great extremities to do what is not right: 4. except the action be such as no extremities ought to bring a man to consent to, in which case pardon is withheld.

In these distinctions we may recognize a practical and political wisdom such as might be found in the speeches of Thucydides, but the discussion does not rise to the level of philosophy.

Freedom (III. 5)

His arguments to prove that virtue and vice are free are as follows:—

1. All action implies the possibility of its reversal: 4. to act rightly be in our power, to act wrongly must be in our power also.
2. That an individual is the originating cause of his actions is a conception difficult to get rid of: this is free will.
3. We all act as if vice were free as well as virtue. It is punished by the state. Even for ignorance and passion producing vice men are held to be responsible.
4. Men must not charge their acts upon their nature or character: rather their character is produced by their acts.
5. The analogy of bodily infirmities shows us that vices are congenital none at all events, are self-born.
6. If as was said above (Chap. IV) we each desire what seems good: if our concept of the end, that is our idea of good depends not on our own will, but on our nature, or our character and tendency from birth: and if all our acts are determined by this concept of the end, how can they be called free?

Aristotle answers by putting various objections.

1. One may say that virtue and vice are equally not a law of nature, neither will be voluntary: but this the end seems to revolt against.

2. Or you may say that while the end is self-determined the means to it are all free as proceeding from the will of the individual. Thus virtue

something better produced and self-determined than there
character as a whole and therefore in the case of good
which is to determine our actions.

Temperance. III. 10)

Σωφροσύνη was regarded as having to do with pleasures,
and this often defined in Plato. Aristotle seeks to ascer-
tain more definitely its object. Pleasures are either bodily
or mental. With mental pleasures temperance and in-
temperance are not concerned; nor again with all bodily
pleasures - not those of hearing or of smell: but only the
merely animal pleasures of touch and taste: even taste
as an object of intemperance reduces itself to touch:
and with regard to touch we must exclude the man-
ly and human satisfaction felt in ^{exercise} ~~working~~, &c.
Desires of the kind in question are either common, in
which excess is the only kind of error possible, or
special and acquired, in which all kinds of excess are
committed. The only pains with which temperance and
intemperance can be concerned are pains arising from
the want of certain pleasures: these pains the intem-
perate man feels to excess. There is no deficiency corre-
sponding to temperance, and thus no name for the oppo-
site extreme.

Equity - ἔπιεικεία (VIII. 11).

Equity is thus described in Rhet. i. 13: - It is equity
to pardon human failings, and to look to the feelings
and not to the law: to the spirit and not to the let-
ter: to the intention and not to the action: to the
whole and not to the part: ~~to the~~ character of
the actor in the long run and not in the present
moment: to remember good rather than evil, &
good that one has received rather than good that
one has done: to bear being injured: to wish
to settle an action by words rather than by
deeds: lastly to prefer arbitration to judg-
ment, for the arbitrator sees what is equitable,
but the judge only the law, and for this an
arbitrator was first appointed in order that
equity might flourish.

12. 148^a 10. 165^b 26. 166^a 27.
 174^a 2. ^b 21. 175^a 7. 14. 27.
^b 34. 176^a 3. 181^a 2. οὐπω
 φάσις 142^b 12 sq. θεωρητική,
 πρακτική, ποιητική 139^a 26
 sqq. 35 sqq. ἀρεταὶ τῆς δια-
 νοίας 138^b 35 sq.
 διανομὴ τιμῆς, χρημάτων 130^b
 31. 131^a 25. ^b 29 sq. τὸ ἐν
 διανομῇ δίκαιον 131^b 10.
 διαπνεεῖν 166^a 16. 178^a 26.
 διαπορεῖν 96^a 12. 100^b 12. 101^a
 35 (?). 136^a 23. 143^b 17. 145^b 4.
 διαρρηρῶν 98^a 23.
 διάστασις 165^b 25.
 διάστημα 158^b 33.
 διάτασις 166^b 33.
 διδασκαλία 103^a 15. 139^b 26.
 διδασκαλικός 151^a 17.
 διδαχὴ 179^b 21. 23.
 διηγητικός 117^b 34.
 δικαιοπραγεῖν 135^a 17. 136^a 4.
 19. 29. 30. 172^b 24. 173^a 21.
 177^a 31. 178^a 31. δικαιο-
 πράγημα 135^a 12. 20. δικαιο-
 πράγία 133^b 30.
 δίκαιος, δίκαιον, δικαιοσύνη
 103^b 14 sqq. 105^b 7 sqq. 108^b
 8 sqq. 114^a 12 sqq. 120^a 20.
 127^a 34. 129^a 3—138^b 15.
 144^b 5. 167^b 8. 168^b 25. 173^a
 18 sqq. ^b 29 sq. 177^a 29 sq.
 178^a 10. 29 sqq. δικαιοσύνη
 καὶ ἀδικία ποσαχῶς λέγεται
 129^a 26 sqq.: καθόλου μὲν
 τὰ δίκαια τὰ νόμιμα, τὰ
 ἄδικα τὰ παράνομα, ἡ δι-
 καιοσύνη ἡ ὅλη καὶ τελεία
 πρὸς ἕτερον ἀρετὴ 129^a 32
 —130^a 13. 130^b 8 sq. 19 sq.,
 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ἐν μέρει
 δικαιοσύνη 130^a 14—^b 5.
 εἶδη αὐτῆς 130^b 30 sqq.: τὸ
 διανεμητικόν 131^a 10—^b 24,
 τὸ διορθωτικόν 131^b 24—

132^b 20. τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός
 132^b 21—133^b 28. ποία μεσό-
 της ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη 133^b
 30—134^a 13. τὸ πολιτικὸν
 δίκαιον 134^a 25—135^a 8, τὸ
 μὲν φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ νομικόν
 134^b 18 sqq. 136^b 32. 137^b
 13. = τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ
 δὲ κατὰ νόμον 162^b 21 sq.
 cf. τὸ νομικὸν καὶ τὸ πρῶ-
 τον 136^b 33 sq. δίκαιον οἰ-
 κονομικόν, δεσποτικόν, πα-
 τρικόν 134^b 9—17. 138^b 7 sq.
 δίκαιον καὶ δικαίωμα 135^a
 9 sqq. δίκαια πράττειν καὶ
 δίκαιον εἶναι 135^a 9 sqq.
 144^a 13 sqq. οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὸ
 δίκαιον εἶναι 137^a 5—25.
 πρὸς δικαιοσύνην πῶς ἔχει
 ἐπιείκεια 137^a 31—138^a 3.
 δίκαια μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀν-
 θρώπινα 135^a 3 sqq. δικαιο-
 σύνη καὶ φιλία 155^a 22—28.
 158^b 29 sqq. 159^b 25 sqq.
 161^b 6 sqq. 162^a 29 sqq. ^b 21
 sqq. δικαιοσύνη ἀλλότριον
 ἀγαθόν 130^a 3 sq. 134^b 5. v.
 etiam νόμιμον. praeterea v.
 ἀδικία.
 δικαιοῦσθαι 136^a 18 sqq.
 δικαίωμα 135^a 9. 13.
 δικανικοὶ λόγοι 181^a 4.
 δικαστής 132^a 7. 20 sqq. 32.
 δικαστική 141^b 33.
 δίκη 132^b 27. 134^a 31. 162^b 30.
 164^b 13.
 Διομήδης 116^a 22. 24. 136^b 9.
 διομολογία 164^a 34.
 διορθοῦν ἀλλήλους 172^a 12.
 διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον 131^a 1 sqq.
^b 25 sqq. 132^b 24.
 διορισμός 134^b 33. 136^b 3. 23.
 138^a 27.
 δίκαιον, δικαστής 132^a 32.
 δίκη 148^a 8. 154^b 2.

διώκειν 94^a 16. 95^a 8. ^b 27.
96^b 11. 97^a 17. 18. 129^b 4.
139^a 26. 146^a 31. ^b 24. 148^a
29. 151^a 11. 14. 23. 152^a 5.
^b 16. 153^b 25. 30. 31. 154^a
28. 30. 154^b 2. 156^a 25. 33.
160^b 8. 179^b 13. καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι
151^b 1. καὶ φεύγειν 104^b 22.
148^a 7. 18 sq. 150^a 19 sqq.
153^a 27 sqq. 154^a 16 sqq.

διωκτόν 97^a 31.

δίωξις καὶ φυγή 139^a 22.

δοκιμασία 162^a 14.

δολοφονία 131^a 7.

δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις
ἡδη 142^b 13 sq. ἀληθής 151^b
3 sq. cf. 142^b 10 sqq. τοῦ
καθόλου 147^a 25. δόξα καὶ
ἐπιστήμαι 112^b 7. 145^b 31—
146^a 4. 146^b 24—31. προ-
αίρεσις καὶ εὐβουλία καὶ
σύνεσις οὐ δόξα 111^b 10 sqq.
30 sqq. 142^a 32 sqq. ^b 9 sqq.
143^a 1 sqq. ὑπολήψει καὶ
δόξη ἐνδέχεται διαφενδεσθαι
139^b 17. cf. 142^b 9 sqq. δόξα
καὶ φρόνησις εἰσι περὶ τὸ
ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν 140^b
27 sq. δόξα καὶ περὶ τὰ
αἰδία 111^b 31 sq. χρῆσθαι
τῇ δόξη 143^a 13 sq. φάσεις
καὶ δόξαι ἀναπόδεικτοι 143^b
12 sq. λόγος καὶ δόξα 147^b 1.
αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι 179^a 17.
κατὰ δόξαν opp. κατ' ἀλή-
θειαν 128^b 24.

δοξάζειν 112^a 3. 4. 5. 7. 9. 10.
124^b 6. 146^b 26. 27. 30.

δοξαστικόν v. ψυχῆς μόρια.

δοτικός 121^b 16.

δουλαπατία 131^a 7.

δουλεία 133^a 1. δουλεύειν 172^a
32. δουλικόν 125^a 1.

δοῦλος 160^b 28. 29. 161^a 35.
^b 3 sqq.

δρομικός 101^b 16.

δύναμις καὶ πλοῦτος 161^a 26 sq.
εἰς δύναμιν 163^b 18. 181^b 15.
δύναμις πρὸς ἀρετὴν 172^a 24.
ἀναγκαστική 180^a 21. τῶν
πλείστων 152^a 27. = notio,
natura rei 130^b 2. 134^b 19.
26. δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς 102^a
34. 144^a 22 sqq. 170^a 16. δύ-
ναμις προνοητική 141^a 28.
δυνάμεις, ἕξεις, πάθη 105^b
19 sqq. cf. 157^b 32. opp. προ-
αίρεσις 127^b 14. syn. ἐμπει-
ρία, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη 94^a 10.
26. ^b 2. 180^b 32. 181^a 9. opp.
διάνοια 181^a 2. ἐπιστήμαι
καὶ δυνάμεις opp. ἕξεις 129^a
12 sq. δυνάμεις synon. ἕξεις
143^a 25. 28. cf. 103^a 26. δυν-
άμεις, τίμια, ἐπαινετά 101^b
11 sq. opp. ἐνέργεια 103^a
26 sq. 153^b 25. 168^a 5 sqq.
δυναστεία 124^a 14 sqq. 155^a 6.
176^b 17. 177^b 13.

δυναστεύειν 124^a 22. 177^a 18.

δυναστής 163^a 35. 179^a 7. 14.

δυσσφαίρετον 95^b 26.

δυσγενής 99^b 4.

δυσδιάλυτος 126^a 20.

δύσελπις 116^a 2.

δύσερις καὶ δύσκολος 108^a 30.
126^b 14 sqq. 127^a 10 sq. 158^a 3.

δύσπειστος 151^b 6.

δυσπραξία 101^b 7.

δυστυχήματα 100^a 17. δυστυχία
100^a 21. 153^b 19. 155^a 11.
171^a 21. 29.

δυσχερής 145^b 6. 166^b 15. 176^a 20.

δωροδόκος 163^b 11.

ἐαρ 98^a 18.

ἐγγυή 131^a 4. ἐγγυητής 133^b 12.


ἐγερσις θυμοῦ 116^b 30.

ἐγκλήματα 131^a 23. 162^b 9. 24.
163^a 21. 164^a 29. 33.



- ἐγκληματικὴ φιλία 162^b 16.
 ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἀκρασία, ἐγκρα-
 τῆς καὶ ἀκρατῆς 102^b 14 sqq.
 27. 145^a 15—152^a 36. 154^b
 32. 168^b 34 sq. τὰ λεγόμενα
 περὶ αὐτῶν 145^b 8—20. ἀπο-
 ραίει 145^b 21—146^b 5. πῶς
 εἰδότες ἀκρατεύονται 146^b 8
 —147^b 19. τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς
 ἀκρατῆς 147^b 19—149^a 20.
 ἦττον αἰσχυρὰ ἀκρασία θυμοῦ
 ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν 149^a 24
 —^b 26. ἀκρασία καὶ θηρι-
 ότης 149^b 27—150^a 8. ὁ ἐγ-
 κρατῆς καὶ ὁ καρτερικός, ὁ
 ἀκρατῆς καὶ ὁ μαλακός τί
 διαφέρουσι 150^a 9—^b 28. πῶς
 ἀκρασία ἔχει πρὸς ἀνολεσίαν
 καὶ ὅλως κακίαν, ἐγκράτεια
 πρὸς σωφροσύνην καὶ ὅλως
 ἀρετήν 102^b 14—28. 119^b 15
 sqq. 150^b 29—151^a 28. cf. 145^a
 17 sq. 33—^b 2. τίνι λόγῳ καὶ
 τίνι προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἐστὶν
 ὁ ἐγκρατῆς 151^a 29—^b 22. ὁ
 ἐγκρατῆς μέσος τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς
 καὶ τοῦ ἥττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς
 σωματικοῖς χαίροντος 151^b 23
 —32. ὁ σώφρων καθ' ὁμοιό-
 τητά μόνον ἐγκρατῆς λέγεται
 151^b 32—152^a 6. οὐκ ἄμα
 φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ εἶναι
 ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτόν 152^a 7
 —14. ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἡμιπόνηρος
 152^a 15—24. ἀκρασία καὶ
 ἐγκράτεια ἐστὶ περὶ τὸ ὑπερ-
 βάλλειν τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἔξεως
 152^a 25—27. τίς ἀκρασία
 εὐιατοτέρα 152^a 28—33.
 ἐγκύκλια 96^a 3. cf. ἐξωτερικοὶ
 λόγοι.
 ἐγκώμια 101^b 32 sqq.
 ἐδωδή 118^a 20.
 ἐθισμός 98^b 4. 119^a 27. 152^a
 29. ἐθιστόν 99^b 9. ἐθιστὴ
 ἀρετῇ 151^a 18 sq.
 ἔθος 95^b 4. 103^a 17 sqq. 148^b
 17. 27. 30. 34. 152^a 30. 154^a
 33. 179^b 21. 180^a 8. ^b 4. 5.
 εἶδη *ideae* Platonis 96^a 13 sqq.
 εἰδοποιός 174^b 5.
 ἐλλικρινῆς ἡδονή 176^b 20.
 εἶρων, εἰρωνεία, εἰρωνεύεσθαι
 108^a 22 sq. 124^b 30. 127^a 14.
 22 sq. ^b 22 sqq.
 εἰσάγειν τὰ εἶδη 96^a 13 sq.
 ἐκβολαί 110^a 9.
 ἐκγονοί 100^a 24. 30.
 ἐκδέχεσθαι 120^a 4.
 ἐκκαγχάζειν 150^b 11.
 ἐκκρούειν 119^b 10. 154^a 27.
 175^b 8.
 ἐκλέγεσθαι, ἐκλογή 181^a 17 sq.
 ἐκούσιον 132^b 30. 135^a 20 sqq.
 ἐκούσιον καὶ προαιρετόν πῶς
 διαφέρει 111^b 7 sqq. ἐκού-
 σια συναλλάγματα v. συναλ-
 λάγματα. *praeterea* v. ἀκού-
 σιον, ἔξις.
 ἐκπύπει τί τινα 111^a 9.
 ἐκστατικός 145^b 11. 146^a 18.
 151^a 1. 20. 26.
 Ἐκτωρ 116^a 22. 25. 33. 145^a 20.
 ἐλαττωτικός 136^b 20. 138^a 1.
 Ἑλένη 109^b 9.
 ἔλεος 105^b 23. 109^b 32. 111^a 1.
 ἐλεεῖν 105^b 25. 106^b 19. 114^a
 27.
 ἐλευθερία 131^a 28.
 ἐλευθερίος, ἐλευθεριότης 103^a
 6. 107^b 8 sqq. 108^b 22 sqq.
 32. 115^a 20. 119^b 19—122^a
 18. 151^b 7. 158^a 21. 176^b 20.
 178^a 28 sq. ^b 14. 179^b 8. opp.
 ἀνδραποδώδης 128^a 18 sqq.
 ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν ἡδονῶν
 118^b 4 sqq. 176^b 20.
 ἔλκειν 149^b 11. 150^b 3. 159^b 15.
 166^b 21.

- ἑλλέβορος 137^a 15.
 ἑλλογα καὶ ἄλογα 172^b 10.
 ἑλος 116^b 33.
 ἑμβρυα 102^b 1.
 ἑμμελής 127^b 8. 128^a 1. ἑμμε-
 λῶς 100^a 21. 123^a 31. 128^a 9.
 170^b 21.
 ἑμμενετικός 145^b 11. 146^a 17.
 151^a 26. ^b 5. 152^a 19.
 ἑμπεδοκλῆς 147^a 20. ^b 12. 155^b 7.
 ἑμπειρία, ἑμπειρος 103^a 16.
 116^b 3. 141^b 18. 142^a 14 sqq.
 (opp. ἀφαίρεσις). 143^b 11 sqq.
 158^a 14. 180^b 18. 181^a 2. 10.
^b 5.
 ἑμπλέκειν τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν
 εὐδαιμονίαν 153^b 15.
 ἑμφρων 101^a 1.
 ἑμψυχος 132^a 22. 150^a 4. 161^b
 4. 167^b 35.
 ἐναντιότης 108^b 27. — ἐναν-
 τιώσις 126^b 34.
 ἐνδεής 97^a 5. ^b 15. 118^a 10.
 154^a 34. 157^b 20. 159^b 14.
 163^a 33 sq. ^b 3. 170^b 18. 173^b
 14. 174^a 15. 25. 176^b 5.
 ἐνδεια 104^a 12. 109^a 4. 118^b 18.
 120^b 13. 163^b 4. 173^b 7. 20.
 ἐνδεῖν 153^a 1.
 ἐνδεχόμενον 143^b 3. ἀντὶ πρᾶ-
 ξαι 140^a 32. ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ
 ἄλλως ἔχειν 134^b 31. 139^a
 7 sqq. 14. ^b 20 sq. 140^a 1.
 23. 33 sqq. ^b 27. 141^a 1. καὶ
 εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι 140^a 12 sq.
 ἐνδοξος 98^b 23. 122^b 32. 127^a
 21. ^b 25. 145^b 5.
 Ἐνδυμίων 178^b 20.
 ἐνέργεια opp. ἔξις 98^a 6. ^b 31 sqq.
 122^b 1. 152^b 33. 157^b 6. 176^a
 33 sqq. cf. ἔξις. opp. δύνα-
 μις v. δύναμις. κινήσεως καὶ
 ἀκινήσεως 154^b 27. ἐνέργειαι
 καὶ ἔργα 94^a 4 sqq. praeterea
 v. ζωή. θεωρεῖν. θεωρητικός.
- ἐνίστασθαι 172^b 36.
 ἐνισχύειν 180^b 4.
 ἐννοεῖν 167^a 34.
 ἐννοια 171^a 32. ^b 14. 177^a 15.
 179^b 15.
 ἐντιμος 94^b 2. 116^a 21. 122^b 35.
 124^a 23. ^b 23. 125^a 29.
 ἐξαγωγή 133^b 9.
 ἐξακριβοῦν 96^b 30. 101^b 34.
 102^a 25. 175^a 31. ^b 14. 180^b 11.
 ἐξαμελεῖσθαι 180^a 27. 30.
 ἐξαργεῖν 99^a 2.
 ἐξελαύνειν 154^b 13. 155^a 26.
 ἔξις ψυχῆς 104^b 19 sqq. opp.
 δύναμις καὶ πάθος 105^b 19
 sqq. 157^b 32. ἐπαινετή =
 ἀρετή 103^a 9 sq. at cf. 151^a
 27. ἀποδεικτική 139^b 31.
 πρακτική καὶ ποιητική 140^a
 3 sqq. ^b 5. ἔξεις καὶ ἐνέρ-
 γειαι 103^b 21 sqq. καὶ πρᾶ-
 ξεις 114^b 30—115^a 3. φυσι-
 καὶ 144^b 8 sq. θηριώδεις καὶ
 νοσηματώδεις 148^b 18—149^a
 20. ἔξεων σημεῖον 104^b 4 sqq.
 (cf. ἀρετή). praeterea v. δυ-
 ναμις. λογισμός. προαιρετική.
 ἐξιστάναι 119^a 23. 29. 149^b 35.
 151^b 4.
 ἐξορίζειν 180^a 10.
 ἐξουσία 161^a 9. 163^b 22. 178^a
 33. οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις 95^b
 21. 158^a 28. 159^a 19.
 ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι 102^a 26 sq.
 140^a 3. cf. ἐγκύκλια.
 ἐπαγγελία 164^a 29.
 ἐπαγωγή 98^b 3. 139^b 23—31.
 ἐπαινετικός 125^a 7.
 ἐπαινετόν, ἔπαινος 101^b 11 sqq.
 v. τίμιος. cf. ἔξις.
 ἐπαναφορά 130^a 29.
 ἐπανισοῦν 132^a 25. 163^b 11.
 ἐπανορθοῦν 137^b 22. ἐπανόρ-
 θωμα 135^a 13. 137^a 12. 26.



ἐπανόρθωσις 165^b 18. ἐπαν-
ορθωτικός 132^a 18.
ἐπαχθής 180^a 24.
ἐπείσαντος ἡδονή 169^b 27.
ἐπετείνειν 97^b 12.
ἐπήβολος 99^a 6. 101^a 13.
ἐπηύρατο 163^a 20.
ἐπιβάτης 106^a 20.
ἐπιβλέπειν 147^a 24.
ἐπιβουλεύειν 135^b 33.
ἐπίβουλος 149^b 13. 14. 152^a 18.
ἐπιδεικνύναι 123^a 25.
ἐπιδέξιος, ἐπιδεξιότης 128^a 16
sq. 33. 171^b 3.
ἐπιδέχεσθαι 94^b 25. 155^b 13.
ἐπιδιδόναι 175^a 35. ἐπίδοσις
98^a 25. 109^a 17.
ἐπιδικάζεσθαι 107^b 34.
ἐπιδυσσώμεῖν 145^a 33.
ἐπιείκεια πῶς ἔχει πρὸς δι-
καιосύνην 137^a 31 — 138^a 3.
cf. 143^a 20 sqq. 28 sqq.
ἐπιθυμητικόν 102^b 30. 119^b 14.
15.
ἐπιθυμία πάθος ἐστὶ 105^b 21.
ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμός 111^a
25 sqq. ^b 10 sqq. 147^a 15 et
v. ἐγκράτεια. ἐπιθυμία νεα-
νική 148^a 21. ἐπιθυμῖαι κοι-
ναὶ καὶ φυσικαί, ἴδιοι καὶ
ἐπίθετοι 118^b 8 sqq. 149^b 5
sqq. ἰσχυραὶ καὶ φαῦλαι 146^a
2 sq. 10 sqq. 178^b 16. χρη-
σταί 146^a 13. ἀσθενεῖς 146^a
15. τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν
αἰσχυρῶν 148^a 22 sqq. 175^b
28 sq. ἐπιθυμιῶν σωματικῶν
διαφοραί 149^b 26 sqq. v. etiam
νεανική.
ἐπίκληρος 161^a 1.
ἐπικουρά 163^a 19. ^b 4. 24. 171^a
23. ^b 1.
ἐπιλέγειν 106^b 10.
ἐπιληπτικός 149^a 11. 150^b 34.

ἐπίλυπος 110^b 19. 111^b 17. 117^a
33. 175^b 18.
ἐπιμέλεια 99^b 20. 30. 121^b 12.
179^a 24. 180^a 1. 25. 29. ^b 12.
23. 28. ἐπιμέλειαι περὶ ὄσας
ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη 138^b 26 sq.
ἐπιμελής 167^b 25. ἐπιμελῶς
105^b 15.
ἐπίνοσος 113^a 28.
ἐπιπειθής 98^a 4.
ἐπιπολάζειν 95^a 30. 128^a 12.
ἐπιπολαίως 95^b 24. 167^a 3.
ἐπίπονος 116^a 14. 168^a 25. 170^b
25. ἐπιπόνως 168^a 21.
ἐπίσκεψις 96^a 5.
ἐπίστασθαι διχῶς, ἔχειν καὶ
χρησθαι 146^b 31 sqq. — ἐπι-
στήμη τί ἐστι 139^b 16. 18—
36. κυριωτάτη καὶ μάλιστα
ἀρχιτεκτονική 94^a 27. cf. 143^b
34. ἡ κυρίως δοκοῦσα εἶναι
καὶ ἡ αἰσθητική 147^b 15—
17. πρακτική 94^b 4. περὶ
ἀρετὴν καὶ ἄλλας ἐπιμελείας
138^b 26 sq. καὶ φρόνησις 142^a
23 sqq. καὶ εὐβουλία 142^a
34 sqq. ^b 9 sqq. ἐπιστήμης
οὐκ ἐστιν ὀρθότης καὶ ἀμαρ-
τία 142^b 10. ἐπιστῆμαι τοῦ
κοινοῦ, περὶ τὸ καθόλου 180^b
15. 22 sq. αἱ ἀκριβεῖς καὶ
αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
112^b 1. ἀκριβεστάτη σοφία
141^a 16 sqq. χρησθαι τῇ ἐπι-
στήμῃ 143^a 13. — ἐπιστητόν
139^b 23. 25. 140^b 34 sq. prae-
terea v. ἐπιμέλεια. τέχνη.
ἐπιστημονικόν v. ψυχῆς μῦθος.
ἔσχατος ὅρος τῷ καθόλου
οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐπιστημονικός
147^b 13 sq.
ἐπισφαλής 155^a 10.
ἐπίταγμα 149^a 31. — ἐπιτακτική
ἡ φρόνησις 143^a 8.
ἐπιτεροπής 166^a 25.

ἐπιτηδεύειν 180^a 2. ἐπιτήδευμα
125^a 26. 179^b 35. 180^a 16.
26. ^b 3.
ἐπιτιμᾶν 114^a 23 sqq. 168^a 29.
ἐπιτίμησις 102^b 34.
ἐπιτίμια 113^b 32. 116^a 19.
ἐπιχαιρεκακία, ἐπιχαιρέκακος
107^a 10. 108^b 1 sqq.
Ἐπίχαρμος 167^b 25.
ἐπονείδιστος 118^b 2. 119^a 25.
ἐπονείδιστοι ἡδοναί 173^b 21.
ἐρᾶν ὑπερβολή φιλίας 171^a 11 sq.
πολλῶν 158^a 11 sq.
ἐρανιστά 123^a 22. 160^a 20.
ἐραστής καὶ ἐρώμενος 157^a 6.
159^b 15 sqq. 164^a 3 sqq.
ἔργον ἀνθρώπου 97^b 24 sqq.
ὀφθαλμοῦ, χειρός 97^b 30 sq.
106^a 17 sq. ἔργα τοῦ μεγα-
λοπρεποῦς 122^b 3. praeterea
v. ἐνέργεια.
ἐρήμης ἀμφισβητεῖν 125^b 17 sq.
ἔρις 155^b 6.
Ἑρμαῖον 116^b 19.
ἐρυθραίνεσθαι 128^b 13.
ἐρωτικός, ἐρωτική 156^b 1 sq.
164^a 3.
ἔσπερος 129^b 28.
ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν 122^b 23. ἐρα-
νιστάς 123^a 22 sq.
ἔσχατον 112^b 19. 23. 141^b 28.
142^a 23 sqq. 143^b 3. ἔσχατα
142^a 28. 143^a 29. 33. 35. 146^a 9.
ἔσχατος ὅρος v. ἐπιστημονι-
κός. τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τοῖς μα-
θηματικοῖς τρίγωνον 142^a 28.
v. etiam αἷτιον.
ἐταιρική φιλία v. φιλία.
ἐταῖρος 160^a 2. 5. 161^b 35. 162^a
32. 164^b 26. 32. 33. 165^a 16. 29.
εὐβουλία, εὐβουλος 141^b 13.
142^a 32—^b 33.
εὐγένεια 99^b 3. 131^a 28.
εὐγενής 122^b 31. 124^a 21. 179^b 8.
εὐγνώμων 143^a 19. 30.

εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐδαιμονία, εὐ-
δαίμων 95^a 13—102^a 4. 176^a
30—179^a 32. εὐδαιμονία τί
ἐστι 95^a 16—99^b 8. 153^b 9
—21. 169^b 28 sqq. 177^a 12
—179^b 22. πόθεν γίνεται
99^b 10—100^a 9. ἀνθρωπον
ζῶντα πῶς εὐδαιμονιστέον
100^a 10—101^a 21, καὶ πῶς
συμμεταβάλλοι τι καὶ ὁ τε-
θνεὼς 100^a 27 sqq. 101^a 21
—^b 9. εὐδαιμονία οὐ τῶν
ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν
τιμῶν 101^b 10—102^a 4. εὐ-
δαιμονία ἀνθρωπίνῃ 102^a 15.
ἡ τελεία (= θεία) εὐδαιμο-
νία 177^a 17. ^b 24 sqq. 178^b
7. ὁ εὐδαίμων φίλων δεῖται
169^b 3—170^b 19 (v. φιλία).
εὐδαιμονία οὐ ποιότης 173^a
15. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ 176^b 9
—177^a 11, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα κατὰ
τὴν κατίστην ἀρετὴν τὴν
τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρίας
ἐνέργεια 177^a 11—178^a 8.
178^b 3—32, δευτέρως δὲ κατὰ
τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἡθι-
κὴν ἀρετὴν 178^a 9—^b 3, με-
τρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγη-
μένῃ 178^b 33—179^a 22. ὁ
εὐδαίμων θεοφιλέστατος 179^a
23—32. πῶς ἔχει πρὸς εὐ-
δαιμονίαν ἡ παραμεμιγμένη
ἡδονή v. ἐμπλέκειν. ἡδονή.
τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαι-
μονεῖ 179^a 27 sq. οὐδ' ἀνδρά-
ποδον 179^a 8 sq. praeterea
v. παῖς.
εὐδαιμονίζειν 96^a 2. 100^a 9.
10. ^b 1. 101^b 24. 176^b 12.
εὐδαιμονικός 99^b 3. 176^b 16.
177^a 6. 178^b 23.
εὐδαιμονισμός 127^b 18.
εὐδιάντοι φίλοι 156^a 19.
Εὐδοξος 101^b 27. 172^b 9 sqq.

- εὐεκτικός 129^a 20 sqq. 138^a 31.
 176^a 15.
 εὐελπίς 115^b 3. 116^a 4. 117^a
 9 sqq.
 εὐεξία 119^a 16. 129^a 19 sqq.
 εὐεργέται καὶ εὐεργετηθέντες
 167^b 17—168^a 27.
 εὐεργετικός 171^b 16.
 εὐετηρία 98^b 26. 155^a 8.
 εὐζωία 98^b 21.
 εὐήκοος 102^b 27.
 εὐήμερία 99^b 7. 178^b 33.
 Εὐηρος 152^a 31.
 εὐθήναι (εὐσθενεῖν K^b) 100^a 6.
 εὐθήρατος 110^b 14.
 εὐάτος 121^a 20. 146^a 33. 152^a 28.
 εὐκατάφορος 109^a 15.
 εὐκαταφρόνητος 127^b 27.
 εὐκοινωνήτος 121^a 4.
 εὐκόλως 100^b 31.
 εὐλάβεια τῶν αἰσχυρῶν 121^b 24.
 εὐμετάβολος 100^b 3. 101^a 9.
 154^b 30.
 εὐμετάπειστος 151^a 14. 154^b 6.
 εὐνοεῖν, εὐνοια, εὐνοος 155^b
 32 sqq. 157^b 17 sqq. 158^a 7.
 166^b 30—167^a 21.
 εὐνομία 112^b 14.
 εὐπάθεια 159^a 21. 171^b 24.
 εὐπαράκολούθητος 108^a 19.
 εὐπειθής 119^b 7. 12. 180^b 7.
 εὐπειστος 151^b 10.
 εὐπορία 158^b 34. 167^a 16.
 εὐπραγεῖν 167^a 16. εὐπραξία
 98^b 22. 100^a 21. 101^b 6. 139^a
 34. ^b 3. 140^b 7.
 εὐρεσις 112^a 27. ^b 19. 146^b 8.
 Εὐριπίδης 110^a 28 (Ἀλκμαίων).
 111^a 12 (Μερόπη = Κρε-
 σφόντης). 136^a 11 [Ἀλκμαίων].
 142^a 2 [Φιλοκτήτης]. 155^b 2.
 cf. 167^a 33.
 εὐριπος 167^b 7.
 εὐσθενεῖν v. εὐθήναι.
 εὐστοχία 142^a 33. ^b 2.
 εὐσυνεσία, εὐσύνετος 142^b 34
 —143^a 18. 181^b 11.
 ευσχημοσύνη, εὐσχήμων 128^a
 7. 25. εὐσχημόνως 101^a 1.
 εὐτεκνία 99^b 3.
 εὐτραπελία, εὐτράπελος 108^a
 23 sq. 127^b 34—128^b 9. 156^a
 13. 157^a 6. 158^a 31. 176^b 14.
 εὐτροπος 128^a 10.
 εὐτύχημα 100^b 23. 124^a 20. 31.
 125^a 31.
 εὐτυχία καὶ εὐδαιμονία 99^b 8.
 124^a 14. 153^b 21 sqq. εὐ-
 τυχίαι 124^b 19. 169^b 14. 171^a
 21. 26. 28. ^b 13. 15. 23. — οἱ
 ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχεῖς 179^b 23.
 εὐνπέρβλητος 123^a 17.
 εὐφιλοτίμητος 122^b 22.
 εὐφυνής, εὐφυνία 114^b 8 sqq.
 144^b 34.
 εὐχεσθαι τί δεῖ 129^b 5 sq.
 εὐχρηστος 181^b 9.
 εὐωχία 148^b 23.
 ἔφρεσις 114^b 6.
 ἔως 129^b 28.
 Ζεύς 124^b 16. 160^b 26. 165^a 15.
 ζῆλος 105^b 23.
 ζημία καὶ κέρδος, ζημιοῦσθαι
 καὶ κερδαίνειν 132^a 9 sqq.
^b 11 sqq.
 ζῆν = αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν
 170^a 19.
 ζήτησις 96^a 13. 102^a 13. οὐπω
 φάσις 142^b 14. καὶ βούλευσις
 112^b 21 sqq. cf. 142^a 31 sq.
 ζωὴ ἐνέργεια τις 175^a 12. θρε-
 πτική καὶ ἀνξητική, αἰσθη-
 τική, πρακτική τοῦ λόγον
 ἔχοντος 98^a 1 sqq. v. etiam
 ἀόριστος.
 ἡγούμενον 113^a 6.
 ἡδονὴ καὶ θυμός 105^a 8. δια-
 φοραὶ τῶν ποιούντων ἡδο-

νήν 147^b 23 sqq. ἡδονῶν
σωματικῶν 149^b 26 sqq. ἡδο-
ναὶ τῶν καλῶν 148^a 22 sqq.
αἱ δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως
ἡδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι 150^a 9.
περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης 152^a
36—154^b 31. 172^a 16—176^a
29. τὰ λεγόμενα 152^b 8—
24. ὅτι οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ
ταῦτα τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ εἶναι
ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἀρίστον 152^b
24—153^a 35. ἡ ἡδονὴ μό-
ριον τοῦ ἀρίστου 153^b 1—
154^a 7, ἀλλ' ὑπερβολὴ σωμα-
τικῶν ἡδονῶν ψεκτόν 154^a
8—21. διὰ τί τοῖς πολλοῖς
φαίνονται σωματικαὶ αἰρε-
τώτεραι 154^a 22—^b 31. διὰ
τί περὶ ἡδονῆς ἔπεται διελ-
θεῖν 172^a 19—^b 8. τὰ εἰρη-
μένα 172^a 27—33. ^b 9—174^a
12: Εὐδοξος 172^b 9—26. Πλά-
των 172^b 28—35. οἱ ἀντίπα-
λοι τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐλέγχονται
172^b 36—173^b 31, ἀλλὰ καὶ
Εὐδοξος 173^b 32—174^a 10.
ἡδονὴ τί ἐστὶ 174^a 12—176^a
29. οὔτε κινήσεις οὔτε γένε-
σις 174^a 12—^b 13, ἀλλὰ τὸ
τελειοῦν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὡς
τέλος ἐπιγιγόμενον 174^b 14
—175^a 3. οὐδεὶς οὖν συν-
εχῶς ἥδεται 175^a 3—10, ἀλλ'
ἀπαντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ὀρέγον-
ται 175^a 10—21, καὶ κοινή
ἐστὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις 104^b
34 sqq. cf. 157^b 16 sq. 172^a
19 sq. ^b 9 sq. 173^a 2 sqq.
διάφορα τῶν ἡδονῶν εἶδη
173^b 13—31. 174^a 1 sqq. 175^a
22—^b 23, καθάπερ τῶν ἐνερ-
γειῶν 175^b 24—176^a 3. ἐκά-
στω ζῳῷ ἄλλη οἰκεία 176^a
4—9, ἀνθρώπῳ αἱ τελειοῦ-
σαι τὰς ἐνεργείας τοῦ ἀρίστου

καὶ εὐδαίμονος 176^a 10—29,
ᾧστε ὁ τούτου βίος οὐδὲν
προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀλλ'
ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ 99^a 7—30. 177^a
22—27. ἡδονὴ οὔτε διάνοια
οὔτ' αἰσθησις 175^b 34. ἡδίστη
τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ σο-
φίαν 177^a 24. αἱ ἄνευ λύ-
πης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἡδοναὶ
152^b 36 sqq. ἄλυποι 173^b 16
sqq. ἐλλικρινεῖς 176^b 20. v.
praeterea ἀβλαβής. ἄλυπος.
ἀμιγής. ἀόριστος. ἀρετὴ. ἄτο-
πος. ἀφροδίσια. ἐλευθέριος.
ἐμπλέκειν. ἐπέλακτος. ἐπο-
νεῖδιστος. θεός. θεωρεῖν. θη-
ριώδης. μαθηματικός. νοσώ-
δης. ὁμιλεῖν. παραβάλλειν.
σωματικός. ψυχικός.

ἡδυσμα 170^b 29.

ἡθος, ἡθικός v. ἀρετὴ. πάθος.
ἡθικὴ φιλία 162^b 23. 31.

ἡλίδιος 111^b 22. 112^a 20. 121^a
27. 122^b 28. 123^b 4. 125^a 23.
28. 126^a 5. 176^b 32.

ἡλικία 95^a 6. 121^a 20. 128^b 16.
143^b 8. 156^a 33. 161^a 5. ^b 34.
165^a 28.

ἡλικιωταί 161^a 26.

ἡμιπόνηρος 151^b 28.

Ἡράκλειτος 105^a 8. 146^b 30.
155^b 4. 176^a 6.

ἡρεμία 124^b 25. 154^b 28.

ἡρωικὴ ἀρετὴ 145^a 19 sq. ἡρωικά
100^a 7 sq.

Ἡσίοδος 95^b 9.

ἡσυχία 180^b 9. ἡσύχιος 116^a 9.

θαλάττιοι 115^b 1.


Θαλής 141^b 4.

θάνατος = φόνος 131^a 8.

θαρραλέος 117^a 12 sq. 151^b 8.

τὰ θαρραλέα 115^b 17.

θαρρεῖν 103^b 17. 106^b 18. 107^b



2. 4. 115^a 23. ^b 19. 28. 116^a
1. 4. 117^a 11.
θάρος 107^a 33 sqq. 115^a 7. 117^a
29. θάρσος 105^b 22.
θανυμαστικός 125^a 2.
θείαμα 99^a 9. θεατής 98^a 31.
θείατρον 175^b 12. θεᾶσθαι
97^a 10 sq. 167^b 27.
θεῖος ἀνὴρ 145^a 27 sq. θεία
μοῖρα 99^b 10. αἰτία 179^b 22.
Θεόγνις 170^a 12. 179^b 6.
Θεοδόκτου (Φιλοκτήτης) 150^b 9.
θεόπεμπος 99^b 15.
ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν χεῖρα ἡδονήν
154^b 26. θεῶν δώρημα 99^b 11.
θεόσδοτος 99^b 12.
θεοφιλής 179^a 24. 30.
θεράπευμα 181^b 3.
θερμασία 118^b 6.
θερμότης 149^a 30.
θεῖσιν διαφυλάττειν 96^a 2.
Θέτις 124^b 15.
θεωρεῖν 98^b 3. 100^a 32. ^b 19.
102^a 7. 23. 104^a 11. 122^a 36.
139^a 7. 140^a 11. 24. ^b 9. 141^a
26. 143^b 19. 146^b 33. 152^a
15. 153^a 20. 169^b 33. 170^a 2.
175^a 1. 177^a 21. 33. ^b 2. 178^b
3. 30. 34. 181^b 8. 20. = sen-
sibus percipere 139^b 21. cf.
169^b 33. αἰ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέρ-
γεια 153^a 1. αἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ
θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν ἡδο-
ναί 153^a 22. θεωρῆσαι καὶ
γῶναι 179^b 1.
θεωρημα 166^a 26. 175^a 15.
θεωρητικός 180^b 21. βίος 95^b
19. 96^a 4. θεωρητικὴ ἀρετὴ
177^a 18 sq. 28. διάνοια 139^a
27. ἐνέργεια 177^b 19. 178^b
7 sq. 22.
θεωρία 122^b 17. — 103^b 26.
146^b 14. 174^b 21. 178^b 5. opp.
πράττειν et ποιεῖν 178^b 21.
28 sq.
θηρία πράξεως οὐ κοινωνεῖ
139^a 20.
θηριότης 145^a 17. 18. 149^a 1
(cf. 148^b 15 sqq.). 150^a 1 sqq.
θηριωδης 118^b 4. ἄνθρωπος
118^a 25. 145^a 30. ἕξις 145^a
24. 148^b 19. ἡδονή 118^a 25.
θητικός 125^a 2.
διασῶται 160^a 19.
θλίβειν 100^b 28.
θρασύδειλοι et θρασύνεσθαι
115^b 32 sq.
θρασύς, θρασύτης 107^b 3. 108^b
19 sq. 23 sqq. 109^a 2 sqq.
7 sqq. 115^b 28 sqq. 151^b 7.
θρεπτικὴ ζωὴ 98^a 1. θρεπι-
κόν 102^a 32 sqq. 144^a 9 sqq.
cf. ψυχῆς μόρια.
θρηνητικός 171^b 10.
θυμίαμα 118^a 10.
θυμοειδής 116^b 26.
θυμός 105^a 8. 111^a 25 sqq. (cf.
ἀκούσιον). ^b 10 sqq. 116^b 23
sqq. 126^a 21. 135^b 21. 26.
145^b 19. 147^a 15. ^b 34. 149^a 3.
24 — ^b 26. cf. ἀκρατής.
θυμώδης 149^b 14.
θυσίαι 122^b 10. 160^a 23. 24.
λατός 150^b 32.
λατρεία 104^b 17. 152^b 32. 154^a
27. 30. ^b 12.
λατρεύειν 97^a 13. 137^a 24. 154^b
18.
λατρική 94^a 8. 96^a 33. 34. 97^a
17. 102^a 21. 104^a 9. 112^b 4.
138^a 30. ^b 31. 141^a 32. 143^a
3. ^b 27. 33. 144^a 4. 145^a 8.
180^b 8. 27.
λατρικός 97^a 10.
λατρός 97^a 12. 102^a 21. 105^b 15.
112^b 13. 114^a 16. 127^b 20.
133^a 8. 137^a 17. 148^b 8. 164^b
24. 180^b 14. 18. 34.
ιδέαι (τοῦ Πλάτωνος) 96^b 17 sqq.

ιδιογνώμων 151^b 13 sq.

ιδιώτης opp. ἀθλητής 116^b 13.

opp. δυνάστης 121^a 18. 179^a 6.

ἴλιον 139^b 7.

ἵπικῃ, ἵπικὰ ὄργανα 94^a 11.

ἴσον μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως, τοῦ πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος 106^a 28 sq. 131^a 11 sqq. τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ τὸ κατὰ ποσόν 158^b 30 sqq. praeterea v. ἀναλογία.

ἰσχύειν 105^b 3. 116^b 15. 179^b 8. 24.

ἰσχυρίζεσθαι 124^b 23.

ἰσχυρογνώμων 151^b 5. 12.

ἰτητικός 116^b 26.

καθαριότης 176^a 1. 177^a 25.

καθόλου = Platonis idea boni 96^a 11. opp. καθ' ἕκαστα 110^b 32 sq. opp. κατὰ μέρος 147^a 2 sq. περὶ τὸ καθόλου αἱ ἐπιστήμαι 180^b 22 = τοῦ κοινοῦ 180^b 15. praeterea v. ἀρχή.

κακηγορεῖν 129^b 23. κακηγορία 131^a 9.

κακία v. ἀρετή. μοχθηρία.

κακολόγος 125^a 8.

τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου 106^b 29. ἐαντὸ ἀπόλλυσι 126^a 12.

κακοπαθεῖν 96^a 1. 176^b 29.

κακοποιεῖν 114^b 4(?). κακοποιός 125^a 19.

κακουργεῖν 114^a 6. κακουργία 165^b 12.

κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι 123^b 7.

καλοκαγαθία 124^a 4. 179^b 10.

τὸ καλὸν τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς 115^b 12 sq. 122^b 6 sq.

Καλυψώ 109^a 31.

κανονίζειν 105^a 3. κανών 113^a 33. 187^b 30 sq.

Καρκίνον ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκίων 150^b 10.

καρτερία, καρτερικός 145^a 36.

^b 15. 146^b 12. 147^b 22. 150^a

14—^b 28. 152^a 35. καρτερικῶς 179^b 33.

κατάνλισις 165^a 28.

κατακωχίμος 179^b 9.

καταπέλτης 111^a 11.

καταπλήξ 108^a 34.

κατασμικρίζειν 163^a 14.

καταφάναι 139^b 15. κατάφασις 139^a 21.

καταφεύγειν 105^b 13. 132^a 20.

176^b 12. 20. καταφυγή 155^a 11.

κατέχειν 126^a 16. 20. 149^a 14. 150^b 10.

κατηγορεῖσθαι 96^b 32. κατηγορία 96^a 29. 32.

κοτήκοος 102^b 31.

κατορθοῦν 98^b 28. 106^b 26. 31. 107^a 14. 142^b 30.

κατορθωτικός 104^b 33.

καχεξία 129^a 19 sqq.

Κέλτοί 115^b 28.

κερδαίνειν, κέρδος v. ζημία.

κέρδος καὶ τιμὴ 163^b 1 sqq.

Κερκίων v. Καρκίνος.

κεφαλή 141^a 20.

κιβδηλεῖν 165^b 12.

κιθαριστής 98^a 9 sq. 103^a 34. ^b 9.

κιθαρωδός 164^a 15.

κίμβικες 121^b 22.

κίσσηρις 111^a 13.

κίων 174^a 24.

κλεις 129^a 30.

κλέπτῃς 134^a 18 sqq.

κληρονομία 153^b 33.

κληρωτός 160^b 6.

κλοπή 107^a 11. 131^a 6.

κοῖλον 102^a 31.


κοινόν v. καθόλου. — κοινότης 165^a 30.

κοινωνία πολιτική 129^b 19. 160^a 9. 28 sq. cf. ^b 24 sqq. κοι-

νωνία ἀλλακτικαί 132^b 31.

οἰκονομικαί 160^b 24—161^a 8.

κοινωνικαὶ φιλῆαι 161^b 14.



κοινωνοὶ βίον 134^a 27.
 κόλαξ 108^a 29. 121^b 7. 125^a 1.
 127^a 8 sqq. 159^a 15. 173^b 32.
 κολάσεις 104^b 16. 109^b 35. 180^a 9.
 κοσμιότης 109^a 16.
 κόσμος decus 123^a 7. 124^a 1.
 mundus 112^a 22. 141^a 22.
 b 1. 173^a 33.
 κοῦφα κρέα 141^b 18 sqq.
 κονφίξεσθαι 171^a 29.
 κρηπίς 174^a 26.
 Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νο-
 μοθεῖται 102^a 10 sq.
 κρίνειν 94^b 28. 99^a 23. 109^b 8.
 111^b 6. 113^a 12. 30. 114^b 7.
 135^b 26. 136^b 32. 34. 137^a 3.
 4. 143^a 14. 15. 173^a 18. 174^b
 34. 175^a 31. 179^a 16. 19. 181^a
 20. b 2. 8. 10.
 κρίσις 109^b 23. 118^a 28. 119^b
 24. 126^b 4. 134^a 31. 136^b 33.
 143^a 20. 159^a 24.
 κριτής 95^a 1.
 κριτικός 143^a 10 sqq. 23. 30.
 κτήσις 121^a 26. 176^b 11. opp.
 χρήσις 98^b 32. 120^a 8 sq.
 κυβερνητική 104^a 9. 112^b 5.
 κυβευτής 122^a 7.
 κυκλωπικῶς 180^a 28.
 κυμνοπρίστης 121^b 27.
 κυριεύειν 160^b 35.
 κύριοι 129^b 16. τὰ κύρια πρά-
 ξεως καὶ ἀληθείας 139^a 18.
 cf. 145^a 6. τὸ κυριώτατον
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πόλις τὸ κυ-
 ριώτατον 168^b 30 sqq. prae-
 terea v. ἐπιστήμη.
 κυρτόν 102^a 31.
 κωλυτικός 96^b 12.
 κωμωδίαί αἱ παλαιαὶ καὶ αἱ
 καιναὶ 128^a 22 sqq. κωμω-
 δός 123^a 23.
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι 102^a 10 (cf. Κρη-
 τες). 112^a 29. 167^a 31. 180^a 25.

Λάκωνες 117^a 27. 124^b 16. 127^b
 28. 145^a 28.
 λαμπρύνεσθαι 122^a 34. 123^a 22.
 λειτουργία 163^a 29. 167^b 12.
 Λεσβία οἰκοδομή (οἰκοδομία K^b)
 137^b 30.
 λήθη 100^b 17. 135^b 31. 140^b 29.
 157^b 12.
 λήκνθος 123^a 14.
 λῆμμα 122^a 40.
 ληπτικός 120^b 15. 121^a 32.
 ληστής 122^a 7. 134^a 19. 164^b 33.
 λιθουργός 141^a 10.
 λογίζεσθαι = βουλευέσθαι 139^a
 12 sq. 140^a 30. 142^b 2. 15.
 175^b 18 sq.
 λογικός v. ἀρετή.
 λογισμός 111^a 34. 119^b 10. 141^b
 14. 142^b 19. 145^b 11. 146^a
 33. 149^b 35. 150^b 24. καὶ
 λόγος opp. ἔξις 117^a 21.
 λογιστικόν v. ψυχῆς μόρια.
 λόγος ὁ ὀρθός 103^b 32 sqq.
 114^b 29. 138^a 10. b 20. 25.
 29. 34. 144^a 23 — 145^a 11
 (= ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν).
 147^b 31. 151^a 12. 21. 22. λό-
 γος = ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος 95^a 10.
 107^a 1. 119^b 11. 15. 18. 138^b 22.
 144^b 29 sq. 145^b 14. 151^b 10.
 26. 35. 152^a 3. 169^a 5. cf. 102^b
 15. opp. προαίρεσις 152^a 13.
 λοιδορεῖν, λοιδορημα 128^a 30 sq.
 λύμη 176^a 21.
 λύπη v. ἡδονή. ὁμιλεῖν. σωμα-
 τικός.
 λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὗρεσις 146^b
 7 sq.
 λωποδύτης 122^a 7.

μαθηματικός 94^b 26. 102^b 33.
 131^b 13. 142^a 12. 17. τὰ
 μαθηματικά 142^a 28. 151^a 17.
 μαθηματικαὶ ζητήσεις 112^b
 22. ἡδοναί 173^b 17.

- μάθησις* 99^b 9 sqq.
μαθητόν 99^b 9. 139^b 26.
μακαρίζειν 100^a 3. 16. 33. 101^b 24 sq.
μακάριος 98^a 19. 100^b 34. 101^a 19. 113^b 15. 152^b 7. 157^b 21. 158^a 22. 169^b 17. 25. 170^a 2. 8. 27. ^b 14. 176^a 27. 177^b 23. 178^b 26. 179^a 2. *τὸ μακάριον* 99^b 2. 101^b 5. *μωκαρίως* 100^a 22.
μακαριότης 178^b 22.
μαλακία, μαλακός 116^a 14. 145^a 35. ^b 9. 147^b 23. 148^a 12. 150^a 14—^b 28. 152^a 35.
μαντεύεσθαι 95^b 26.
μάντις 127^b 20.
Μαργίτης 141^a 14.
μαστιγοῦσθαι 115^b 24.
μάταιος 94^a 21. 95^a 29. 96^b 20. 127^b 11. *ματαίως* 95^a 5.
μάχαι ἐν ταῖς φιλαίαις 162^b 9.
μάχιμος 116^b 14. 117^a 7.
μεγαλοκίνδυνος 124^b 8.
μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοπρεπής 107^b 16 sqq. 122^a 18—123^a 33.
μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλόψυχος 100^b 32. 107^b 21 sqq. 123^a 34—125^a 35.
Μεγαρεῖς 123^a 24.
μέθοδος 94^a 1. ^b 11. 98^a 29. 129^a 6. cf. *τέχνη*.
μεθύσκεσθαι, μεθύειν 110^b 26. 113^b 31. 32. 117^a 14. 151^a 4.
μελαγχολικός 150^b 25. 152^a 19. 28. 154^b 11.
μελέτη 151^b 32. *μελετᾶν* 114^a 8.
μέλι 137^a 14.
μελλητής 124^b 24.
μέλος 118^a 8. 123^a 22. 170^a 10. 175^a 14.
μέμψεις ἐν ταῖς φιλαίαις 162^b 5.
μεριστόν 102^a 30. 130^b 32. 174^b 11.
Μερόπη 111^a 12. cf. *Εὐριπίδης*.
μεσίδιος 132^a 23.
μεσότης ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ 106^a 26—107^a 7.
μετάδοσις 133^a 2.
μεταμέλῃσθαι, μεταμέλεια 110^b 19. 21 sq. 111^a 20. 166^b 24.
μεταμελητικός 150^a 21. ^b 30.
μεταρρεῖν 167^b 7.
μεταρροθμίζειν 179^b 16.
μεταφέρειν 119^b 8. 137^b 1. 167^a 10.
μεταφέρειν 119^b 3. 137^b 1. 167^a 10.
μεταφορά 115^a 15. 138^b 6. 149^a 23. ^b 32.
μέτρον ἑκάστου ἡ ἀρετὴ 176^a 17 sq. *ὁ σπονδαῖος* 113^a 32 sq.
μητρικὴ τιμὴ 165^a 27.
μητροκτονεῖν 110^a 29.
μιαιφόνος 177^b 10.
μικροκίνδυνος 124^b 7.
μικροπρέπεια, μικροπρεπής 107^b 19 sq. 122^a 30. ^b 8. 123^a 27 sqq.
μικροψυχία, μικρόψυχος 107^b 23. 123^b 9 sqq. 24 sq. 125^b 17 sqq.
Μιλήσιοι 151^a 8 sq.
Μίλων 106^b 3.
μίσθωσις 131^a 4.
μῖσος 105^b 22.
μνησίκακος 125^a 3.
μοῖρα 99^b 10.
μοιχεία 107^a 11. 131^a 6.
μοιχεύειν 107^a 14. 129^b 21. 130^a 24. 29. 132^a 3. 134^a 22.
μοιχός 117^a 1. 134^a 18. 22.
μολίβδινος κανών 137^b 30 sq.
μοναδικὸς ἀριθμὸς 131^a 30.
μοναρχία 160^b 1. 11. *μόναρχος* 115^a 32.
μονάς 174^b 12.
μονοῦμενον 96^b 17. 97^b 14. 172^b 28.
μονώτης 97^b 9. 99^b 4. 157^b 21. 169^b 16 sq. 170^a 5.
μουσικὴ 180^b 3. 181^a 19. *μου-*





σικός 105^a 20 sqq. 170^a 10.
173^b 30 sq. 175^a 13.
μοχθηρία = κακία, opp. ἀρετή
129^b 23 sq. 130^a 16 sq. ^b 24.
136^a 24. 145^b 1. 151^a 15. καὶ
ἀκρασία 148^b 2. 150^b 32 sqq.
μυρεψική 153^a 26.
μυστικά 111^a 10.
μωραίνειν 148^b 2.
ναυπηγική 94^a 8.
νεανική ἐπιθυμία 148^a 21.
νεαρός τὸ ἥθος 95^a 7.
νεμεσητικός, νέμεσις 108^b 1 sqq.
νέοι γεωμετρικοί, φρόνιμοι δ'
οὐ 142^a 12 sq.
Νεοπτόλεμος ν. Σοφοκλῆς.
Νιόβη 148^a 33.
νοεῖν 152^b 18. 155^a 16. 170^a
19. τὸ νοοῦν 166^a 22. νοοῦ-
μεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν 170^a 32.
νόησις 170^a 17.
νοητικά μόρια (τῆς ψυχῆς)
139^b 12.
νομή 117^a 1. 131^b 8.
νομική φιλία 162^b 21 sqq. δι-
καιον νομικόν 134^b 18 sqq.
136^b 34. νόμιμον 137^b 13.
cf. 162^b 21. νόμιμα πάντα
δίκαια πῶς 129^b 12 sqq.
νόμισμα 119^b 26. 133^a 20. 29 sqq.
^b 11. 16. 21. 164^a 1. 165^b 12.
178^b 15.
νομοθεσία 141^b 32. 181^b 14.
νομοθετεῖν 94^b 5. 109^b 34. 130^b
25. 134^b 23. 137^b 23. 180^a 6.
181^a 16.
νομοθέτης 101^b 11. 103^b 3 sq.
113^b 23. 128^a 30. 137^b 18.
21. 155^a 23. 160^a 13.
νομοθετική 129^b 13. 141^b 25.
νομοθετικός 180^a 33. ^b 24.
29. 181^b 1.
νόμος ὡν ἐαυτῷ 128^a 32. ἀναγ-
καστικήν ἔχει δύναμιν λόγος

ὡν 180^a 20 sq. καθόλου πᾶς,
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλλείπει 137^b
13 sqq. 26 sq. καὶ ψήφισμα
137^b 27 sqq. praeterea v.
ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. φύσις.
νοσηματώδεις ἔξεις 148^b 27.
149^a 6. 12. νοσηματώδης
ἀκρασία 149^a 19. νοσηματο-
δῶς 147^b 33.
νοσώδη ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων 152^b
22. 153^a 17.
νουθέτησις 102^b 34.
νοῦς 96^a 25. ^b 29. 97^b 2. 112^a
21. 33. 139^a 18. 169^a 17. =
cognitio principiorum 140^b
31 — 141^a 8. 141^a 19. ^b 3.
142^a 25 sqq. (opp. λόγος, ut
143^b 1). 143^a 27. ^b 7. τῶν
πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχά-
των 143^a 36 — ^b 11. ἐν ταῖς
πρακτικαῖς 143^b 2. ὁρεκτικός
139^b 4. καὶ διάνοια 139^a 33.
= νοῦς θεωρητικός vel po-
tius = τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν 177^a
13. 20 sq. ^b 19. 30. 178^a 22.
179^a 27. cf. ψυχῆς μόρια. =
νοῦς πρακτικός 144^b 9. 12.
150^a 5. 168^b 35. 169^a 18. 176^b
18. 180^a 22.
νῦν πάντες = Platonis disci-
puli 144^b 21.

ξενία 170^b 21.
ξενική φιλία 156^a 31. 161^b 16.
ξένων ὑποδοχαί 123^a 3.
Ξενοφάντος 150^b 12.

ὄγκος 178^a 1. ὀγκηρόν 127^b 24.
ὀδύρεσθαι 123^a 30.
Ὀδυσεύς 146^a 21. 151^b 20. v.
Σοφοκλῆς.
ὀδυεῖς 126^b 27. 160^a 6. 162^a
8. 32. 165^b 34. 169^b 13. 21.
οἰακίζειν 172^a 21.
οἰκέτης 136^b 31.

- οικήσεις ἀδέσποτοι 161^a 7.
οἰκία ἀναγκαιότερον πόλεως
162^a 18 sq.
οἰκοδομεῖν 103^a 33. ^b 11. οἰ-
κοδομή (οἰκοδομία K^b) 137^b
30. οἰκοδόμησις 152^b 14. οἰ-
κοδομική 97^a 20. 140^a 7. 174^a
20. οἰκοδόμος 103^a 33. ^b 10.
11. 133^a 7. 9. 23.
οἰκονομία 141^b 32. 142^a 9.
οἰκονομική 94^a 9. ^b 3. οἰκονο-
μικός 140^b 10. οἰκονομικὸν
δίκαιον 134^b 17. 138^b 8.
οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα 135^a 2.
οἰνοφλυγία 114^a 27.
οἰνωμένος 147^a 14. ^b 7. 12. 151^b
16. 154^b 10.
οἰκηρός 125^a 24.
ὀλιγαρχία 160^b 12 sqq.
ὀλιγαρχικός 131^a 28.
ὀλιγωρεῖν 124^a 10. ὀλιγωρία
149^a 32. ὀλιγώρως 121^b 1.
ὀλοκληρος 121^a 19. 126^a 12.
ὀλοφυρτικός 125^a 9.
Ὀλυμπίασι 99^a 3. τὰ Ὀλύμπια
147^b 35.
ὄμβρος 112^a 26. 155^b 3.
Ὅμηρος [μ 219 sq.: 109^a 31 sqq.
Γ 156 sqq.: 109^b 9.] 113^a 8.
X 100. Θ 148 sqq.: 116^a 21 sqq.
[B 391. 393: 116^a 33 sqq.]
Π 519 Α 11 Ξ 151 et O 232.
594 et ω 319 et alius ver-
sus: 116^b 27 sqq. [Γ 24: 118^a
22.] Ω 129(?): 118^b 11. [ρ
420: 122^a 28.] Z 236: 136^b
9 sq. Ω 258 sqq.: 145^a 20 sqq.
Ξ 214. 217: 149^b 15 sqq. [K
224: 155^a 15. ρ 218: 155^a 34.]
Α 544: 160^b 26. B 243. 772.
Δ 413: 161^a 14 sq. [ι 114 sq.:
108^a 28.] praeterea v. Μαρ-
γίτης.
ὀμιλεῖν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύ-
πην 127^a 18. 173^b 33 sq.
- ὀμίλια 126^b 11. 31. 127^b 34.
128^b 2. 156^a 29. 158^a 3. 172^a 11.
ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς 144^a 30. ὄμμα
ἔχειν ἐν τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ 143^b
13 sq. cf. ὁρᾶν et αἰσθάνε-
σθαι.
ομογενής 165^a 33.
ὁμογνωμονεῖν 166^a 13. 167^a 24.
27. 168^b 7.
ὁμοδοξία 167^a 23.
ὁμοήτης 157^a 11. 161^a 27. 162^a
12.
ὁμοιοπαθεῖν 95^b 22.
ὁμοίωμα 157^a 1. 160^b 22. 178^b 27.
ὁμολογία 127^a 33. 161^b 15. 162^b
27.
ὁμόλογος 115^a 31. ὁμολόγως
139^a 30.
ὁμονοεῖν, ὁμόνοια 155^a 24 sq.
167^a 22 — ^b 16.
ὁμοπαθής 161^a 26.
ὁμωνυμία, ὁμωνύμως 129^a 27.
30. ὁμωνυμος 96^b 27.
ὁνοματοποιεῖν 107^b 18.
ὀξύς, ὀξύτης 116^a 9. 126^a 17.
18. 150^b 25. 153^a 5.
ὀξυφωνία 125^a 15.
ὀπνίειν 148^b 32 sq.
ὄραμα 173^b 18. 174^b 27.
ὁρᾶν animo videre 113^a 33.
143^b 14. cf. 114^b 6 sq. et
ὄμμα. αἰσθάνεσθαι.
ὄρασις 174^a 14. ^b 12.
ὀργανικά μέρη 110^a 16. ὀργα-
νικῶς 99^b 28.
ὀργή πάθος 105^b 22 et v. πέ-
πτειν.
ὀργίλος, ὀργιλότης 103^b 19. 108^a
7 sq. 126^a 13 sqq.
ὀρεκτικός v. νοῦς et προαίρε-
σις. τὸ ὀρεκτικόν 102^b 30.
ὄρεξις 95^a 10. 107^b 29. 116^a 28.
119^b 7. 9. 138^b 11. 139^a 18.
22. 24. 30. ^b 4. 149^b 4. 159^b
20. 166^b 33. 175^b 30. βου-

- λευτική, διανοητική 113^a 11.
 139^a 23. ^b 5.
 ὀρθοδοξεῖν 151^a 19.
 ὀρθή 98^a 30. 140^b 15. ὀρθός
 λόγος v. λόγος.
 ὀρισμός 130^a 83. 159^a 3.
 ὀρμή 102^b 21. 116^b 30. 180^a 23.
 ὄρος finis 97^b 12. 149^a 1. de-
 finitio 138^b 23. 24. notio 153^b
 25. μέσος 142^b 34. ἔσχατος
 147^b 14. ὄροι ὧν οὐκ ἔστι
 λόγος 142^a 26. αἰνήτοι καὶ
 πρῶτοι 143^b 2. membrum
 proportionis 131^b 5. 9. 16.
 ὅσιον 96^a 16.
 ὁσμή 118^a 9 sqq.
 ὁσφρησις 173^b 18. 176^a 1.
 τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ διότι 95^b 6 sqq.
 98^b 1 sqq.
 οὐσία 96^a 21. 107^a 6. 119^a 18.
 120^a 1. ^b 9. 12. 24. 121^a 18.
 165^b 20.
 ὀφείλημα 162^b 28. 165^a 3.
 ὀφθαλμιαῖν 173^b 25.
 ὀποποιητική 153^a 26.
 ὀποφάγος τις (Φιλόξενος) 118^a
 32.
 πάγκρατος 99^b 5.
 παθητικός 105^b 24. 175^a 2.
 πάθος damnum 132^a 9. 13.
 πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς 105^b 19 sqq.
 cf. δύναμις et ἔξις. τὰ ἡθη
 καὶ τὰ πάθη 155^b 10. μεσό-
 τητες ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τοῖς
 περὶ τὰ πάθη 108^a 30 sqq.
 πάθει, κατὰ πάθος ζῆν 95^a
 8. 156^a 32. 179^b 13. 27 sq.
 παιδαγωγός 119^b 14.
 παιδεύειν 162^a 7. 13. 172^a 20.
 180^b 2. ὁ πεπαιδευμένος 94^b
 23. 95^a 1 sq. 128^a 21.
 παιδεία ἢ ὀρθή 104^b 13. cf.
 172^a 20 sqq. 179^b 24 sqq. ἢ
 πρὸς τὸ κοινόν 130^b 26 sqq.
 παιδιά 127^b 35. 128^a 14. 19.
^b 4. 8. 150^b 17. 176^b 9. 27 sqq.
 παιδικαὶ ἀμαρτίαι 119^a 34. φι-
 λία 165^b 26. παιδικὸν δῶ-
 ρον 123^a 15.
 παιδιᾶδης 150^b 16. 18.
 παίξειν 128^a 10. 176^b 30. 33.
 παῖς οὐκ εὐδαίμων 100^a 1 sq.
 μαθηματικός γίνονται ἂν ἄλλ'
 οὐ σοφὸς ἢ φυσικός 142^a 17 sq.
 παμφάγος 149^b 34.
 παναίσχητος 99^b 4.
 πανουργία, πανουργος 144^a
 27 sq.
 παραβάλλειν εἰς ἡδονήν 153^b 34.
 παραγγελία 104^a 7. cf. τέχνη.
 παρακαταθήκη 131^a 4. 135^b 4.
 178^b 11.
 παράκλησις 103^a 1.
 παρακούμεν 149^a 26.
 παραμυθητικός 171^b 2.
 παράνομος 101^a 32. 129^a 32.
^b 11. 130^b 8. 10. 11.
 παρασεῖν 123^b 31.
 παραφνός 96^a 21.
 παρεκβάσεις πολιτειῶν 160^a
 31 sqq. 161^a 30 sqq.
 παρεκκλίνειν 103^a 18.
 πάρεργον 98^a 32.
 πάροδος 123^a 23.
 παροιμία 146^a 34. 156^b 26. 159^b
 31. 168^b 6.
 παροιμιάζεσθαι 129^b 29.
 παρηρησία 165^a 29.
 παρηρησιαστής 124^b 29.
 πατρική ἀρχή 160^b 26. πρόσ-
 ταῖς 180^a 19. τιμή 165^a 26.
 φιλία 161^a 15. ^b 17. πατρι-
 κὸν δίκαιον 134^b 9.
 παχυλῶς 94^b 20.
 παιδαρχεῖν 102^b 26. 169^a 18.
 179^b 11. 180^a 5. 11.
 παιδαρχικός 94^b 31.
 πέπτειν τὴν ὀργήν 126^a 24 sq.
 περίαπτος 99^a 16.

- περιγράφειν, περιγραφή 98^a
 21. 23.
 περιέργος 170^b 27.
 Περικλῆς 140^b 8.
 περιῶλος 124^a 16.
 περιμάχητα v. ἀγαθά.
 περιφέρεια 102^a 31.
 περιχαρής 124^a 15.
 Πέρσαι 134^b 26. 160^b 27. ἡ
 Περσική τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς
 νειῖς κοινωνία 160^b 31.
 πεπρωμένος πρὸς ἀρετήν 99^b
 19.
 πήρωσις 114^a 25. 131^a 8. 145^a
 31. 148^b 17. 149^b 29.
 πιθανολογεῖν 94^b 26.
 πιθανότης 97^a 3.
 πικρός 113^a 28. 153^a 5. 173^b 24.
 οἱ πικροί 126^a 19.
 πιπίσκειν 111^a 14.
 Πιττακός [113^b 31 sq.] 167^a 32.
 πλάνη 94^b 16. 155^a 21.
 Πλάτων 95^a [27—29]. 32. [96^a
 11—97^a 13.] 104^b 12. [145^a
 29. ^b 23 sqq.] 172^b 28 sqq.
 πλεονεκτεῖν 130^a 17. 20. 136^b
 21. 137^a 1.
 πλεονέκτης 128^b 32. 129^b 1. 9.
 130^a 26. 168^b 19.
 πλεονεξία 129^b 9. 167^b 10.
 πλευρά 112^a 23.
 πλευρεῖτις 138^b 2.
 πλωτῆρες 160^a 15.
 πόθος 105^b 23.
 ποιήσις καὶ πρᾶξις, ποιητὸν
 καὶ πρᾶκτον ἕτερον 140^a 2 sqq.
^b 3 sqq. 6 sq. cf. 94^a 3 sqq. 139^b
 1 sqq. praeterea v. θεωρία.
 ποιηταὶ ὑπεραγαπᾶσι τὰ οἰκεῖα
 ποιήματα 168^a 1 sqq.
 ποιητική 139^b 1 et v. διάνοια.
 ἔξις.
 ποικίλος 101^a 8.
 ποιότης 173^a 13 sqq.
 πολεμικός 94^a 12. 101^a 4. 115^a
 20. 116^b 6. 119^b 24. 164^b 24.
 177^b 7. 8. 17.
 πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον 168^b 31.
 μέγεθος πόλεως 170^b 31 sq.
 πολιτεία ἀγαθὴ καὶ φανύλη 103^b
 6. ἀρίστη 181^b 21 sq. μία
 πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀρίστη
 135^a 5. πολιτεῖαι καὶ παρ-
 εκβάσεις 160^a 31 sqq. οἱ κοι-
 νωνοῦντες τῆς πολιτείας 130^b
 32. πολιτειῶν συναγωγὰς 181^b
 7. 18. = τιμοκρατία 160^a 34.
 πολιτικός 102^a 8. 18. 23. 112^b
 14. 140^b 11. 142^a 2. 177^b 6 sqq.
 180^b 30. 181^a 11. πολιτικὴ
 94^a 27 sqq. 95^a 2. 15. 99^b
 29. 102^a 12. 21. 105^a 12. 130^b
 28. 141^a 21. ^b 22 sqq. 145^a
 10. 152^b 1. 177^b 15. 180^b 31.
 181^a 11. κοινωνία 129^b 19.
 160^a 9. 11. 21. συνήθεια
 181^a 10 sq. φιλία 161^a 10 sqq.
^b 13. 163^b 33 sq. 167^b 2. 171^a
 17 sqq. τὰ πολιτικά 95^b 5.
 180^b 35. = οἱ πολῖται 116^b
 18. ἢ τὰ πολεμικά 177^b 6 sq.
 πολιτικαὶ ἢ πολεμικαὶ πρά-
 ξεις 177^b 16 sq. ἀνθρωπος
 φύσει πολιτικὸν 97^b 11. 169^b
 18. πολιτικὸν δίκαιον v. δί-
 καιον.
 πολιτεύεσθαι 112^a 29. 141^b 28.
 177^b 13. 181^a 1. ^b 20.
 Πολύκλειτος 141^a 11.
 πολύκοινος 99^b 18.
 πολυπράγμων 142^a 2.
 πολυφιλία, πολύφιλος 155^a 30.
 170^b 23. 171^a 9. 15.
 Πόντος 148^b 22.
 πορνοβόσκος 121^b 33.
 πορφύρα 123^a 23.
 Πονλυδάμας 116^a 23.
 πραγματεία 103^b 26. 105^a 6. 11.
 πραγματεύεσθαι 101^b 22. 122^a
 9. 176^b 29.

πρακτικὴ ζωὴ 98^a 3. οἱ πρα-
κτικοί 95^b 22.
 πρᾶος, πρᾶότης 103^a 8. ^b 19.
 108^a 4 sqq. 109^b 17 sq. 125^b
 26—126^b 9. 129^b 22.
 πρεσβύτης 156^a 24. 158^a 5.
 πρεσβυτικός 158^a 2.
 Πρίαμος 100^a 8. 145^a 21. Πρια-
 μικάι τύχαι 101^a 8.
 προαγωγή 131^a 7.
 προαίρεσις τί ἐστὶ 111^b 4—
 112^a 17. πῶς γίνεται ὁρθή
 144^a 19 sqq. 145^a 4 sq. πρᾶ-
 ξις καὶ π. 94^a 1. γνῶσις καὶ
 π. 95^a 14.
 προαιρετικός 137^b 35. προαι-
 ρετικὴ ἔξις 106^b 36. 139^a 22 sq.
 προαιρετός 112^a 15. 113^a 3. 10.
^b 4. 139^b 6.
 προαισθάνεσθαι 150^b 23.
 προβουλεύειν 112^a 15. 135^b 10.
 20.
 προγαγαλίζειν 150^b 22.
 προγιγνώσκειν 139^b 26.
 πρόγονοι 122^b 31. 161^a 18. 19.
 προεγείρειν 150^b 23.
 πρόστις καὶ λήψις 107^b 12 sq.
 προετικός 120^b 15. προετικῶς
 122^b 8.
 προέχειν 95^b 18. 164^b 9. 177^b 17.
 προῖεσθαι 114^a 17. 119^b 18. 164^a
 23. 35. 169^a 20. 26. 30. 33.
 προνοητικὴ δύναμις 141^a 28.
 προπέτεια, προπετής 116^a 7.
 150^b 19. 26. cf. ἀκρασία.
 προπηλακίζεισθαι 126^a 7.
 προπηλακισμός 131^a 9.
 προσαντης 96^a 12.
 πρόσθεσις 115^a 1. 148^a 10. 149^a
 17.
 πρόσκαιος 166^b 35. προσπαίως
 167^a 2.
 προσποιεῖσθαι 127^b 9. 18. 26(?).
 159^a 15. 165^b 5. 178^a 31.
 προσποίημα 127^a 20.

προσποιήσις 108^a 21. 165^b 10.
 προσποιητικός 115^b 30. 127^a 21.
 πρόσταγμα 119^b 13.
 πρόσταξις 149^a 28. 180^a 19.
 πρόσφορος 180^b 12.
 πρότασις 147^a 1. ἑτέρα 143^b 3.
 τελευταία 147^b 9.
 τὸ προτερον καὶ ὕστερον 96^a
 18 sqq.
 προὑπαρχή 165^a 5.
 Πρωταγόρας 164^a 24.
 πτῆσις 174^a 31.
 Πνθαγόρειοι 96^b 5. 106^b 30.
 132^b 22.
 πυκτικός 180^b 10.
 πυρέττειν 180^b 9.

ῥάβδωσις 174^a 24.
 ῥαδάμανθους 132^b 25.
 ῥητορικὴ 94^b 3. 181^a 15. ῥήτο-
 ρικός 94^b 27. ῥήτωρ 112^b 13.
 ῥίζα 161^b 32.
 ῥυπαίνειν 99^b 2.

σαθρῶς 100^b 7.
 Σαρδαναπαλλος 95^b 22.
 Σάτυρος 148^a 34.
 σεῖος 145^a 29.
 σεμνύνεσθαι 124^b 21.
 Σικυνῶνιοι 117^a 27.
 Σιμωνίδης [100^b 21 sq.]. 121^a 7.
 σιναμορία 149^b 33.
 σιτηρὰ μέτρα 135^a 2.
 σκέψις ἄλλη 99^b 14. ἡ σκέψις
 αὕτη 102^a 12.
 σκληρός 128^a 9.
 σκῦθαι 112^a 28. 150^b 14.
 σκῶμμα 128^a 30. σκώπτειν 128^a
 7. 14. 25. 31.
 Σόλων 100^a 11 sqq. 179^a 9.
 σοφία 98^b 24. 103^a 5. 141^a 2 sqq.
 9—^b 8. 143^b 15 sqq. 33—
 144^a 6. 145^a 7. 177^a 24 sqq.
 σοφός 95^a 21. 103^a 9. 137^a 10.
 141^a 10 sqq. 142^a 17. 159^a 2.

- 165^a 26. 179^a 17. 30. = σο-
 φιστής 127^b 20.
 σοφισταί 164^a 31. 180^b 35 sq.
 181^a 12 sqq.
 Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος καὶ
 Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ
 146^a 19 sqq. 151^b 18 sqq.
 Σπένσιππος 96^b 7. 153^b 5.
 σπενστικός 125^a 14.
 σπουδαστὸν καὶ φευκτόν 163^b
 25.
 στασιάζειν 166^b 19. 167^a 34. ^b 14.
 στάσιμος λέξις 125^a 14.
 στιγμή 174^b 12.
 στοχαστικός 106^b 15. 28. 109^a
 22. 141^b 13.
 στρατηγική 94^a 9. 12. ^b 3. 96^a
 32. 97^a 17. στρατηγικός 97^a 10.
 στρατηγός 101^a 3. 164^b 24. 165^a
 26.
 στρατιώτης 116^b 6. 117^a 15. ^b 17.
 στρυφνός 157^b 14. 158^a 2. 6.
 συγγενική φίλια 161^b 12. 16 sqq.
 συγγνώμη 109^b 32. 110^a 24.
 111^a 2. 143^a 22 sq. 146^a 2 sq.
 149^b 4.
 συγγνωμονικός 126^a 3. 136^a 5
 sqq. 143^a 21. 150^b 8.
 συγγνώμων 143^a 31(?).
 συγκυμνάζεσθαι, συγκυβεύειν,
 συγκυνηγεῖν 172^a 4.
 συγκαίρειν 166^a 8. ^b 18. 171^a 6.
 σύζευξις 103^b 9. 133^a 6.
 συζῆν 126^b 11. 127^a 18. 156^a
 27. ^b 5. 157^b 7. 18. 19. 158^a
 23. 169^b 17. 170^a 12. ^b 11.
 171^a 2. 3. 10. ^b 32. 172^a 6.
 8(?). 178^b 5.
 συλλογίζεσθαι 101^a 34. 149^a 33.
 συλλογισμός 139^b 26—31. 142^b
 23. 146^a 24. συλλογισμοὶ τῶν
 πρακτῶν 144^a 31 sqq. cf. 146^b
 35 sqq.
 συλλυπεῖν 171^b 8.
 σύμβιος 171^a 23.
- συμβιοῦν 126^a 31. 162^a 29. 165^b
 30.
 συμβόλαιον 164^b 13.
 σύμβουλος 112^b 10.
 συμβαχία 157^a 27.
 συμεταβάλλειν 100^a 28.
 συμετρία 133^b 18. 173^a 26.
 συμπεραίνεσθαι 94^b 22. τὸ συμ-
 περανθῆν 146^a 26. 147^a 27.
 συμπέρασμα 98^b 9. 139^b 34.
 συμπίνειν 172^a 3.
 συμπλοὶ καὶ φίλαι, σύμπλοι
 159^b 28. 161^b 13.
 συμπορεύεσθαι 160^a 9.
 συμπράττειν 167^a 1. 9.
 συμφιλοσοφεῖν 172^a 5.
 συμφοιτητής 162^a 33.
 συμφνῆναι 147^a 22.
 συναγειν 181^a 16. ^b 18.
 συναγωγή v. πολιτεία.
 συναδεῖν 98^b 11. 179^a 21. 181^a 21.
 συναισθάνεσθαι 170^b 4. 10.
 συναίτιος 114^b 23.
 συνακολουθεῖν 100^b 4.
 συναλγεῖν 166^a 7. 27. ^b 18. 171^a
 7. 30. 32. ^b 11.
 συναλλάγματα 103^b 14. 131^a 1.
^b 25. 33. 135^b 29. 178^a 12.
 ἐκούσια καὶ ἀκούσια 131^a
 1 sqq.
 συναλλάττειν 162^b 24. 30. 33.
 συνανάλσκειν 156^b 27.
 συνάπτειν 156^b 18. 157^a 34.
 συναριθμεῖσθαι 97^b 16 sqq.
 105^b 1.
 συναχθεσθαι 171^a 8.
 σύνδεσμος 162^a 27.
 συνδιαγειν 157^b 22. 162^b 14.
 166^a 7. 23.
 συνδιημερεύειν(?) 162^b 16. 166^b
 14.
 σύνδουλος 148^b 26.
 συνδυνάζειν 121^a 16. 131^b 8.
 157^a 35.
 συνδυαστικός 162^a 17.

συνεργεῖν 116^b 31. 171^b 23.
 συνεργός 98^a 24. 99^b 28. 177^a 34.
 σύνεσις, συνετός 103^a 5. 8. 143^a
 26. ^b 7. 161^b 26. 181^a 18.
 σύνεσις καὶ εὐσύνεσία 142^b
 34—143^a 18.
 συνεχής 100^b 16. 106^a 26. 131^a
 33. ^b 15. 150^b 34. 170^a 7.
 177^a 21.
 συνηδεδεσθαι 166^a 27. 171^a 8.
 συνηδύνειν 126^b 30. 32. 127^a
 3. 8.
 συνημερεῖν 156^b 4. 157^b 15.
 20. 158^a 9. 169^b 21. 171^a 5.
 172^a 5 et fort. 162^b 16. 166^b 14.
 συνθέλειν 167^a 1.
 συνθήκη 133^a 29. 134^b 32. 35.
 161^b 7.
 σύνθηρος 171^b 9.
 συνιέναι 143^a 13. 18. 179^b 27.
 181^a 20.
 συνοικεῖν 162^a 21.
 συνοικειοῦν 161^b 21. 162^a 2.
 172^a 20. 175^a 29. 178^a 15.
 συνορᾶν 116^b 7.
 συντρέφειν 105^a 2.
 σύντροφος 161^b 34. 162^a 13.
 συνωδός 98^b 30. 172^b 5.
 συνώνυμος 130^a 33.
 σύρμα 176^a 7.
 συστένειν 171^b 10.
 συστοιχία τῶν ἀγαθῶν 96^b 6.
 συστρατιῶται 159^b 28. 160^a 16.
 σφαῖρα 123^a 14.
 σφαιροῦν 111^a 12.
 σφάλλεσθαι 144^b 11.
 σφάττειν ἑαυτόν 138^a 9 sq.
 σφοδρός 119^b 10. 154^a 29. ^b 2.
 13. σφοδρῶς 105^b 27.
 σφοδρότης 150^b 27.
 σχῆμα 118^a 4. 133^b 1. 137^b 31.
 160^b 25.
 σχολάζειν 160^a 27. 177^b 5.
 σχολαίως 171^b 24.
 σχολαστικός 177^b 22.

σχολή 177^b 4 sq.
 Σωκράτης 116^b 4. 127^b 25. 144^b
 18. 28. 145^b 24. 25. 147^b 15.
 σωματικάι ἀπολαύσεις 148^a 5.
 ἡδοναί 104^b 5 sq. 117^b 28.
 118^a 1. 149^b 26. 151^a 12 sq.
^b 35. 153^b 33 sq. 154^a 8. 10.
 26. 29. 168^b 17. λῦπαι 150^a
 24. σωματικά ἀγαθὰ 154^a 15.
 ἔργα 101^b 33. ἡδέα 152^a 5.
 πάθη 173^b 9. ποιοῦντα ἡδο-
 νήν 147^b 23 sqq.
 σωφρονεῖν 172^b 25.
 σωφρονικός 144^b 5.
 σωφροσύνη, σώφρων 102^b 27.
 103^a 5 sqq. ^b 19. 104^a 19 sqq.
 33 sqq. ^b 5 sqq. 105^b 7 sqq.
 107^b 5 sqq. 108^b 20. 109^a
 3 sqq. 117^b 23—119^b 18. 129^b
 21 sq. 145^b 14. 147^b 28. 148^a
 6. 14. ^b 12. 149^a 22. 30 sqq.
 150^a 11. 23. 151^a 19. ^b 31. 34.
 152^a 1. ^b 15. 153^a 27. 34 sq.
 168^b 26. 172^b 16. 177^a 31. 178^a
 33. ^b 15. modestus 123^b 5.
 125^b 13. — σωφρόνως 105^a
 30. 179^a 12. ^b 33.

τάξει opp. φύσει 135^a 10.
 ταπεινός 124^b 22. 125^a 1.
 τε γάρ etenim 161^a 18. 163^a
 29. 177^a 21.
 τεκνοποιία 162^a 19. 21.
 τέλειος v. ἀρετή. βίος.
 τελειοῦν (τελειοῦν) 103^a 25. 154^b
 1. 174^a 15. 18. ^b 23. 31. 175^a
 15. 21. 23. 28. 30. 176^a 27.
 181^b 16.
 τελέωσις 153^a 12.
 τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου 95^b
 23 sqq. ἐπιγιγνόμενον 174^b
 33. τελῶν διαφορά 94^a 3 sqq.
 97^a 25 sqq.
 τέρεπιν 128^a 27. 162^b 15. 175^a
 6. 176^a 11.

- τέρεψις 164^a 19.
 τετράγωνος 100^b 21.
 τευτικὸς 142^b 22.
 τεχνάζειν 140^a 11.
 τέχνη τί ἐστι 140^a 1—23. καὶ
 τύχη 100^a 20—24. 105^a 21 sqq.
 140^a 18. καὶ πρᾶξις 94^a 1. 7.
 97^a 16. καὶ ἀρετὴ 103^a 29 sq.
^b 6 sqq. 105^a 9. 18 sqq. 26 sqq.
 106^b 14 sqq. ἀρετὴ τέχνης
 140^b 22. 141^a 12. πᾶν ἀγα-
 θὸν τέχνης ἔργον 152^b 19.
 οὐδεμιᾶς ἐνεργείας τέχνη
 ἄλλὰ τῆς θυνάμεως 153^a 25.
 synonym. ἐπιστημῇ, μέθοδος,
 παραγγελία 94^a 1. 7. 104^a 7.
 opp. φύσις 99^b 23. 103^a 32.
 106^b 14 sq. 175^a 24.
 τεχνικός καὶ θεωρητικός 180^b
 20 sq.
 τεχνίτης 97^a 7. ^b 26. 101^a 6.
 106^b 13. 161^a 34. 167^b 34.
 τητᾶσθαι 99^b 2.
 τὸ τί καὶ τὸ πρὸς τι 96^a 20 sq.
 24. τί ἦν εἶναι 107^a 6.
 τίσις 148^b 28.
 τιμὴ μέγιστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγα-
 θῶν 123^b 20 sq. καὶ κέρδος
 v. κέρδος. καὶ γέρας 134^b 7.
 πατρικὴ καὶ μητρικὴ 165^a
 26 sq.
 τίμημα 160^a 33. ^b 19.
 τίμιον opp. ἐπαινετόν 101^b 10
 sqq. cf. 122^b 19.
 τιμιότης 178^a 1.
 τιμοκρατικὴ πολιτεία, τιμοκρα-
 τία 160^a 33 sqq. ^b 16 sqq.
 161^a 28. κοινωνία 161^a 3 sqq.
 τιμωρητικός 126^a 2.
 τιμωρία 126^a 22. 28. 137^a 1.
 149^a 31.
 τοῖχος, τοιχορυχεῖν 138^a 25 sq.
 τοκιστής 121^b 34.
 τραγηματίζειν 175^b 12.
 τραγηδία 101^a 33.
 τρίγλυφος 174^a 26.
 τρίγωνον 140^b 14. 142^a 29.
 τριηραρχεῖν 122^b 23. τριήραρ-
 χος 122^a 25.
 τροπή 112^a 25.
 τροφή syn. παιδεία 180^a 1. 26.
 τροχίζεσθαι 153^b 19.
 τρυφᾶν, τρυφή 145^a 35. 150^b
 2 sq.
 Τρῶες 116^a 25.
 Τυδείδης 116^a 26.
 τύπω 94^a 25. ^b 20. 101^a 27.
 104^a 1. 107^b 14. 113^a 13. 114^b
 27. 117^b 22. 176^b 31. ἐν τύπῳ
 129^a 11.
 τυραννικὴ κοινωνία 160^b 28 sqq.
 τυραννίς 160^b 1 sqq. 161^a 32. ^b 9.
 τύραννος 110^a 5. 120^b 25. 122^a
 5. 134^b 1. 8. 160^b 2 sqq. 176^b
 13.
 τύχη v. Πρίαμος. τέχνη. φύσις.
 ἀπὸ τύχης 105^a 23.
 ὑβρίζειν 129^b 22. 149^b 20. 21.
 ὑβριστής 124^a 29.
 ὕλη 116^b 33. ὕλη ὑποκειμένη
 94^b 12. 98^a 27 sq. 104^a 3.
 τῶν πρακτῶν 137^b 19.
 ὑπάλλαγμα 133^a 29.
 ὑπανάστασις 165^a 28.
 ὑπεραποδνήσειν 169^a 20. 25.
 ὑπερόπτης 124^a 20. 29.
 ὑπήκοος 102^a 10.
 ὑψηροσία 158^a 17.
 ὑψηρετεῖν 124^b 18. 159^b 5. 164^b
 25.
 ὕπνος 102^b 4. 6. 8.
 ὑπόγυις 115^a 34.
 ὑποδοχαὶ ξένων 123^a 3.
 ὑποζύγις 180^a 12.
 ὑπόθεσις 128^b 29 sq. 133^b 21.
 151^a 17.
 ὑποκρίνεσθαι 147^a 23.
 ὑπόκρισις 118^a 8.
 ὑποκριτής 111^b 24. 148^b 8.

ὑπολαμβάνειν 95^a 19. ^b 31. 96^a
8. 97^b 5. 100^b 2. 135^b 13.
145^b 2. 22. 26. 146^a 28. 147^a
23. 148^b 11. 155^b 35. 165^b 8.
166^a 11. ^b 4. 178^b 9. 18. 179^a
14. 22.

ὑπόληψις 139^b 17 (cf. δόξα).
140^b 13. 31. 142^b 33. 145^b 36.
146^b 28. 147^b 4.

ὑπόλοιπος(?) 152^b 35.

ὑπόνοια 128^a 24.

ὑποτυποῦν 98^a 21.

ὑπουργία 164^a 34.

ὑποφαίνεσθαι 96^b 9.

ὑψηγμένους τρόπος 108^a 3 sq.

Φάλαρις 148^b 24. 149^a 13.

φανερόμιστος, φανερόφιλος 124^b
26 sq.

φαντασία 114^a 32 sqq. 147^b 5.
149^a 32. 150^b 28.

φάντασμα 102^b 10.

φαρμακεία 131^a 6.

φαρμακεύειν 137^a 25.

φάρυγξ γεράνου 118^a 32 sq.

φάσις 142^b 13 sq. (cf. διάνοια,
δόξα, ζήτησις). φάσεις ἀν-
απόδεικτοι 143^b 12.

φανλότης 107^a 10. 150^a 5. 175^b
25. = παρέκβασις 160^b 10.

Φειδίας 141^a 10.

φειδωλός 121^b 22.

φεύγειν v. αἰρεῖσθαι. λαβεῖν
ἢ φυγεῖν 112^a 5.

φρευκτός 111^a 34. 119^a 23. 145^a
16. 148^b 5. 153^b 2. 3. 172^b
19. 173^a 10. 175^b 25. cf. σπου-
δαστόν.

φθαρκτικός 140^b 19.

φθίσις 150^b 33.

φθονερός 108^b 4.

φθόνος 105^b 22. 107^a 10. 108^b
1 sqq. 115^a 20.

φιλαλήθης 127^b 4.

φιλόανθρωπος 155^a 20.

φιλάρετος 99^a 11.

φίλανλος 175^b 3.

φιλαντία, φίλαντος 168^a 28—
169^b 2. v. φίλία.

φιληδής 157^a 33.

φιλήσις 155^b 27 sq. 156^a 6. 157^b
28 sqq. 158^b 29. 166^b 32 sqq.
167^b 30. 168^a 19.

φιλητικός 117^b 30.

φιλητός 156^b 29. 159^b 18. τὰ
φιλητά 155^b 17 sqq. 157^b 26.
165^b 14. 166^b 17. 168^a 6. 15.
176^a 12.

φιλία πάθος 105^b 22. μεσότης
ἀρεσκείας καὶ δυσκολίας 126^b
10—127^a 12. περὶ φιλίας

155^a 3—172^a 15. διότι περὶ
φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν

155^a 3—31. ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ'
ἀρετῆς 155^a 3 sq. διαμφισβη-

τούμενα περὶ αὐτῆς 155^a 32
—^b 16. πότερον τῶν ὁμοίων

ἢ τῶν ἀνομοίων 155^a 32—
^b 9. cf. 156^b 20 sq. 34 sqq.

157^b 2 sq. 36. 158^b 1 sqq.
28. 159^b 1 sqq. 17 sqq. 165^b

17. τί ἐστι 155^b 27—156^a 5.
τρία τῆς ἐν ἰσότητι (158^b 1

—11) φιλίας εἶδη 155^b 17—
156^a 10, διὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον,

τὸ ἡδύ 156^a 10—^b 6, τὸ ἀγα-
θόν 156^b 7—32, ὃν ἡ τῶν

ἀγαθῶν τελεία φιλία, αἱ δὲ
λοιπαὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα μό-

νον 156^b 7—24. 33—157^b 5.
25—158^a 36. ἐνέργεια τῆς

φιλίας ἐν τῷ συζῆν 157^b 5—
24. cf. 165^b 30. 171^b 29 sqq.

αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαι 158^b
11—28. τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τού-


των ἔστι τρία εἶδη (cf. 162^a
7 sqq. 34 sqq.), καὶ ὥσπερ


τὰ δίκαια οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ
κατ' ἀξίαν ἢ κατ' ἀναλο-

γίαν ἴσον ἔχουσι 158^b 29—

159^b 23, καὶ ὥσπερ τὰ δι-
 καια πασας κοινωνίας συν-
 έχουσι, μάλιστα δὲ τὴν πο-
 λιτικὴν 159^b 25 — 160^a 30.
 αἱ πολιτικαὶ φιλίαι διαφέ-
 ρουσι κατὰ τὰ τῆς πολιτείας
 εἶδη 160^a 31 — 161^b 10. φι-
 λία βασιλικὴ καὶ πατρικὴ,
 ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ γαμικὴ,
 τιμοκρατικὴ καὶ ἀδελφικὴ,
 τυραννικὴ καὶ δεσποτικὴ 161^a
 10 — ^b 10. cf. 160^b 22 sqq.
 ἄλλα τρεῖς φιλιῶν εἶδη, φι-
 λίαί κοινωνικαί, συγγενικαί,
 ἑταιρικαί 161^b 11 — 16. εἶδη
 τῆς συγγενικῆς 161^b 16 —
 162^a 33. φιλία ἑταιρική 157^b
 22 — 24. 161^a 25. ^b 12. 35.
 162^a 10. 32. 171^a 14 sqq.,
 ξενική 156^a 31. 161^b 16. φι-
 λίαί πολιτικαί, φυλετικαί,
 συμποιοικαί, συστρατιωτῶν
 159^b 26 sqq. 161^a 10 sqq.
^b 13. 163^b 33 sq. 167^b 2. 171^a
 17 sqq. φιλία ἀνθρώπων πρὸς
 θεοὺς 162^a 5. τὰ ἐγκλήματα
 τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἐν ἰσότητι 162^a
 34 — 163^a 23, καθ' ὑπεροχὴν
 163^a 24 — ^b 27, ἀνομοιοειδέσι
 φιλίαις 163^b 28 — 164^b 21.
 εἶδη τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον
 φιλίας, ἡ ἡθικὴ καὶ ἡ νο-
 μικὴ (ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς) 162^b 21 —
 32. τί ἐνάστω τῶν φίλων δεῖ
 ἀπονέμειν, καὶ τίνι αὐτῶν
 μάλιστα ὑπηρετητέον 164^b
 22 — 165^a 35. πότε καὶ πῶς
 δεῖ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας
 165^a 36 — ^b 36. φιλία καὶ
 φιλαυτία 159^a 5 — 12. 166^a
 1 — ^b 29. 168^a 28 — 169^b 2.
 ὁ φίλος ἄλλος (ἕτερος) αὐτός
 166^a 31 sq. 169^b 6 sq. 170^b
 6 sq. εὐνοια πῶς διαφέρει
 τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς φιλησεως

155^b 32 — 156^a 5. 158^a 7 sqq.
 166^b 30 — 167^a 21. ὁμόνοια
 καὶ φιλία 155^a 24 sq. 167^a
 22 — ^b 16. διὰ τί οἱ εὐεργέ-
 ται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας μάλ-
 λον φιλοῦσιν ἢ οὗτοι ἐκεί-
 νους 167^b 17 — 168^a 27. ὁ
 εὐδαίμων δεῖται φίλων 169^b
 3 — 170^b 19. φίλοι τὸ μέγι-
 στον τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν 169^b
 10 (cf. tamen ἀρετὴ et τιμὴ).
 πόσους φίλους ποιητέον 170^b
 20 — 171^a 20. πότερον ἐν εὐ-
 τυχαῖς μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ
 ἐν δυστυχίαις 169^b 13 — 16.
 171^a 21 — ^b 28. αἰρετώτατον
 φίλοις τὸ συζῆν 171^b 29 —
 172^a 14. cf. 156^a 27 sq. ^b 4 sq.
 157^b 6 — 24. 158^a 22. φυσικὴ
 φιλία 163^b 24. παιδικαὶ φι-
 λίαί 165^b 26. ἅπας ἀνθρώ-
 πος ἀνθρώπῳ φίλον 155^a
 21 sq. praeterea v. ἐγκλημα-
 τικὴ. εὐδιάλυτος. μάχαι. μέμ-
 ψεις.
 φιλικός 155^a 28. 157^b 14. 158^a
 4. 10. 162^b 29. 167^a 22. 25.
 τὰ φιλικὰ 156^b 30. 162^a 16.
 166^a 1. 168^a 21. ^b 5 sq. 171^a
 2. φιλικὸν πλήθος 170^b 31.
 φιλικῶς 157^b 10. 166^b 26. 29.
 φιλιππος 99^a 9.
 φιλοδίκαιος 99^a 11.
 φιλοθέωρος 99^a 10.
 φιλοκόδομος 175^a 34.
 φιλόκαλος 99^a 13. 179^b 9.
 φιλοκλίνδυνος 124^b 7.
 φιλόκολαξ 159^a 14.
 Φιλοκτῆτης v. Θεοδέκτης et
 Σοφοκλῆς.
 φιλομαθία 117^b 29.
 φιλομαθής 175^a 14.
 φιλόμουνσος 175^a 34.
 φιλόμυνθος 117^b 34.
 φιλοπάτωρ 148^a 34.





[Φιλόξενος v. ὀψοφάγος.]

φιλοπότης 165^b 16.

φίλος v. φίλια.

φιλοσοφείν 105^b 13. 18. τὴν
πολιτικὴν 152^b 1.

φιλοσοφία 164^b 3. 177^a 25. ἄλλη
96^b 31. ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα
181^b 15 sq.

φιλότεκνος 168^a 25.

φιλότης 157^b 36. 159^b 2 sq.
168^b 8.

φιλοτιμία, φιλότιμος 107^b 24
sqq. 117^a 29. 125^b 1—25.
159^a 13.

φιλοτοιοῦτος 99^a 9.

φιλόφιλος 155^a 29. 159^a 34.

φιλοχρήματος 121^b 15.

φόβος 105^b 22 et v. αἰφνίδιοι.

Φοίνισσαι (Εὐριπίδους) 167^a 33.

φορᾶς εἶδη 174^a 29 sqq.

φορτικός 95^b 16. 124^b 22. 128^a
5. 178^b 16.

φρονεῖν 96^b 17. 142^a 3. 152^b
16. 166^a 19. 177^b 32.

φρόνησις 96^b 23. 98^b 24. 145^b
17 sqq. 146^a 4 sqq. 152^a 7 sqq.

^b 15 sq. 153^a 21. 27 sqq. 172^b
30. 178^a 16 sqq. 180^a 22. ^b 28.

τί ἐστι 140^a 24—^b 30. 141^b
8—142^a 30. 143^a 6 sqq. 26.

τί χρήσιμος 143^b 15—145^a 11.

φρόνιμος 95^b 28. 107^a 1. 140^a
25. 29. ^b 8. 141^a 26 sq. ^b 4.

9. 142^a 1. 7. ^b 31. 143^a 28.
33. ^b 12. 28. 144^a 27. 36. ^b 32.

145^b 17. 146^a 6. 8. 152^a 7 sqq.
^b 15. 153^a 27. = ἔλλογος

173^a 3.

φροντίζειν 121^b 1. 126^b 15. 27.

φυγή opp. αἵρεσις, ὄρεξις, δί-
ωξις, ἐπιθυμία 104^b 30 sq.
116^a 29. 139^a 22. 150^a 10.

φυλακή v. δαπάνη.
φυλακτικός 96^b 11. 120^b 15.
129^b 18.

φυλέτης 160^a 18. 165^a 30.

φυλετικάι φίλιαί 161^b 13.

φυσική ἀρετή, ἔξις, φίλια 144^b

3 sqq. 151^a 18 sq. 163^b 24.

φυσικὸν δίκαιον 134^b 18 sqq.

φυσικοὶ ἀκρατεῖς 152^a 30.

φυσικοὶ λόγοι 154^b 7.

φυσιολογοὶ 147^b 8.

φύσις, ἀνάγκη, τύχη, νοῦς 112^a

31 sqq. φύσει opp. νόμῳ 94^b

16. 133^a 30. τάξει 135^a 10.

ἔθει καὶ διδαχῇ 179^b 20 sq.

φυτικόν 102^a 32. ^b 29. cf. ψυ-
χῆς μόρια.

φυτόν 97^b 34. φυτῶν βίος 176^a

34 sq.

χαλεποί, χαλεπότης 126^a 26. 30.

130^a 18. 149^a 6. ^b 7.

χαλινοποιητικὴ 94^a 11.

χαμαιλέον 100^b 6.

χαρά 105^b 22.

χαρίεις 95^a 18. ^b 22. 102^a 21. 127^b

23. 31. 128^a 15. 31. ^b 1. 162^b 10.

Χαρίτων ἱερόν 133^a 3.

χαῦνος, χαυνότης 107^b 22 sq.

123^b 8 sq. 25 sq. 125^a 17 sqq.

χειροτέχνης 141^b 29.

χελιδών 98^a 18.

χορηγεῖν 122^b 22. κωμωδοῖς 123^a

23. κεχορηγημένος τοῖς ἐκτὸς

ἀγαθοῖς 101^a 15. 177^a 30. 179^a

11. ἡ ἐκτὸς χορηγία 178^a 24.

χρήματα τί λέγομεν 119^b 26 sqq.

χρηματίζεσθαι 163^b 8.

χρηματισμός 153^a 18.

χρηματιστής 96^a 5.

χρηματιστική 112^b 4.

χρῆσις mutui datio 131^a 4.

praeterea v. κτήσις.

χρονίζεσθαι 167^a 11.

χρώματα καὶ σχήματα 118^a 3 sq.

χυμός 118^a 28.

χωρίζειν 96^b 14. 121^b 19. 134^b

11. 144^b 33. 157^b 11. 159^a 5.

175^b 35. 178^a 22.

χωριστόν 96^b 33.

χωρισμός 175^a 20.

ψεκτός 108^a 16. 118^b 29. 126^b

7. 17. 127^a 29. 31. 138^a 32.

145^b 10. 146^a 4. 148^b 6. 175^b 29.

ψευδομαρτυρία 131^a 7.

ψεύστης 127^b 16.

ψηφίζεσθαι 152^a 20.

ψηφισμα 137^b 29. 32. 141^b 27.

151^b 16.

ψηφισματώδης 134^b 24.

ψιμύθιον 96^b 23.

ψόγος 100^b 22. 109^b 31. 110^a 33.

ψυχῆς μόρια τὸ λόγον ἔχον

(νοῦς, τὸ διανοητικόν 166^a

16 sq., νοῶν 166^a 22, κυριώ-

τατον 168^b 30 sq., ἡγούμε-

νον? 113^a 6) καὶ τὸ ἄλογον

(cf. 168^b 20 sq.), τοῦ ἀλόγον

τὸ θρεπτικόν (φυτικόν) καὶ

ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ ὅλως ὀρε-

κτικὸν λόγον πημετέχον 102^a

23—103^a 3. cf. 98^a 4 sq. 119^b

14 sq. 138^b 8 sq. 139^a 3 sq., τοῦ

λόγον ἔχοντος τὸ ἐπιστημο-

νικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν 139^a

6 sq. cf. 143^b 16 sq. 144^a 2.

ἡ δοξαστικόν 140^b 26. 144^b

14. τὸ ἡθικόν = τὸ ὀρεκτι-

κόν 144^b 15. τὸ σύνθετον

= τὸ ὀρεκτικόν 177^b 28. 178^a

20. βέλτιον μόριον = τὸ ἐπι-

στημονικόν 145^a 7 et fort. 3.

177^a 5 sq. τὸ ἄριστον, κρά-

τιστον, θεϊότατον, κύριον,

νοῦς = τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν

177^a 13 sq. b 30 sq. 178^a

1 sq. cf. νοῦς.

ψυχικός 98^b 15. 99^a 8. 101^b 34.

ψυχικαὶ ἡδοναί 117^b 29.

ὥχριαν 128^b 14.


APPENDIX.

Loci Ethicorum Nicomacheorum, qui in eodem opere citantur, sunt hi:

1096a, 5. ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις] 1177a, 12—1178a, 8. 1178a, 24—b, 32 || 1099a, 24. εἴπομεν] 1097b, 25—1098a, 17 || 32. εἴπομεν] v. n. ad 1098a, 20 || 1100b, 9. εἴπομεν] 1099a, 31 sq. || 34. εἴπομεν] v. 9—11 || 1102b, 26. εἴπομεν] v. 13 sq. || 1103b, 31. εἰρήκαμεν] 1103a, 31—b, 23 || 33. ὕστερον] 1144a, 11—1145a, 6 || 1104a, 2. κατ' ἀρχὰς] 1094b, 11—27 || b, 18. πρότερον] a, 27—b, 3 || 1105a, 17. λέγομεν] 1103a, 31—b, 25. [1103b, 31 sq.] cf. 1104a, 27—b, 3 || 1106a, 10. πρότερον] 1103a, 18 sq. || 24. ἤδη — εἰρήκαμεν] 1104a, 10—26 || 1107b, 15. ὕστερον] 1119b, 19—1122a, 18 || 21. ὕστερον] 1122a, 20 sq. || 24. λέγομεν] v. 17—19 || 1109b, 1. λέγομεν] a, 30 sq. || 1113a, 15. εἰρηται] 1111b, 26 sq. || 1113b, 12. ἦν] 1103a, 31—b, 23. [1103b, 31 sq.] 1105a, 17—b, 18. cf. 1104a, 27—b, 3, sed v. Addenda || 1115b, 25. ἐν τοῖς πρότερον] 1107b, 2 || 1117a, 16. ἦν] 1115b, 11—24 || b, 25. εἰρηται] [1104a, 22—24.] 33 sq.

b, 5 sqq. [1107b, 4 sqq.] 1109a, 14 sqq. || 1121a, 10 εἴρηται] 1119b, 27 sqq. || 31. εἴρηται] v. 15—19 || 1122a, 34. ὅστερον] 1123a, 19—33 || b, 1. ἐν ἀρχῇ et 24. εἴρηται] a, 24—27 || 34. τοιούτοις — 35. εἴρηται] v. 19—23 || 1123a, 21. εἴρηται] 1122a, 30—33 || 1125b, 1. εἴρηται] 1123a, 34—b, 22. [1107b, 26] || 2. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις] 1107b, 24 sqq. || 13. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις] 1107b, 32 sqq. || 1126a, 31. ἐν τοῖς πρότερον] 1109b, 14—26 || 1127a, 10. εἴρηται] 1126b, 14—16 || 1128b, 35. ἐν τοῖς ὅστερον] 1145a, 15—1152a, 36 || 1129b, 11. ἦν] a, 32 sqq. || 1130b, 28. ὅστερον] si b, 6—29 Eudemo tribuenda sunt, in deperditis ultimis Ethicorum Eudemiorum capitibus: certe quae in Nic. 1179b, 20—1181b, 12 leguntur non satis complent promissi summam, magis ad eam quadrant Pol. 1276b, 16 sqq. 1278b, 1 sqq. 1288a, 32 sqq. 1293b, 1 sqq. 1328b, 33 sqq. 1333a, 11 sqq. 1337a, 3 sqq. 11 sqq. 1310a, 12 sqq. cf. 1260b, 13 sqq. || 1132a, 17. ἦν] v. 14 sq. || λέγομεν] 1131a, 10—14 || 1133a, 26. πρότερον] v. 19 sqq. || 1134b, 6. πρότερον] 1130a, 3 sq. || 14. ἦν] v. 30 sq. 35 || 15. ἦσαν] v. 1 sqq. || 1135a, 23. πρότερον] 1111a, 22—24 vel potius E. E. 1223a, 23—1225b, 17. cf. inprimis 1224b, 13 sqq. 1225b, 1—10 || 1139a, 3. πρότερον] 1102a, 27 sqq. || 1140a, 21. εἴρηται] v. 9 sq. || 1142a, 24. εἴρηται] 1141b, 9—16 || 1144a, 31. εἴρηται] videtur hoc inter 1142b, 30 et 31 in lacuna periisse, cum neque v. 8. neque 20 sq. neque 24—26 satis respondeant || 1145a, 34. ὅστερον] 1148b, 19 sqq. || 35. πρότερον] 1103a, 17—1138b, 13 || 1146a, 8. πρότερον] 1140b, 4 sqq. 20 sq. 1141b, 9 sqq. 1142a, 23 sqq. 1144a, 29 sq. 1144b, 32—1145a, 2 || 1147b, 11. ἦν] a, 10—24 || 28. ἔθεμεν] 1118a, 23 sqq. || 1148a, 5. λέγομεν] 1117b, 27—1118b, 7 || 25. πρότερον] v. Prolegg. p. XVII. n. ** || 1149b, 27. κατ' ἀρχάς] 1148b, 15 sqq. || 1150a, 11. πρότερον] 1118a, 23 sqq. || 1150b, 29. ἐλέχθη] a, 21 sq. || 31. ἠπορήσαμεν] 1146a, 31—b, 2 || 1151a, 33. πρότερον] 1146a, 16—21 et 21—31, cf. 13—15 || 1152a, 8. δέδεικται] 1144a, 29—b, 1. 1144b, 30—1145a, 6 || 13. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] 1144a, 23—b, 4 || 1152b, 5. ἔθεμεν] 1104b, 8 sq. vel potius E. E. 1220a, 34. 1221b, 39 sq. 1222a, 10—17. b, 9 || 1155b, 16. ἔμπροσθεν] ut videtur, 1108b, 30 sqq., si spuria sunt verba 15. εἴρηται — 16. ἔμπροσθεν, sin genuina, loco deperdito || 1157b, 26. πολλάκις] 1156b, 7 sqq. 30 sqq. 1157a, 16—33 || 1158a, 33. εἴρηται] 1156b, 13 sqq. 1157a, 1—3 || b, 5. εἴρηται] 1157a, 3 sqq. || 1159a, 9. εἴρηται] 1155b, 31 || b, 25. ἐν ἀρχῇ] 1155b, 22 sqq., quamquam haud plane eadem ibi leguntur || 1161b, 11. εἴρηται] vel 1159b, 31 sq. vel si πάση recte ci. Rr. (v. Addenda), 1159b, 29 || 1162a, 34. ἐν ἀρχῇ] 1156a, 6 sqq. || 1163b, 12. εἴρηται] 1159a, 35—b, 2, cf. 1158b, 27 sq. 1162b, 4 || 33. εἴρηται] v. 12 locisque ibi ci-


tatis || 1164a, 12. εἴρηται] 1163a, 21 sqq. cf. 1157a, 10 sqq., at prorsus eadem ne ibi quidem dicta sunt || 35. εἴρηται] 1162b, 6—12 || 1165a, 2. εἴρηται] 1164b, 30 sqq. || 12. πολλάκις] 1094b, 11—27. 1098a, 26 sqq. 1103b, 34 sqq. cf. 1109b, 14—26. 1126a, 31—b, 9 || b, 6. ἐν ἀρχῇ] 1157a, 3 sqq. 1158b, 4 sq. 1162b, 23 sqq., quamquam similia tantum, non penitus eadem his locis inveniuntur || 1165b, 16. εἴρηται] 1156b, 20 sqq. 34 sq. 1157b, 36. 1158b, 28. 1159b, 2 sqq. || 30. ἦν et 31. εἴρηται] 1157b, 17—24. || 1166a, 12. εἴρηται] 1113a, 32 sq. || 34. ἀφελσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος] cf. 1168a, 28—1169b, 2 || b, 32. πρότερον] 1155b, 34 sqq. || 1168b, 5. εἴρηται] 1166a, 1—34 || 1169b, 29. ἐν ἀρχῇ] 1098a, 5 sqq. 15 sq. b, 31 sqq. || 32. ἐν ἀρχῇ] 1099b, 10 sqq. || 1170a, 15. εἴρηται] 1113a, 22—33 || 25. τοῖς ἐχομένοις] 1172a, 16—1176a, 29: vix certum aliquem huius dissertationis locum respicit interpolator || 1175b, 22. εἴρηται] v. 1 sqq. || 1176a, 32. τίθεμεν] cf. 1094a, 18—22 cum 1095a, 15 sqq. || τὰ προειρημένα] 1097b, 22—1102a, 4 || 33. εἵπομεν] 1098b, 31 sqq. cf. 1095b, 31 sqq. 1100a, 8 sq. b, 28—30. 1102b, 3 sqq. || 1176b, 2. ἐν τοῖς πρότερον] 1098a, 5 sqq. || 25. πολλάκις] 1113a, 32 sq. 1170a, 14 sqq. 1176a, 15 sqq. cf. 1166a, 12 sq. || 1177a, 11. πρότερον] 1176a, 35—b, 9 || 18. εἴρηται] v. n. ad h. l. || 19. τοῖς πρότερον] 1098b, 17 sq. 1099a, 29 sqq. 1102b, 13 sq. 1103a, 1 sqq. 1139a, 6 sqq. 1140b, 25 sqq. 1141a, 16 sqq. 21 sqq. 1143b, 33 sqq. 1144a, 1 sqq. 1145a, 6 sqq. 1173b, 16 sqq. 1174b, 20 sqq. 1175b, 36 sqq. 1176b, 25 sqq. || 1178a, 4. πρότερον] nisi fallor, 1168b, 31 sqq., ut λεχθὲν illud ad ultima tantum verba v. 7. εἵπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος spectet || 1180a, 14. εἴρηται] 1179b, 31—1180a, 5 b, 22. εἴρηται] v. 15 sq.











**University of Toronto
Library**

**DO NOT
REMOVE
THE
CARD
FROM
THIS
POCKET**

**Acme Library Card Pocket
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File"
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU**

